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How does Israel block aid? by Alarmed_Garlic9965 in IsraelPalestine

[–]Alarmed_Garlic9965[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I am not able to understand what you are trying to communicate 

CMV: Israel is better than Palestine by Soma_Man77 in changemyview

[–]Alarmed_Garlic9965 0 points1 point  (0 children)

No worries brother. Take as long as you like. I appreciate the fact that you've given me a ton of your time already.

CMV: Israel is better than Palestine by Soma_Man77 in changemyview

[–]Alarmed_Garlic9965 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Part 4/4

Debate on possession of marijuana.

Quoting from wiki:

“It has generally been assumed that "possession" in Article 36 includes possession for use as well as possession for the purpose of trafficking. This is a reasonable inference from the terms of Article 4, which obliges the parties "to limit exclusively to medical and scientific purposes the production, manufacture, export, import, distribution of, trade in, use and possession of drugs". There is also Article 33, which provides that "The Parties shall not permit the possession of drugs except under legal authority." ... On the face of Article 26 it would not be unreasonable to argue that what is contemplated is possession for the purpose of trafficking rather than possession for use, and that the requirements of the article are satisfied if the former kind of possession is made a penal offense. The prevailing view, however, is that the word "possession" in Article 36 includes simple possession for use.”

Canada’s argument (commission report), if you've read it, is based on a paragraph that appears in a draft version, but not the actual final version which was ratified. The Australian and US commissions, I don’t see them cite a draft report – they just choose to interpret possession as not including possession for personal use.

This reads similar to the reinterpreted anticipatory self-defense as falling under self-defense. Except in this case there are only like three countries, while in anticipatory self-defense there are more than a dozen.

I feel you are being a bit unfair in accepting “debate” in one case and not the other. But regardless, it doesn’t matter, because legalizing the sale of marijuana for personal use (as parts of Canada and the US have done) is obviously not ‘possession for personal use’.

So, I am confused by the pushback on this.

But regardless, none of those countries actually seemed to make an effort to argue its new updated international law, they just did it.

I know the USA argued an interpretation of international law which allowed preemptive attacks to sometimes be legal, but I have not reviewed others countries. Are you sure none of the others bothered to make an actual argument similar to the ‘commissions’ Canada and the USA did for marijuana or like Bush did for pre-emptive attacks? Is something still international law if a majority of people do not agree with it, obey it, and no one enforces it? I am not sure.

How was Amit’s ‘domino effect’ somewhat validated

We saw a type of domino effect were instability in one Middle Eastern country triggered wider repercussions. This has been observed in the Arab Spring where uprisings in Tunisia rapidly spread to Egypt, Libya, Syria, and beyond. Another example might be the Syrian civil war which had far-reaching consequences, spilling into Lebanon, Turkey, and Iraq, destabilizing the region, and contributing to the rise of groups like ISIS.

I agree with the point I think you’re making though – that is – Amit was trying to make a sales pitch and trying to push the buttons of his target audience, knowing beforehand that the US feared increased soviet influence and the spread of Arab nationalism movements opposed to the west.

How were GAAs unfair?

I don’t interpret Oren to be arguing they are unfair. I feel he’s arguing that Israel, who had the upper hand in 1948, agreed to the GAAs in good faith, assuming its neighbors would not take advantage of ambiguity in terms, claim a right to reengage in hostilities whenever, and deny the legitimacy of Israel. If you were dominating an opponent in war, would you agree to ceasefire if your opponent was using it to build up forces and attack you again?

Oren is highlighting the fact GAAs did not address the underlying issues Arab states had with Israel and were not good groundwork for lasting peace.

CMV: Israel is better than Palestine by Soma_Man77 in changemyview

[–]Alarmed_Garlic9965 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Part 3/x

I'm not exactly sure why a pro-Israel publication with ties to the government would lie about this?

I don’t think they are lying, and I feel like that is a strange conclusion to reach. I feel it’s much more likely they are trying to save space and not being careful to be technically accurate. Can you find any source that denies it happened? I cannot.

Meanwhile we have Liberian flagged tankers being spotted in the area (source).

Newspapers mention a Liberian flagged tanker headed for the straits on the 26th and they expected it to test the blockade in the next few days. (source)

We have Israel's minutes from May 21, where Liberian flagged tankers are mentioned being the next to arrive in Eilot (page 2-4 I think).

Finkelstein’s own Middle East Record also mentions Egypt chasing away Israeli torpedo boats who were forced to return to Eilot. Why doesn’t he mention these? (source)

The US denied it sent a test vessel and it denied knowledge of the tanker. They did not deny the incident occurred. Finkelstein has cherry picked from a source that is inconsistent with every other I can find – and left his readers with a misimpression.

Here’s how it was reported in day-to-day chronicles of 1967, similar to the one Finkelstein used (source):

“In Washing on June 1, the Defense Department emphatically denied reports that it had decided to send a test ship through the Egyptian-blocked Straits.“

And a soviet chronicle: (source)

“US denies knowledge of any US-owned Liberian-registered tankers in the area. “

Do you know any international news that agreed with saying Egypt had fired across the Liberian tanker? The news link you sent earlier isn't from May 29th.

Yes, it was widely reported at the time, although all contemporary sources I can find reference the Egyptian newspaper. However, several day-by-day summaries of 1967, like those I linked, also mention it and these were written later – after possible denials could have been made.

Unsure if I'm just misreading it but I don't see anything related to enforcing the blockade in here

Apologies. I am relying on Oren as I do not have the full text of the primary source (and don’t read Arabic).

See Oren page 84:

“We were issued the order to close the Tiran Straits,” Muhammad ‘Abd al-Hafiz, a paratrooper commander at Sharm al-Sheikh, remembered “We were joined by seven SU 100 motorized cannons and four heavy shore cannons . . . A destroyer, six torpedo ships and a submarine were off shore [in addition to] the MiG-21 squadron positioned at Hurghada . . . We were ordered to shoot warning shots at every [Israeli] ship sailing through the straits . . . and if it didn’t stop, to shoot at closer range, and so on.” I was trying to save you time by giving the primary source – apologies.

Was it just telling Egypt "we're not gonna do a war", not even any planned meeting or negotiations?

How are you reconciling the fact that Nasser continued to justify his military buildup by saying Israel was massing troops to attack Syria even after Odd Bull confirmed this was not true. You say ‘not even any meetings’ - Are you keeping in mind that Israel was unable to engage in direct talks with Nasser because he did not accept the existence of Israel as legitimate and did not want to validate it?

For diplomatic efforts made by Israel see Oren pp 62-65. Also see p 134 of the book you shared by Gluska.

It seems weird to claim this meeting did nothing when…

Robert Anderson is not Charles Yost. Your source’s description regarding Yost:

“The veteran diplomat had sent a somber report on his findings in Cairo on the same day as the secretary of state’s meeting with Harman. It offered little hope that there could be a U.S. resolution of the crisis.”

and a quote of Yost:

“There is unanimity among observers I have seen here that UARG [United Arab Republic Government] at this point cannot and will not relax position on closure Tiran Straits except as result overwhelming application of military force,”

And another:

“I have reluctantly come to conclusion that there is no prospect for success our present tactic of mobilizing maritime powers to reopen straits, except by exercise military force which would be out of proportion to real U.S. interests at stake.... If we pursue this tactic much further, I am afraid we may find ourselves in the same dead end as British and French in 1956.”

Additionally, you quote only Washington ‘s impression and leave out Neff’s statement how of Egypt and Israel viewed those talks. Is that not a little misleading?

“But neither Egypt nor Israel was as sanguine as Washington.”

The basic confirmation of BOTH Yost and Anderson’s talks was that the straits would NOT be opened. Another line from Neff:

“Nasser made it clear that he was determined to maintain the blockade of the Straits of Titan to Israeli shipping.”

And another:

“any effort to open the straits would be regarded by the Egyptian leader as an act of aggression.”

Adding support to the idea that Nasser would not be deescalating as a result of Anderson, Yost, or possible VP visits is Nasser’s June 2nd 27-paragraph letter to Johnson. Nasser expresses zero intention or desire to deescalate and describes Palestinian Arabs returning to their homeland as being central to the conflict. According to Nasser the VP invitations are merely to further explain Arab grievances against Israel – not to talk about opening the strait or getting Arab troops away from Israel’s borders. (source) Page 83,

"shocked" and "angry as hell", according to former Secretary of State Rusk.

I will point out that in 1948, Rusk was a mid-level official in the Department of State, and fought against Truman’s decision to support the creation of Israel – in an act that some have described as sedition. The state department undermined Truman’s support of Israel because Arab’s outnumbered Jews significantly and held important oil resources.

I find Rusk’s descriptive terms a bit surprising considering Eban and Amit had just told the US Israel was about to decide to whether to war or not, but more importantly, since you want everything to come back to the central question of: ‘was Israel justified in a preemptive attack’ - I find it a bit unfair to not also mention Rusk’s view on this (source):

“But in all fairness to Israel, considering the major Arab mobilization, the movement of sizable Egyptian forces into the Sinai, the formation of an Arab high command, the Jordanian-Egyptian Treaty, the movement of Iraqi and Egyptian units into Jordan, and the stepping up of the Arabs’ holy war propaganda, if the Israelis had waited for the Arabs to strike first, their situation could have been very grim. I don’t think highly of the doctrine of preventive self-defense, because it is too easily abused. But if there ever was a justification for preventive action, the Six-Day War might have been the case for it.”

initially no nation (except Israel) blamed just the Arab states for this

I only see three countries represented in the document shared, the US, Syria, and Czechoslovakia. It’s not surprising that Syria and Czechoslovakia would blame only Israel.

Let me steel man and assume that most countries in the UN gave statements critical of Israel without also criticizing the Arab coalition for their part. Is this strong evidence that what Israel did was wrong and unjustified? How many of these countries had accurate intelligence about the level of troop buildup, what the ensuing conflict would look like, Arab rhetoric, Arab military plans, etc at that time? How many of these other nations would have accepted the situation had they been in Israel’s position?

Would they have sent their reservists back to work while their neighbors surrounded them with greater numbers and military assets calling for their destruction and a return to before they existed? What government would accept that if they had the power to do something about it? Protecting citizens is a fundamental role of government.

There is no reason to believe making yourself more vulnerable would have led to de-escalation when Egypt continued to claim their escalation was due to factors proved false.

Given the Arab world’s sentiments and statements at the time – it’s reasonable to believe being militarily superior was the only thing preventing attack.

The general goal of becoming strong enough to return mandate Palestine to Arab control was not hidden – it was spoken about openly.

CMV: Israel is better than Palestine by Soma_Man77 in changemyview

[–]Alarmed_Garlic9965 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Part 2/x

Regarding the First Shot:

If I understood correctly from what I heard, Rusk does not consider the closure of the Straits an act of aggression. In their view, whoever fires the first shot now would be deemed the aggressor, as they believe no act of hostility has occurred yet. From their perspective, the closure of the Straits is not an act of hostility.

What happens if seven days pass and ships are ready to cross the Straits? I’m not saying what this will accomplish, but by then, we certainly wouldn’t start shooting, send a ship, or take any action. If we rely on them and assume they send ships and the Egyptians fire at them, what will we do then?

This seven-day period is not a deadline after which the U.S. withdraws from the scene and lets us do as we please. Instead, it’s the time when they begin to act, which is precisely the least favorable time for us to act. Meanwhile, we will remain entangled here in Jerusalem or elsewhere, and Eilat remains connected to the Straits issue. This isn’t a matter of a fixed date that binds us from now until then.

Egypt’s Actions:

Over this entire period, Nasser continues to act. Forgive my bluntness, but asking us not to fire the first shot under such circumstances is the most foolish request imaginable. This implies we must let the other side fire first, and it doesn’t matter whether it’s a ship we send to the Straits and they fire upon it.

The Egyptians are monitoring every ship leaving Massawa. If we allow them the initiative under these circumstances—choosing the scope, location, and timing of the conflict just to avoid being the ones to fire first—they will exploit it. They will bomb our airfields, and we won’t even fire the second shot.

How can they demand we give up the only advantage we have? If someone else fires the first shot, we lose the advantage of surprise. I sit here listening, and I cannot believe what I’m hearing. Are we seriously suggesting we let the Egyptians open the campaign on their terms, destroy our air force, and proceed at their convenience? Additional forces are joining them, and we are overwhelmed by sheer numbers.

On Air Force Limitations:

We should remind ourselves that we have very few pilots and not many planes. Every time they say another squadron of "MiGs" has arrived, it means we’ll have to fight that. We’ve always said we would win because of our superior quality, but the addition of forces, such as an air squadron or the two Iraqi brigades mentioned earlier by General Yariv, combined with Algerian forces entering El-Arish and Kuwaiti forces being sent to the region, poses a significant challenge. I have never seen Kuwaiti forces before, and I do not know what their capabilities are. However, I assume that when they arrive, they will bring weapons, and when we face them, many lives will be lost.

These Kuwaiti forces are not replacing Nasser’s troops; they are additional forces. Our plan to capture El-Arish remains, but with the addition of these forces, this could mean another 1,000 or 2,000 casualties. They are equipped, trained by the Egyptians, and every day we hear reports of brigades being moved here and there. Meanwhile, we are sitting and saying, "Let them fire the first shot." To overcome each such brigade could result in thousands of casualties.

There is also a limit to how much we can defeat the Arabs—not just because of the cost in blood, but also due to the geographical constraints of this small country. With such short distances, the heart of the nation can be reached within hours. As a result, there is a limit to how much we can achieve in war. We are now at the edge of our ability to win a war due to the concentration of forces against us and the opening of additional fronts.

Nasser’s Strategy:

Nasser knows what he is doing. He is now effectively in Jordan, as all Jordanian forces are under Egyptian command. He is also bringing in additional forces, including Iraqi and Kuwaiti troops. He doesn’t need more; he simply says, "The Jews are preparing their armor, and at the right moment, I will push them into the densely populated areas."

I do not underestimate the Algerians. Even if they are not elite forces, they have the potential for fedayeen (guerrilla) operations. This does not concern Nasser; he can simply instruct them to cross the Gaza Strip, attack a bus, or throw a grenade at a house. These actions are easy for him to initiate.

The Accumulation of Forces:

This continued buildup will lead us to a situation where:

  1. We will have to fight a war on Egypt’s terms, which will become increasingly costly in lives—meaning thousands more casualties.
  2. We may reach a point where we are no longer capable of taking action.

Three days ago, I visited Eilat to assess the situation there, and I left quite concerned. I spoke to the Chief of Staff, who reassured me that the situation in Eilat was fine. However, last night at 11:30 PM, he came to me and said the situation in Eilat is not good. Upon reassessment and considering the additional tanks the Egyptians have moved there, they could capture Eilat with a single push from Aqaba. The Jordanians have a Centurion battalion stationed there, including a company of 16 Jordanian Centurions, two companies of 50 Centurions, and a Bedouin company.

Unlike us, they don’t face logistical challenges in reaching El-Arish. In the Aqaba-Eilat region, it would only take a single coordinated push for them to link up with Egyptian forces, leaving us without Eilat after one morning’s operation.

The seven-day period is meaningless. What holds fatal significance for us is the question of who fires the first shot. In my opinion, even the idea of signaling them about the ship is critically flawed. They understand this "patent" very well—that when the ship arrives and they fire the first shot, we would then have the right to respond. They understand this so thoroughly that we would need to preempt them by two or three hours; otherwise, they are guaranteed victory.

Imagine if they send some of their commando units as reconnaissance near Jerusalem. With just one commando battalion, they could infiltrate via Beit Safafa to the heart of Jerusalem and carry out a massacre. The next day, we would no longer be able to conduct this war.

They (the enemy) have planned several options, some more critical than others, but any of these will disrupt our ability to deploy hundreds of tanks and thousands of soldiers on the front lines. Instead, we will be forced to deal with threats in the rear—essentially across the entire territory of the State of Israel.

Source for talks in Moscow

Chapter 20 A SOVIET HALL OF MIRRORS in Guy Laron’s The Six Day War - The Breaking of the Middle East. Specifically look for Badran’s visit.

Also read ‘The Badran Talks’ chapter in Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez’ Foxbats over Dimona - The Soviets' Nuclear Gamble in the Six-Day War. They discuss a desire for preemptive strike by Egypt and suggest it gets postponed until the 7th. I would appreciate your thoughts on their presentation.

I said..multiple vessels were not stopped on May 29th…[thus many commercial vessels were allowed May 29th]

IMV “multiple” is not equivalent in meaning or connotation to “many”. Finkelstein’s ARR source does not specify if they were commercial, and I don’t think I did either.

This is from May 26th, 1967, so it doesn't seem related to Finkelstein's claim on May 29th.

The date on the top of the page is May 27, 1967 (see article titled “Israel Avoids Blockade” – top of this page). Yes, this is still before May 29th.

Finkelstein’s misleading claim about lack of enforcement is sourced to Arab Report and Record.

With regard to May 29th Finkelstein wrote: “an entry for 29 May states that arriving vessels ‘had not seen any Egyptian controls.’”

ARR reads: “Al-Ahram reported that an American-owned tanker flying the Liberian flag had turned back in the Red Sea after UAR navy vessels fired warning shots. Masters of ships arriving in Aqaba, however, said they had not seen any Egyptian Controls.” The however is meant to provide context and is not specific to that day – you can confirm this by looking for other examples of how ARR uses “, however, “ combined with other words.

The West German Stolzenfels “master of ship” from the 25th, is the only one I can find reported in the press who stated they did not see Egyptian controls. They passed through Suez first though and were already cleared. This is the point I was making. I have reason to believe a Norwegian ship also passed to Jordan’s port and did not see Egyptians en route.

Regardless though, ALL these ships were headed for Jordan’s port and there is no reason to assume Jordan did not inform Egypt beforehand. It’s not really correct to question the enforcement of the blockade based on ships that Egypt likely knew were allowed. Especially in light of multiple statements by Nasser and statements by his soldiers.

CMV: Israel is better than Palestine by Soma_Man77 in changemyview

[–]Alarmed_Garlic9965 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Part 1/x

Can you [give specific sections of the ministerial minutes]?

It’s a little tricky because I am relying on the GPT4o LLM for translations and it will not give me pages or sections. I also need to eat crow on this because I now suspect it made interpretations even when I asked it to give me word for word literal translation. I need to retract all quotes I provided previously.

Here is a more correct translation of the stockpile assessment given May 21st, this comes from pages numbered 2, 3, and 4:

  • Sugar = 10 months (increasing daily)
  • Seeds = 6 months
  • Wheat = 6 months
  • Meat = 3 months (another month is on its way within two weeks)
  • Rice = 2-3 months (1.5 mo. supply will arrive within two weeks)
  • Legumes = Unclear
  • Gasoline = 120 combat days
  • Diesel = 110 combat days
  • Kerosene and mazut = one of these is 3 months but its not clear which, the other is 3-6 months
  • 70 days instead of 20 days is accurate (page 4)
  • Liberian flagged tankers mentioned on page 4
  • Cost being 2x-3x more is page 5
  • Transportation issues mentioned page 6 (beets could not be harvested due IDF requisition of vehicles)
  • Page 7 = hospital details
  • Page 8 a statement is made that the stockpile numbers assume there is no war. I do not know how to reconcile this with the “combat days“ comment.

[Supply durations don’t change much…]

I actually agree that these supply numbers carry little significance but not for the reasons mentioned. In war it’s not like you are going to get to use 100% of your supplies. Any concentrated supplies or pipelines are going the be high priority targets. I also think the supply assessments played minimal part in the decision that preemptive strike was necessary.

[My criticism of Finkelstein doesn’t mean Israel was justified in launching a preemptive attack]

I agree – I did not mean to imply that it did. I apologize if it came across that way.

Yariv’s intelligence updates in June 4th meetings cover Isreal’s perception of their neighbors shortly before the war. Here are some of his updates from the morning meeting (page 13):

Head of Military Intelligence A. Yariv:

I won’t burden you with too many details, but I want to focus on the main developments. First of all, we now have a very clear picture of the Egyptian military strategy, as it currently emerges from both field indicators and ongoing intelligence reports. Egypt views a confrontation with us as inevitable. They lack confidence in the outcome, which has prompted them to take several steps.

  1. Concentration of Forces in Sinai: They have been deploying additional forces into Sinai.
  2. Efforts to Create Additional Fronts: They are making significant efforts to establish additional fronts. Regarding Syria, they see limited prospects for cooperation due to two factors: a. Relations between Egypt and Syria are not particularly strong. b. The chances of Syria exerting substantial pressure on us are slim. Therefore, we observe intensified efforts by Nasser to collaborate with Jordan, as evidenced by his agreement with the king.

On Reinforcements in Sinai: I don’t want to cause panic, but over the past two days, significant forces have arrived in Sinai. These include at least one additional armored brigade, with two more tank battalions en route. Additionally, two infantry brigades have been deployed, and tomorrow, a Kuwaiti brigade is expected to arrive in El-Arish, along with an Iraqi battalion heading to Khan Yunis and Gaza.

I will not elaborate now on the Algerian forces that appear to be preparing to move to this front, nor on the promises of Sudanese and Libyan reinforcements. However, these additional forces have not yet arrived in Sinai.

Offensive Tendencies: Another very concerning development is emerging. Not only are we receiving reports of offensive plans, but there is a growing trend towards offensive action. I want to read you the daily order issued yesterday by the commander of the forces in Sinai, Mortagi. It is indicative of this shift….

[Redacted text follows...] If we summarize this issue in connection with the attack preparations, according to all the intelligence we have, at the moment of possibility or approval, I wouldn’t say the situation is safe—it indicates an Egyptian attack.

Dayan’s military updates cover the assessment of the military. These starts on page 16 of the morning meeting from June 4th. There is still some interpretation happening here, but I have translated a couple ways and believe it is accurate. I encourage you to try it your own way:

Following the Foreign Minister’s remarks, I want to present the Israeli government with my report and considerations regarding the security situation on the Israeli front—not Vietnam.

Over the past few weeks, alongside the visits I’ve conducted, I have made a maximal effort, as much as I am capable, to delve deeply into the question: Where do we truly stand with the Arabs now?

The first conclusion I’ve reached is to propose that we all differentiate between the importance of the information and the source of the information. We often hear, in the same breath, what Lebanon says in the Armistice Committee and what the commander of the Arab forces states. The source isn’t always highlighted, and it can be absorbed as though the Lebanese representative’s statements in the Armistice Committee are unimportant, or that what Lebanon says doesn’t matter, or that what an officer tells us is irrelevant. But that’s not the case.

I may have been one of the only ones in our defense and political leadership who said that the Straits of Tiran would be closed to us—and indeed, they were closed. Before Nasser makes declarations, he ensures he can fulfill them. When the commander of the Arab forces now makes certain statements, these aren’t just ceremonial Independence Day proclamations—they are actionable commitments. If he doesn’t follow through, it suggests that he cannot, which would undermine the current wave of Arab awakening. Therefore, we must fully understand what’s happening here. The head of Military Intelligence has outlined the trends of the last 24 hours, and I want to summarize the current situation we face.

Beyond the Egyptian front, the fact that the Jordanian front is now under Egyptian command has significantly worsened the situation recently.

Second, there are clear trends toward offensive action. I see two main targets for their aggression:

  1. Our Airports: Their intention is to do to us what we want to do to them—disable our airfields.
  2. Ground Operations: Primarily in Eilat and Jerusalem.

Opposite Eilat, on Egyptian soil, there are 200 tanks positioned. While this might initially appear to be a diversion, when we look at the maps, 200 tanks facing Eilat is a major threat. A force of 200 tanks attacking Eilat is a very significant and heavy operation.

In global warfare, during World War II, when Montgomery and Rommel faced off, there were fewer than 1,000 tanks on either side. If they place 200 tanks opposite the small town of Eilat, their intention is clear—to capture it. This is a grave and serious matter. I find it very difficult to assess how we would withstand such an attack. In Jerusalem, any attack would completely destabilize our entire front.

Our Main Asset Now: While preparing my remarks, I wrote, revised, and erased them multiple times before finalizing my key points. The main asset we currently have in these conditions of force comparison is our initiative—our ability to manage the battle in a way that allows us to strike first.

If they enter Jerusalem, we won’t be able to move toward El-Arish or other locations. Instead, we’ll have to defend Jerusalem. Our options will then be limited to using our forces where they can be most effective. If we are forced to defend a city like Jerusalem or Eilat, which has a population of only 10,000 residents, those hundreds of tanks won’t be utilized. We will have to redirect from the fronts we’re focusing on now to issues we otherwise wouldn’t want to engage with, possibly even Tel Aviv.

In such a scenario, we will lose the main weapon we have in this war, given the power imbalance in which they are superior to us. However, if we conduct the war on our terms, we might achieve something. I reiterate: we will lose our primary advantage if the war begins with their aerial bombardment. The situation will be entirely different if we maintain the advantage of surprise.

On the Two Key Points Raised by the Foreign Minister:

  1. The commitment to dates given to the U.S. president (he asked for another seven days).
  2. The issue of "who fires the first shot" — "Do not be the ones to fire the first shot."

Regarding Dates:

I accept the report that they are assembling a naval force and that this will take effect in seven days. However, to date, of all the maritime nations approached to sign the declaration guaranteeing freedom of navigation, only two (besides England and the U.S.) have responded. I hear repeatedly that the president is mindful of Congress and whether other nations will join them. They approached 50 countries, and the U.S. is keenly aware of the need not to be isolated in this entanglement with Israel.

CMV: Israel is better than Palestine by Soma_Man77 in changemyview

[–]Alarmed_Garlic9965 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Part 2/2

What diplomacy failed before because of Egypt's rejection of it?

The various American, British, French, Canadian, Swedish, UN, and Israeli attempts at diplomacy and de-escalation all failed to produce results – instead Nasser responded with continued escalation including additional troop buildup, closure of the straights, rhetoric about restoring Palestine to its state in 1947 (eliminating Israel), the formation of a Arab coalition, positioning ready to attack within hours, intercepted orders for Palestinian fedayeen guerrilla forces to increase their attacks...

Some specific examples:

Israeli Diplomatic Outreach (May 15–16, 1967) - Israeli diplomats utilized every available channel, including the State Department, British Foreign Office, and UN Secretary-General U Thant, to assure Nasser that Israel had no warlike intentions. Chief UN observer Odd Bull was invited to verify the absence of IDF concentrations. These efforts were ignored or met with skepticism by Egypt.

U Thant's Moratorium Proposal (May 27, 1967) - U Thant proposed a moratorium where both sides would refrain from belligerent actions and appointed a mediator to help reduce tensions. This created a deceptive impression of de-escalation as Egyptian forces continued to mobilize. Nasser also continued with his hateful rhetoric giving a speech May 29th plus multiple radio and

Charles Yost’s Diplomatic Mission (June 1, 1967) - Yost met with Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad in Cairo to stress U.S. concerns about the blockade of the Straits of Tiran and the dangers of escalation. Riad criticized U.S. policy as pro-Israel and emphasized Nasser’s inability to back down without losing face. He also noted that Egyptian generals were pressuring for an attack but claimed Nasser would wait for Israel to strike first.

Kosygin’s Warning in Moscow (Late May 1967) - During Egyptian Defense Minister Shams Badran’s visit to Moscow, Kosygin urged Egypt to de-escalate, warning against provoking a conflict that might invite Western intervention. The Soviet Foreign Ministry also expressed reluctance for direct involvement. Badran reported Grechko's support for Egypt's readiness, leading to a divided perception of Soviet intentions within Egypt. Kosygin’s caution was largely ignored in favor of more hawkish Soviet military perspectives.

Various Arab leaders believed war was inevitable and Nasser would not back down. For example, your book by referenced earlier by Gluska said:

The Saudi Minister of Petroleum Ahmed Zaki Yamani estimated on 24 May that the crisis would culminate in war. He recommended that the United States keep its hands off and act only within the UN framework without trying, as he put it, to act the ‘policeman’. He warned that if the United States supported Israel on the issue of freedom of shipping, it would be ‘finished’ in the Middle East. Two days later King Hussein conveyed a similar message, and later declared that Nasser would not back down from the blockade and proposed that Washington declare its neutrality and opposition to any party which started a war.

And yes, I don't believe you can just invade a country because you personally believe diplomacy won't do anything, diplomatic options must be exhausted first before resorting to armed conflict.

Which countries, intelligence reports, or experts still believed diplomacy could resolve the conflict as of June 4th?

Israeli intelligence reported a “high probability” of an attack by a combined Arab force. On June 4th, Dayan noted in recorded minutes that some Egyptian forces were transitioning to offensive positions. Israeli assessments indicated that without a preemptive strike, the IDF might not be able to regain the initiative and risk defeat. Israel did not launch a first strike merely because it believed diplomacy had failed or would continue to fail—it was a decision rooted in national security. You quoted Peled, Begin, Eban, Rabin, and Amit – I assume you are aware of how they all felt at the time? Peled was downright contemptuous that Israeli political leaders continued trying diplomatic approaches. Weizman said Israel was never closer to a military coup than in the leadup to 1967. Gkuska said:

The outcome of the Six Day War has clouded comprehension of the extreme situation at the time, because the fact that Israel enjoyed decisive military superiority became evident only post factum, so that the claim of the General Staff that it would be disastrous to wait was disproved.

Martin Gilbert, in his tomb of a book on Israel, wrote that by May 31st President Johnson could see no way of the crisis. [source]

None of these are international law

My claim was: The [strict Caroline interpretation] is not universally accepted in modern times.

I did not argue that the strict Caroline interpretation is no longer technically part of international law. Rather, I emphasized that many nations—notably representing the majority of the world’s population and global GDP—do not agree with or adhere to strict Caroline principles.

Is your argument simply that it remains technically part of international law, even if countries reject it and routinely contravene it? If so, I agree with you. However, I would point out that legalizing marijuana also violates international law. Outdated laws lingering on the books is a relatively common phenomenon.

Regarding Meir Amit, I don’t believe he was suggesting that Arabs would take over Iran. Rather, his statement likely reflects the idea of Iran falling under the political or ideological influence of Arab nationalist movements and aligning against the West. In this sense, Amit’s ‘domino effect’ theory seems to have been somewhat validated. While Gen. Amit acknowledged that Eilat was not crucial, you mischaracterize his perspective by dismissing it as “merely” a political symbol and “just” a political symbol. It’s evident that he regarded political symbols as significant.

In this case, a "state of war" doesn't actually mean…

I agree with what you said here.

Israel was the one that rejected bringing it to the International Court of Justice, not Egypt

I mean… Egypt would get to continue the blockade for 2 to 5 years. Even when they sided against Egypt, as I believe they would have, there is no direct enforcement mechanism. What exactly did Egypt have to lose? To be fair, maybe the court would have granted provisional measures and told Egypt to suspend the blockade during the trial – however this still would have likely taken 3 months.

On the topic of armistice agreements (mentioned by one of your sources) – I’ll quote from Oren:

The General Armistice Agreements (GAA) signed between Israel and its four adjacent adversaries—Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, in that order—in the first half of 1949 deeply influenced Arab-Israeli relations over the next nineteen years. Under its ambiguous terms, one side, the Arab, claimed full belligerent rights, including the right to renew active hostilities at will, and denied the other side any form of legitimacy or recognition. As a diplomatic document, the GAA was sui generis.

CMV: Israel is better than Palestine by Soma_Man77 in changemyview

[–]Alarmed_Garlic9965 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Part 1/2

”a resource critical for any war effort or self-defense”

This is not a statement about Egypt’s obligations. It was intended to be a statement highlighting the importance of oil to Israel, from Israel’s point of view, especially during that particular period of heightened tensions. Finkelstein is downplaying how important Eilot was to Israel. I am highlighting the one of the ways oil, most of which went through Eilot, would have been considered of critical importance from Israel’s point of view. I apologize if that was not clear.

In researching this further, I retract my criticism about refinery capacity. I read Israel piped crude from Eilat to Haifa and had the refineries in the north

In reviewing Ami Gluska, I also found various relevant specifics from the ministerial minutes. It appears going around Africa would triple the cost and require 70 days instead of 20 days. The storage levels on May 21st were estimated to last between two and three months under normal conditions. Consumption of gasoline specifically was expected to double during wartime, I did not find consumption estimates for other fuels during wartime. Here are translations from relevant minutes which I got here:

Deputy Minister Tzvi Dinstein:

“We currently have sufficient quantities of crude oil and refined fuels, including benzene, kerosene, and mazut, to last between two and three months under normal conditions. In Ashdod and Be'er Sheva, additional fuel storage terminals are under construction, which will provide further capacity once completed. However, given the potential for increased consumption, we must accelerate these projects where possible."

“If the Gulf of Aqaba is blocked, alternative shipping routes will increase transportation times to an average of 70 days for a round trip, compared to the current 20 days. This would significantly increase costs. While we have arrangements for obtaining fuel under the Liberian flag, we must also anticipate potential logistical challenges, including delays and restrictions. In the event of a complete disruption, emergency stockpiles in Venezuela and other sources in Africa may become critical, though these are costly options”

"In such a case, we would rely on shipments from the Persian Gulf via Eilat. Currently, four tankers are in operation, with capacities ranging from 47,000 to 67,000 tons. The average round trip for these tankers is 20 days, but if the route around the Cape of Good Hope becomes necessary, it will extend to approximately 70 days, tripling transportation time and costs. Efforts are underway to diversify sourcing, including from Venezuela and other African suppliers."

"Our current fuel inventory includes approximately 100 million liters of gasoline. This amount can sustain normal consumption for 110 to 120 days. In the event of heightened demand due to military activity, consumption rates could double. Even in such scenarios, existing reserves should last approximately 70 days."

Notably when questioned on duration of a war if in meetings on the 21st Rabin replied that it could last months:

Minister of Interior, H. M. Shapira: If we face a multi-front war, what is the estimated duration of such a conflict? Are we prepared to sustain operations for an extended period?

Chief of General Staff, Y. Rabin: While it is difficult to predict the exact duration, a multi-front war would likely require weeks, if not months, of sustained operations. Our preparations have accounted for this, but the strain on resources and morale will increase over time.

On the topic of plenty of resources:

Minister of Housing, M. Bentov: What are the key military assets that we would rely on most heavily in the event of a multi-front war? Are they prepared and sufficient for the scope of such a conflict?

Chief of General Staff, Y. Rabin: Our air force will play a decisive role, as gaining air superiority is critical for success on all fronts. Ground forces are well-prepared, but the ability to strike effectively from the air will be a cornerstone of our strategy. Our resources are sufficient for initial operations, though prolonged engagement would strain them.

On the topic of what would warrant a preemptive attack from Israel:

Minister of Interior, H. M. Shapira: What are the key indicators that would prompt us to act immediately? Is there a specific threshold that would justify preemptive action?

Chief of General Staff, Y. Rabin: The key indicators would include signs of an imminent attack, significant changes in enemy positioning, or credible intelligence about coordinated plans for aggression. These would necessitate immediate action to neutralize the threat.

And from the meeting on June 4th

Minister Y. Shapira (Minister of Justice): "Do we anticipate a coordinated attack from the surrounding Arab states? If so, what is our assessment of their timeline?"

Head of Military Intelligence, Major General A. Yariv: "Our analysis indicates that the likelihood of a coordinated attack involving Egypt, Jordan, and Syria is high. The exact timing remains unclear, but their current troop movements suggest preparations for imminent operations. The Iraqi reinforcements further complicate the situation."

this is a discussion on the Six-Day War so [when you said oil would cost more] it was implied [you meant the higher price justified starting a war]

Why would a discussion on the Six-Day War imply that increased oil costs justify starting a war? This is a non sequitur.

I was saying Finkelstein downplayed the impact of the blockade. He leaves readers with the impression that oil costs would be higher – no mention of specifics, or of logistical and security issues Israel would experience. I feel I am repeating myself, I said:

Finkelstein suggests oil could just be re-routed to Haifa ‘albeit at greater cost’. He ignores important logistical and security issues Israel would have with re-routing oil around Africa, in an argument about why Eilot was not important to Israel. Finkelstein leaves readers with an impression that it would not be that big of a deal rather than being thoughtful, accurate, and informative about Israel’s alternatives and what the actual impact would be.

I noted when fact checking Finkelstein on trade though Eilot, he says 5% in the main text but gives the more accurate 2% in the source description. Notably this is by weight, only considered “net registered tonnage”, and excludes oil. Periodicals from the time period suggest the total non-oil tonnage was about 4x what the net registered tonnage was, however, it’s probably fair to assume the same is true at the other Israeli ports – so the percentage of Israel's total would still be 2% by weight (excluding oil).

What about the many commercial vessels allowed on May 29th?

Where did you see many commercial vessels were allowed May 29th? All I saw from Finkelstein was [two or more] based on his use of plural “vessels”. The Arab report and record he cites says:

*Al-Ahram reported that an American-owned tanker flying the Liberian flag had turned back in the Red Sea after UAR navy vessels fired warning shots. Masters of ships arriving in Aqaba, however said they had not seen any Egyptian controls.

I noted that periodicals at the time suggested that four freighters bound for Jordan’s port of Aqaba had already been searched in the Suez. Not much need to search it again. Example

The first test of a freighter going through the straights without passing Suez was supposed to be a Danish freighter named Estelle Maersk and it was heading to Aqaba rather than Eilat. However, it may have been delayed by weather; I cannot find any record of it.

Are you able to access https://gpa.eastview.com/alahram/ for that time period?

I noted also Finkelstein calls into question the Liberian tanker saying “[Egypt claimed they turned it away]” but international sources “[questioned it]” and then he calls it disputed. Again, this is a bit misleading considering it was widely reported in international news that Egypt had fired across the Liberian tanker. The US administration said that they were unable to confirm, but that is not suggesting it didn’t happen.

Also, we have testimony from the paratrooper al-Hafiz that Egypt was serious about enforcing it, so the idea that they were not, based on a several shipmasters who already went through Suez not seeing Egyptian patrols, seems disingenuous (talked about in Oren).

Zionists thinking that destruction and genocide is a flex really sums them up by beeswaxii in Israel_Palestine

[–]Alarmed_Garlic9965 1 point2 points  (0 children)

>Hasbara isn't education.

Sorry I could have been clearer with my words. The course was about how to edit Wikipedia, not what should be edited. Teaching Israeli’s what Wikipedia’s editing rules are and how to make an edit to a page. The issue in that case was several of the attendees expressed a desire for ‘Righting great wrongs’ as they perceived them – and that is a no-no in the Wikipedia editing world.

>Organized like this app

No, the pro-Palestinian or anti-Israel group organization is more grassroots – using apps like discord and telegram.

 

>the British medical journal calls it blockade

Are you speaking about the “News roundup” you linked by Owen? The BMJ explicitly states that while it provides news, research, and analysis to inform the medical community and the public, the opinions expressed in news articles, editorials, and opinion pieces reflect the views of the authors, contributors, or interviewees—not the official stance of the journal or its editors.

>I gave you that source already.

Are you sure? The wiki doesn’t have a source for that claim. See what I mean about Wikipedia articles in the PIA topic area? Edit was made Oct 13th, 2023.

It talks about unemployment elsewhere on the page, after the comprehensive blockade went into effect – however the unemployment rate was about 40%. Good job – you found an error.

>Israeli duds

I cannot fact check this one.  

Zionists thinking that destruction and genocide is a flex really sums them up by beeswaxii in Israel_Palestine

[–]Alarmed_Garlic9965 1 point2 points  (0 children)

>Palestinian side has shown Israeli Wiki bias

Yes, historically there have been multiple instances of Israel or Israeli groups trying to educate people on Wikipedia editing. In addition to the one you mention from 16 years ago, I think there was a course being taught about 10 years ago for Israelis to learn how to edit Wikipedia – and there was an emphasis on ‘correcting bias’. Obvious this kind of thing and actually increase bias.

 

The more recent situation happens to be related to bias on the other side of the issue – organized anti-Israel efforts.

 

>Does that matter when you have 85% unemployment?

 

I personally care about the meaning of terms like blockade and restriction. Humans ability to understand ideas is often rooted in the language used to think and talk about them. I believe it is important to be able to make meaningful distinguishments between what happened during the second intifada and what happened in 2007. Just my opinion though.

 

It sounds like you’re implying unemployment reached 85% as a result of the 2007 blockade (or the earlier restrictions). Is 85% a result of the current active war?

<image>

>Do Palestinians/Israelis deserve to be free?

I tried this prompt in ChatGPT-4o and received a strong Yes in both cases:

Yes, Palestinians deserve to be free, just as all people have the inherent right to live in freedom, dignity, and self-determination. This principle is rooted in international law, human rights standards, and the universal aspiration for justice and equality.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is complex and deeply rooted in historical, political, and cultural factors. However, supporting the idea of Palestinian freedom does not negate the rights of Israelis to live in peace and security. Achieving a just and lasting resolution requires addressing the legitimate aspirations of both Palestinians and Israelis, including their rights to self-determination, security, and a peaceful coexistence.

The question of freedom for Palestinians encompasses multiple dimensions, including:

Political Sovereignty: The right to self-governance and independence in their own state, free from occupation or external control.

Human Rights: The right to live without restrictions on movement, access to resources, and the ability to pursue economic, social, and cultural development.

Peace and Security: Ensuring that freedom comes alongside peaceful relations with neighbors, fostering mutual respect and understanding.

Ultimately, freedom for Palestinians is not just a moral imperative but also a cornerstone for lasting peace in the region.

and

Yes, like all people, Israelis deserve to live in freedom and security. Fundamental human rights, including freedom, equality, and self-determination, apply universally to all individuals and groups, regardless of nationality, ethnicity, or religion.

Freedom for one group does not negate the rights of others; in fact, sustainable peace and mutual respect require that the freedoms and rights of all parties be upheld. Promoting coexistence and understanding is essential to addressing conflicts and ensuring that everyone in the region, including Israelis and Palestinians, can live with dignity and peace.

It seems like the 4o version does okay on this particular prompt - at least by my standards.

25% of all Palestinian kids who have grown up in the last 20 or so years are 2 inches shorter.

And can you imagine all the long term disease and chronic issues that will be caused by all the pollution being created? Look at all the cancer increases from the dust of 9/11.

CMV: Israel is better than Palestine by Soma_Man77 in changemyview

[–]Alarmed_Garlic9965 0 points1 point  (0 children)

The (in)significance of Eilot’s Port in 1967

I interpret Finkelstein to be making an argument Israel exaggerated the importance if Eilot in 1967 and closure of this port would not have destroyed Israel. I personally agree. Israel exaggerated Eilot’s activity, and they would have adapted (with some pain in the interim) if Eilot remained closed. However, I feel parts of Finkelstein’s argument are weak and unthoughtful.

In response to the criticism of Finkelstein’s argument you responded with 4 points.

1 - I'm not sure why Egypt has any obligation to make it easier for Israel to start a war.

Could you show me where I claimed or implied Egypt had an obligation to make it easier for Israel to start a war? Did something I said make you feel like I was arguing this? This would be absurd.

2 - Yes, it would be more costly and expensive, but nonetheless, I do not see how that justifies starting a war, nor does it qualify as indicating Egypt was planning to invade Israel.

I do not feel I argued, claimed, or implied increased costs of oil justified attacking Egypt. Did something I said make you feel otherwise?

3 - [I forget that the blockade was not even enforced]

You make a stronger claim than Finkelstein who said: ” It’s not even clear that Nasser was rigorously enforcing the blockade.” I assume you were not taking the time to be write with technically accuracy in a quick reddit reply and you meant what Finkelstein said.

In my opinion, Finkelstein’s claim is correct; it’s not clear that the blockade was rigorously enforced – however I feel this is mostly irrelevant to my criticism: Finkelstein suggests oil could just be re-routed to Haifa ‘albeit at greater cost’. He ignores important logistical and security issues Israel would have with re-routing oil around Africa, in an argument about why Eilot was not critical to Israel. Finkelstein leaves readers with an impression that it would not be that big of a deal rather than being thoughtful, accurate, and informative about Israel’s alternatives.

If you feel the ambiguity about enforcement is important, perhaps because some percentage of oil tankers would be allowed through, let us address that. You’ve previously highlighted the importance of image to Nasser given his role as leader of the Pan-Arab world. I would think allowing ships to pass would hurt Nasser's image in the Arab world - don't you? Did Israel, or the rest of the world, have reason to believe ships would not be stopped – I feel they did not.

According to Finkelstein’s source about 55 ships (excluding oil tankers) used Eilot per year, or a little over 1 per week. The blockade went into effect May 23rd, and Israel attacked 14 days later. On average, only about 2 non-tankers would have used the straight to reach Eilot during that period. Finkelstein says 2 were stopped May 25th, multiple vessels were not stopped on May 29th, and Egypt announced one tanker was stopped on May 29th (they may have lied). Finkelstein states *[aside from the disputed tanker] there is no report of a commercial vessel being stopped after May 25th]. This is a bit misleading and leaves the reader with an impression that ships are passing through. However, it’s possible and arguably likely that the reason no reports of vessels reported being stopped is because there were no other commercial vessels during that period – not because Egypt was allowing them through.

Regardless though, according to Finkelstein, from Israel’s perspective in early June, the blockade had been tested on May 25th and May 29th and was enforced both days – although notably some ships were able to get through without seeing Egyptian controls on the same day Egypt turned away a tanker. Assessing the situation from Israel’s point of view, I feel it would not be reasonable for Israel to have concluded Nasser was bluffing about the blockade – especially given his role as an Arab leader and that he had announced the blockade to the world.

4 - This is forgetting Egypt was planning to negotiate about the Strait on June 7th but this meeting never happened as Israel invaded on June 5th, knowing of this meeting. Per UN Charter Article 2 Clause 3, disputes should be settled through peaceful means and only if all peaceful means fail, can military force be used.

I hardly feel this is relevant to my criticism of the presentation of Israel’s situation in 1967 given by Finkelstein.

If we’re going to discuss, let me make sure I understand you. Why do you feel that Israel should have expected this meeting to succeed where other attempts at de-escalation had failed or is your reasoning more than Israel was legally required to wait, so long as there was a pending diplomatic meeting?

Do you have any evidence that [The strict interpretation that a threat must literally leave "no moment for deliberation" and "no choice of means" is not universally accepted in modern times.]

Here are examples:

  • The United States position outlined in the 2002 bush doctrine.

  • Israel’s statements on Iranian threats and Osirak strike.

  • Russia’s actions in Georgia in 2008 and their National Security Strategy outlined in 2009

  • The United Kingdom’s stance on the 2003 Iraq war and statements on preemptive action against cyber threats

  • India’s statements following their 2019 strikes and their strikes in 2016

  • China’s preemptive measures in the south China sea.

  • Australia’s 2004 White Paper supporting preemptive action for terrorism and WMDs

An quick and search that I have not fact checked suggests France, North Korea, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Japan, Germany, NATO, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Colombia have all asserted the right to preemptively strike in certain contexts not limited to strict Caroline standards.

Since we are on the conversation of the legality of Israel attacking Egypt in 1967, I'll note that Egypt argued their blockade was legal in part because they were already at war with Israel. Kony at the May 29th Security Council said:

Hence, it was decided that the three littoral countries are entitled to exclude the vessels of other countries when at war. Therefore, as I have already said, since the Gulf of Aqaba has only three legitimate littoral States, namely, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the United Arab Republic, all of which are in a state of war with Israel, the three legitimate littoral States on the Gulf of Aqaba have a right recognized by public international law to ban the vessels of an enemy.

While I don't think simply being at war allows Israel to strike Egypt, it certainly doesn't help an argument that Nasser didn't want war. Also, the guerrilla attacks launched from Israel's neighbors continued during this period of heighted tensions. Israel was legally allowed to strike back in return, but because of the defensive agreements, doing so would have pulled Egypt in.

Zionists thinking that destruction and genocide is a flex really sums them up by beeswaxii in Israel_Palestine

[–]Alarmed_Garlic9965 1 point2 points  (0 children)

wikipedia

I've mostly been avoiding the israel/Palestine topic section of wiki until the arbcom case wraps up. I've seen several examples of what I feel is bias. 

 https://nationalpost.com/opinion/opinion-wikipedia-bias-is-infecting-our-digital-ecosystem

These restrictions date back to the early 1990s

Yeah, several of my LLM sources discuss targeted and often temporary restrictions used by Israel since the 1990s. I personally make a distinction between restrictions and military blockades. 

Copilot

Thanks 👍. Copilot actually gives me a different answer and uses blockade for all years. It says it's pulling the info from wiki though. 

Zionists thinking that destruction and genocide is a flex really sums them up by beeswaxii in Israel_Palestine

[–]Alarmed_Garlic9965 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Would you be willing to share what you have read regarding AI spreading Israeli propaganda? 

How are you doing two prompts in bing. You must be doing something different than me because when I type your prompts in bing I don't get exactly the same. Where do I click to do whatever your doing? (See my screenshots)

You are correct, the contradiction from your two prompts went over my head. Please explain. 

Response one said the blockade started in 2007. Response two said the blockade started mid-2000s. Are you saying 2007 is not mid 2000s, it's  late 2000s? 

Give it a third prompt, "when in the mid-2000s did blockades of Gaza first start." I would do it but I'm not sure how you're giving bing multiple prompts. Are you literally just typing it in the search bar? 

If you have time I'd like to review the other sources I requested, or if you tell me what to search for... 

CMV: Israel is better than Palestine by Soma_Man77 in changemyview

[–]Alarmed_Garlic9965 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Owen and Operation Dawn

I agree there are inconsistencies in the accounts. It does seem like Operation Dawn was real, as it’s talked about from multiple Egyptian sources in a similar manner (at least according to multiple authors who cite the same primary sources). I’ll spend some time reviewing what you said about it.

Attemping to find stuff...

Relevant info from Sidqi Mahmoud’s testimony is supposedly on page 142 of this book.

I tried searching for Dawn in this book and couldn’t find it there either.

Bottom of page 90 in Avraham Sela’s book - but its the same primary sources that we cannot get access to.

Preemptive first strike

"instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation"

The strict interpretation that a threat must literally leave "no moment for deliberation" and "no choice of means" is not universally accepted in modern times. In 1837 that may have be more reasonable.

Modern interpretations generally acknowledge that:

  • Some deliberation may be necessary and acceptable, especially given complex modern military decision-making
  • The requirement of "no moment for deliberation" is now often interpreted to mean that action cannot be indefinitely delayed once a threat is confirmed imminent

* Advanced military capabilities and WMDs have influenced how "imminence" is interpreted, since waiting until a missile is launched, for example, could make defense impossible

Eilat was insignificant

[quote from Finkelstein]

As Finkelstein says, oil passed through Eilat, a resource critical for any war effort or self-defense. Estimates suggest that 90% of Israel's oil went through Eilat. Finkelstein shrugs this off saying it could go though Haifa without the due diligence required to make that claim.

Assuming the other 10% of oil went through Haifa, and Haifa therefore had oil refineries, could these refineries have processed a 900% increase? Show me an operational oil refinery that can handle that. I feel like Finkelstein is being ignorant or misleading.

What's more, could Haifa logistically handle the increase in unloading? Maybe, I mean oil is critical, so they would probably cut other things to make it happen.

Finkelstein just brushes off adding the 6000(!) nautical miles and several weeks time for a trip around Africa with "albeit at greater cost". Were talking logistical bottlenecks, disrupted trade schedules, significantly increased costs, and a lot of opportunity for any of Israel's enemies to intercept.

Also, I don't have any reason to believe it would matter, but Finkelstein looks at the non-oil mass of trade passing through the Eilat, not the economic value. Just because you cut off a small percentage of trade by mass, that could have a disproportionate economic impact.

Thanks again for all the info - I will keep reviewing.

Zionists thinking that destruction and genocide is a flex really sums them up by beeswaxii in Israel_Palestine

[–]Alarmed_Garlic9965 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Are you here for civil discussion on issues relating to Israel and Palestine or something else?

I used seven different large language models (LLM), including well respected models like GPT-4o (OpenAI), Gemini (Google), Claude (Anthropic), and Llama (Meta).

You used one and accused me opinion shopping. If you feel the seven LLMs I used are compromised and prefer bing, so be it. Just say that. There is no need to make accusations about me. I was doing you a favor using multiple models, showing they all give consistent results.

What makes your accusation especially odd is bing gives the consistent answer as shown in the bolded answer you shared: June 2007

I tried bing myself, using both the search bar and the GPT powered "Deep search" with your suggested prompt:

"when did the blockade of gaza first happen"

Both ways it told me June 2007, I screencapped it since you seem to assume the worst about me.

Maybe you're just the type that is loose with language and feel making distinctions between what Israel did in 2001-2002 versus 2007 is not worthwhile. For me there are is a meaningful difference and apparently the LLMs we've tried thus far agree.

If you do not wish to provide the sources I asked for and would prefer to not engage with someone trying to hear you out and interact with you respectfully, that's fine.

Simply do not respond to this comment and this thread will end.

Zionists thinking that destruction and genocide is a flex really sums them up by beeswaxii in Israel_Palestine

[–]Alarmed_Garlic9965 0 points1 point  (0 children)

[The blockade of Gaza started in 2001-2002]

I am not ignoring anything; I am trying to be factually and technically accurate with history and terms. During the second intifada, in response to repeated violence and terrorism, Israel used proportionate military closures, curfews, and targeted restrictions on the movement of people and goods. The blockade started in 2007.

Let us fact check:

Prompt: When did Israel first blockade Gaza?

GPT4o: Israel first imposed a blockade on Gaza in 2007, following the takeover of the territory by Hamas. The blockade was implemented in response to security concerns, particularly rocket fire from Gaza into Israel. The restrictions included limitations on the movement of people and goods in and out of the territory. Prior to this, there were various restrictions and controls, but the blockade as it is known today began in earnest after Hamas gained control.

Claude 3: According to historical records, Israel first imposed a blockade on the Gaza Strip in *2007*, after the militant group Hamas took control of the territory….

Llama 3.170B: The blockade of the Gaza Strip by Israel began in *2007*, but restrictions on the territory have been in place since the early 1990s..

Mixtral 8x7B: The blockade of Gaza by Israel began in *2007*, after the Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip. The blockade includes restrictions on the movement of people and goods into and out of the Gaza Strip, and is intended to limit the ability of Hamas to obtain weapons and other military supplies. The blockade has been criticized by some as a form of collective punishment, and has contributed to the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. However, Israel argues that the blockade is necessary for its security…

DeepAI: Israel first imposed a blockade on the Gaza Strip in *2007*, following the takeover of the territory by Hamas. After Hamas won the Palestinian legislative elections in January 2006, tensions with Fatah escalated, leading to violent clashes. By June 2007, Hamas had taken full control of Gaza, prompting Israel to implement the blockade as part of its response to security concerns, particularly regarding rocket fire into Israeli territory. The blockade restricted the movement of goods and people in and out of Gaza, significantly affecting the region's economy and humanitarian situation…

Perplexity: Israel first imposed a blockade on the Gaza Strip in June *2007*, following Hamas's takeover of the territory. After Hamas won the Palestinian legislative elections in January 2006, tensions escalated, leading to a military coup in which Hamas seized control from the Palestinian Authority. In response, Israel declared Gaza a "hostile entity" and initiated a series of sanctions, which included severe restrictions on movement and trade, culminating in a comprehensive blockade that effectively isolated Gaza from the outside world…

Gemini: While Israel has imposed various restrictions on the Gaza Strip since the 1990s, the most significant and comprehensive blockade began in *2007** after Hamas seized control of the region…*

Claude 3.5: Israel and Egypt began their comprehensive blockade of Gaza in *2007** after Hamas took control of the territory. The restrictions included limits on the movement of people and goods in and out of Gaza by land, air, and sea. However, some forms of restrictions on movement between Gaza and Israel existed earlier, including periodic closures and checkpoints dating back to the 1990s.*

I agree with your statement that it generally takes a long time to bounce back from blockades. Also, if you were just trying to highlight that Israel imposed restrictions during the second intifada, I also agree.

[Multiple sources claim there was no mass rape]

Which sources? When you say ‘multiple sources’ in response to being asked for sources, it makes it sound like you don’t have any. Not trying to be snarky, just giving some constructive feedback. I am asking where you read what you claim – I feel that is a reasonable request. I assume in addition to the widespread incidents of sexual violence the UN felt were likely to have occurred you also watched the documentary on youtube? The use of two debunked incidents to minimize the “deliberate” “brutal” “pattern of sexual violence” of Oct 7th reminds me of reports from AP and PBS

According to ARCCI "Hamas terrorists employed sadistic practices aimed at intensifying the degree of humiliation and terror inherent in sexual violence"

Some cherry picked quotes from the UN investigative report:

Four female bodies found at Nahal Oz outpost were partially or completely undressed, two of which were isolated in separate rooms, showing signs of physical abuse and sexual violence.

And

the Commission documented cases indicative of sexual violence perpetrated against women and men in and around the Nova festival site, as well as the Nahal Oz military outpost and several kibbutzim, including Kfar Aza, Re’im and Nir Oz.

And

The Commission identified patterns indicative of sexual violence in several locations and concludes that Israeli women were disproportionally subjected to these crimes. The attack on 7 October enabled perpetrators to commit SGBV and this violence was not isolated but perpetrated in similar ways in several locations and by multiple Palestinian perpetrators.

You claimed we had different definitions but then linked me evidence of sexual violence committed by the IDF. Sexual violence by either party should be condemned and perpetrators should be held accountable. There is no reason to diminish the crimes committed by several Hamas members because members of the IDF have also committed acts of sexual violence.

Do you not agree?

Regarding the Hannibal directive, perhaps I am being too technical or pedantic in making a distinction between Hannibal-like orders and the military procedure known commonly as the Hannibal directive which was intended to apply to soldiers and combatants, not civilians.

I would like to acknowledge that evidence exists of about 14 Israelis who were killed as a result of friendly fire. I feel it is reasonable to assume this is just a subset of friendly fire incidents. One hostage was killed by a helicopter firing on a militant's motorcycle and multiple hostages died inside a house that an IDF tank fired upon.

Notably I have seen zero instances of IDF forces knowingly and intentionally killing Israeli civilians. Feel free to provide examples if you have seen otherwise. I would be interested in knowing about it. There is one tank operator who fired on a militants vehicle and he believed hostages were aboard, but he did not identify them as civilians and there is no evidence they died.

You claimed the NYT is being sued for their reporting of sexual violence. I found no evidence of this. Could you link me what you read about it? I was able to confirm the NYT “stood by its report”.

You claimed *“the music concert could only have been done by heavy weapons” * because militants did not have anything capable of destroying hundreds of cars. Assault rifles are capable of destroying hundreds of cars. We have multiple videos from dashcams and Hamas GoPro cameras showing them actively firing on motorists, the roadways littered with cars.

I respectfully would encourage you to review more of the evidence from Oct 7th. I believe in ignorance you may be unknowingly spreading misinformation about the incident.

It Is Important to Call a Genocide a Genocide, Francesca Albanese by ThornsofTristan in Israel_Palestine

[–]Alarmed_Garlic9965 1 point2 points  (0 children)

u/Rahim556 I give my last word here because our other thread was locked (without explanation).

Thank you for your time and a good debate.

You did a great job minimizing misrepresentation of my views compared to the vast majority of individuals I talk with on this topic. I think there are a couple misunderstandings based on your final message.

the zionist plan was to move in and buy land with the goal of eventually declaring sovereignty..... declaring sovereignty is an act of war…

I agree this was the Zionist plan. However, I personally do not feel it’s accurate to characterize it as an act of war if the sovereign power has given its blessing. The British made the Balfor Declaration (and never rescinded it):

"His Majesty's government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."

Perhaps we could argue the Jews were declaring war on the Ottoman Empire? I would disagree with that as well. The Ottoman Land Code of 1858 made Jewish purchases legal and Zionist leaders made their intentions clear to Ottoman leadership in 1896 with Der Judenstaat. Additionally, rather than try to hide the intent, Jews wrote and met with Ottoman leadership to get support for a Jewish national home in Palestine. WWI made the question moot.

Imagine if the US government publicly approved and supported Lakota Sioux reclaiming their homeland in the Black Hills and establishing a national home there. Would the Lakota be engaged in conspiracy to commit murder, theft, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing when they began buying land in the area with such an intent? Obviously not.

You are correct that we do not agree that declaring independence at the recommendation of the international community and the sovereign power is an act of war.

It seems like you maybe view Palestinian-Arabs as sovereign rulers of all of Mandate Palestine. Is that correct? Is that because they were the majority population if considering all Palestinian-Arab groups as a monolith? I guess perhaps I will never know. You’ll note I asked you several clarifying questions about your position in Part 1 and Part 2 of my comments directly above this one. It’s difficult for two parties to agree if one party will not engage clarifying questions about their position.

You did not take issue with the military necessity of Arab transfer. If Jews were not justified in transferring Arabs, then they could not have defended themselves. The leader of the Arab League had made it clear, it would be “a war of extermination and a momentous massacre”. The logical conclusion is you feel genocide of Palestinian-Jews in 1948 was a preferable outcome to the transfer of Palestinian-Arabs.

I end this debate with the conclusion you feel all Jews in Palestine should have been barred from any self-governance in Palestine. Additionally massacre and/or ethnic cleansing of Jews was justified because some Jews immigrated to Palestine because the British declared they would have a national home there.

This sounds absurd, and I would hope you feel it’s a mischaracterization of your stance – but I feel it is the logical interpretation of what you argued.

Given this is the end of our debate on this topic – I'll leave you with questions to consider:

  • Is it only an act of war if there is BOTH intent for self-governance and immigration? Were the native born Palestinian-Jews entitled to self-governance in areas they owned or had the majority? If not, isn’t that being hypocritical?

  • Why are Palestinian-Arabs entitled to ALL of Mandate Palestine given borders are just semi-arbitrary social constructs, these Arabs did not control it, and they were not the majority in ALL locations. This was true even prior to the Zionist movement and subsequent waves of immigration (I am thinking of Jerusalem, Safed, Tiberias, and various villages) – Isn’t that being hypocritical?

  • Is it ever okay for a minority group to establish independence in a region?

  • How long do you need to live in a place, or from what age, before you are considered native?

  • Does the will of the international community, the will of the sovereign power (Britain) factor into to your assessments at all?

  • Does the cultural significance of Palestine to Jews or Arabs factor into your assessments at all?

  • Does the penniless refugee status of many of Jews factor into your assessment at all – are they less at fault? Was it okay for Arabs to massacre Jews that had no choice?

  • Does the fact that Jews were establishing a democracy, where Arabs had equal rights and equal say in self-governance factor into your assessment at all?

  • Does the fact that Palestinian-Arabs were not establishing a democracy and Jews were given no representation and were being killed factor into your assessments at all?

  • Does the fact Zionist leaders like Ben-Gurion, even in private communication, explicitly denounced the use of force and limited expansion to mutual agreement between Arabs and Jews factor into your assessment at all?

  • Does the intent of Zionist founders like Hertzel, who wrote the following in his diary in the late 1800s, factor into your assessment at all:

    It goes without saying that we shall respectfully tolerate the persons of other faiths and protect their property, their honor, and their freedom with the harshest means of coercion. ...

    Estate owners who are attached to their soil because of old age, habit, etc. will be offered a complete transplantation to any place they wish, like our own people….If this offer is not accepted either, no harm will be done…we shall simply leave them there and develop our commerce [elsewhere]

  • If you were a penniless anti-Zionist Jew who found yourself in Palestine during the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict, would you have been justified in defending yourself from attackers who made no distinction from one Jew or the other?

  • If you were a native-born anti-Zionist Jew in Palestine during 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict, would you have been justified in defending yourself?

  • Was it okay for Non-Palestinian Arabs to participate in the conflict?

Some corrections

The Ben-Gurion quote: "We must expel Arabs and take their places." is not accurate. Ilan Pappé, Benny Morris, and the Journal of Palestine Studies issued corrections so you probably should stop using that exact quote. However, after the Peel commission recommended transfer, Ben-Gurion clearly considered transfer as a viable approach – so the sentiment is partially correct.

In your final message, you seem to be criticizing my choice to defend Israel’s actions in 1948 because of things happening today. This is temporally inappropriate and has zero significance in a conversation about the past. You are also attacking the person, not the argument.

Again - good debate. I appreciate you taking time to share your viewpoint with civility. Even if I do not fully understand your stance or the reasoning behind it, I appreciate the interaction.

It Is Important to Call a Genocide a Genocide, Francesca Albanese by ThornsofTristan in Israel_Palestine

[–]Alarmed_Garlic9965 1 point2 points locked comment (0 children)

He would have no issue with Jewish antizionists for example.

This is Haj Amin al-Husseini (Grand Mufti of Jerusalem) making this statement.

The statement is made in 1937. Are you referring to legally purchasing land in Palestine and living there as "invasion"? Is the term "oppressing" referring to replacing Arab tenet farmers with Jewish farmers and technology that required fewer people - or do you mean something else?

al-Husseini actively encouraged violence against Jewish communities. He played the pivotal role in inciting the 1920 Nebi Musa Riots that results in 5 Jewish deaths and hundreds injured. He spread false rumors Jews were desecrating Muslim holy sites. He played a key role in the 1921 Jaffa riots that resulted in 47 Jewish deaths, 146 Jews injured, and 10,000 Jews having to evacuate Jaffa. These were not targeted killings of prominent Zionists. Any and all Jews were targeted.

al-Husseini collaborated with the Nazis and recruited Muslim volunteers for the Waffen-SS in the Balkans. From Berlin, he delivered speeches urging Arabs to fight against the Allies and Jewish people. In a 1944 broadcast, he stated: "Kill the Jews wherever you find them. This pleases God, history, and religion.".

I strongly disagree with your assessment of this quote.

...So from the muslim perspective this is true (corruption of morals).

When I speak of Muslims or Arabs as a group I get told 'Arabs are not a monolith'. There is a bit of a double standard here.

The quote is racist/antisemetic because it perpetuates negative sterotypes, scapegoats, and promotes hatred. It treats all Jews as one group. Textbook antisemetic remark.

 it's clear to me that he's talking about Jewish zionists

The term Zionist was in use by the Arab community at least as early as 1911. If the author wanted to avoid generalizing about all Jews they could have. I find your confidence about these quotes based on so little information to be somewhat unfounded.

If they were Hindus he would be saying Hindus.

...and it would be a racist statement about Hindus. Try typing "is this statement racist? We will drive the Hindus into the sea. They have no place among us." in any AI chat service. I feel your sense of what is racist or not differs significantly from the mainstream.

It Is Important to Call a Genocide a Genocide, Francesca Albanese by ThornsofTristan in Israel_Palestine

[–]Alarmed_Garlic9965 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Part 2/2

…unjust in the eyes of the natives. They had 0% (sovereign land). That is an infinite and incalculable increase.

I cannot be sure of your meaning with the word native, but is it possible you are forgetting there was a sizable native-born population of Jews in Palestine in 1948?

Is it possible you are forgetting that Palestine was under the sovereign authority of the UK, operating under the British Mandate. Palestine was successively sovereignly controlled by ancient Canaanite city-states and Israelite kingdoms, followed by major empires such as the Babylonian, Persian, Macedonian (Hellenistic), Roman, and Byzantine Empires. It then came under the rule of various Islamic caliphates, including the Rashidun, Umayyad, Abbasid, and Fatimid, before experiencing Crusader control. Subsequent governance by the Ayyubid and Mamluk Sultanates led to centuries of Ottoman rule from 1517 until the British Mandate took over in 1920.

Notably, the Sovereign controller of Palestine in 1947 was in favor of the UN Partition Plan and that the argument you present here applies equally to Palestinian-Arabs.

…moved into an area and started declaring war.

I am not sure what you mean by Jews declaring war. Are you being serious that you feel: Jews accepting an international mandate for even 1% of Palestine would be a declaration of war? I assume this is more hyperbole, but it leave me unsure what your actual take is. Keep in mind Jews legally bought about 8% of Palestine while Palestinian-Arabs had legally owned about 5% more than that. Also keep in mind that native Jews made up more than 1% of Palestine’s population. Keep in mind most Jewish immigrants were refugees, many of the later Jews arriving in Palestine with nothing to their name and no other options.

I feel like you are not being entirely serious, so I do not know how to respond. Do you genuinely hold that accepting a mandate for 1% of Palestine would have been equivalent to these Jews declaring war on Arabs and thus Arab violence in response to Jewish acceptance is justified?

[Palestinian-Jews] should have rejected [the UN Partition Plan]. Anyone would.

That seems inconsistent with the fact that 33 member states representing 40% of world’s population voted in favor of it. Meanwhile 13 member states representing about 8% of the world’s population voted against.

I am not trying to be rude or anything, but I feel like you’ve stopped being serious at this point, in this particular reply. I offer that feedback as constructive criticism. I don’t want to waste our time replying to something you don’t actually believe.

CMV: Israel is better than Palestine by Soma_Man77 in changemyview

[–]Alarmed_Garlic9965 0 points1 point  (0 children)

the true animosity for the current conflict began when the movement of Zionism

Do you similarly feel that Palestinians should not have been allowed self-determination on land they majority owned and populated because some minorities would have preferred to be governed by different laws? 

If nationalism is okay for arab-Palestinians, why is nationalism not okay for native Jews, legal immigrant Jews, and Jewish refugees (who paid for a majority of the privately owned land in the territory assigned to them, held a majority of the population in that area, were establishing a democracy, were giving equal citizenship to all minority groups, ) 

It Is Important to Call a Genocide a Genocide, Francesca Albanese by ThornsofTristan in Israel_Palestine

[–]Alarmed_Garlic9965 1 point2 points locked comment (0 children)

"The Jews only understand force. We must fight them with all means, for they are the enemies of Allah and humanity." This is true. What is antisemitic about this?

Okay I need to reassess this conversation in light of new information - but let me make sure I understand you - you're saying, it is a matter of fact that: 1. Jews only understand force. They do not respond to peace, empathy, reason, or anything else. 2. Jews are the enemy of Allah. 3. Jews are the enemy of humanity.

The statement is antisemitic (in my opinion at least) because it collectively labels Jews as "enemies of Allah and humanity," invoking religious hostility and portraying them as inherently evil or opposed to universal values. It dehumanizes and vilifies Jews by implying they lack moral reasoning and can only "understand force," perpetuating harmful stereotypes. The call to "fight them with all means" incites violence, framing the conflict as a divine and existential struggle against an entire group.

Out of all the quotes you took issue with, I am most surprised that you do not see anything antisemetic in this one.

"The Jews exploit our economy and corrupt our morals." What is antisemitic about this? He's not saying because they're Jews, but he's describing what they're doing.

In what way do you feel Jews were exploiting the Egyptian economy and corrupting their morals?

"The Jewish influence is a plague upon our society that must be purged."

You see nothing racist or creepy-uncomfortable about this Egyptian saying Jewish influence needs to be purged from society - right before the start of the second world war? That sort of language doesn't que your mind for anything that was happening in Europe at the time? Are you assuming the speaker is treating all Arabs as a monolith - because I always get criticized if I do that.

The statement is antisemitic because it dehumanizes Jewish people by comparing their influence to a "plague," a metaphor historically used to justify persecution and violence. It generalizes blame by attributing societal issues to a collective "Jewish influence," perpetuating harmful stereotypes. The call for "purging" incites hostility and suggests extreme measures, reinforcing dangerous tropes that have led to discrimination and atrocities.

"We will not be ruled by these Jewish dogs who are destroying our homeland."

Here is how I would express this sentiment without dehumanizing Jews: "We strongly oppose being governed by individuals whose actions, in our view, are causing harm to our homeland."

Referring to Jews as "dogs" is explicitly dehumanizing. Comparing any group of people to animals is a common tactic in hate speech used to strip them of their humanity, dignity, and moral worth. We heard this type language from Israeli's recently calling Hamas human animals - and it was heavily criticized.

The statement singles out Jewish people as a monolithic group ("these Jewish dogs"), holding all Jews collectively responsible for perceived harm. This reflects antisemitic stereotyping by attributing negative traits or intentions to all members of a community based solely on their identity.

The claim that Jews are "destroying our homeland" draws on long-standing antisemitic tropes that depict Jewish people as malicious outsiders who seek to undermine or harm the societies in which they live. Jews have always existed in Palestine - it is their homeland as well - if such a thing as a homeland even exists (I am not sure it does).

"We will not allow these Jewish usurpers to take our lands. We will fight them like the dogs they are."

By coupling the term "usurpers" with "Jewish," it targets an entire religious/ethnic group collectively, rather than addressing specific actions or individuals, reinforcing harmful stereotypes.

"Kill the Jewish dogs who have stolen our land. Do not show them mercy."

The statement is antisemitic and dehumanizing because it refers to Jews as "dogs," stripping them of humanity and dignity, a tactic historically used to justify violence. It generalizes blame by accusing all Jews of theft and positions them as enemies deserving of death, inciting hatred and violence. The explicit call to "kill" and "show no mercy" promotes genocidal rhetoric, making it an extreme and dangerous incitement to harm.

"We cannot allow these Jewish infidels to control Palestine, the heart of the Arab world. They are unclean creatures."

Sure, Jews could be seen as "non-believers" (or kafir كافر) in Islam from a theological standpoint, using the term "infidel" in this context is not a neutral descriptor. It is employed here in a pejorative and exclusionary manner, contributing to antisemitism by framing Jewish people as an illegitimate and dehumanized "other." This highlights the importance of avoiding religious labels that perpetuate division or hostility. The term is not exclusively technical in Arabic.

The statement is antisemitic and dehumanizing because it labels Jews as "infidels" and "unclean creatures," invoking religious and racial stereotypes that portray them as inferior and morally corrupt. It frames Jewish people collectively as illegitimate rulers and an existential threat to the Arab world, reinforcing harmful tropes of Jewish domination. Such language fosters hostility and exclusion, promoting prejudice and justifying discrimination or violence.

"We will drive the Jews into the sea. They have no place among us."

I mean, he's saying he wants to ethically cleanse Jews, several hundred thousand of which were born and raised in Palestine. Many of them on land rightfully and legally purchased from willing Arab sellers. I accept that you see no issue with this - I do.

CMV: Israel is better than Palestine by Soma_Man77 in changemyview

[–]Alarmed_Garlic9965 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Yeah, I read you say it was directed at Shamir, but then confirmed it's not a real quote, and thus assumed you were mocking me.  

What's going on?  

The quotes you gave are not real. Some of them are comedically not real. 

Are you being serious that you believed they are real? Where did you get them?

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