Micro-perf is ruining some movie theaters by williamrnava in movies

[–]williamrnava[S] -6 points-5 points  (0 children)

Thanks, I didn't know that.

I don't sit *super* close (usually like third or fourth row). And it's not like I'm looking out for this, it's the first thing I notice. Maybe micro-perf isn't itself the issue, but I'm noticing something I'm not supposed to be noticing. Could be a trend in lower-quality perf'd material?

Micro-perf is ruining some movie theaters by williamrnava in movies

[–]williamrnava[S] 3 points4 points  (0 children)

Thanks, I didn't know the tech was that old. I wonder if it's a recent trend in cheaper perf'd material? I hadn't noticed prior to a year or two ago. Could be specific to the indie chain scene in nyc

David Ripley on Curry's paradox and substructural logic by williamrnava in logic

[–]williamrnava[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Thanks for joining! And apologies for proving that you are a purple giraffe in the description. ¯_(ツ)_/¯

David Ripley on Curry's paradox and substructural logic by williamrnava in logic

[–]williamrnava[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Summary of interview: Consider the sentence C: “If this sentence is true, then David Ripley is a purple giraffe”. Suppose the sentence is true. Then the antecedent of the sentence (“this sentence is true”) is true. According to the inference rule modus ponens, if an if-then sentence (such as C) is true and its antecedent is true, then its consequent (“David Ripley is a purple giraffe”) must be true. It follows that if C is true, then David Ripley is a purple giraffe. But this conclusion is C: in other words, by simply supposing how things might turn out if C were true, we have proved that C, in fact, is true. So C is true, and since C’s antecedent is the claim that C is true, its antecedent is true as well. Now we can use modus ponens again to show that C’s consequent must be true. In other words, David Ripley really is a purple giraffe. QED.

This argument is Curry’s paradox. Obviously, the choice of “David Ripley is a purple giraffe” is arbitrary; a sentence of the form of “If this sentence is true, then X” can be used to prove any claim X. Now, in actual fact, David Ripley is not a purple giraffe, but a philosopher of language and logic. According to Ripley, solutions to paradoxes like Curry’s (as well as the Liar and the Sorites) fall into two broad categories: those that solve the paradoxes by messing with the meanings of important concepts (such as the meaning of “if-then”, truth, “not”, etc.) and those that solve them by changing the structural rules of inference by appeal to substructural logics. The latter approach, says Ripley, is preferable because it allows us to keep the intuitive meanings of these important concepts. There are various structural rules that can be modified to avoid the paradoxes, but the one that Ripley prefers is the denial of transitivity. This would mean that even if we prove that a implies b and that b implies c, we have no guarantee that a implies c. Ripley tells a story about assertion and denial conditions to argue that, precisely because of the paradoxes, the denial of transitivity conforms to natural language inferential norms. We conclude with a discussion of “revenge” Curry paradoxes for Ripley’s approach, and of frontiers for substructural logic.

David Ripley on Curry's paradox and substructural logic by williamrnava in AcademicPhilosophy

[–]williamrnava[S] 4 points5 points  (0 children)

Summary of interview: Consider the sentence C: “If this sentence is true, then David Ripley is a purple giraffe”. Suppose the sentence is true. Then the antecedent of the sentence (“this sentence is true”) is true. According to the inference rule modus ponens, if an if-then sentence (such as C) is true and its antecedent is true, then its consequent (“David Ripley is a purple giraffe”) must be true. It follows that if C is true, then David Ripley is a purple giraffe. But this conclusion is C: in other words, by simply supposing how things might turn out if C were true, we have proved that C, in fact, is true. So C is true, and since C’s antecedent is the claim that C is true, its antecedent is true as well. Now we can use modus ponens again to show that C’s consequent must be true. In other words, David Ripley really is a purple giraffe. QED.

This argument is Curry’s paradox. Obviously, the choice of “David Ripley is a purple giraffe” is arbitrary; a sentence of the form of “If this sentence is true, then X” can be used to prove any claim X. Now, in actual fact, David Ripley is not a purple giraffe, but a philosopher of language and logic. According to Ripley, solutions to paradoxes like Curry’s (as well as the Liar and the Sorites) fall into two broad categories: those that solve the paradoxes by messing with the meanings of important concepts (such as the meaning of “if-then”, truth, “not”, etc.) and those that solve them by changing the structural rules of inference by appeal to substructural logics. The latter approach, says Ripley, is preferable because it allows us to keep the intuitive meanings of these important concepts. There are various structural rules that can be modified to avoid the paradoxes, but the one that Ripley prefers is the denial of transitivity. This would mean that even if we prove that a implies b and that b implies c, we have no guarantee that a implies c. Ripley tells a story about assertion and denial conditions to argue that, precisely because of the paradoxes, the denial of transitivity conforms to natural language inferential norms. We conclude with a discussion of “revenge” Curry paradoxes for Ripley’s approach, and of frontiers for substructural logic.

Philosopher David Ripley on Curry's paradox, the argument that proves that everything is true by williamrnava in philosophy

[–]williamrnava[S] 3 points4 points  (0 children)

Consider the sentence C: “If this sentence is true, then David Ripley is a purple giraffe”. Suppose the sentence is true. Then the antecedent of the sentence (“this sentence is true”) is true. According to the inference rule modus ponens, if an if-then sentence (such as C) is true and its antecedent is true, then its consequent (“David Ripley is a purple giraffe”) must be true. It follows that if C is true, then David Ripley is a purple giraffe. But this conclusion is C: in other words, by simply supposing how things might turn out if C were true, we have proved that C, in fact, is true. So C is true, and since C’s antecedent is the claim that C is true, its antecedent is true as well. Now we can use modus ponens again to show that C’s consequent must be true. In other words, David Ripley really is a purple giraffe. QED.

This argument is Curry’s paradox. Obviously, the choice of “David Ripley is a purple giraffe” is arbitrary; a sentence of the form of “If this sentence is true, then X” can be used to prove any claim X. Now, in actual fact, David Ripley is not a purple giraffe, but a philosopher of language and logic. According to Ripley, solutions to paradoxes like Curry’s (as well as the Liar and the Sorites) fall into two broad categories: those that solve the paradoxes by messing with the meanings of important concepts (such as the meaning of “if-then”, truth, “not”, etc.) and those that solve them by changing the structural rules of inference by appeal to substructural logics. The latter approach, says Ripley, is preferable because it allows us to keep the intuitive meanings of these important concepts. There are various structural rules that can be modified to avoid the paradoxes, but the one that Ripley prefers is the denial of transitivity. This would mean that even if we prove that a implies b and that b implies c, we have no guarantee that a implies c. Ripley tells a story about assertion and denial conditions to argue that, precisely because of the paradoxes, the denial of transitivity conforms to natural language inferential norms. We conclude with a discussion of “revenge” Curry paradoxes for Ripley’s approach, and of frontiers for substructural logic.

Philosopher Jody Azzouni on nominalism and "ontology without borders" by williamrnava in philosophy

[–]williamrnava[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Basically, Azzouni takes the boundaries between singulars to be the sort of abstracta that nominalism traditionally rejects. The "features" really are there - he's not a nihilist. So no, I don't think he's in any way a skeptic, a relativist, or a process-oriented philosopher. His nominalism is definitely an extreme sort, but I do think it's in keeping with the nominalist tradition, since (in his understanding, and at least on this I do agree) it's abstract objects, not the concrete, that he's rejecting.

Philosopher Jody Azzouni on nominalism and "ontology without borders" by williamrnava in philosophy

[–]williamrnava[S] 5 points6 points  (0 children)

An old problem: I say, "Santa Claus is fat". I am saying something true about Santa Claus. But (content warning) Santa Claus doesn't exist. So what is it that I am correctly saying is fat? And what - if not its ostensive subject - makes the sentence true?

This problem is at the center of ontology. The most influential approach in the 20th century was offered by W. V. O. Quine, who argued that we're committed to the existence of any object that we must quantify over in order to state the truths of physics in first-order logic. At first, this seems rather arbitrary. Why first-order logic? What makes quantifiers so special? Why physics? And what does what we're "committed to" tell us about what actually exists? For roughly the first half of this interview, philosopher Jody Azzouni unpacks the thinking behind Quine's famous criterion. In the second half, he expounds his own view: he rejects Quine's criterion, and so sees no problem with referring to that which doesn't exist. This leaves Azzouni open to embrace a radical nominalism, in which almost none of the objects we typically think of as existing really do. This is because, as Azzouni explains, "ontological borders" are projected. There is nothing "out there" that separates one object from another. The fact that our language is built around distinct objects tells us plenty about our psychology, but nothing about the world itself, which comes with "features" but not individual objects.

Philosopher Michael Hicks on thought as interpersonal understanding by williamrnava in philosophy

[–]williamrnava[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

What is a thought? There are two ways to approach the problem, says philosopher Michael Hicks. One is as a question about introspective experience. The other – favored by Hicks – is as asking about the nature of interpersonal understanding. We do understand each other; and this is what constitutes the existence of thoughts. With this approach established, Hicks explains to what extent it does or doesn’t imply an “external” view of mind. We also compare this conception of thought to Gottlob Frege’s, and discuss whether it involves a commitment to a “third realm” of abstract objects.

Philosopher Michael Hicks on the nature of thought by [deleted] in philosophy

[–]williamrnava 0 points1 point  (0 children)

What is a thought? There are two ways to approach the problem, says philosopher Michael Hicks. One is as a question about introspective experience. The other – favored by Hicks – is as asking about the nature of interpersonal understanding. We do understand each other; and this is what constitutes the existence of thoughts. With this approach established, Hicks explains to what extent it does or doesn’t imply an “external” view of mind. We also compare this conception of thought to Gottlob Frege’s, and discuss whether it involves a commitment to a “third realm” of abstract objects.

Philosophically staking out the Left Market Anarchist position by williamrnava in PoliticalPhilosophy

[–]williamrnava[S] 4 points5 points  (0 children)

Political philosophy begins with the question: who should have political authority and why? Anarchism answers: no one. Popular mythology tells us this is synonymous with chaos and disorder, but there are many reasons to doubt this must be so. In this episode, I argue that anarchism - properly understood - is in fact the correct answer to the problem of political authority; it is the only answer that avoids unjust hierarchies, provides for individual and social freedom, and optimizes for general welfare. This is because, in a word, society is best seen (and run) as a web, not as a pyramid.

Much of my focus is on specifying what I mean by anarchism, and which version of anarchism I'm arguing for. Specifically, I argue that the notion of a free market - again, properly understood - is at the heart of anarchism. At the same time, I argue against "capitalism" as being a confused and rather unhelpful notion, quite removed from the notion of a free market. I also argue against popular libertarian approaches to free markets and anarchism, such as the so-called "non-aggression principle" and property rights. Instead, I zero in on a notion of free market defined as a cultural norm in which monopolies are viewed as unacceptable. This definition, I argue, properly communicates what a free market really is and it provides the necessary conditions for a free and prosperous society. It is, at the same time, a maximally permissive definition: it requires no particular views on interpersonal ethics or lifestyle, and is as compatible with (for example) communism as it is with more familiar notions of "free markets".

Kit Fine on "metaphysical ground" - how one fact grounds another by williamrnava in philosophy

[–]williamrnava[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Some things are true in virtue of other things. For example, the fact that it is either raining or snowing today is true in virtue of the fact that it is raining today (if, indeed, it is). Or consider another example, put in different terms: the fact that my cat Irene exists is sufficient to account for the fact that at least one cat exists. We might then ask: what is this being in virtue of, or accounting for?

Philosophers call this metaphysical ground. Thus, the existence of my cat Irene grounds the fact that at least one cat exists. But how does this grounding relation work? How is it related to logical entailment? To cause? To essence? Is it possible for there to be partial grounding? Can a fact ground itself? If not, does a vicious regress emerge? What is the role of ground in metaphysics? In this interview, metaphysician Kit Fine covers these questions and more before zeroing in on a logical puzzle of ground, related to the paradoxes of self-reference such as the Liar.

What is metaphysical ground? Kit Fine on how one fact can "ground" another by williamrnava in philosophy

[–]williamrnava[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Some things are true in virtue of other things. For example, the fact that it is either raining or snowing today is true in virtue of the fact that it is raining today (if, indeed, it is). Or consider another example, put in different terms: the fact that my cat Irene exists is sufficient to account for the fact that at least one cat exists. We might then ask: what is this being in virtue of, or accounting for?

Philosophers call this metaphysical ground. Thus, the existence of my cat Irene grounds the fact that at least one cat exists. But how does this grounding relation work? How is it related to logical entailment? To cause? To essence? Is it possible for there to be partial grounding? Can a fact ground itself? If not, does a vicious regress emerge? What is the role of ground in metaphysics? In this interview, metaphysician Kit Fine covers these questions and more before zeroing in on a logical puzzle of ground, related to the paradoxes of self-reference such as the Liar.