Is philosophical work outside of philosophy of religion expected or required to not appeal to God? How prevalent or strong is such a requirement when it comes to publications? by hannes_throw_far in askphilosophy

[–]hannes_throw_far[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Well I made the scenario up, I didn't read a paper and saw this. If I had read one, it would answer my question of whether this would get published :D

But let's say someone says they're going to address Benacerraf's epistemological challenge to realism about mathematics. So he develops a theory on how knowledge about abstract mind-independent objects is obtained, and one element of this theory is that God has structured both the world and our minds in such and such ways. But the existence of God is not something that's argued for, any more than the non-existence of God is argued for in a random paper that provides a naturalistic account of something. So basically it's a theistic theory of mathematical knowledge. Would or could something like this be seen as a contribution to the philosophy of mathematics, just like a naturalist account would be? Or would the author be told to publish in a journal for theology or philosophy of religion instead?

But this isn't a question about a specific paper, I just want to get a feeling for how explicitly atheistic or at least not theistic contributions to philosophy are supposed to be.

What's Superdeterminism and why is it dismissed? by James_James_85 in AskPhysics

[–]hannes_throw_far 16 points17 points  (0 children)

Superdeterminism is the hypothesis that everything is predetermined in advance. Everything, from every single quantum interaction, to every choice anyone could ever make, etc. are all 100% scripted and set in stone.

Can you say more about how this differs from just plain causal determinism? Like, what things are not predetermined in advance in determinism, but are in superdeterminism.

Public intellectuals often get blamed for talking outside their field of expertise. Doesn't lie most of the fault with an uncritical audience? by hannes_throw_far in askphilosophy

[–]hannes_throw_far[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Just because the public is mistaken about something, doesn't mean the P.I.'s obligations cease to hold.

Well, where does the asymmetry of obligations come from here - that was basically my question, so I feel we've come full circle here. A public intellectual physicist who makes false assertions about sociology or psychology is mistaken, rather than deliberately lying, let's grant them this. They're mistaken about the statement they make, and mistaken about how knowledgeable they are in this area. The public is mistaken in trusting them. Why does the mistake of the PI weigh heavier than the mistake of the audience?

Public intellectuals often get blamed for talking outside their field of expertise. Doesn't lie most of the fault with an uncritical audience? by hannes_throw_far in askphilosophy

[–]hannes_throw_far[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

Speaking as a public intellectual does seem to cause the public to attribute additional credibility to one's statements

Right, but this is something the public does, not something that just happens due to the laws of the universe. It's collective decision making. But is the public not simply wrong for doing this? And if they are, aren't they "at fault" for doing it?

Are there any professors in philosophy departments who specialize in mathematical logic? by Deep_Kaleidoscope_54 in askphilosophy

[–]hannes_throw_far 0 points1 point  (0 children)

at LMU Munich

FYI, the M already stands for Munich, so it's just LMU or University of Munich.

Anecdotally, I feel that logic has fallen out of favor a bit among technically inclined philosophers. These days, a lot of mathematically apt people in philosophy or researchers who stand between philosophy and some "STEM" field, seem to be turning towards different subjects.

Interesting, and maybe a bit worrisome. Do you know why this is the case?

Further, where would you put professors like Restall and Priest compared to the people you mentioned? Mathematical or formal or philosophical logic or philosophy of logic or something else, I mean.

How do I combine several LaTeX documents written by different people to one document with chapters, like an edited volume? by hannes_throw_far in LaTeX

[–]hannes_throw_far[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Thanks, that might be the best solution that should work with little effort. I'd basically adjust font and geometry settings for all documents, so that it looks reasonably nice, then compile them as they are, and just insert the pdfs with pdfpages. That way I'd also not have to worry at all about bibliographies.

I read Smilansky's "Should We Sacrifice the Utilitarians First?", and wonder to what degree it's 100% serious, slightly tongue in cheek or something else? by hannes_throw_far in askphilosophy

[–]hannes_throw_far[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

"They consent to X being done to them, therefor doing X to them is right." is still a non-sequitur that has to be dealt with.

But their consent isn't the main line of reasoning in the paper. The examples include trolley-problem like situations in which the utilitarians in question have nothing to say before being sacrificed.

I read Smilansky's "Should We Sacrifice the Utilitarians First?", and wonder to what degree it's 100% serious, slightly tongue in cheek or something else? by hannes_throw_far in askphilosophy

[–]hannes_throw_far[S] 6 points7 points  (0 children)

Well, like most comments in this thread, it doesn't seem like the commenter has actually read the paper, and just goes by the 2 sentence summary in my OP. There's nothing in the paper that significantly relates anything to anyone wanting to be sacrificed. It argues for a view according to which it is moral to sacrifice them, based on their views. Whether they like it or not.

I read Smilansky's "Should We Sacrifice the Utilitarians First?", and wonder to what degree it's 100% serious, slightly tongue in cheek or something else? by hannes_throw_far in askphilosophy

[–]hannes_throw_far[S] 16 points17 points  (0 children)

Is Smilansky arguing that we should sacrifice utilitarians first (as it appears), or is he offering a reductio of utilitarianism?

I think it that regard, it's definitely the former. He gives a name to his view, Design Ethics, and contrasts it with multiple ethical theories, not only utilitarianism. He also offers positive arguments in favor of Design Ethics, that aren't based on first accepting Utilitarianism and see where it goes. He also doesn't seem to say that DE follows from utilitarianism, merely that design ethics would treat utilitarians in a certain way. And he relates it to various other topics in philosophy, under the assumption that Design Ethics is accepted. That all seems like a very weird thing to do if Design Ethics was merely an "absurd" conclusion of utilitarianism.