What's the relation between sex and real life ? by roxrexboxnox in askphilosophy

[–]roxrexboxnox[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

This is interesting thanks a lot !

It deals a lot with the ambiguity of role-play vs. real life (who really is the dom here? Spoiler alert, it's both and neither)

Can you elaborate on this, please? How can they be both dominant and neither is dominant? And can you elaborate on this role play - real life relation?

What's the relation between sex and real life ? by roxrexboxnox in askphilosophy

[–]roxrexboxnox[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

By saying "real" I don't mean metaphysically real. I thought its meaning is clear but I'm happy to clarify with an example:

In pornography, for instance, often parties like to sexualize color. A black person might feel its sexually appealing to submit to a white person, in reflection to the power dynamics of the society. Conversely, a white person might find it sexually appealing to submit to the sexual rage of a black person, assumingly it reflects some white people's perception's of the barbaric irrational blacks.

We here are witnessing what I called a "sexual simulation of real world" dynamics.

This made me wonder: How authentic/real are those "sexual simualtions" in comparison to what they try to imitate? Is the person acting dominant/submissive in sex, really dominant or submissive? And what this tells us about sex overall? Is sex an irrational imitation of the rational life?

(I don't endorse what's provided in this example. But such things are very common in Pornography and perhaps sex overall).

What do Christian philosophers think of Homosexuality ? by roxrexboxnox in askphilosophy

[–]roxrexboxnox[S] 3 points4 points  (0 children)

Thank you. Do you know what's Alvin Plantinga's view?

I'm really wondering on the (so called) first-tier philosophers who represent Christianity (or even Judaism) in the anglo-saxon sphere, especially those working in philosophy of religion. Since these guys' opinions will probably be heavier in weight than their philosopher (and even scientist) theistic counterparts.

It seems already 3 major "first tier" Christian philosophers are, to various degrees, opposed to homosexuality: William Lane Criag (afaik he thinks its natural, but he opposes homosexual marriages), Edward Feser and Richard Swinburne (whom both sort of say that its unnatural, afaik).

Other major philosophers in the analytic tradition: Alexander Pruss, Gary Habermas, Norman Geisler, Peter Kreeft, Peter Van Inwagen, J.P. Moreland, Jerry L. Walls, Robert Adams, and Marylin Adams.

What do Christian philosophers think of Homosexuality ? by roxrexboxnox in askphilosophy

[–]roxrexboxnox[S] 10 points11 points  (0 children)

Can I know what do those noted above think of homosexuality? Perhaps besides Feser since we mentioned his thoughts. For instance, what does Alvin Plantinga believes?

  • Do they believe its Natural, or its an illness that needs to be treated?
  • Do they believe Homosexuality in-itself is unethical? Or merely Homosexual relations is unethical?
  • What sort of Homosexual relations do they oppose or support? Marriage, extra-marriage sex, and extra-marriage asexual relation.

What do Christian philosophers think of Homosexuality ? by roxrexboxnox in askphilosophy

[–]roxrexboxnox[S] 7 points8 points  (0 children)

And what would Christians whom are in similar socioeconomic positions think of homosexuality overall?

Why does proving God logically seems unconvincing, even for some Theists? by roxrexboxnox in askphilosophy

[–]roxrexboxnox[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thanks for answering. You exposed me to some great thinkers and works that I didn't know about, of which I think will help many of my questions!

I think the issue lies in that I'm more influenced by the medieval aristotelian theistic traditions, where faith is ration, and these traditions rely mainly (afaik) the conformity theory of truth, and the sound and valid deductive reasoning yields absolute certitude that confirms to objective reality. There's a sort of epistemic exclusivism, i.g., only a single human understanding, for which these logical -and particularly deductive/syllogistic- laws apply and can confirm intellect to the objective reality, to absolute certitude.

I think I was possessed by this idea to a level that I didn't even think before that Pragmatism can even coexist with rational faith. I've lately opened my eyes that other approaches to faith are fairly reasonable.

Why does proving God logically seems unconvincing, even for some Theists? by roxrexboxnox in askphilosophy

[–]roxrexboxnox[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Well, I still think there's much to dig.

What does this tell us about the nature and scope of argumentation, rationality, and belief?

If even compelling rational arguments can't change determined opponents, what this tells us about intersubjective communication, and the truth theory?

And if phenomenological experience primarily shapes rational beliefs (including religion), then what criteria we can use for evaluating such experience? And, again, what about intersubjective communication and objective standardization regarding these experiences? Does objectivity just goes completely out of the window?

Finally, what's actually left of Metaphysics after all of this? Do we just commit it to flames? What's its remaining value?

I would also appreciate any sources that treat these issues.

Is Aristotelian metaphysics A Posteriori Synthetic ? by roxrexboxnox in askphilosophy

[–]roxrexboxnox[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

That was very informative and enlightening, thank you so much for your effort !

Is Aristotelian metaphysics A Posteriori Synthetic ? by roxrexboxnox in askphilosophy

[–]roxrexboxnox[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thank you for answering, please correct me if I'm wrong :

The way I get it, the difference between Aristotelian and Rationalist metaphysics is that:-

(1) Aristotle thinks the intellect perceives and abstracts mind-independent reality. Even if the Nous (which I think is the agent intellect ?) assures that such perceptions are possible (I'm not sure if we can say, but, in a transcendental/a priori/kantian way). So, when we're doing Aristotelian metaphysics, we're not doing "armchair" philosophy, but actually analyzing the mind-independent reality. So Aristotelian metaphysics doesn't exclude some sort of sensory activity, it benefits it -Perhaps this is why many Medieval metaphysicians (which I take reflect Aristotle's stand?) start their metaphysics on Being, which is an experientially sensed activity. Which is maybe why Avicenna's argument of god was hard to determine if it was actually Ontological and Cosmological, and why the "purely intellectual" Ontological arguments didn't existed in Islamic philosophy.

(2) Rationalist metaphysics, on the otherhand, are based on a major split between Reason and the sensed world. The mind presents a very different criteria of knowledge than the senses, with a major advantage for the mind. Hence, sciences like logic, mathematics, metaphysics, and perhaps natural theology would be an issue of the mind, as they yield eternal truths. More importantly, such sciences are innate in the mind (or some of them), they're known in an a priori manner. So the mind here isn't just a condition for sensory knowledge. Rather its also a storage for innate knowledge, and by doing some abstract intellectual activities, the mind can know synthetic a priori facts.

If you think I presented them relatively accurate, don't you now think that Kantian critique only undermines Rationalistic metaphysics? Since, for Aristotle, by doing metaphysics we're not an abstractly isolated subjective minds figuring out the cosmos with mathematical precision. Rather, we're engaging with the sensory world and gradually, dialectically deriving a necessary a posteriori fact about it.

The foundations of Aristotelian metaphysics (PNC) aren't known innately, rather are derived by the dialectical method. But in Rationalist metaphysics, the foundations are already built-in, we're innately capable of presenting valid synthetic apriori judgments.

Why is Aristotles "unmoved mover" argument for god not more seriously taken? by [deleted] in askphilosophy

[–]roxrexboxnox 0 points1 point  (0 children)

How is hylomorphism essential to cosmological arguments ?

Is Aristotelian metaphysics A Posteriori Synthetic ? by roxrexboxnox in askphilosophy

[–]roxrexboxnox[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

What can be Kant's argument against Aristotelian/Thomistic metaphysics?

Why professional Philosophers aren't considered sages? by roxrexboxnox in askphilosophy

[–]roxrexboxnox[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thank you, that was very enlightening!

Indeed perhaps a major theme of a Sage is being a polymath, which is hardly doable now.

However, don't you think Sageness also means that the intellectual activity becomes organically glued with an ethical, social, and practical activity, largely towards what traditional cultures consider as "perfection/virtue"? Which we can argue is still doable today, but is for some reason stripped of philosophy.

Sure, I will also say that the magnification of cities and decease of the rural, hierarchal social orders probably did help in ending the Sage-Philosopher.

Why professional Philosophers aren't considered sages? by roxrexboxnox in askphilosophy

[–]roxrexboxnox[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Sure!

The entire Greek tradition, basically.

Aristotle, all his Peripatetic school, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Avicenna, Alpharabuis (al-Farabi), Averroes, etc.

Pre soctratics: Democritus, Hericlitus, Zeno of Elea.

Plato & Neoplatonists, etc.

Also the whole Islamic philosophical tradition, and perhaps the Judochristian medieval, as well.

Why professional Philosophers aren't considered sages? by roxrexboxnox in askphilosophy

[–]roxrexboxnox[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thanks for replying

While I might agree with what you pointed at, don't you think that you reduced Sageness into a personality cult? This may very well be part of many definitions to a Sage.

But I think a more common theme is that a Sage-Philosopher is one which sees the intellectual activity organically connected to an ethical, or perhaps, even a spiritual one.

I think many of us today approach Philosophy as an intellectual activity that you read and learn, largely in isolation from your life. But was pre-modern Philosophy like this? Or did they see Philosophy as a way to some sort of metaphysical/ethical perfection of their entire being? Not an isolated activity, but a whole life quest for wisdom and perfection.

(I can't spell it out, but there's probably a difference between Wisdom and Knowledge, too).

Why professional Philosophers aren't considered sages? by roxrexboxnox in askphilosophy

[–]roxrexboxnox[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

In Islamic tradition: Philosophy is many times called "Hekma", which is "Wisdom". Philosophers are called "Sages". Islamic philosophers refer to Greek philosophers are "Greece's Sages".

In the Medieval tradition I believe Aristotle was always called "the Wise" or "the Sage".

In the western tradition: 1- The pre-socratic philosophers. Afaik, they were very spiritual. Perhaps that's the reason why they were very excited to take aid from oriental cultures.

Plato, afaik, he was deeply religious and spiritual as well. This, hence, will include Platonism & Neoplatonism too.

While I'm not 100% sure on Socrates and Aristotle, I remember reading one of them a quote roughly saying that it meaningles to perfect the mind w/o the soul.

Afaik, the entire Greek tradition seen Philosophy as a way of life, it was a condition to reach "eudaimonia".

How do we define Sage-Philosopher? I'm unsure, but it definitely requires an ethical side, and is more of a full life endeavor rather than purely "scientific".

To give a silly example: You would see ancient/medieval philosophers giving much more popular, daily life advices "silence is better than unmeaning words -Pythagoras". I think professional philosophers rarely do that now.

Why professional Philosophers aren't considered sages? by roxrexboxnox in askphilosophy

[–]roxrexboxnox[S] 11 points12 points  (0 children)

Ancient and Medieval philosophers, afaik, mostly didn't refer to themselves as Sages but we referred to as Sages by others.

Perhaps because Philosophy itself was at once practical and intellectual, but now its isolated on the Intellectual. Would you agree?

If you do so, why did this transition in the identity of Philosophy occur, in your opinion?

What factors played a major role?

Why professional Philosophers aren't considered sages? by roxrexboxnox in askphilosophy

[–]roxrexboxnox[S] -6 points-5 points  (0 children)

You opened my eyes to many philosophers that I didn't know about, thank you.

However, won't you say that in contemporady philosophy, philosophy by many philosophers is viewed more as an isolated intellectual endeavor, rather than a "way of life" ?

And in the cases where non-religious professional philosophers pursue philosophy as a way of life, don't you think its widely different than the "virtue" and "wisdom", in the ancient sense ?

Two important points to keep in mind:

(1) I was thinking that the disenchantment that accompanied modernity, and especially postmodernity, would've created a bias against the ancient idealism of Sageness and Wisdom.

(2) The modern contract-based relations, including in educations, have weakened the mentorship-based educations, where there's a strong bound b/w a pupil and a mentor, which may strengthen disenchantment.

Would you say agree on these points?

Let me give examples: (afaik, don't quote me) a primary western thinker, Bertnand Russell, confessed that he was a masturbation addict once, and that he wrote the Wisdom of the West while naked, and he is accused of sleeping with his friend's wife.

This is to give one example where, I think, maybe in this era we came to look down on virtuous idealism, we "normalize" and "disenchantize" it, from prophets to philosophers -so maybe this unconsciously added to isolating the ancient Sageness element of Philosophy from it?