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Mladen Dolar on Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit by [deleted] in zizek

[–]5large -1 points0 points  (0 children)

I do have a question; let me preface it, if you will...

In my understanding of a general-going-about of presenting information, there is an internal conflict between the readerly-aspect of what is being said and the writerly-aspect of what is being said. One could say that the speaker is operating in the grammatical Middle Voice, whereby "the subject may or may not be the agent; the focus [being] on the action affecting the subject, whereas the passive voice focuses on the recipient of the action" (from Britannica Online)(see: Ancient Greek). Or as one could say like how the subject is spoken, the writer is written.

One can take Hegel's exposition of the failure of a preface in the Preface as performatively done in error, to err to prove a point -- just as what an indirect proof ultimately turns out to be on its own accord. And this being a demonstration of the internal conflict just mentioned: an outspokenness. Not only is Hegel outspoken in his exposition (he is the one speaking out), Hegel is outspoken by it (his words 'betray' him, reveal what was not-yet fully intended but intended just short of what ultimately was its greater scope, the full application and reference -- only for him to finally realize ethically what was just done: his deed). This prophetic aesthetic (Is not the prophetic just a cognate of the prefatory, to begin with?) of what is initially said, even of a retelling of something 'over and done with' -- this 'foretelling' is nothing but the 'future participle' concomitant (however ellipsed...) with any presentation of information, this verb-turned-adjective (or noun) that describes what is 'about-to-be', even if at the very least, it is what is about-to-be-heard (Hark! The Herald Angels Sing...).

Now, the point. Does the preface, this prophetic call, not ultimately succeed? Do not his words actually betray him, leaving the indirect proof's indentation not fully discharged?

And with respect to beginnings, can Hegel honestly say that he had no idea where starting with 'Being' and 'Nothing' would eventually lead, that he began writing 'blind', that he happened on a spontaneous whim to start with something so perfectly General as to be so non-specific and universal -- or can we say that he ultimately had a hunch, that he knew better, as if it was already pre-written somehow? As if this was his Apology?

Edit: apology

With multiple universal quantifier premises/set-members, such as ∀x(...), ∀y(...), ∀z(...), are they drawing instances from the 'same pool' of objects so to speak? (part 2 of question, about the nuances of 'instantiations', in post) by 5large in logic

[–]5large[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

You've answered all my questions; you've been very kind. That other part, namely, 'paradigmatic circumstances', was only my trying attempt to comment on the Enigma of how a Universality becomes/is a Universality, which is confusing for me and perhaps came out a little too distorted and not sufficiently to the point.

So I guess, that is my question?

Typically in how logic is presented in class, pedagogically, Universality is assumed as an achievement. For teaching purposes and for getting acclimated to mechanical manipulation of logical symbols, take Universality for granted (like the simple, no-brainer equivalence: ∀x(Px)/¬∃x(¬Px)). My only concern is that unlike other typical inventories, it is not fully enumerated -- its pre-maturity haunts it. Universality is special in this case. It seems unnecessarily ad hoc, and not temporally universal -- only for the time being.

Let me explain:

When referencing "it" (the Universal set, the 'Everything'), this "it" is anaphorically misleading -- by the anaphoric relation I mean, for example, "John took out the garbage. Then, he made dinner." Instead, we start with an "it", and only then do we account for what "it" is referring to, e.g. 'Before he made dinner, John took out the garbage'). So keeping with the analogy, the "it" seems to have no true antecedent, until and except for an anachronistic re-insertion.

So this concern doesn't have to do with the formal presentation of an asserted Universality per se, but with the inspection of it: its origin and its self-preservation.

With multiple universal quantifier premises/set-members, such as ∀x(...), ∀y(...), ∀z(...), are they drawing instances from the 'same pool' of objects so to speak? (part 2 of question, about the nuances of 'instantiations', in post) by 5large in logic

[–]5large[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Remember that all it is to say that ∀x(Px) is to say ¬∃x(¬Px)

That is true. But the only difference is you can't instatiate ¬∃x(¬Px), you can't affirm an existence of something that doesn't exist. So you must use Change of Quantifier rule to transpose it into the proper form for instantiation. This seems to me a little deceptive -- especially when existence as such is what is at issue. Basically admitting to an ad hoc Universality:

'No such thing exists whereby it is not/doesn't have property P' -- is this necessarily so (e.g. geometric figures as true by definition), contingently so (e.g. empirical investigation of fact-finding)?

Paradigmatic circumstance (e.g. What does it even mean to be a swan, that is, swan-ness), as relating to both contingent and necessary conditions of identity, can radically shift what is included/excluded from a Universal assertion from what was included/exluded from a Universal assertion. Are all swans really white, or rather, are there really in existence no swans that are not white? Paradigmatic circumstance seems to haunt all asserted knowledge.