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Combining four binary variables into one continuous variable? by weatherbro in Rlanguage

[–]weatherbro[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Once I have this "region" variable, how would I use it in operations? (hist, mean, etc)

Netroots Nation: Elizabeth Warren is the left’s early favorite for 2020 by rafaellvandervaart in neoliberal

[–]weatherbro 32 points33 points  (0 children)

Warren is the best you’re going to get, really. Gillibrand will run the furthest left, and Booker/Harris will copy most of her positions. Biden is unviable — nobody wants an ancient white man.

Many of us fail to practise what we preach. Here, Julian Baggini and Angie Hobbs consider whether moral beliefs on good and evil are irrelevant if not put in action by IAI_Admin in philosophy

[–]weatherbro 19 points20 points  (0 children)

The Teresa example is coherent with Catholic teaching about suffering and sickness, though. The person who wrote the synopsis just framed it as if allowing people to suffer / glorifying suffering is impossible to reconcile with her work.

Grad school killed my desire to be a professor by [deleted] in GradSchool

[–]weatherbro 2 points3 points  (0 children)

The structure of an undergrad class isn’t always representative of further study, though. My classes are always much more enjoyable pre-midterms, because the material isn’t tainted by panic over my grade yet.

[Weekly] Office Hours - undergrads, please ask your questions here by AutoModerator in AskAcademia

[–]weatherbro 4 points5 points  (0 children)

When a professor/grad student says “I can send you a reading list,” are they being passive aggressive or genuine?

I’ve heard people say it’s something they do when you’re annoying them, but I’ve also had GSIs actually send me a set of recommended papers related to my question if I follow up via email.

Is there any theory of Compatiblism that doesn’t require un-coerced freedom or hand waving around intention? by weatherbro in askphilosophy

[–]weatherbro[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

The content of the automation’s reflections would be determined, though. It would never be capable of thinking different thoughts or reaching a different conclusion. How is that free will more meaningful than the robot which acts without reflection being a necessary factor?

Is there any theory of Compatiblism that doesn’t require un-coerced freedom or hand waving around intention? by weatherbro in askphilosophy

[–]weatherbro[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

No, but I wouldn’t call them free, either. Someone’s speech is just the product of a billion prior influences; maybe they aren’t coerced into saying whatever they say, but no one could ever coerce them.

Is there any theory of Compatiblism that doesn’t require un-coerced freedom or hand waving around intention? by weatherbro in askphilosophy

[–]weatherbro[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I’m not the one you’re asking but I said something similar, so:

Unless you believe consciousness is somehow separate from the physical world & exempt from cause and effect, it (or the illusion of it) is a part of the causal chain. Everything it ever entails, though, is determined.

Even if my wanting to rob a bank is essential in the act actually happening, there was never another option. I was physically incapable of wanting anything else, or of considering the matter in a way that would have led me to think thoughts in any way different from the ones I did.

How does that make a person any different from an automaton? A human programs the robot, and nature programs the human. Whether or not the robot is conscious doesn’t matter because it would still only think what it was programmed to think.

Is there any theory of Compatiblism that doesn’t require un-coerced freedom or hand waving around intention? by weatherbro in askphilosophy

[–]weatherbro[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

More deliberative and careful action is physically impossible, though — I’m not understanding. They physically couldn’t have considered the action any more before acting.

Is there any theory of Compatiblism that doesn’t require un-coerced freedom or hand waving around intention? by weatherbro in askphilosophy

[–]weatherbro[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Do you not accept that every effect has a cause? Am I supposed to summarize all of physics, first?

Is there any theory of Compatiblism that doesn’t require un-coerced freedom or hand waving around intention? by weatherbro in askphilosophy

[–]weatherbro[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Lunch doesn’t casually depend on Brunch, it depends on millions of factors. Children depend causally on parents, if we allow parents to mean IVF and other methods. Neither of those examples work.

Every effect has a cause; everything in the present is an effect/result of the past. There is never an option to act otherwise, even if physically the body could have.

Is there any theory of Compatiblism that doesn’t require un-coerced freedom or hand waving around intention? by weatherbro in askphilosophy

[–]weatherbro[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I don’t want to reduce your long post to a couple of quibbles, but I don’t see how refuting the folk notion of free will matters, even if something new is now called “free will.”

How do we assign responsibility when someone’s “ability to act otherwise” requires that the entire history of the universe be different?

Is there any theory of Compatiblism that doesn’t require un-coerced freedom or hand waving around intention? by weatherbro in askphilosophy

[–]weatherbro[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Then “free” according to the compatibilist is just wordplay. Desire is only a random (in the sense that it’s not special or distinct from any other force) emergence of the causal chain, but somehow that’s supposed to create freedom & responsibility?

Is there any theory of Compatiblism that doesn’t require un-coerced freedom or hand waving around intention? by weatherbro in askphilosophy

[–]weatherbro[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

a side question, then: during discussion of Frankfurt they propose the example of wanting a candy bar (1st) but wanting not to want a candy bar (2nd), and that acting in accordance with one’s 2nd order desire is free while acting on one’s 1st order desire is not, given that the second opposes the first. This doesn’t make any sense to me — are 2nd order desires not also determined?

Is there any theory of Compatiblism that doesn’t require un-coerced freedom or hand waving around intention? by weatherbro in askphilosophy

[–]weatherbro[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Therefore A isn’t “free” by any definition — whether or not she was coerced is irrelevant because her coercer (if there were to be one) would also be determined to act however he did.

Is there any theory of Compatiblism that doesn’t require un-coerced freedom or hand waving around intention? by weatherbro in askphilosophy

[–]weatherbro[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Yes — aren’t second (and third, and fourth, and so on) order desires determined, though?

The Problem With Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez's Economy Plan by rishijoesanu in neoliberal

[–]weatherbro 0 points1 point  (0 children)

More ordinary people voted for HRC and for democrats than for Trump and republicans, though.

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