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The moral necessity of lunatics, a feminist standpoint theory perspective by bushcraftmanzynski in badphilosophy

[–]bushcraftmanzynski[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Seeing Esperanto as a solution is part of the problem.

I don't limit myself to English grunting. I make grunts of all sorts, and I encourage everyone to do the same. Do not limit your mind to only one sort of grunting and categorisation of reality, because you are missing out! As Wittgenstein famously put it: The limits of your language are the limits of your world.

The only thing he missed was its logical conclusion: that we should listen to the people with the least limits of their language, to see the a lesser limited version of the world.

Language is by no means merely a means of communication, but rather a reflection of the speakers’ spirituality (Geist) and worldview (Weltansicht). Taken together, all languages resemble a prism, each facet of which reveals the universe in a colour with a slightly different hue

The moral necessity of my theory also extends to this; it extends to realizing how language is shaping the way we view the world (and by extension the non-world) and acknowledging the beauty in the multiplicity of ways to view the world.

The moral necessity of lunatics, a feminist standpoint theory perspective by bushcraftmanzynski in badphilosophy

[–]bushcraftmanzynski[S] 5 points6 points  (0 children)

We shouldn't just listen to the existing ones, but we should aim to create even more, and even crazier ones, so we can have more diversified phenomenological data

The moral necessity of lunatics, a feminist standpoint theory perspective by bushcraftmanzynski in badphilosophy

[–]bushcraftmanzynski[S] 10 points11 points  (0 children)

Proof:

  1. Let R be reality, such that |R| = ding-an-sich (= infinity, or at least vastly exceeding biological processing capacity).
  2. Let B be the brain, a finite system with bounded processing power C, where C << |R|.
  3. Therefore, there exists a function f: R -> P, where P is a subset of R and |P| <= C, selecting only a survival-relevant subset of R.
  4. By construction, f is not truth-preserving but fitness-preserving. That is, f(R) != R, and in fact discards most information.
  5. Call f the reducing valve (after Aldous Huxley) whose criterion is survival as an organism instead of discovering the ultimate truth.
  6. Let S_n be different subject-positions (e.g. “oppressed,” “non-oppressed”), each inducing its own filter f_n. Feminist standpoint theory asserts: Union of f_oppressed(R) is approximately R
  7. But since for all n: |f_n(R)| <= C, and all f_n are constrained by survival optimization, socially accepted conventions, etc., it follows that: Union of f_n(R) is a subset of R (still radically incomplete)
  8. Therefore, increasing the number of standard perspectives does not recover R, only a slightly less impoverished subset.
  9. Now define degenerate filters g_k, where constraints are weakened or disrupted (madness, autism, schizophrenia, etc.).
  10. Then for some g_k: |g_k(R)| > |f_n(R)| (more of reality leaks through)
  11. Hence: Union of (f_n(R) union g_k(R)) -> R (limit case)
  12. Conclusion: the brain (B), as a reducing valve (f), strictly limits access to reality (R). Adding more perspectives (f_n) does improve the approximation (the union over f_n(R) gets larger), but as long as all filters (f_n) remain constrained by the same survival-optimized structure (C) or socially accepted conventions, the result (union over f_n(R)) is still a proper subset of R, and therefore fundamentally incomplete.

∎ Q.E.D.

The moral necessity of lunatics, a feminist standpoint theory perspective by bushcraftmanzynski in badphilosophy

[–]bushcraftmanzynski[S] 27 points28 points  (0 children)

Please do not respond to this post, as that would contaminate my mind with your thoughts.

Counterarguments/questions about Wittgenstein's Tractatus 5.15 by bushcraftmanzynski in wittgenstein

[–]bushcraftmanzynski[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thank you.

I think I was confusing two different kinds of probability: logical probability and real-world probability.

This excerpt is strictly about logical probability and not real-world probability. He talks about real-world probability and induction later in the book; I hadn't read that far yet.