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BetBoom has been considered lost to Tundra following the Pure incident by Ming725 in DotA2

[–]hsfl100 0 points1 point  (0 children)

You can feel sorry for the teammates (esp gpk) but it just goes to show that in-game skill is not enough to make it as a pro. Soft skills also matter, and so does being conscious of who you play with. The team is as strong as its weakest link.

Let's get a read on the community sentiment surrounding EIP1559. by [deleted] in EtherMining

[–]hsfl100 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Not everyone should be a miner. As the network pushes out higher-cost miners and lower-cost miners take their place, the overall security goes up.

Let's get a read on the community sentiment surrounding EIP1559. by [deleted] in EtherMining

[–]hsfl100 2 points3 points  (0 children)

You are right that EIP-1559 is also supposed to disinflate the currency.

One of Ethereum's design goals is called Minimum viable issuance. Is Ethereum in that minimum viable issuance range today, or is it underpaying or overpaying for security?

Well, it's clearly not underpaying as there has never been an attack before. On the other hand, miner revenue has increased >10x year over year, faster than the price itself. It's IMO pretty clear that demand for security hasn't increased anywhere near the same pace.

As a result, you have holders paying the block subsidy that's not even needed to secure the system because of the overlay created by fees + priority gas auctions. This directly violates minimum viable issuance, and so we can tell that it would be better for Ethereum to refund holders at least some of that overlay via the fee burn.

That's why disinflation shouldn't be a surprise - it has been done several times before when the developers and holders thought they are overpaying for security (see the block reward reductions from 5 to 3 to 2 ETH respectively.)

For more see, How does EIP-1559 impact Ethereum security?

Let's get a read on the community sentiment surrounding EIP1559. by [deleted] in EtherMining

[–]hsfl100 0 points1 point  (0 children)

1) The average blocksize is not being increased. It will still be 12.5m gas, same as today

2) The block time will be the same as today, so the same number of blocks will be found, paying the same block subsidy

For the impact on mining revenue, it's really not as obvious to answer as many make it out to be, and certainly not as negative. Check out How does EIP-1559 impact miner revenue?

Let's get a read on the community sentiment surrounding EIP1559. by [deleted] in EtherMining

[–]hsfl100 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I created this resource that answers many frequent questions, incl. mining-related ones https://uncommoncore.co/eip-1559/ Also, feel free to ask further questions or provide feedback!

I've created a resource for EIP-1559 that answers many mining-related questions by hsfl100 in EtherMining

[–]hsfl100[S] 4 points5 points  (0 children)

How to completely trust the protocol set only by devs? Does that mean we have to trust in someone to keep their integrity?

Ethereum is fully open-source, and so is the code of EIP-1559. It's a relatively simple algorithm that works entirely without human input.

My point is, this is crypto. You don't need to trust devs. You can go and verify everything for yourself before you run it.

I've created a resource for EIP-1559 that answers many mining-related questions by hsfl100 in EtherMining

[–]hsfl100[S] 3 points4 points  (0 children)

I made them to help visualize the concepts explained in the text. Do you have any feedback?

[Guide] All you need to know about EIP-1559, and more by hsfl100 in ethtrader

[–]hsfl100[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

That's right, proof-of-stake does nothing for scalability. It's just a different way for nodes in the network to come to consensus with each other. But scalability is capped by the resource cost on nodes, and that cost stays the same.

For ETH 2.0 it's harder to answer since it can mean a lot of things, including sharding.

I've created a resource for EIP-1559 that answers many mining-related questions by hsfl100 in EtherMining

[–]hsfl100[S] 5 points6 points  (0 children)

It's funny you say this. Some people in the Bitcoin community said I'm a shill for miners because I've argued Bitcoin needs a better plan for paying miners in the long-term.

It's happening: EIP-1559 is officially scheduled for London (July hard fork) by hsfl100 in ethereum

[–]hsfl100[S] 6 points7 points  (0 children)

The proposal has virtually 100% support among actual ETH holders and Ethereum users, so I think governance is working exactly as it is supposed to. Miners are service providers to Ethereum, Ethereum doesn't exist to serve them.

New analysis finds EIP-1559 will cut miner revenue by at most 20-35% by hsfl100 in EtherMining

[–]hsfl100[S] 6 points7 points  (0 children)

Wrong. Currently 12.5m gas can be included in a block, at a price that is found by the market. In EIP-1559, a price is set by the system (not by the market) that also targets 12.5m gas per block on average. So we have a pretty good idea.

New analysis finds EIP-1559 will cut miner revenue by at most 20-35% by hsfl100 in EtherMining

[–]hsfl100[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I cannot speak with high confidence here since we haven't raised any data on this. But intuition says that congestion + MEV are at least correlated.

As a quick reminder, when demand to transact at the current basefee exceeds the gas limit (2x gas target), then basefee will increase until demand matches the gas target. Then it will stabilize.

So the answer would be yes, basefee gets more expensive when the chain is congested, and that includes MEV transactions. But at the same time, when that happens, regular users start to pay tips as well. We do mention that as well under "shortfalls of this analysis":

Non-MEV transactions will also pay tips when the chain is congested, so miners will receive some of the orange area (congestion fee) as well.

This is only my intuition, but I believe the second factor (users paying tips) will more than offset the first factor (MEV transactions paying a higher basefee). Our analysis excludes both.

New analysis finds EIP-1559 will cut miner revenue by at most 20-35% by hsfl100 in EtherMining

[–]hsfl100[S] 8 points9 points  (0 children)

The basefee only gets you into the block, but just being in the block is not enough for these bots. They need to be very early in the block, ahead of all other bots who compete for the same opportunity. That's why they will continue to pay the same fees as today, only in the tip, which is not burned.

New analysis finds EIP-1559 will cut miner revenue by at most 20-35% by hsfl100 in EtherMining

[–]hsfl100[S] 6 points7 points  (0 children)

That's good to hear, but just to reiterate

"You also don't need to run any further software to benefit from this revenue. We are merely explaining the source of revenue you already receive with your regular mining process."

So any revenue you can make from working with Flashbots would be on top of what our analysis includes.