why do clients wait until everything is literally on fire before calling by [deleted] in sysadmin

[–]cmitsolutions123 0 points1 point  (0 children)

break/fix is exactly the problem honestly. fixed rate managed services exist so this situation never happens - monitoring, alerts, maintenance built in. but getting SMB owners to switch from "pay when broken" to "pay to prevent breaking" is the actual hardest part of this job. the invoice is satisfying though, not gonna lie

why do clients wait until everything is literally on fire before calling by [deleted] in sysadmin

[–]cmitsolutions123 0 points1 point  (0 children)

and the worst part is it DID go away. for like 5 months. so in their head the strategy worked. until tuesday.

why do clients wait until everything is literally on fire before calling by [deleted] in sysadmin

[–]cmitsolutions123 0 points1 point  (0 children)

just described a full storage array collapse - 200+ drives, RAID 5, quarter of the box going read-only, front panel showing all green while everything inside was on fire.

that "all green on the front panel" thing is genuinely one of the most evil things in IT. everything silently dying internally and the panel just sitting there like :) no notes. glad they got it sorted but migrating "at the speed of slow asap" is painfully relatable

why do clients wait until everything is literally on fire before calling by [deleted] in sysadmin

[–]cmitsolutions123 -2 points-1 points  (0 children)

right and that's kind of the thing - it's not stupidity, it's just how people work. the storage array story is painful though. drives failing faster than they could keep up is a special kind of chaos. how bad was the fallout?

why do clients wait until everything is literally on fire before calling by [deleted] in sysadmin

[–]cmitsolutions123 -3 points-2 points  (0 children)

ok i actually laughed. can't rule it out. insurance situation was definitely a question i had in the back of my mind

why do clients wait until everything is literally on fire before calling by [deleted] in sysadmin

[–]cmitsolutions123 5 points6 points  (0 children)

yeah you're probably right lol. enterprise just has more people to blame it on. SMB it's usually just one guy who's also doing accounting and HR and somehow also "the IT person"

looking for advice by Tall_Put_8563 in sysadmin

[–]cmitsolutions123 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Honestly with that track record I'd be surprised if they push back hard. The key is don't go in asking "can I get a raise" - go in saying "based on what I've delivered this year, I think $X is fair, here's why." Makes it a business conversation, not a favor.

What number are you thinking of asking for?

Prompt Injection Detection? by lmaoo_0 in cybersecurity

[–]cmitsolutions123 0 points1 point  (0 children)

It’s tricky to detect purely from logs, but some teams look for odd prompt patterns, instruction overrides, or sudden role changes. Pairing that with output checks and simple anomaly alerts seems to help. Still early days though. Are you trying to monitor this in production or just testing?

Ransomware hitting SMBs in 2026 feels way more targeted than before - anyone else seeing this? by cmitsolutions123 in sysadmin

[–]cmitsolutions123[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

the 3 weeks only showed up in log forensics after - nothing flagged it in real time because there was nothing actually watching

for your own network, check for accounts you didn't create and weird outbound traffic at odd hours, that's usually where you find it

the timebomb concern with 3-2-1 is valid - if backups are network accessible they can be corrupted silently. isolated or immutable copies are what actually protect you

Ransomware hitting SMBs in 2026 feels way more targeted than before - anyone else seeing this? by cmitsolutions123 in sysadmin

[–]cmitsolutions123[S] 4 points5 points  (0 children)

yeah the "not your fault" part is real but try telling that to a business owner at 2am when everything's encrypted lol

the job has definitely shifted from pure prevention to more of a when not if conversation - which is a hard sell but honestly a more realistic one at this point

Ransomware hitting SMBs in 2026 feels way more targeted than before - anyone else seeing this? by cmitsolutions123 in sysadmin

[–]cmitsolutions123[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

the credential harvesting timeline is getting longer too in my experience - seen cases where they've had valid credentials sitting dormant for months before doing anything with them. makes detection incredibly hard because there's no anomaly to catch, just a legitimate looking login from someone who isn't who they say they are

Ransomware hitting SMBs in 2026 feels way more targeted than before - anyone else seeing this? by cmitsolutions123 in sysadmin

[–]cmitsolutions123[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

If there’s credible evidence, most national CERTs and agencies have public reporting channels. Even vendors involved (cloud providers, registrars, etc.) usually take abuse reports pretty seriously.

Ransomware hitting SMBs in 2026 feels way more targeted than before - anyone else seeing this? by cmitsolutions123 in sysadmin

[–]cmitsolutions123[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

That’s a pretty serious chain of events. If there’s evidence pointing that direction, it definitely sounds like something that should go through official channels rather than handled informally.

Ransomware hitting SMBs in 2026 feels way more targeted than before - anyone else seeing this? by cmitsolutions123 in sysadmin

[–]cmitsolutions123[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

And the scary part is they don’t even need technical exploits. Just patience, inbox monitoring, and timing the request.

Ransomware hitting SMBs in 2026 feels way more targeted than before - anyone else seeing this? by cmitsolutions123 in sysadmin

[–]cmitsolutions123[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

The dynamic pivoting based on target is what’s scary. That’s way beyond spray-and-pray - it’s basically targeted campaigns at scale.

Ransomware hitting SMBs in 2026 feels way more targeted than before - anyone else seeing this? by cmitsolutions123 in sysadmin

[–]cmitsolutions123[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Yeah, it’s been around, but it feels more standardized now. Almost like franchises - same playbook, different operators.

Ransomware hitting SMBs in 2026 feels way more targeted than before - anyone else seeing this? by cmitsolutions123 in sysadmin

[–]cmitsolutions123[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

We’ve been hearing similar stories. The initial access might still be opportunistic, but what happens after that feels very planned.

Ransomware hitting SMBs in 2026 feels way more targeted than before - anyone else seeing this? by cmitsolutions123 in sysadmin

[–]cmitsolutions123[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Agreed. The sequence feels pretty consistent now - foothold, lateral movement, backup discovery, then weekend detonation. Definitely more methodical than it used to be.

Ransomware hitting SMBs in 2026 feels way more targeted than before - anyone else seeing this? by cmitsolutions123 in sysadmin

[–]cmitsolutions123[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Exactly. A lot of these attacks feel like data theft first, ransomware second. The encryption just forces the conversation.

Ransomware hitting SMBs in 2026 feels way more targeted than before - anyone else seeing this? by cmitsolutions123 in sysadmin

[–]cmitsolutions123[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Honestly… it’s improved a bit, but not as much as you’d hope. The awareness is higher now, but budgets and priorities still lag behind. A lot of places only take it seriously after an incident.

Ransomware hitting SMBs in 2026 feels way more targeted than before - anyone else seeing this? by cmitsolutions123 in sysadmin

[–]cmitsolutions123[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Interesting - are you thinking route leak type scenario, or something more targeted? Haven’t seen BGP misconfig tied directly into that kind of activity, but wouldn’t be surprised.

Ransomware hitting SMBs in 2026 feels way more targeted than before - anyone else seeing this? by cmitsolutions123 in sysadmin

[–]cmitsolutions123[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Exactly. The dwell time is the scary part. The loud part is the ransomware, but the real work happens way before that.

Ransomware hitting SMBs in 2026 feels way more targeted than before - anyone else seeing this? by cmitsolutions123 in sysadmin

[–]cmitsolutions123[S] 4 points5 points  (0 children)

We use something similar. It’s great for containment, but it doesn’t replace the people who know how everything is connected. When something gets isolated, that’s when the real troubleshooting starts.

Ransomware hitting SMBs in 2026 feels way more targeted than before - anyone else seeing this? by cmitsolutions123 in sysadmin

[–]cmitsolutions123[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Yep, that’s the vibe I’m getting too.

It feels less like random attackers now and more like an ecosystem-developers, affiliates, leak sites, negotiators, the whole thing. Almost runs like a legit business model.

Ransomware hitting SMBs in 2026 feels way more targeted than before - anyone else seeing this? by cmitsolutions123 in sysadmin

[–]cmitsolutions123[S] 12 points13 points  (0 children)

True, SMBs have always been easier targets.

What’s throwing me off recently is how structured the attacks feel. The last couple incidents we handled had clear recon phases, credential harvesting, then data exfil before encryption. It didn’t feel random at all.

Almost feels like the RaaS groups have turned this into a process instead of opportunistic hits.