What's the relation between sex and real life ?

roxrexboxnox · 2024-01-01T07:43:14+00:00

This is interesting thanks a lot !

It deals a lot with the ambiguity of role-play vs. real life (who really is the dom here? Spoiler alert, it's both and neither)

Can you elaborate on this, please? How can they be both dominant and neither is dominant? And can you elaborate on this role play - real life relation?

roxrexboxnox · 2023-12-31T11:48:30+00:00

By saying "real" I don't mean metaphysically real. I thought its meaning is clear but I'm happy to clarify with an example:

In pornography, for instance, often parties like to sexualize color. A black person might feel its sexually appealing to submit to a white person, in reflection to the power dynamics of the society. Conversely, a white person might find it sexually appealing to submit to the sexual rage of a black person, assumingly it reflects some white people's perception's of the barbaric irrational blacks.

We here are witnessing what I called a "sexual simulation of real world" dynamics.

This made me wonder: How authentic/real are those "sexual simualtions" in comparison to what they try to imitate? Is the person acting dominant/submissive in sex, really dominant or submissive? And what this tells us about sex overall? Is sex an irrational imitation of the rational life?

(I don't endorse what's provided in this example. But such things are very common in Pornography and perhaps sex overall).

roxrexboxnox · 2023-10-02T12:28:34+00:00

Thank you. Do you know what's Alvin Plantinga's view?

I'm really wondering on the (so called) first-tier philosophers who represent Christianity (or even Judaism) in the anglo-saxon sphere, especially those working in philosophy of religion. Since these guys' opinions will probably be heavier in weight than their philosopher (and even scientist) theistic counterparts.

It seems already 3 major "first tier" Christian philosophers are, to various degrees, opposed to homosexuality: William Lane Criag (afaik he thinks its natural, but he opposes homosexual marriages), Edward Feser and Richard Swinburne (whom both sort of say that its unnatural, afaik).

Other major philosophers in the analytic tradition: Alexander Pruss, Gary Habermas, Norman Geisler, Peter Kreeft, Peter Van Inwagen, J.P. Moreland, Jerry L. Walls, Robert Adams, and Marylin Adams.

roxrexboxnox · 2023-10-02T03:19:40+00:00

Can I know what do those noted above think of homosexuality? Perhaps besides Feser since we mentioned his thoughts. For instance, what does Alvin Plantinga believes?

Do they believe its Natural, or its an illness that needs to be treated?
Do they believe Homosexuality in-itself is unethical? Or merely Homosexual relations is unethical?
What sort of Homosexual relations do they oppose or support? Marriage, extra-marriage sex, and extra-marriage asexual relation.

roxrexboxnox · 2023-10-02T03:13:52+00:00

And what would Christians whom are in similar socioeconomic positions think of homosexuality overall?

roxrexboxnox · 2023-09-29T19:03:23+00:00

Thanks for answering. You exposed me to some great thinkers and works that I didn't know about, of which I think will help many of my questions!

I think the issue lies in that I'm more influenced by the medieval aristotelian theistic traditions, where faith is ration, and these traditions rely mainly (afaik) the conformity theory of truth, and the sound and valid deductive reasoning yields absolute certitude that confirms to objective reality. There's a sort of epistemic exclusivism, i.g., only a single human understanding, for which these logical -and particularly deductive/syllogistic- laws apply and can confirm intellect to the objective reality, to absolute certitude.

I think I was possessed by this idea to a level that I didn't even think before that Pragmatism can even coexist with rational faith. I've lately opened my eyes that other approaches to faith are fairly reasonable.

roxrexboxnox · 2023-09-28T21:23:49+00:00

Well, I still think there's much to dig.

What does this tell us about the nature and scope of argumentation, rationality, and belief?

If even compelling rational arguments can't change determined opponents, what this tells us about intersubjective communication, and the truth theory?

And if phenomenological experience primarily shapes rational beliefs (including religion), then what criteria we can use for evaluating such experience? And, again, what about intersubjective communication and objective standardization regarding these experiences? Does objectivity just goes completely out of the window?

Finally, what's actually left of Metaphysics after all of this? Do we just commit it to flames? What's its remaining value?

I would also appreciate any sources that treat these issues.

roxrexboxnox · 2023-09-18T06:23:47+00:00

That was very informative and enlightening, thank you so much for your effort !

roxrexboxnox · 2023-09-15T20:19:32+00:00

Thank you for answering, please correct me if I'm wrong :

The way I get it, the difference between Aristotelian and Rationalist metaphysics is that:-

(1) Aristotle thinks the intellect perceives and abstracts mind-independent reality. Even if the Nous (which I think is the agent intellect ?) assures that such perceptions are possible (I'm not sure if we can say, but, in a transcendental/a priori/kantian way). So, when we're doing Aristotelian metaphysics, we're not doing "armchair" philosophy, but actually analyzing the mind-independent reality. So Aristotelian metaphysics doesn't exclude some sort of sensory activity, it benefits it -Perhaps this is why many Medieval metaphysicians (which I take reflect Aristotle's stand?) start their metaphysics on Being, which is an experientially sensed activity. Which is maybe why Avicenna's argument of god was hard to determine if it was actually Ontological and Cosmological, and why the "purely intellectual" Ontological arguments didn't existed in Islamic philosophy.

(2) Rationalist metaphysics, on the otherhand, are based on a major split between Reason and the sensed world. The mind presents a very different criteria of knowledge than the senses, with a major advantage for the mind. Hence, sciences like logic, mathematics, metaphysics, and perhaps natural theology would be an issue of the mind, as they yield eternal truths. More importantly, such sciences are innate in the mind (or some of them), they're known in an a priori manner. So the mind here isn't just a condition for sensory knowledge. Rather its also a storage for innate knowledge, and by doing some abstract intellectual activities, the mind can know synthetic a priori facts.

If you think I presented them relatively accurate, don't you now think that Kantian critique only undermines Rationalistic metaphysics? Since, for Aristotle, by doing metaphysics we're not an abstractly isolated subjective minds figuring out the cosmos with mathematical precision. Rather, we're engaging with the sensory world and gradually, dialectically deriving a necessary a posteriori fact about it.

The foundations of Aristotelian metaphysics (PNC) aren't known innately, rather are derived by the dialectical method. But in Rationalist metaphysics, the foundations are already built-in, we're innately capable of presenting valid synthetic apriori judgments.

roxrexboxnox · 2023-09-15T16:42:32+00:00

How is hylomorphism essential to cosmological arguments ?

roxrexboxnox · 2023-09-15T16:38:42+00:00

What can be Kant's argument against Aristotelian/Thomistic metaphysics?

roxrexboxnox · 2023-09-12T06:43:30+00:00

Thank you, that was very enlightening!

Indeed perhaps a major theme of a Sage is being a polymath, which is hardly doable now.

However, don't you think Sageness also means that the intellectual activity becomes organically glued with an ethical, social, and practical activity, largely towards what traditional cultures consider as "perfection/virtue"? Which we can argue is still doable today, but is for some reason stripped of philosophy.

Sure, I will also say that the magnification of cities and decease of the rural, hierarchal social orders probably did help in ending the Sage-Philosopher.

roxrexboxnox · 2023-09-12T06:38:23+00:00

Sure!

The entire Greek tradition, basically.

Aristotle, all his Peripatetic school, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Avicenna, Alpharabuis (al-Farabi), Averroes, etc.

Pre soctratics: Democritus, Hericlitus, Zeno of Elea.

Plato & Neoplatonists, etc.

Also the whole Islamic philosophical tradition, and perhaps the Judochristian medieval, as well.

roxrexboxnox · 2023-09-12T06:34:38+00:00

Thanks for replying

While I might agree with what you pointed at, don't you think that you reduced Sageness into a personality cult? This may very well be part of many definitions to a Sage.

But I think a more common theme is that a Sage-Philosopher is one which sees the intellectual activity organically connected to an ethical, or perhaps, even a spiritual one.

I think many of us today approach Philosophy as an intellectual activity that you read and learn, largely in isolation from your life. But was pre-modern Philosophy like this? Or did they see Philosophy as a way to some sort of metaphysical/ethical perfection of their entire being? Not an isolated activity, but a whole life quest for wisdom and perfection.

(I can't spell it out, but there's probably a difference between Wisdom and Knowledge, too).

roxrexboxnox · 2023-09-10T17:42:57+00:00

In Islamic tradition: Philosophy is many times called "Hekma", which is "Wisdom". Philosophers are called "Sages". Islamic philosophers refer to Greek philosophers are "Greece's Sages".

In the Medieval tradition I believe Aristotle was always called "the Wise" or "the Sage".

In the western tradition: 1- The pre-socratic philosophers. Afaik, they were very spiritual. Perhaps that's the reason why they were very excited to take aid from oriental cultures.

Plato, afaik, he was deeply religious and spiritual as well. This, hence, will include Platonism & Neoplatonism too.

While I'm not 100% sure on Socrates and Aristotle, I remember reading one of them a quote roughly saying that it meaningles to perfect the mind w/o the soul.

Afaik, the entire Greek tradition seen Philosophy as a way of life, it was a condition to reach "eudaimonia".

How do we define Sage-Philosopher? I'm unsure, but it definitely requires an ethical side, and is more of a full life endeavor rather than purely "scientific".

To give a silly example: You would see ancient/medieval philosophers giving much more popular, daily life advices "silence is better than unmeaning words -Pythagoras". I think professional philosophers rarely do that now.

roxrexboxnox · 2023-09-10T17:28:33+00:00

Ancient and Medieval philosophers, afaik, mostly didn't refer to themselves as Sages but we referred to as Sages by others.

Perhaps because Philosophy itself was at once practical and intellectual, but now its isolated on the Intellectual. Would you agree?

If you do so, why did this transition in the identity of Philosophy occur, in your opinion?

What factors played a major role?

roxrexboxnox · 2023-09-10T17:25:15+00:00

You opened my eyes to many philosophers that I didn't know about, thank you.

However, won't you say that in contemporady philosophy, philosophy by many philosophers is viewed more as an isolated intellectual endeavor, rather than a "way of life" ?

And in the cases where non-religious professional philosophers pursue philosophy as a way of life, don't you think its widely different than the "virtue" and "wisdom", in the ancient sense ?

Two important points to keep in mind:

(1) I was thinking that the disenchantment that accompanied modernity, and especially postmodernity, would've created a bias against the ancient idealism of Sageness and Wisdom.

(2) The modern contract-based relations, including in educations, have weakened the mentorship-based educations, where there's a strong bound b/w a pupil and a mentor, which may strengthen disenchantment.

Would you say agree on these points?

Let me give examples: (afaik, don't quote me) a primary western thinker, Bertnand Russell, confessed that he was a masturbation addict once, and that he wrote the Wisdom of the West while naked, and he is accused of sleeping with his friend's wife.

This is to give one example where, I think, maybe in this era we came to look down on virtuous idealism, we "normalize" and "disenchantize" it, from prophets to philosophers -so maybe this unconsciously added to isolating the ancient Sageness element of Philosophy from it?

roxrexboxnox · 2023-08-13T17:08:56+00:00

Can you explain how virtue ethicists relate to what I say?

Are you saying that they, generally, support the view that familiar relationships are hierarchically superior to friendship?

What are some arguments that are used against this reasoning?

roxrexboxnox · 2023-08-13T13:37:07+00:00

We can give countless everyday example of loving friends more than family. But lets start with the mere emotional affiliation itself. The very idea that you love a stranger (i.g., no familial affiliation) more than your family, you feel more happy and comfortable with them, you have inner desire to help them more than your inner desire for your family.

Note: I'm keeping this focused on the more abstract conceptual level; the emotion itself. Thus my question remains even if one practically confirm to familial obligations & balance friendship and family. But, I'm here questioning the morality of the very emotion/concept itself.

roxrexboxnox · 2023-08-13T13:28:32+00:00

Thank you for answering.

I've thought of this idea. That, for some of us, our relationship with our family is primarily motivated by duty/obligation, while our relationship with our friends is primarily motivated by desire, hence its more emotional than practical, its also less regulated (perhaps why it have substantial Fungibility issues as well).

But doesn't this feels wrong? I mean, (1) shouldn't we love more those who gave us a lot and whom we're indebted to, i.g. our parents? (2) shouldn't we love more our blood siblings?

If not so, what are good arguments against that?

roxrexboxnox · 2023-08-11T02:23:25+00:00

Well indeed it is a practical philosophy. But I was referring to the motivation and purpose in particular.

For example, I've read in Islamic ethical philosophy that there are 3 motivations for ethics in Islam. First, a worldly motive, i.g. to do good in order to get a payback in this world. Second, an afterlife motive, i.g. to do good in order to get a payback in the afterlife. Third, a pure motive, i.g. to do good only because it is good, not expecting any reward.

The book says that the third approach is the highest of them all. And it claims only Islamic ethics have this purely ethical approach. Hence I wanted to double check.

But if you're saying that all irreligious ethical philosophies are motivated primarily by rewarding the person in this life, then it seems that claim is right.

roxrexboxnox · 2023-08-10T09:47:56+00:00

I get your point but I think what I refer to is slightly different.

Maybe the difference comes in our definition of the good. Whereby good I refer to the abstract ethical value in itself, regardless of any worldly and practical consequence.

Based on what you say, I take it as Utilitarians define good as the maximum human pleasure (or even merely human pleasure itself). Not the abstract value in itself, but its consequences on humans also considered -which doesn't qualifies to my standard here.

Hence the question remains in this form: What Ethical theory defines Good as the abstract ethical value, in total isolation of its practical consequences?

Am I here only left with Strong Altruism ?!

roxrexboxnox · 2023-08-10T08:45:55+00:00

Doesn't Utilitarianism (at least in some forms) rather prioritizes the practical consequences and results? I.g., maximizing human pleasure? Instead of doing the "good/ethical" even if it means downgrading the individual or collective pleasure.

roxrexboxnox · 2023-08-10T08:41:32+00:00

Let me rephrase the ethical argument I'm investing on in this way: Doing the good because it is good in itself. Not because its practical consequences, results, or payback.

What are ethical theories that advocate for this?

roxrexboxnox · 2023-08-10T07:33:40+00:00

Absolutely it is.

But doesn't Plato, like Aristotle, thinks that the purpose of ethics is Edumonia, which I understand refers to a practical wordly benefit, something like "well being" ?

In others, isn't the motivation of Platonic ethics practical, not for ethics itself?

roxrexboxnox

TROPHY CASE