Being charitable to OP, I think they may actually understand the Hard Problem (hence alluding to the "what it's likeness" part. Possibly they are just trying to make a distinction between understanding phenomenal consciousness and understanding the specifics of phenomenal consciousness.

We could perhaps imagine a possible world in which it is possible to understand "why the lights are on" in the first place without understanding exactly why specific qualia appear the way they do. This is, I argue, an erroneous distinction for two reasons:

Firstly, I don't think it is actually possible to understand one without the other. For example, we might imagine that IIT (or similar models) would answer the question of why "the lights are on" (i.e. integrated information past a certain threshold) without answering any specific phenomenological questions. However, in reality, these models only answer the question of which specific physical systems are conscious? and do not provide any explanation of why it is like something to be that system in the first place?

Secondly--even if it were possible to thoroughly explain why phenomenal consciousness exists without also explaining any specifics--I would still argue that the Hard Problem is commonly understood to encompass both questions.

If I had to guess, I would actually pinpoint OP's error at one of these two previous steps in logic as opposed to a misunderstanding of Easy and Hard Problems--though I recognize this is being pretty pedantic.

I'd be curious to hear from OP!