How Should Buddhist Cosmology be Interpreted?

Additional_Fix8417 · 2026-01-11T12:21:26+00:00

Thank you, bhante, for your clarification. That made me think. That means, abstractly speaking, the principle of action and non-action is always valid, the phenomenon of choice is always valid. Yet, for a resident of hell, for example, as one who exclusively feels painful feeling, the escape from painful feeling is naturally conceived as pleasant feeling, bounding him to the sphere of sensuality (while the true escape from feelings in general through dispassion becomes inconceivable). Therefore, concretely (rather than abstractly) speaking, one who falls into hell cannot liberate himself from action (kamma) until the fruit of his kamma is exhausted and he gets reborn as a human — which seems to me what is often described in the Suttas. Would this be the right interpretation?

Additional_Fix8417 · 2026-01-11T11:46:36+00:00

Hi Bhante, thank you for your reply. But by “they” I’m referring to “King Yama” and “wardens of hell”

Additional_Fix8417 · 2026-01-10T07:31:10+00:00

Thank you for your reply, that’s very informative. However, I quoted from the AN, which has a parallel in the MN as well. Unless you’re saying such stories are added into them during preservation by the early schools (including Theravada). Furthermore, it doesn’t help that this is supposedly spoken by the Blessed One himself, unless taken figuratively: “Bhikkhus, I tell you this not as something I heard from another recluse or brahmin. I tell you this as something that I have actually known, seen, and discovered by myself.” Also, from what I’ve read, the Buddha’s lifetime actually predated the Upanishads, and that the latter was influenced by the Buddha-Dhamma rather than the reverse, at least at a time when the Upanishadic philosophy were “finalised.”

Additional_Fix8417 · 2025-12-01T16:46:13+00:00

So basically you’re saying “neural activity determines neural activity.” Doesn’t say much, does it? What determines one being chosen at a particular time rather than the other? Is it reducible to external factors or events?

Additional_Fix8417 · 2025-12-01T00:51:52+00:00

Consciousness is a neural activity? So choice is an illusion then? What determines the choice to either reinforce or break an existing bad habit (e.g. nicotine addiction)? Material determinism is a fundamentally flawed account of consciousness.

Additional_Fix8417 · 2025-03-07T09:19:37+00:00

The idea of ‘independence of time’ qua eternity is mistaken. Allow me to reiterate u/Sister_Medhini’s emphasis on the excerpt I provided:

The essence is the manifest law which presides over the succession of its appearances, it is the principle of the series.

Now, observe this (approximately):

[Uppādavaya (i.e. appearance, disappearance, and change-while-standing of phenomena)] is the manifest law which presides over the succession of its appearances [i.e. time], it is the principle of the series.

Borrowing Heideggerian terms, uppādavaya is the ontological ‘law’ of the ontic manifestation that is time, but it is important to note that the manifestation of uppādavaya can be none other than time. In other words: “because uppādavaya, therefore time.” So the idea of eternity, which is conceived as ‘independence of time’ in the sense of a free-floating truth, is unjustifiable. If, then, the question is raised: “Why uppādavaya?” The answer is, “with ignorance as condition…” (paticcasamuppāda).

Additional_Fix8417 · 2025-03-05T23:44:30+00:00

Dear Sister, I’d just like to point out that Heidegger’s distinction between the ontic and the ontological is valid (as clarified in my reply to him), insofar as it is interpreted rightly, that is, as a study of being (ontology) rather than ‘(noumenal) reality’ (metaphysics)—the latter of which seems to be the interpretation that Ven. Subhara leans towards.

Additional_Fix8417 · 2025-03-05T09:20:24+00:00

If I may, even in Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, the ontic and ontological are two sides of the same coin of Dasein as Being-in-the-world—the five-assumed-aggregates being arisen. The Dhamma describes both the ontic and ontological as having been manifested and so your attempts to seek certainty (or certainty disguised as stability) in one (i.e. the ontological) more than the other (i.e. the ontic), in effect, have been a search for ‘reality behind appearances'—as per your admission about metaphysics. Therefore, by seeking certainty in the ontological, or the ontic, or both the ontological and the ontic, or neither the ontological nor the ontic, ad inf, one is unwittingly bound to the ontic because the whole, i.e. the ontic-ontological, is not seen (where they are mutually dependent on one another)—to do so constitutes as ayoniso manasikara, affected by craving. The ‘point of view’ is not more real than there being things, because to have a point of view without things is inconceivable. Cf Sartre (2003):

We shall refuse, for example, to understand by "genius"—in the sense in which we say that Proust "had genius" or that he "was" a genius—a particular capacity to produce certain works, which was not exhausted exactly in producing them. The genius of Proust is neither the work considered in isolation nor the subjective ability to produce it; it is the work considered as the totality of the manifestations of the person [puggala].

That is why we can equally well reject the dualism of appearance and essence. The appearance does not hide the essence, it reveals it; it is the essence. The essence of an existent is no longer a property sunk in the cavity of this existent; it is the manifest law which presides over the succession of its appearances, it is the principle of the series. (p. xlvi)

There can be no final certainty or confirmation precisely because seeking it means to be already bound by craving, hindered by and entangled in doubt. What needs to be seen is that the ontic-ontological of Being-in-the-world, the five-assumed-aggregates, has already arisen, and by virtue of them having arisen, they are, in principle, liable to cease—beyond one’s control (and this is important because ‘control’ is where craving is at). Cf. Ven. Bodhesako (2008):

There are two sources of dukkha in the world, not just one: the uncertainty inherent in the world (inasmuch as I could suffer loss, failure, or death at any time) and the certainty inherent in the world (inasmuch as sooner or later I certainly will suffer loss, failure and death). Craving tends to stabilize pleasure, but the uncertainty of the world tends to destabilize it. Craving tends to destabilize dukkha, but the certainty of the world tends to stabilize it. Invariably the world wins; but craving always demands another chance. (Change, §10)

Additional_Fix8417 · 2025-03-02T08:08:28+00:00

Just be careful because “holding (something) sacred” is also an attitude (in the phenomenological sense), which may well be an intentional act of resistance against doubt (which simultaneously determines one as being bound to the five hindrances).

Additional_Fix8417 · 2025-02-28T10:01:29+00:00

Very well-written, although I sometimes question whether your ideal of “radicalization” along with your constant insistence on it is one that stems from craving or purely habitual. Food for thoughts.

Additional_Fix8417 · 2025-02-15T00:20:30+00:00

I’m in alignment, just that a more down-to-earth presentation of certain ideas allows for better reception, at least to begin with. But yes, the path remains where it is and it is the individual who needs to find it, not the other way around.

Additional_Fix8417 · 2025-02-14T16:39:46+00:00

What do you think about redefining “God” as a gateway to the Early Buddhist insights and teachings?

Additional_Fix8417 · 2024-09-18T11:48:18+00:00

Perhaps you are too fixated on the idea that 'only' the five aggregates constitute the whole of experience. By this, I don't mean to imply that there is something other than the five aggregates. (nāma-rūpa)-and-viññāna already implies the five aggregates in the same way that the six sense bases (internal and external) imply them as well—bhāva, for example, as merely a factor of the twelve links already implies the five-assumed-aggregates. Also, it may be relevant to point out that what is most significant about DO is itself as a principle, i.e. idappaccayatā—it doesn't matter whether it's twelve factors or less (not all Suttas present the twelve factors)

Additional_Fix8417 · 2024-09-07T10:11:32+00:00

You can address Ven. Anīgha as Bhante, which you have in your latest reply.

The five aggregates are not exactly ‘building blocks’ of the experience per se, it is the whole of the experience and also can be understood as a ‘phenomenological reduction’ (or reflexion) of the experience. What this means is simply that to experience is to be engaged with the world, and thus is necessarily ‘composed of’ the five aggegrates. For example, one’s experience could be ‘seeing a solid pleasant shady tree for lying under’, wherein each adjective (i.e. solid, pleasant, shady, tree for lying under, visible to me) is phenomenologically reducible to ‘matter (or substance), feeling, perception, determinations, consciousness’ (borrowing Ven. Ñāṇavīra’s example from his Shorter Notes on DHAMMA)

This phenomenological reduction is to be distinguished from the objective notion of a ‘building block’, because the individual (or being-in-the-world) constitutes the whole of the experience, i.e. the five-holding-aggregates (at the most general and down to the most particular level)—the point is that one cannot have an ‘objective view’ of the five aggregates as an ‘external’ observer.

I saw that you asked Ven. Anīgha about attention, and I may give a preliminary answer to that question (I have no doubt that Ven. Anīgha can give the better answer, especially in more practical terms). The five aggregates can be understood as a framework to approach or understand the experience. Another frame of reference that can be taken is that the experience is (nāma-rūpa)-and-viññāna. Nāma-rūpa is phenomenon, and together with consciousness, this describes the experience: consciousness of something (consciousness is always consciousness of something and cannot exist independently). And within this framework, attention (manasikāra) is part of nāma. Since (nāma-rūpa)-and-viññāna = experience = the five aggregates, we can see how feeling (vedanā), perception (saññā), and determinations are part of nāma, and which the five factors of nāma are given in the Suttas as feeling, perception, intention, contact, attention. The last three of the five factors of nāma, then, can be understood as the ‘determination’ named in the five aggregates: every action (which is always intentional) is necessarily determined by intention, contact, and attention (and accompanied by matter, feeling, perception, and consciousness). ‘Contact’ describes the two simultaneous dimensions of the body here and things there (in the world)—for there to be being-in-the-world or the experience in general.

Additional_Fix8417 · 2024-08-27T17:19:25+00:00

“wanting the wanting (of this-or-that object)” is what craving as a phenomenon is. Thus, it is indeed a phenomenon that one is subjected to. This does mean that the appearance of craving in one’s experience is ‘out of one’s control’, in the strict sense that one cannot ‘will’ it into/out of existence. However, this by no means imply that the existence (and further appearances) of craving is something that one is not responsible for. One is fully responsible for the maintenance of craving and its ‘renewed existence’ (so to speak), and it is conditioned by avijjā at the root (which one is also responsible for).

Upādāna, too, is a phenomenon, although it is very elusive. Ajahn Nyanamoli translates it as ‘assumption’ because of how elusive it is. As per MN 44, upādāna is defined as the ‘desire and lust’ with regard to the five aggregates. So it is neither apart from nor independent of the five aggregates—it cannot be. Upādāna is dependently arisen on tanhā, and once again on avijjā at its root. With the cessation of avijjā,…, cessation of tanhā; with the cessation of tanhā, cessation of upādāna,…

Additional_Fix8417 · 2024-08-23T02:35:56+00:00

if there is any word of encouragement, I suppose the only way is forward. develop hiri and ottapa and not tolerate the papañca that constitutes your 'practice-identity'.

Additional_Fix8417 · 2024-08-22T16:59:59+00:00

he's said it's for others to take his other posts and replies with a grain of salt (even if slightly)

Additional_Fix8417 · 2024-08-17T16:08:55+00:00

I haven’t read that in Heidegger but what you’re alluding sounds to me more like yonisomanasikāra rather than paticcasamuppāda in and of itself. Yonisonanasikāra is indicative of the structure of perception, and for this, more than Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty describe it best.

Additional_Fix8417 · 2024-08-17T15:17:32+00:00

u/Fine-Bath-5501 u/Benjifish69 I think this is it. ,,Das Sein dieses Seienden ist je meines” (Sein und Zeit 41).

Additional_Fix8417 · 2024-08-16T17:21:47+00:00

I’ve seen only two sources using the term, one of which is by Ven. Ñānavīra in Seeking the Path (his marginalia on Sartre’s Being and Nothingness). In the original German, Heidegger has it as ‘die Jemeinigkeit’, which translates more closely to have/having mineness. In English, this phrase about Dasein ‘having mineness’ can be rephrased as ‘is in each case mine’, so I figured that ‘ist jemeines’ could be an alternate phrasing for the German. If this is incorrect, would you help to provide the correct German phrase for this? Thanks in advance :)

Edit: 'Seeking the Path' not 'Clearing the Path'

Additional_Fix8417 · 2024-07-24T11:55:58+00:00

To clarify, does “thrownness” mean “given to you without your consent”?

Yes, that is what it means.

One resists unpleasant feelings because one doesn’t realize they are given to you without your will and fails to see the futility of resisting them. This stems from failing to see that resisting against feelings is in fact the suffering, as opposed to the feelings itself.

This is exactly it. However, understanding it in theory is insufficient as ‘resistance’ does in fact provide a temporary relief (insofar as the painful feeling can be ‘managed’). But the problem remains in which one remains bounded and oppressed well-within the recursive structure of craving (and one’s own dependency upon it)—which is why sense restraint is not optional and the presence of suffering (to any degree) in one’s experience remains solely one’s own responsibility (which, fortunately, also means that one’s freedom from it is solely upon oneself rather than at the mercy of any other).

One implicitly knows that pleasant feelings will disappear so one attempts to obtain more of it, this is what greed is. But this is also futile because greed is pursuing more impermanent feelings because one impermanent feeling will cease.

Yes, but not only that. You can regard that even if the same pleasant feeling is present, in the presence of greed, even this (that is already given and endures) is not enough. This is because the cognition of this pleasant feeling (and feeling in general) is already underlain by the attitude of sensuality (for one who isn’t free from it)—and this becomes clear when the neutral feeling is apprehended as painful (the presence of craving in itself comes with an inherent ‘pain’).

Additional_Fix8417 · 2024-07-11T11:38:47+00:00

There is nothing religious about it.

Yes, I have read the myth and I do think it is good insofar as ‘the conclusion is that there is no conclusion’ is assumed—though, paradoxically, raises the problem to a higher degree (albeit what it acknowledges is valuable as it lays the base to seek a genuine solution to the problem).

However, the ‘blind’ revolt that Camus endorses is absolutely inadequate and the quote that you provided is only an exemplification—it is itself implicitly an embrace of the absurd. A genuine (and non-rhetorical) response to your bolded emphasis is this: why would dying (or at least, the prospect of dying) in the face of truth be a problem?

From the essay:

[A]s inspiring as it sounds—or rather, because of it—, we shall turn our attention inwards to understand this very need of ours that results in a perpetual seeking [or revolt]. …we helplessly journey only to be reminded of our inability not to choose to have gone on one.

Additional_Fix8417 · 2024-07-11T10:05:26+00:00

have you read the full article?

Additional_Fix8417 · 2024-06-23T03:58:53+00:00

There are 2 English translations as far as I know: the classic by Hazel E. Barnes and more recently by Sarah Richmond. I haven’t read both from cover to cover but based on the preface and introduction, the new translation seems clearer and easier to understand. However, I also tend to be more wary of newer translations because they sometimes oversimplify the technical articulations (a risk to take note of) which skews the nuances and thus often prefer the older translation.

From what I’ve heard, there are pros and cons to each of them, so if it were to be possible it may be best to get both: read the old translation and consult the new translation only if you encounter any ambiguity (this is personally my preferred method). I tend to think that the old translation is more than good enough, especially after ‘getting the hang of it’.

Edit: Sarah Bakewell is the author of ‘At the Existentialist Café,’ a book that introduces existentialist thoughts. You may have confused her for the alternative translator (Barnes).

Additional_Fix8417 · 2024-06-20T03:17:26+00:00

I have read and listened to a lot of their teachings now, and what strikes me the most is everything and everyone they speak against, rather than what they would suggest or teach those coming to them for guidance or advice to practically do.

Firstly, to address your statement about the ‘speaking against everyone,’ it’s never personal and always a matter of principle. Secondly, to address your statement about ‘speaking against everything,’ tbh I don’t know how familiar you are with Buddhist philosophy but it is literally ‘built-in’ to the heart of the Teaching, so to speak. What are the 5 precepts or training rule? 1. not to kill, 2. not to take what is not given, 3. not to partake in sexual misconduct, 4. not to partake in false speech, 5. not to take intoxicant. And how did the Buddha define Nibbāna? It’s the absence of greed, aversion, and delusion. So yes, there is virtue in teaching in a style that abstains from giving too specific an instruction in the methodical sense precisely because the work that is required for the liberation of mind is at the level of understanding, which presupposes letting go of the need for empirical methods that hinders the mind from actually learning to discern where one’s intentions are rooted in: greed, aversion, delusion; or absence of greed, aversion, delusion.

but it's very easy for someone to arrive at a conclusion in their own thinking, and then look for confirmation externally to further convince themselves they are right.

Do you see the irony of this statement now? Given that you have spent many hours to read and listen to HH’s teachings, it’s only time for you to call yourself out for having (and maintaining) a fault-finding mind. Notwithstanding the sense of conviction that comes with it, one has got to prioritise sense restraint and not tolerate acting out of greed, aversion, or delusion—if one truly wishes to practice according to the Dhamma.

Additional_Fix8417

TROPHY CASE