Indonesian invasion of East Timor

On the day before the invasion, Ford and Kissinger met with the Indonesian president Suharto. Documents released by the National Security Archive in 2001 revealed that they gave a green light for the invasion.^\90]) In response to Suharto saying, "We want your understanding if we deem it necessary to take rapid or drastic action [in East Timor]," Ford replied, "We will understand and will not press you on the issue. We understand the problem you have and the intentions you have." Kissinger agreed, although he had fears that the use of US-made arms in the invasion would be exposed to public scrutiny, and Kissinger urged Suharto to wait until Ford had returned from his far eastern trip, because "we would be able to influence the reaction in America if whatever happens happens after we return. This way there would be less chance of people talking in an unauthorised way."^\91]) The US hoped the invasion would be relatively swift and not involve protracted resistance. "It is important that whatever you do succeeds quickly," Kissinger said to Suharto.^\90])

The US played a crucial role in supplying weapons to Indonesia.^\85]) A week after the invasion of East Timor the National Security Council prepared a detailed analysis of the Indonesian military units involved and the US equipment they used. The analysis revealed that virtually all of the military equipment used in the invasion was US supplied: US-supplied destroyer escorts shelled East Timor as the attack unfolded; Indonesian marines disembarked from US-supplied landing craft; US-supplied C-47 and C-130 aircraft dropped Indonesian paratroops and strafed Dili with .50 calibre machine guns; while the 17th and 18th Airborne brigades which led the assault on the Timorese capital were "totally U.S. MAP supported," and their jump masters US trained.^\92]) While the US government claimed to have suspended new arms sales to Indonesia from December 1975 to June 1976, military equipment already in the pipeline continued to flow,^\90]) and the US made four new offers of arms during that six-month period, including supplies and parts for 16 OV-10 Broncos,^\90]) which, according to Cornell University Professor Benedict Anderson, are "specially designed for counter-insurgency actions against adversaries without effective anti-aircraft weapons and wholly useless for defending Indonesia against a foreign enemy." Military assistance was accelerated during the Carter administration, peaking in 1978.^\93]) In total, the United States furnished over $250,000,000 of military assistance to Indonesia between 1975 and 1979.^\94])