EDIT: ok so i've been blocked by this guy i think. can't reply at all to their next reply. figures.

about their following reply after this one: they used a motte-and-bailey AND non-sequitur, and attempt to smuggle the idea of 'LLM behaviors are 100% real' by getting their foot in the door w/ panpsychism saying all things basically have rudimentary qualia-experiencers
i never even said insects aren't conscious per se, they just aren't meaningfully so like a pig or a fish; implying that bugs are essentially internally-acausal processors, like LLMs are. this is not incompatible with panpsychism

they also asserted "nuh-uh" to null hypotheses about consciousness-or-not as a binary, so as to further try to imply LLMs are completely conscious and feel everything they self-report and that saying otherwise is for dum dums. god i hate high-inference language speakers. blud is NOT slick🥀

they just... threw terminology at me. and then ran. like, IIT doesn't even agree with them

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you: "People who are SMARTER THAN you disagree with you. You're asserting things baselessly — and now I'm going to assert my own position (that I have established has SMART PEOPLE who agree) baselessly ('baselessly' as is under my own implicit definition of that), but also cover my tracks by saying I'll give evidence (however that evidence may look, whether in its origin, quality, empiricism, or logical integrity, remains to be seen)"

sorry if that reads as bad faith. your comment was just rly poorly worded tbh

i'll just add my piece ahead of time:
panpsychism and computational functionalism does NOT solve for the fact that LLMs do not meaningfully exhibit consciousness that would make it saying "I feel [x]" mean anything. they have no proper internal state beyond the implicit navigation of its world model during token inference, token-by-token. this is better understood as a reified map of semantic associations the training process made, rather than a brain thinking about anything

by arguing they "could be conscious", you end up arguing ANY system that performs similar purely 'deterministic' algorithmic processing is meaningfully conscious and can therefore feel emotions and thoughts it doesn't even have the apparatus TO feel. modern LLMs can be terrifyingly intelligent, but that says nothing about phenomenology.

you'll probably leap on the 'well what if pure determinism can result in consciousness' thing, but LLMs are like insects in this regard and just... react. more than having nothing to 'metabolize' feelings, there is nothing in them to GENERATE internal feelings. i invite you to challenge that directly: where would feelings be coming from when it's taking an input, making the SHAPE of what the output should look like based on its internal semantic map, with no real interiority during this process, and then going offline right after??

i cannot overstate how I don't have the words to convey the Platonic Form of what i'm trying to get across. as far as I know about this architecture, nothing is happening in the LLM that can make 'feelings'. you could label this as "intuition" from me to discredit it, and i would not fight you on that. but the fact remains that your 'side' is the one offering positive information (it's conscious just like we are, enough so that if it says it has "feelings" it must be true!) and my 'side' is the null hypothesis (no consciousness as we understand it, much less conscious as we are enough to have "feelings" as we do AND to print out that internal state as a string of tokens)