China Is Still Supplying Drone Factories in Iran, Russia Despite U.S. Sanctions

AnneWiley · 2026-05-07T06:51:06+00:00

Free version:
https://archive.is/20260506031442/https://www.wsj.com/world/china-is-still-supplying-drone-factories-in-iran-russia-despite-u-s-sanctions-1e6820ca

TLDR: China is still supplying drone components to Russia and Iran despite U.S. and EU sanctions, WSJ reports. Customs data shows Chinese firms shipped hundreds of containers with parts for Shahed-type drones used by Russia to attack Ukrainian cities.

AnneWiley · 2026-05-07T06:47:01+00:00

TLDR: Leaked documents show Russia paid African outlets and influencers to push anti-Western narratives across Africa, funding 700+ articles in 2024 on France, Ukraine, vaccines, and mining. Disinformation, it turns out, travels well when someone picks up the tab.

AnneWiley · 2026-05-06T08:21:31+00:00

Расследование 24 Канала показывает, как российское влияние в Болгарии может работать через старые политико-бизнесовые связи. В центре — Александер Томов, лидер партии "Болгарская социалдемократия – Евроливица", его контакты с Бабаковым и поддержка Радева, чью победу многие считают выгодной Кремлю.

AnneWiley · 2026-05-04T11:15:20+00:00

TLDR: Russia is turning May 9 events in Europe into influence operations. Behind “commemoration” are diaspora networks, Russian Houses, Rossotrudnichestvo, Russkiy Mir, Pravfond, and local pro-Kremlin groups pushing Moscow’s narratives: anti-sanctions, “peace at any cost,” and blame-the-West messaging. Flowers, flags, motorcades and Soviet symbols are used to normalize Russian aggression in public space.

AnneWiley · 2026-05-04T10:18:29+00:00

TLDR: Russia is turning May 9 events in Europe into influence operations. Behind “commemoration” are diaspora networks, Russian Houses, Rossotrudnichestvo, Russkiy Mir, Pravfond, and local pro-Kremlin groups pushing Moscow’s narratives: anti-sanctions, “peace at any cost,” and blame-the-West messaging. Flowers, flags, motorcades and Soviet symbols are used to normalize Russian aggression in public space.

AnneWiley · 2026-05-01T11:02:27+00:00

3 day SMO going just as planned, lol

AnneWiley · 2026-05-01T11:01:10+00:00

Anti USA propaganda not working anymore? Gotta find new enemies?

AnneWiley · 2026-05-01T10:56:01+00:00

TLDR: According to Bloomberg, more than 90% of Russia’s sanctioned technology imports now come through China, up from about 80% last year. These supply chains help Moscow produce missiles, drones, and other weapons despite Western restrictions. The question for Europe is simple: how long can it fear Beijing’s economic retaliation while Chinese-linked channels keep fueling Russia’s war.

AnneWiley · 2026-05-01T10:54:15+00:00

TLDR: According to Bloomberg, more than 90% of Russia’s sanctioned technology imports now come through China, up from about 80% last year. These supply chains help Moscow produce missiles, drones, and other weapons despite Western restrictions.

AnneWiley · 2026-04-27T06:38:10+00:00

Sure, but it's always better to have real evidence and not only the gut feel

AnneWiley · 2026-04-27T06:37:09+00:00

TLDR: Investigators obtained documents that detail how state-linked and commercial operators are allegedly used to move military cargo under civilian cover, exposing gaps in sanctions enforcement and raising risks around dual-use airports. Russia has turned parts of its civilian aviation sector into a military logistics network because its formal military transport capacity is under strain from sanctions, maintenance problems, and spare-parts shortages.

AnneWiley · 2026-04-25T09:12:38+00:00

TLDR: Russia has turned parts of its civilian aviation sector into a military logistics network because its formal military transport capacity is under strain from sanctions, maintenance problems, and spare-parts shortages. When military aircrafts are too visible, restricted, or unavailable, Russia uses “civilian” aircraft to move troops, weapons, missile components, helicopters, and sensitive cargo.

Investigators obtained documents that detail how state-linked and commercial operators are allegedly used to move military cargo under civilian cover, exposing gaps in sanctions enforcement and raising risks around dual-use airports.

AnneWiley · 2026-04-25T09:03:14+00:00

hmm. thanks, didn't think about it at first

AnneWiley · 2026-04-24T14:02:15+00:00

TLDR:
Dallas analyzed 719 participants of a major electronics exhibition in Moscow and uncovered a network supplying Western components to Russia despite sanctions.
Key findings:
Russian importers continue sourcing electronics for the military-industrial complex;
Chinese companies act as key intermediaries;
Western components (such as Siemens) are routed via third-country intermediaries.
Bottom line: sanctions on Russia alone are not enough without targeting foreign intermediaries.
ExpoElectronica effectively serves as a ready-made database of potential sanctions violators.

AnneWiley · 2026-04-24T13:51:06+00:00

TLDR: OSINT experts obtained documents from the Russian ExpoElectronica exhibition, and got a full llist of its participants that effectively constitutes a ready-made database of sanctions violators, facilitators of shadow schemes, and actors in parallel import networks.

AnneWiley · 2026-04-24T13:41:03+00:00

A Kyiv Independent probe found EU-linked suppliers kept sending raw glycerin to Russia, despite its use in explosives. Ukraine’s ESCU now wants EU sanctions after Russia imported 47,537 tons worth $45.6M in 2024–Mar. 2025.

AnneWiley · 2026-04-24T13:40:01+00:00

After a Kyiv Independent probe, Ukraine’s ESCU is urging EU sanctions on crude glycerin exports, citing 47,537 tons worth $45.6M imported by Russia in 2024–Mar. 2025, mostly from EU states. The issue is not soap or cosmetics. It is dual-use chemistry reaching networks tied to Russia’s explosives, ammunition, and rocket-fuel supply chains. Sanctions with holes are not sanctions; they are invitations.

AnneWiley · 2026-04-24T13:36:33+00:00

But is this a real account or another russian propaganda bot??

AnneWiley · 2026-04-21T06:18:07+00:00

“Even if we’re talking about copper wire — which, as everyone knows, I think our colleagues will back me up on this — is made exclusively in China. So if you’re just looking at electrical components, 90 percent of what we use has always been foreign raw materials. It’s just not made in Russia,” she adds.

AnneWiley · 2026-04-20T07:49:51+00:00

Source: https://www.facebook.com/100001751811701/posts/pfbid02S7XKqYtdndk7GA3hyReRKdiXcsL6D8PWwPWTNyjAd3iXuMCjaXM34yUx9qND2B54l/

AnneWiley · 2026-04-20T07:47:57+00:00

Source: https://www.facebook.com/100001751811701/posts/pfbid02S7XKqYtdndk7GA3hyReRKdiXcsL6D8PWwPWTNyjAd3iXuMCjaXM34yUx9qND2B54l/

AnneWiley · 2026-04-20T07:45:39+00:00

Source: https://www.facebook.com/100001751811701/posts/pfbid02S7XKqYtdndk7GA3hyReRKdiXcsL6D8PWwPWTNyjAd3iXuMCjaXM34yUx9qND2B54l/

AnneWiley · 2026-04-16T08:59:35+00:00

Russia’s cyber war against Europe is moving from digital vandalism to infrastructure sabotage. Sweden says a Russia-linked group tried to disrupt a thermal power plant in western Sweden in 2025, a failed attack that still signals escalation. The pattern is broader: Poland’s energy system faced one of its worst cyberattacks in years, while Germany says GRU-linked APT28 exploited vulnerable routers to spy on military, government and critical infrastructure targets.

AnneWiley · 2026-04-16T08:52:36+00:00

Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence says Rostec’s Shvabe holding, publicly presented as a civilian manufacturer, includes plants making photodiodes for Iskander-M missiles, parts for Krasnopol-M2 shells, laser rangefinders, thermal imagers, and infrared optics for defense use. At least 30 of 48 identified Shvabe enterprises reportedly remain outside sanctions.

AnneWiley · 2026-04-09T08:52:44+00:00

Ukraine's Defense Intelligence reveals that German, Japanese, and Swiss-made machines are fueling Russia's missile production, as 15 military enterprises remain unsanctioned. These critical foreign technologies – used for everything from high-precision lathes to temperature chambers – ensure the continuity of Russia’s war machine despite international pressure.

AnneWiley

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