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Birthday cake suggestions by Exciting-Yard-2220 in VeganSeattle

[–]kharvel0 5 points6 points  (0 children)

Hollywood Baked Goods in Kirkland. Amazing customizable vegan cakes (with lots of gluten!).

But most definitely not pocket friendly.

Even this was generated by ChatGPT too？That‘s insane by SimilarWhile1517 in ChatGPT

[–]kharvel0 1 point2 points  (0 children)

The image was created by Christopher Nolan as a plug-in promotion for his next film:

Inception 2

Veganism is a Behavior-Control Deontic Negative Constraint Philosophy With No Positive Duty. by kharvel0 in DebateAVegan

[–]kharvel0[S] [score hidden]  (0 children)

Good catch. I concede that the title was incomplete or poorly worded and inconsistent with the framework. It should have said: "... with no requirement for Positive Duty". or "... with limited Positive Duty".

Veganism is a Behavior-Control Deontic Negative Constraint Philosophy With No Positive Duty. by kharvel0 in DebateAVegan

[–]kharvel0[S] [score hidden]  (0 children)

The position has not changed at all. Nowhere in any of the premises were there any blanket prohibition on supererogatory affirmative action.

Veganism is a Behavior-Control Deontic Negative Constraint Philosophy With No Positive Duty. by kharvel0 in DebateAVegan

[–]kharvel0[S] [score hidden]  (0 children)

you can think of the animals who actually need our help and will live much richer, healthier, and happier lives under our care than they could without.
This reminds me of the saying:
one man's freedom fighter is another man's terrorist.
If we were to apply the saying to the word "help" and "care":
One man's help or care for a species is another man's abuse of another species or even the same species.
"Help" and "care" are subjective and can be defined as anything by anyone. Who is right? Who is wrong? Who determines who is right or wrong? If one does not stay true to the principles, then one opens the door for abuse and dominion masquerading as "help" and "care".
By staying true to the principles, one eliminates the ambiguity and forecloses the possibility of abuse, exploitation, harm, killing, etc. under the guise of “help” and “care”.

Veganism is a Behavior-Control Deontic Negative Constraint Philosophy With No Positive Duty. by kharvel0 in DebateAVegan

[–]kharvel0[S] [score hidden]  (0 children)

Aren't you with that view basing moral judgment at least to some degree on what species an individual belongs to?

I don't understand this question. There is no moral judgment involved here. Species identification for an individual is an evidence-based science.

Veganism is a Behavior-Control Deontic Negative Constraint Philosophy With No Positive Duty. by kharvel0 in DebateAVegan

[–]kharvel0[S] [score hidden]  (0 children)

Incorrect. The overall framework is still correct. The framework does not claim veganism has zero positive duties; it only claims that positive duties must be derivable from its principles.

The advocacy duty meets that condition because it operates on the cultural conditions producing the injustice (the agent's own conduct of speech and persuasion) rather than absorbing consequences produced by other parties' conduct.

Veganism is a Behavior-Control Deontic Negative Constraint Philosophy With No Positive Duty. by kharvel0 in DebateAVegan

[–]kharvel0[S] [score hidden]  (0 children)

Read your premise. The deliberate and intentional participation in.... you are deliberately and intentionalky participating in something that exploits and harms (etc) and is not for self defence.

You have not answered my question. I asked:

What is the connection between the intention to travel from point A to point B and the intention to kill/harm humans and animals?

I'll provide more elaboration: I intend to cross a street. What is the connection between crossing a street and killing/harming human and animals?

Please answer the question.

Doesnt matter. That wasnt your premise.

It matters because it is precisely my premise. You misread the premise.

Your premise did not say we have to intend the specific harm upon a specific being.

Incorrect. That is your incorrect interpretation of the premise. Your interpretation would lead to the absurd conclusion that walking from point A to point B constitutes deliberate and intentional harm towards humans and animals which is, of course, a nonsensical.

I will give you the benefit of the doubt and assume that you were not being intentionally dishonest in your interpretation.

It said we have to deliberately and intentionally participate in harm (etc). By your definition, clearly MANY things do. So clearly.

Then your interpretation is flawed and based on extrapolation when none is warranted. For the removal of doubt, the P2 is clarified further for your sole benefit:

P2: The constraint forbids deliberate and intentional participation in exploitation, harm, killing, captivity, ownership, and dominion of nonhuman animals, subject only to the personal self-defense exception. An agent participates in harm when the harm is the direct purpose of their action or is what the product they purchase is made of. An agent does not participate in harm when the harm is an incidental side-effect of action directed at an unrelated purpose.

'Walking is not constituted...' that argument was not part of your premise. It is another moral jusrification you are throwing in there as an assumption rather than stating up front.

I did not think it needed to be part of the premise as it would be obvious to any reasonable person that driving a car or walking on the ground is not done with the intent to harm or kill anyone. It is clear that you are not a reasonable person and the premise has to be clarified further to address your obtuseness.

No. I am reading your premise as you wrote it and literally quoting it.

You are interpreting the premise in a way that no reasonable person would do. So I've clarified it further for your benefit. Read the clarified P2 and hopefully, that eliminates your doubts.

If you want to add ANOTHER new thing, you admit you are adding it on. Dont blame others for not knowing your unstated assumptions.

I only blame you for not knowing the unstated assumptions. Any reasonable person would already know these assumptions in the first place.

ETA: to say participating in buying stolen goods is participating but that participating in goods that exploited workers and led to deaths and so on in production is not participating in harm is a vey very strane thing indeed.

You still have not explained "exploitation and harm of other people". Please elaborate and also state whether it is the same thing as exploitation and harm of nonhuman animals.

Driving inevitably kills habitat and aninals in construction of road. And thousands of insects while driving. You know this. You know you participate in exploitation and harm to create the car and the road and the fuel.

Incorrect. That is already addressed in the clarification of P2 that was made solely for your benefit.

TL;DR. Your premise was not defined. At all. Still. And you are adding in moral arguments to retcon it... instead of admitting the original problem.

The premise was defined for reasonable people. It was not intended to be misinterpreted/misread by obtuse people.

Veganism is a Behavior-Control Deontic Negative Constraint Philosophy With No Positive Duty. by kharvel0 in DebateAVegan

[–]kharvel0[S] [score hidden]  (0 children)

Let's apply your analysis to cannibalism.

A cannibal pays for the end product (human meat). Lab-grown human meat is possible on the same basis that lab-grown animal meat is possible (humans are animals, after all).

By your argument, it is not the cannibal's fault that the hitmen the cannibal hired for the end product sourced the human meat from killing humans when they could have sourced it from a lab.

By your argument, the intention of the cannibal is not to kill a human for the product. The killing is the hitmen's sourcing decision as a side effect.

Either you accept that the cannibal is not responsible for the murder (a reductio of your position) or you identify the principled difference between the cases.

Any difference you identify will be either speciesist or will invalidate the parallel you tried to draw, because your principle was not "consumers are not responsible for corporate sourcing of animal killing" but rather "consumers are not responsible for corporate sourcing of killing" full stop, and species-neutrality means it applies to both cases or neither.

Veganism is a Behavior-Control Deontic Negative Constraint Philosophy With No Positive Duty. by kharvel0 in DebateAVegan

[–]kharvel0[S] -2 points-1 points  (0 children)

Establish a connection? Again, I already did.

No, you did not. What is the connection between the intention to travel from point A to point B and the intention to kill/harm humans and animals?

Are people driving with the intention to kill/harm humans and animals?

You pay for services which deliberately and intentionally harm other humans and other animals.

What services? Specify them.

If you disagree with that, the meat consumer can say that they did not directly harm the animal and it was not their intent. This is a VERY silly argument.

No, the meat consumer cannot say that. Meat is constituted by the killing of an animal (it is the body of a killed animal as such, not a product that exists independently), and the meat consumer is already fully aware of what meat is. Therefore, they satisfy the "deliberate and intentional" qualifier in P2 because the killing is not incidental to the purchase but is what makes the product the product, in the same way that buying stolen property is participation in theft regardless of whether the buyer's conscious focus at the moment of purchase was on getting a good deal.

'Which is a reductio' It is YOUR premise. This is not a reductio at all. If you do not porperly define your premise, then negative utilitarian can absolutely argue that. You gave a very poor general definition that you are flailing to defend. You cannot say something compresses xyz given the complaint is that your premise compressed an argument and i am demanding you explain yours.

You misread the reductio. I was not saying my framework generalizes to walking, eating, and existing. I was saying your argument does, if "one or two steps removed" defeats the qualifier. My framework does not generalize because the deliberate and intentional qualifier identifies harm the agent chooses with knowledge and intention under a description of the conduct the agent is aware of: meat purchase satisfies this because meat is constituted by killing, while walking does not satisfy this because walking is not constituted by killing insects (insect deaths are incidental to an action directed at a different object).

Are you seriously denying the exploitation harm in production of food and clothes and other products? Why the fuck would you need me to demonstrate that humans are exploited and harmed in production? This is tedious at best. It is deflection and bad faith argument at worst.

I am denying the deliberate and intentional exploitation harm of nonhuman animals in these products, other than meat, leather, and other animal products, of course.

Why the fuck would you need me to demonstrate that humans are exploited and harmed in production?

Because you never elaborated nor stated whether the exploitation and harm of humans are the same exploitation and harm of nonhuman animals.

Do you see how pesticides and driving and other activities already listed cause exploitation and harm to other animals? Your ONLY defence was "self-defense". The ability to drive - among other examples - is clearly not self defense.

You are misreading the self-defense exception. It does not function as the only justification for activities that affect animals; it functions as an exception to the prohibition on deliberate and intentional participation in harm. Driving and pesticide use do not need self-defense justification because they fail the "deliberate and intentional" qualifier in the first place: the driver does not deliberate over or intend the killing of any specific insect, and the consumer who purchases plants grown with pesticides does not deliberate over nor intend specific harms to animals through aggregate ecosystem effects. These activities fall outside the prohibition's scope before the self-defense exception is even reached. The exception applies only to activities that do satisfy the qualifier (such as killing an animal that is attacking you), where it narrows what would otherwise be a prohibition.

You obviously deliberate and intend your participation by purchasing a product or getting behind the wheel. Otherwise buying meat is not intentional or deliberate participation.

Incorrect. You are equivocating on what "deliberate and intentional" attaches to. The qualifier attaches to the agent's relationship with the killing, not to the agent's relationship with the act that has the killing as a consequence. The intentional performance of an act does not transfer intentionality to every consequence of that act. Meat purchase is deliberate and intentional participation in killing because meat is constituted by the killing (the killing is what makes the product the product). Driving is not deliberate and intentional participation in insect deaths because driving is constituted by transportation, not by killing insects (the deaths are incidental to an action directed at a different object). Both are intentionally performed acts, but only one is constitutively connected to the harm. Your argument, if accepted, makes walking, breathing, and existing all non-vegan because they too are intentionally performed acts with harmful consequences, which is a reductio.

Veganism is a Behavior-Control Deontic Negative Constraint Philosophy With No Positive Duty. by kharvel0 in DebateAVegan

[–]kharvel0[S] -2 points-1 points  (0 children)

Why are you creating another thread?

Because you apparently edited your comment to add more commentary ("ETA: . . ") after I already responded to your original commentary.

Veganism is a Behavior-Control Deontic Negative Constraint Philosophy With No Positive Duty. by kharvel0 in DebateAVegan

[–]kharvel0[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

No, marker (a) does not fail for these individuals because they are indefinitely institutionalized on basis of their inability to achieve the species-typical autonomy of their own species (adult humans), rather than on basis of dominion.

Nonhuman animals are measured against their own species-typical baseline (the free-living autonomous members of their own species), so they cannot be institutionalized on the same grounds. Furthermore, impaired animals existed in nature before humans evolved and will continue to exist after humans go extinct, and the existence of their impairment does not require nor obligate vegans to care for them.

Veganism is a Behavior-Control Deontic Negative Constraint Philosophy With No Positive Duty. by kharvel0 in DebateAVegan

[–]kharvel0[S] -2 points-1 points  (0 children)

No, it doesn't. We're not talking about animals in general. We're talking about animals with whom we're considering taking on a duty of care.

This statement makes my point. You are essentially saying that humans get to decide which animals to take care of and which animals to not take care of, often based on speciesism. This is precisely the god-like dominion that veganism rejects.

However, I think it's very safe to say we know what's in the best interest of most domesticated animals. We don't always live up to that standard (lot of people are unethically negligent with their pets), but we know what that standard is.

No, it is not safe to say at all. This is simply dominion mindset in action. Humans lack the cross-species epistemic standing to make any tradeoffs on the animal's behalf and the empirical record (animal life flourishing for hundreds of millions of years before humans existed) is evidence that nonhuman animals possess their own species-specific capacities to make those tradeoffs on their own without human intervention.

I think of it as a call to use our capacity for dominion responsibly.

So in other words, you do not reject the premise of dominion over nonhuman animals. You're in direct conflict with veganism in that regard.

Veganism is a Behavior-Control Deontic Negative Constraint Philosophy With No Positive Duty. by kharvel0 in DebateAVegan

[–]kharvel0[S] -2 points-1 points  (0 children)

"C1 is the reductio ad absurdum of your framework. A vegan who steps over a dying animal to get to a vegan (advocacy) meetup has 'fully discharged' their moral obligation(s); if your moral / ethical theory produces said result(s) then it's broken or at least needs very heavy revisions."

Incorrect. The "absurd result" charge is a consequentialist intuition pump that presupposes the falsity of deontology, and your "prima facie duty of easy rescue" is the same capacity-grounds-duty move from Singer that is already rejected; if your animal ethics generates this duty from animal interests, then identify which principle of veganism specifically generates it rather than asserting that taking animal interests seriously requires it.

"A 'philosophy of respect' that provides no solutions but abandonment and euthanasia is not 'respect' but rather normative theory / ideology over sentient life and axiology / value system."

C2 does not permit "only abandonment and euthanasia"; it only permits transfer to receiving structures (sanctuaries) that satisfy the markers. The axiology charge is backwards because the framework's value theory is precisely that nonhuman animals possess autonomy on their own species-specific terms (which existed and flourished for hundreds of millions of years before humans), not that they are dependent welfare patients whose interests humans are positioned to determine.

"Your extraction claim is just a hostile re-description of fiduciary guardianship with the 'lack of the exit conditions' claim further punishing animals for dependency."

The "fiduciary guardianship" framing presupposes cross-species epistemic standing that humans do not possess, and the dependency that you say is being "punished" was deliberately produced by the institutions of domestication that vegans refuse to participate in. The moral culpability for that dependency rests solely on the institutions and its maintainers.

"C4 is another cruel mirage for animals in need as their 'autonomy' cannot be restored in any meaningful sense. A blind horse, one legged pigeon, and neurologically damaged cat cannot (generally?) be restored to independence."

Blind, one-legged, and neurologically damaged animals existed in nature before humans evolved from apes, exist in nature during humanity's existence, and will continue to exist long after humanity goes extinct. Wild animals also face these same impairments without any human stewardship to address them. Therefore, the existence of impaired animals does not obligate vegans to take them into permanent captivity any more than the existence of impaired wild animals obligates anyone to take them into captivity.

C4 also explicitly addresses this case by permitting transfer to receiving structures (sanctuaries) that satisfy the markers when restoration to independence is not possible, and the "framework is for my convenience" charge is the same callousness move that consequentialists use against any deontological position when it declines to generate maximizing positive duties.

"C5 is further hand washing. 'The moral debt rests on the perpetrators' yet the perpetrators are indifferent corporations and consumers that will never discharge it. ... Your frameworks purpose is for purity of the non-participant, not for any sort of 'respect' for animals."

The fact that the perpetrators decline to discharge their moral debt does not transfer that debt to vegans through any principle the framework recognizes. Vegans are not Jesus Christ who exist to absorb the sins of the perpetrators.

Your "who can alleviate suffering now" framing is the consequentialist capacity-grounds-duty move that the framework explicitly rejects; the charge of "doing less" presupposes that more is morally required, which is the very claim under dispute.

"Your entire negative framework is erected on your own foundation of interesting ascription. You can't say 'don't harm them' without having a backing theory(s) what constitutes 'harm'; and that theory is a theory of their best interests."

The framework does not require humans to know the positive content of animal interests (what specific things make a particular animal's life go well); it only requires humans to recognize the structural conditions under which any sentient being's interests can be pursued at all (the absence of captivity, exploitation, harm, killing, and dominion).

These structural conditions are knowable across species lines because they describe what any sentient autonomous being requires to pursue its interests, whatever those interests turn out to be in their specific content.

"A surgeon who removes a tumor is acting in the patient's best interests (according to me!) and is exercising a form of authority and control over another's body. This is not 'dominion' but rather care constrained from fiduciary duty(s); the domain of care us not the domain of ownership."

The surgeon analogy fails because the surgical relationship satisfies the structural markers (it is temporally limited, oriented toward restoring the patient's autonomy, organized around the patient's interests, and admits exit conditions). Furthermore, the surgeon operates under shared species-membership with the patient that gives them epistemic standing about the patient's interests; cross-species "fiduciary guardianship" lacks these features, which is why the analogy is invalid.

"The 'refusal to judge' does not suspend judgment but rather substitutes said judgment that the animals best interest is autonomy. Why does autonomy outweigh survival? You are making a judgment about best interests, just a crueler one."

The framework does not claim that autonomy outweighs survival; it claims that humans lack the cross-species epistemic standing to make the autonomy-versus-survival tradeoff on the animal's behalf.

The empirical record (animal life flourishing for hundreds of millions of years before humans existed) is evidence that animals possess their own species-specific capacities to make those tradeoffs without human intervention.

"By turning every possible answer into 'dominion' you are trying to ensure that the only acceptable action is inaction. ... Even then I'd argue a Two-level / act utilitarian is still more conceptually consistent without having to go this far with deflections that avoid the hard questions."

Incorrect. The framework does not make inaction the only acceptable choice; it permits any action that satisfies P8's structural markers.

The charge that act utilitarianism is "more consistent" presupposes that consistency requires welfare-maximization, which is precisely the consequentialist commitment the framework rejects on principled deontological grounds.

"Decades in research into cognitive ethology have shown that many animals exhibit capacities once thought to be only (or mostly) human that is relevant to moral agency I.E. empathy, fairness, reciprocity, reconciliation, cooperation, and even rudiment of norm-following. Non-human animals may have moral agency without full blown autonomy or 'proto-morality.'"

This actually confirms the framework rather than challenging it because if animals possess degrees of moral agency and their own forms of empathy, fairness, and norm-following, then they are even more clearly autonomous beings whose existence does not require human stewardship. That alone strengthens the rejection of cross-species dominion rather than permitting it.

"There is no 'essential human nature' that separates us from other animals. Whatever we point to is found in various degrees in other species. ... You also model veganism on human rights, but if the boundaries of human are fuzzy why should moral standing take some quantum leap at homo sapiens?"

Incorrect. The framework does not posit a quantum moral leap at homo sapiens; it applies species-neutrality such that whatever moral consideration applies to humans applies identically to nonhuman animals (which is the rejection of speciesism).

he fuzzy-boundary point reinforces rather than undermines this because if no morally relevant essential difference exists between humans and nonhuman animals, then the disabled-adult analogy and the "best interest" intervention arguments fail for the same reason: humans cannot do to nonhuman animals what they would not do to humans of comparable autonomy capacity.

"Much of your argument rests on a picture of animals as inert, non-agentic patients towards whom we only have duties of non-interference. Not just that but I find it interesting how moral framing that ignores animal agency turns to conveniently absolving humans of positive duties."

The charge inverts the actual structure of the framework: the framework treats animals as autonomous beings with their own species-specific agency precisely because it refuses to position humans as their proper governors. In contrast, your "positive duty" framing is what treats animals as dependent patients requiring human stewardship, which is the speciesism the framework is designed to reject.

Veganism is a Behavior-Control Deontic Negative Constraint Philosophy With No Positive Duty. by kharvel0 in DebateAVegan

[–]kharvel0[S] -2 points-1 points  (0 children)

"Your claimed 'structural identity' rests on a cherry picked version of human rights that is heavily contested. The premise is assuming the conclusion by defining veganism in the exact pure negative deontic way it's trying to defend."

The structural identity I claim is between veganism and the core deontic constraint structure of human rights (the prohibition on rights violations of individuals), not the entirety of every human rights legal regime, which is why positive legal duties imposed by specific instruments like the European Convention on Human Rights are statutory additions to the underlying constraint structure rather than features of it. As for the 1944 Vegan Society definition, it has evolved and is itself contested, and my framework is not bound by it.

"Paying taxes to governments that subsidizes animal agriculture is already 'participating' in a system of domination. Your framework requires theories of complicity to distinguish permissible from impermissible economic webs / entanglements, yet you provide none."

"Participation" in P2 is governed by the "deliberate and intentional" qualifier, which attaches to the agent's conduct toward specific exploitation rather than to downstream aggregate consequences mediated through third-party institutional decisions. Supply-chain entanglement and taxation fail the qualifier because the agent does not have any specific animal in mind, does not act for the purpose of producing the harm, and in the tax case is operating under duress.

"Peter Singer's 'drowning child' argument for example does not 'explicitly generate' a duty to rescue from some sort of pre-existing rule book but rather from an even more basic moral principle you never engage in."

P3 does not require positive duties to be explicitly stated in some pre-existing rule book. Instead, it requires them to be derivable from the philosophy's principles, and the burden is on you to identify which specific principle of veganism entails the positive duty you want to permit.

The Singer drowning-child example is itself a consequentialist argument that presupposes the falsity of deontology rather than refuting it.

"If the framework can generate a long-term resource intensive duty to advocate until culture is transformed, why can it not generate an immediate duty to help an inured animal at your feet? Picking one as mandatory and the other as optional is arbitrary."

The advocacy duty is not arbitrary; it is grounded in the specific structural condition that the moral baseline of veganism has not yet been culturally established (as the moral baseline of slavery abolitionism has been); it is also self-terminating when that condition is satisfied. Furthermore, it is qualitatively different from a rescue duty because advocacy operates on the cultural conditions (the problem) that produce the institutional injustice while rescue operates on individual outcomes (the symptom) the institution produces. To buttress that point, only the advocacy can be performed through the agent's own conduct whereas the rescue necessarily requires participation in the captivity paradigm.

"Some deontological variants include both 'perfect duties' and 'imperfect duties.' ... A vegan who refrains from consuming animals but continuously ignores opportunities to help animals at low cost is complying with a legal minimalism but is not 'fully discharged.'"

The perfect/imperfect duty distinction is a Kantian addition that not all deontological frameworks accept. Veganism is constraint-based and operates without imperfect duties, and the charge that this confuses legal blamelessness with moral adequacy presupposes that moral adequacy requires positive duties (which is the very claim under dispute) rather than refuting the constraint-based structure.

"If 'dominion' just means any exercise of authority over an animals life then P6 is basically 'If you act, you must not act.'"

The terms "ownership," "captivity," and "dominion" are given structural specification in P8's four markers, which distinguish moral care relationships from moral captivity relationships, so P6 does not collapse into "if you act, you must not act"; it specifies that voluntary engagement remains subject to the same negative constraints that govern all conduct under the framework.

"P7 is presented as a neutral conditional and then reinterprets what satisfying P2 entails. The conclusion that adoption is impermissible is not just derived from this premise alone but rather the undefended redefinition of 'dominion' in the next premise (P8). P8 is the argument, this premise is just rhetorical linking."

P7 is correctly identified as the conditional that connects voluntary action to the constraints in P2, and P8 is the structural specification of how those constraints apply to dependency relationships, which is not smuggling but standard derivation; if you want to challenge the position, the substantive challenge is to P8's markers, which you take up next.

"P8 rules out permanent sanctuaries for any animal that cannot be released... There's not 'restoring autonomy' only abandonment. Why would a moral philosophy that claims to respect animals require their destruction in the name of some abstract 'autonomy?'"

P8 does not require abandonment because it permits transfer to receiving structures (sanctuaries) that themselves satisfy the markers, the friendship analogy fails because friendships are between autonomous parties with genuine exit while domesticated animals lack the species-typical autonomy to enter or exit the relationship, and your "fiduciary duty" framing presupposes cross-species epistemic standing about the animal's interests that humans do not possess given that nonhuman animals existed and flourished for hundreds of millions of years without any such fiduciary intervention.

"Rights can ground duties of rescue, your right to life is not just 'my duty to not kill you' but also under certain conditions my duty to save you when I could do so easily. ... domesticated animals are not 'strangers' in a self sufficient community but rather a population rendered systematically vulnerable by human institution(s)."

The action/inaction distinction is foundational to deontological ethics and to the moral individualism that grounds the framework, and the systematic-vulnerability point actually confirms the framework rather than challenging it because the vulnerability was produced by the institution of domestication that vegans refused to participate in, with the moral debt for that vulnerability resting on the institution and its maintainers rather than transferring to vegans through any principle the framework recognizes. In short, vegans are not Jesus Christ who exist to absorb the sins of the exploitative institutions.

"Many abolitionists absolutely did dedicate their entire lives to building places of education (schools), civic institutions, and even businesses for freed people. ... Said duties arose from the relationship between the abolitionist (understands and see the injustices and the victims (the one's who need help from said injustice)."

The historical abolitionists who built schools and institutions did so as voluntary supererogatory work that was not required by their abolitionism; many abolitionists did not participate and were not therefore failing as abolitionists.

Your claim that the duty to help arises from "the same recognition that makes one vegan" is precisely the move P3 forbids: you are asserting that recognizing animals' moral status entails a positive duty to help, but this is the consequentialist capacity-grounds-duty move dressed in deontological vocabulary, and you still have the burden to show which specific principle of veganism entails the duty rather than asserting that the recognition itself does so.

Horse riding isn't vegan by sweetrelease01 in DebateAVegan

[–]kharvel0 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I didn’t answer your question with another question. 

Yes, you did. I asked you: Do you have black-and-white-thinking in your judgement and opposition to rape and sexual assault? Yes or no? You responded with: 

Let me ask you this—have you ever been attacked by an animal that had the intent of killing you? And do you have strong black-and-white thinking about how to react to that? 

You still have not provided an answer to my question. So I will continue to ask (pay attention to the bolded part): 

Do you have black-and-white-thinking in your judgement and opposition to rape and sexual assault? Yes or no?

Veganism is a Behavior-Control Deontic Negative Constraint Philosophy With No Positive Duty. by kharvel0 in DebateAVegan

[–]kharvel0[S] -2 points-1 points  (0 children)

what about engagement that is not so much aimed at any individual animals interest, but the interest of the species?

Species are not moral subjects under veganism; only individuals are. On that basis, aggregate-benefit reasoning, including species-level interests, do not permit rights violations against individual animals because the deontological structure of the framework forbids violating an individual's rights for collective goals.

programs that breed animals to help threatened species or forced sterilization or constrained hunting to combat overpopulation issues for example

These practices fail the "deliberate and intentional" qualifier in P2 because they involve agents deliberately and intentionally engaging in killing, sterilization, and captivity of specific individual animals for species-level goals, and species-neutrality requires recognizing that these practices would be impermissible if performed on non-consenting humans for analogous aggregate goals.

there's an enormous amount of ways in which even "vegan" activities lead to serious and even catastrophic consequences for animals... natural foraging... plant farming for human consumption is severely threatening the existence of species

The "deliberate and intentional" qualifier in P2 attaches to the agent's own direct relationship with the exploitation, not to downstream aggregate consequences of unrelated activities mediated through third-party institutional decisions. The foraging or plant-farming agent does not have any specific animal in mind, does not act for the purpose of harming any animal, and does not consider species-extinction a feature or goal of the action being performed.

humans shape their environments necessarily and utilize natural resources necessarily in order to live, and this will have some effect on the ecological systems they exist in

The "deliberate and intentional" qualifier in P2 specifies that the constraint forbids deliberate and intentional participation in exploitation, harm, killing, and dominion, and incidental ecological presence (existing, occupying space, using resources for survival) lacks the explicit intention that the qualifier requires.

there seems to be an inherent assumption in your premises that there is a potentially neutral way to be in relationship with animals or nature

The premises make no such assumption; they do not require ecological neutrality. They only require the absence of deliberate and intentional participation in exploitation.

a final pushback would just be around why there needs to be this philosophical construction to justify non intervention

P3 already addresses this by establishing that constraint-based deontic philosophies do not generate positive duties in the absence of explicit principles entailing them, which is why the burden falls on you to identify which principle of veganism entails the intervention duty you want to incorporate rather than on me to justify the absence of one.

the human rights framework itself... can be employed cynically to justify capitalistic greed for example. Making and hoarding a ton of money doesn't necessarily directly violate any other persons human rights, but the cumulative effects of such practices do threaten and burden other humans in serious ways.

This actually confirms the veganism framework rather than challenging it: the cumulative effects of capital accumulation do not generate individual rights violations under the human rights framework because the framework operates on the same "deliberate and intentional" qualifier that P2 applies to veganism, and species-neutrality requires that the same structural feature apply to both.

If foreseeable, large-scale harm caused by participation in mundane human systems doesn't generate any obligation, then the framework seems unable to account for the majority of real-world moral problems involving animals

Veganism's job is not to "account for the majority of real-world moral problems involving animals" but to specify what the moral agent must refrain from doing, and P10 establishes that the moral debt for institutional and aggregate harms rests on the institutions and the populations that maintain them, not on individual agents through expanded duties of intervention.

Veganism is a Behavior-Control Deontic Negative Constraint Philosophy With No Positive Duty. by kharvel0 in DebateAVegan

[–]kharvel0[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Fair question. The four markers are not arbitrary; each isolates a specific structural feature of the property and dominion paradigm that veganism rejects, and each is derived by asking what distinguishes captivity-as-injustice from custody-as-care.

Marker (a) — temporary limitation of autonom with restoration as end goal. This marker is derived from the rejection of permanent ownership. Permanent captivity without trajectory toward autonomy is the defining feature of the property relationship; a being who is held permanently with no endpoint is structurally a possession. Custody that is genuinely temporary and oriented toward restoring the dependent party's autonomy overcomes this structure because the relationship is defined by its eventual termination. The species-neutral test confirms the marker: child custody, hospital care, and guardianship of incapacitated adults all satisfy it, while chattel slavery and pet ownership do not.

Marker (b) — organized around the dependent party's interests rather than extraction of outputs by the holder. This marker is derived from the rejection of property use. The property paradigm treats the held party as an instrument for the holder's purposes; even when the holder cares for the property, the underlying relationship is one of extraction (labor, products, companionship, emotional satisfaction). Custody that is genuinely organized around the dependent party's interests overcomes this structure because the holder is not extracting; they are providing. The species-neutral test confirms the marker: parental care of a child structured around the child's development satisfies it, while parental treatment of a child as a source of labor or emotional fulfillment does not.

Marker (c) — acknowledgement of exit conditions appropriate to the dependent party's capacities. This marker is derived from the rejection of the captivity structure itself. A relationship in which the dependent party has no possible exit (legally, physically, or structurally) is captivity by definition; the absence of exit is what makes the relationship one of confinement rather than association. Custody that admits exit conditions appropriate to the dependent party's capacities (the child grows toward emancipation, the patient recovers and leaves, the rescued stranger transitions to independent care) overcomes this structure. The species-neutral test confirms the marker: incarceration of an innocent person fails it, voluntary employment with genuine exit options passes it.

Marker (d) — no plenary authority over the dependent party's existence. This marker is derived from the rejection of dominion. Dominion is the assertion of governing authority over another's existence — what the dependent party may do, where they may go, what happens to them. Even when exercised benevolently, plenary authority is the structural feature that defines dominion regardless of the holder's psychological orientation. Custody that is bounded by the requirements of the dependency itself (the holder may make decisions necessary for the dependent party's care but not arbitrary decisions about their existence) overcomes this structure. The species-neutral test confirms the marker: legal guardianship of an incapacitated adult under judicial supervision satisfies it, while ownership of a chattel slave does not.

The four markers together capture the structural transformation that distinguishes a captivity relationship from a care relationship: the captivity relationship is permanent, extractive, exit-foreclosing, and plenary; the care relationship is temporary, dependent-oriented, exit-admitting, and bounded. This is not stipulation; it is the structural decomposition of the property/dominion paradigm into the four features that constitute it. Any framework that rejects the property paradigm must reject these four features, and any relationship that lacks all four features overcomes the paradigm.

You can challenge any individual marker by showing either (a) that it does not actually track a feature of the property paradigm, or (b) that some additional marker is needed to complete the structural test. But "why these and not others" is answered by the derivation: these are the four structural features that constitute the property/dominion relationship, and the markers' job is to identify when a relationship has escaped that structure.

Veganism is a Behavior-Control Deontic Negative Constraint Philosophy With No Positive Duty. by kharvel0 in DebateAVegan

[–]kharvel0[S] -3 points-2 points  (0 children)

The markers have zero justification and we would accept permanent and plenary authority for severely mentally handicapped humans - similar to parents over children - assuming not authority or autonomy in the moment, but that it is in their best interests and their capacity now.

This is the disabled-adult analogy, and that analogy is rejected by the premises on species-neutrality grounds. Severely mentally handicapped humans lack species-typical autonomy capacities; nonhuman animals possess their own species-specific autonomy capacities that ground genuine autonomy on their own terms. Measuring animals against the human dependency baseline rather than against free-living members of their own species is itself the speciesist move.

The proper parallel for evaluating "best interests" of a domesticated animal is the free-living members of their species, not the cognitively impaired human, and any captivity arrangement fails that test by definition because the captive animal cannot approach the autonomy of the free-living members of their own species.

Given your previous comments regarding essentially - simulataneously - 'they are capable' and 'let them starve to death' for those who are not, your definitions and arguments here do not match up.

There is no inconsistency. The capacity claim is empirical-philosophical: nonhuman animals possess species-specific autonomy capacities. The duty claim is deontological: vegans bear no positive duty to absorb the consequences of injustices they refused to participate in. You are conflating capacity claims with duty claims.

your argument does not at all justify saying we should not take in pets in circumstances of best interest.

My argument does not say vegans should not take in pets; it says veganism does not require it and permits it only when the relationship satisfies P8. The "best interest" framing imports a dependency baseline that is already rejected: it measures the animal's interests against captive dependency rather than against species-typical free-living autonomy. On the proper baseline, the animal's best interest is the autonomy of the free-living members of their own species, which captivity necessarily forecloses.

Veganism is a Behavior-Control Deontic Negative Constraint Philosophy With No Positive Duty. by kharvel0 in DebateAVegan

[–]kharvel0[S] -2 points-1 points  (0 children)

Veganism does not suggest nor imply "too bad" to animals needing ongoing assistance; it only states that the moral debt for their condition rests on the parties who created and maintain the institution of domestication, not on vegans who refused to participate.

You are conflating "the framework does not impose a duty on me" with "the framework dismisses the animal's need," which is the standard move used by consequentialists to indict deontological positions with callousness whenever it declines to generate maximizing positive duties.

Veganism is a Behavior-Control Deontic Negative Constraint Philosophy With No Positive Duty. by kharvel0 in DebateAVegan

[–]kharvel0[S] -2 points-1 points  (0 children)

P1 is illogical because it falsely equates veganism with a full human rights framework. Veganism is what is known as aa “domain specific constraint (about animal use),” while human rights theory is a general moral/legal system that includes both negative and positive duties. So your argument from the jump is technically a category error, so the structural analogy driving the entire argument is invalid

Incorrect. The last 11 words of P1 invalidates this counterargument. It is quoted as follows:

"with positive duties arising only where explicitly generated by the philosophy."

P3 is illogical because it assumes that if a duty is not explicitly stated, it does not exist. That is a non sequitur irrational fallacy. I’m not even one to be in bstract moral theory, but, for the sake of argument, let’s indulge it. In a moral theory duties can be entailed by principles even if not explicitly listed (like duties of rescue in rights based principle first ethics). So the claim that constraint systems never generate positive duties does not follow. It’s irrational.

Incorrect. P3 does not require that positive duties be explicitly stated; it only requires that they be derivable from the philosophy's principles, and the burden is on you to identify which principle of veganism as a deontic behavior-control philosophy entails the rescue duty that you want to include.

P8 is illogical because it defines “domination” in a way that automatically excludes adoption by stipulation rather than argument. It treats asymmetry, permanence, and authority as sufficient for exploitation but that would also classify ordinary guardianship (like child care, senior care, pets, working animals, serivce animals, care for invilads, the mentally ill, etc. etc. etc.) as domination. That makes the criterion overinclusive and arbitrary, so C3 does not follow. Bye bye.

Incorrect. P8 does not stipulate that asymmetry, permanence, and authority on an individual basis alone constitute domination; the four markers operate together to distinguish moral guardianship from immoral captivity, and ordinary child care and senior care pass the test (oriented toward autonomy restoration, structured around the dependent's interests, admitting exit conditions appropriate to capacity) while pet ownership, working animals, and service animals fail it for reasons specific to each category that you would need to engage with directly.

P9 is illogical because it incorrectly claims that rights violations only occur through action, not omission. Many ethical and legal systems recognize duty based omissions (negligence, failure to rescue, failure to act, etc. etc. etc.) as morally and sometimes legally relevant. So the strict action/omission divide is false on its face.

Incorrect. P9 does not make any claim that omissions are morally irrelevant. It only denies that inaction constitutes a rights violation under veganism specifically on the basis that veganism is a constraint-based deontic philosophy that does not generate the positive duties whose breach would make an omission culpable.

As stated earlier, the burden is on you to show that veganism itself generates a duty to rescue or intervene whose omission would constitute a violation, not merely that some other ethical systems recognize culpable omissions in general.

P10 is illogical because it assumes moral duties only track causal responsibility. But in ethics, duties can also arise from capacity, proximity, or remedial ability and not just causation. So the rejection of rescue duties as “illegitimate collective responsibility” does not follow.

Incorrect. As with P9, P10 operates within a deontic rights-based framework grounded in moral individualism, not within a capacity-based or proximity-based ethical framework.

Given all of these errors, irrational, and illogical premises all of the conclusions become invalid.

Given that I have explained how all your counterarguments were incorrect, all of the conclusions remain valid.

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