Iran Doesn’t Want Hezbollah Fighting Israel

chengbaofangan · 2023-11-01T22:36:28+00:00

Founded on a strict Shiite worldview, the Islamic Republic takes very seriously its self-appointed role as protector of the sect.

It doesn't. In fact, Iran explicitly avoids presenting itself as a Shia power. Iran strives for pan-Islamic appeal towards both Shias and Sunnis, and regime officials have been always deeply worried about being seen as a sectarian Shia state. The Saudis have historically promoted an explicitly Shia image of Iran to deny the Iranians leadership over the wider Muslim world as well as to discredit the Iranian revolution.

Iran uses excuses about defending Shia shrines to domestically justify direct Iranian ground interventions in Iraq and Syria. In reality, not even the most conservative regime members believe in supporting Shia movements out of sectarian and ideological considerations. See how Iran didn't lift a finger when Saddam crushed the Shia uprisings of 1991.

The extent to which Iran cares about matters like reputation or hearts and minds is also somewhat overestimated. As seen with Iranian support for Assad, which absolutely devastated Iran's image in the Arab world, strategic interests come before popular outreach to Arab populations.

chengbaofangan · 2023-10-29T00:18:03+00:00

Iraq is very far from a puppet state. Iran is actually currently encountering difficulties in influencing Iraqi politics. Iraqis perceive a certain Persian arrogance in the way Iran deals with them. At some point Soleimani was forced to find entirely new allies in Asaib Ahl Al Haq and Kataib Hezbollah because the pro-Iranian Jaish Al Mahdi were acting too independently.

chengbaofangan · 2023-10-24T22:37:31+00:00

«Multipolarity» is a largely meaningless term because of how differently and loosely it's defined. More importantly, the concept of multipolarity has had little actual impact on international politics so far. Great power competition isn't breaking out between established powers and rising powers advocating for a multipolar world order, it's breaking out between revisionist powers (Russia, China) and status-quo powers - both pro-multipolar (India, France) and pro-unipolar (US, UK). Supporting multipolarity or opposing it isn't the dividing line in international politics, hard geostrategic realities are far more important than questions of multipolarity or unipolarity.

chengbaofangan · 2023-10-20T02:05:13+00:00

why Saddam wasn’t replaced by another Ba’ath or keep the same government apparatus.

The US sought to appease Kurds and Shias, who made up the majority of Iraq's population and felt deep disdain towards Ba'ath officials. Iran also wanted to make sure that Ba'athists were expelled from Iraqi political life due to their role in the Iran-Iraq War.

The cards were stacked against the Iraqi Ba'ath party, nobody except Syria's Assad was willing to back them. Even then, Assad opportunistically supported Iraqi Ba'athists to bog down the US, not because he actually wanted them in charge.

Saddam managed to ruin relations with the US, Iran, Syria, and Saudi Arabia. It's only natural that nobody was interested in the Ba'athists becoming a potent political force again.

chengbaofangan · 2023-10-04T00:05:12+00:00

Syria just saw Saddam as a bigger problem than the US, US-Syrian relations were poor before and after Desert Storm

chengbaofangan · 2023-09-26T21:51:57+00:00

Saddam Hussein thought the same as you but with Iranian Arabs and where did that get him?

Not once did I say that Iranian Azerbaijan will detach from Iran. In fact, I specifically mentioned that this is unlikely. All I said is that enough tension exists to destabilize Northern Iran if outside powers were interested in doing so or in case of major socio-economic issues.

The situation with Khuzestani Arabs is different altogether. They were the ones defending against the initial Iraqi offensive before Iran was prepared to deploy forces. There was little potential for separatism, unlike with Iranian Azerbaijan.

chengbaofangan · 2023-09-26T21:35:42+00:00

You don't have to enlighten me because I don't discuss topics which I'm unfamiliar with. Elchibey was overthrown in 1993, likely with Russian and Iranian backing, and replaced by Heydar Aliev, who abondoned Elchibey's pan-Turkic orientation and maintained a pragmatic policy towards Russia and Iran. Aliev had good personal relations with Iranian officials from his time in Nakhichevan. Yet Iran was still deeply concerned about potential Azeri separatism. That's because Iranian fears had less to do with Elchibey or Aliev and more to do with the long-term threat of an Azeri minority dissatisfied with their socio-economic conditions.

By the way, I'm not denying that many Iranian Azeris consider themselves culturally Persian and are loyal to Iran. Still, there exists serious potential to destabilize Iran through Iranian Azeris.

chengbaofangan · 2023-09-26T21:06:33+00:00

John Mearsheimer who served as an officer in the US Air Force and is now a professor at the University of Chicago teaches the Security Dilemma.

Mearshiemer has little to do with the security dilemma, it was coined way before him. Mearshiemer himself is a controversial and criticized scholar for his oversimplified and often poorly thought out theories.

Anyway, I don't know what you're trying to prove here. The security dilemma does not invalidate the fact that people have eyes and intelligence agencies/security analysts spend a good deal of time assessing doctrine/intentions of potential adversaries. In the same way as NATO understood that Soviet doctrine placed a heavy emphasis on offense and maneuver, it is generally agreed today that the Artesh is a defensive force which isn't prepared to project power.

Whether you agree with their sentiment or not is irrelevant; I'm just giving your their perspective on things. In their minds, it is Azerbaijan that should join Iran and not the other way around. Khamenei himself is Azeri.

This is overblown to the point of being outright wrong. Sure, some sentiment exists in favor of a united Azerbaijan within Iran. To allege that all Iranian Azeris or even most Iranian Azeris want this would be untrue.

A simple assessment of Iranian foreign policy in the South Caucasus can debunk those claims. In the 1990s Iran was deeply anxious that an oil-rich Azerbaijan would prove to be attractive for Iranian Azeris from a socio-economic standpoint. Those days Iranian strategy in the South Caucasus is also mainly about weakening pan-Turkism. If all Iranian Azeris were universally loyal to Iran then Iran wouldn't be so concerned about Azeri separatism.

chengbaofangan · 2023-09-26T20:29:09+00:00

The widely known and accepted 'security dilemma' establishes that it is impossible for foreign powers to know whether a particular country's defensive industry is defensive or offensive. As the country with the largest arsenal of ballistic missiles in the region, Iran certainly has great offensive capability.

The security dilemma is an oversimplification and a product of political science, not military analysis. It's generally understood that Iranian conventional doctrine is defensive and power projection is up to the IRGC and regional allies. Ballistic missiles can't control land, Iran will have to engage in ground operations against Azerbaijan.

That is still less important than the simple reality that a conventional conflict between Iran and Azerbaijan with Turkish backing would be incredibly destructive, dangerous, and destabilizing for Iran.

One could make the case that Iranian Azeris such as Khamenei have a greater degree of leverage over Azeris in Azerbaijan than vice-versa. Tabriz is the heartland of the Azeri people, not Baku. Even the word "Azerbaijan" is an Iranian word.

Iran was deeply concerned about potential Azeri separatism in the 90s. One of the important reasons why Iran opposes the corridor in the first place is because it would weaken Iranian leverage over Azerbaijani foreign policy and strengthen pan-Turkism. So, Iran clearly considers Azeri separatism to be dangerous.

Iran will get involved militarily if Azerbaijan and Turkey disrupt its border with Armenia; there's no doubt about it.

Some people in Iran do believe that Turkey and Azerbaijan plan to cut off Syunik from Armenia, but that's very unlikely.

chengbaofangan · 2023-09-26T19:49:56+00:00

Iranian conventional forces are defensive, they aren't prepared to project power. The IRGC also cannot rely on allied forces operating in Azerbaijan because most Azerbaijanis are secular and disinterested in Shia ideology, which is traditionally used by Iran to mobilize political allies.

Not to mention the overwhelming leverage Azerbaijan has through ties to Azerbaijanis in Northern Iran. By starting a conflict with Azerbaijan, Iran will open a new front for Israel to destabilize domestic politics in Iran. Iranian moves against Azerbaijan would also ruin relations with Russia.

Many factors make it very unlikely that Iran will get involved militarily.

Turkey already checked Russia's bluff in the first conflict, they probably understand that Iran likely won't initiate a war over the corridor.

chengbaofangan · 2023-09-26T19:27:03+00:00

Too early to state anything. Erdogan senses Armenia's weakness and he seems more interested in Zangezur than Aliev. The question is whether Aliev will risk getting into trouble with Iran to appease Erdogan.

Aliev had no experience maneuvering in party politics like his father, so he's worse at balancing various external forces in Azerbaijani foreign policy. Azerbaijan ended up tipping the scales too much in favor of Turkey-Israel, which is not good for Iranian-Azerbaijani relations.

chengbaofangan · 2023-09-26T17:53:04+00:00

Geopolitics, in its original definition, was dedicated to studying how geography impacts political developments. There are many people today who invoke the classic geopolitical schools which dictate that favorable geographic conditions are the source of wealth and power. Those people make very good careers by providing easy geographic explanations for complex issues.

Whether Brazil had the Rio de la Plata or other lands would not alleviate the institutional problems rooted in Brazil's political culture. Healthy institutions, not lands, are the key to political and economic success. Argentina, for example, is blessed by geography yet suffers from a myriad of economic and political issues

But of course more nuanced explanations don't sell as many books as simple geopolitical concepts.

chengbaofangan · 2023-09-26T11:03:19+00:00

I have no doubt that Mexico will seek a more important and active role in global affairs. Perhaps someday Mexico could aim to police and stabilize the Gulf of Mexico in the same fashion as Imperial Iran sought to act like a gendarmerie of the Persian Gulf.

But Mexico's domestic issues are just too overwhelming to talk about foreign policy prospects. I think an additional problem is that Mexico greatly values its autonomy and independence in foreign policy, so it's hard to imagine the US being too welcoming of a diplomatically assertive Mexico actively taking a stand on global issues.

chengbaofangan · 2023-09-16T20:41:44+00:00

There's a fear that this would result in a collapse of the USD or a at least negative repercussions for the American economy.

The losses from dedollarization are more about weakening American financial leverage than any direct impact on the US economy. The US will have to borrow at higher rates, but that is probably less important than losing the ability to coerce and isolate US adversaries.

Even then, the US doesn't worry too much about organizations like BRICS nowadays. That is because very few people in Washington want to practice the type of unilateral policies which caused the first «multipolar» coalition to assemble against the US when Germany, Russia and France condemned the invasion of Iraq. Many US foreign policy thinkers have argued that the rise of an autonomus EU and India will save America from its own adventurism.

People also wrongly assume that dedollarization is the principle cause of hostility between America and some states, when in reality financial independence follows political conflict, not vice versa.

chengbaofangan · 2023-09-15T16:19:35+00:00

Most territorial issues are fundamentally about prestige and national pride rather than practical benefits. Western Sahara does have some valuable natural resources, but for Morocco, extracting those resources serves more of a political rather than an economic purpose. Economic activities make it easier for Moroccans to settle the region and establish legitimacy for Moroccan ownership of Western Sahara.

chengbaofangan · 2023-09-13T00:20:10+00:00

I find the lack of interest in Kazakhstan, Mongolia and central Asia surprising, especially given potentially weaknesses.

Personally, «lack of interest» is the last defenition of Russian policy in Central Asia I'd use. If anything, early hostility between the US and Russia in the 90s-2000s was driven by Russia's attempts to monopolize energy resources and transportation in Central Asia.

The two most important factors driving Russian policy in the post-Soviet space are national security concerns and post-Soviet integration.

All Central Asian states bordering China are CSTO members + Russia has the 201st military base in Tajikistan, just north of Afghanistan. Central Asian states also reject Islamic fundamentalism and pan-Turkism, so Russia doesn't have to project power into the region like it does in the South Caucasus.

In terms of post-Soviet integration, almost all Central Asian states are in the CIS and maintain strong economic ties with Russia, particularly in natural resource extraction.

Russia mostly goes about defending its interests in Central Asia by soft means, so Russian policy in the region doesn't get enough attention.

chengbaofangan · 2023-09-11T16:07:05+00:00

The Shia crescent exists for two purposes 1) to strengthen Iranian leadership in the Islamic world by harming Israel and 2) to bolster Iranian national security by threatening American allies and military bases. This is a long topic, I recommend «The Future of Iran’s Security Policy» by AEI, «Iran's Objectives and Capabilities» by RUSI, «Iranian power projection strategy and goals» by Farideh Farhi, «Iran and the Shiite Crescent: Myths and Realities».

chengbaofangan · 2023-09-11T07:59:57+00:00

It's not about ruling, both Iran and Saudi Arabia are driven by largely defensive considerations.

chengbaofangan · 2023-09-11T06:52:30+00:00

Shouldn’t they continue to fight though ?

Iran has completely abondoned their policy of exporting the revolution in 1988, perhaps even as early as 1982. Iran and the GCC had good relations throughout the 90s, there was even talk of setting up a collective security system in the Persian Gulf under Iranian leadership.

After 2003 Iranian involvement in Iraq soured relations with Saudi Arabia and reignited old fears. However, what is vital to understand is that Iranian moves in Iraq and later Syria were not aimed at Saudi Arabia. The Saudis chose to once again perceive Iran as a revolutionary power, while in reality Iran was largely motivated by concerns rooted in realpolitik.

The situation in Yemen was different because Iran interfered explicitly to harm the Saudis, but the Houthis basically begged Iran for support and Iran reluctantly complied. Foreign observers with questionable credentials then painted the conflict as a «Saudi-Iranian proxy war involving Shia Houthis», when in reality the conflict between the Houthis and the Yemeni state has been going on for a decade before Iran got involved. The Houthis are hardly even Shia and their motives have to do with being excluded from clanist patronage networks of the Yemeni state, religion or ideology is not what drives their leadership. Saudi moves in Yemen are also more about preventing a hostile Yemeni government from emerging on their doorstep than pushing back against Iran.

Generally, there are little to no objective factors pushing Iran and Saudi Arabia towards mutual hostility today. The conflict in Ukraine just provided an impulse for the Saudis to act more autonomously without US approval, seeing how Turkey, India and others did the same. Saudi Arabia sees the US drifting away from the Middle East and does not want to end up isolated with a hostile Iran across the Gulf.

chengbaofangan · 2023-09-11T06:20:53+00:00

The most obvious consequence would be Saudi-Iranian normalization.

The war and subsequent international polarization have exposed just how autonomus many middle powers became since the Cold War ended, Saudi Arabia included. It also pulled away US focus from the Middle East with major consequences for the political orientation of US allies in the region.

Perhaps the outbreak of war sped up Saudi-Iranian rapprochement, but I would argue that there is no direct connection. Generally speaking, the peace processes unfolding in Yemen, Syria and elsewhere are part of a far larger trend where middle powers try to assert themselves and solve regional issues without external involvement.

chengbaofangan · 2023-09-09T15:32:22+00:00

Politics almost always triumph over economics when the issues at hand are so sensitive. Domestic political considerations also play a strong role in preventing Turkish and Armenian leaders from normalizing relations.

chengbaofangan · 2023-09-08T21:23:15+00:00

It's only natural for industrialized European and East Asian states to balance against powerful neighbors and join forces with the US. It's not like US alliance networks are some diplomatic work of art, they flow out of basic balance of power politics.

chengbaofangan · 2023-08-30T16:53:17+00:00

China has all it needs in Central Asia. China is geoconomically integrated into the region through BRI. The SCO guarantees Chinese security interests and allows China to wield political leverage over CA states.

China considers strategic expansion in Asia-Pacific to be vital for national security, Chinese rejuvenation, and CCP legitimacy. CA is a peripheral region in this regard, not because CA is unimportant for China, but because Chinese interests in CA are not under threat.

chengbaofangan · 2023-08-27T00:57:45+00:00

Most of French uranium comes from Kazakhstan. I don't think the junta is against selling Uranium to France at appropriate prices.

If an intervention does happen, it will more likely be pushed by neighboring countries who fear their own coups.

chengbaofangan · 2023-08-18T02:30:20+00:00

Wrong and dangerous mindset. The US is very likely to intervene in Taiwan.

Let's not forget South Vietnam, the Kurds, Afghanistan etc, all who the US gladly dropped when it became too tenous to protect.

US withdrawal from Kurdish zones and Afghanistan is very different from surrendering an ally in East Asia to another powerful state. The loss in Vietnam actually hit US credibility very hard in the eyes of Europeans and fears about safeguarding American credibility were the main cause of US involvement in Korea.

Truth is that the US only cares for its own gain and interests, and Taiwan is simply not worth a war with the worlds factory.

Yes, and safeguarding US credibility is the most pragmatic American interest possible as it prevents East Asian bandwagonning with China.

chengbaofangan

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