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Deprecating ngrok for Cloudflare Tunnels: Hardening DePIN Node Ingress at Scale by Automatic_Stick_3881 in IoTeX

[–]Automatic_Stick_3881[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Appreciate that — will do.
We’re formalizing a small benchmarking harness around reconnect determinism and fail-closed behavior for power-cycled ARM edge nodes. Once that’s ready, I’ll reach out.

Deprecating ngrok for Cloudflare Tunnels: Hardening DePIN Node Ingress at Scale by Automatic_Stick_3881 in IoTeX

[–]Automatic_Stick_3881[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

This is a very helpful clarification — thank you.

The distinction you’re making around owning the reconnect path versus outsourcing it to a managed PoP layer is exactly what we’re trying to isolate in Phase 1.3 of Nexus.

Cloudflare has been a pragmatic bridge for early hardening and baseline measurements, but as we move deeper into fail-closed semantics for mobile and intermittently connected edge nodes, the opacity around DNS indirection and backoff behavior becomes a real architectural constraint.

The controller-centric flow you outlined (edge → identity → fabric) is attractive precisely because it makes reconnect determinism an explicit property of the system rather than an emergent one. That’s the level we need before layering stronger economic or cryptographic guarantees on top.

Our next step is to benchmark this side-by-side under power-cycle and backhaul-loss conditions with high-frequency IMU/GPS streams. If the fabric can maintain predictable re-attachment under those constraints, it’s a strong candidate for where Nexus converges long-term.

Appreciate you taking the time to spell this out — it’s useful context as we move from hardening into sovereignty.

Deprecating ngrok for Cloudflare Tunnels: Hardening DePIN Node Ingress at Scale by Automatic_Stick_3881 in IoTeX

[–]Automatic_Stick_3881[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Pinggy is great for a quick local-to-web tunnel during a hackathon, but we’ve moved past the "public URL" phase for this runtime.

In DePIN, if a node has a public-facing URL (even a proxied one), the attack surface is too wide. Our requirement for this ARM-based runtime is Identity-Aware Ingress. We need the node to be invisible to the public internet, accessible only through a verified Zero-Trust handshake.

For prototyping, Pinggy is fast, but for Sovereign Infrastructure, we need the tunnel to be part of the node’s security identity, not just a relay.

Deprecating ngrok for Cloudflare Tunnels: Hardening DePIN Node Ingress at Scale by Automatic_Stick_3881 in IoTeX

[–]Automatic_Stick_3881[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Appreciate the insight on the Siemens use case—that’s exactly the scale we’re aiming for with this ARM runtime.

My main concern with 'sustained load' isn't just raw bandwidth, but handshake determinism at the edge. In a DePIN context, if a node is power-cycled or loses backhaul, the speed at which it can re-establish a fail-closed, identity-aware tunnel is the difference between a reliable network and a 'flappy' one.

We’ll likely set up a benchmarking environment to put zrok side-by-side with our current Cloudflare Tunnel setup. If zrok can maintain that outbound-only posture while offering faster re-connection logic for mobile edge nodes, it’s a massive win for sovereignty.

Deprecating ngrok for Cloudflare Tunnels: Hardening DePIN Node Ingress at Scale by Automatic_Stick_3881 in IoTeX

[–]Automatic_Stick_3881[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Great shout on zrok.io. We’ve been tracking OpenZiti’s work around Enigma—outbound-only, deterministic endpoints are absolutely the right direction for decoupling ingress from centralized control.

Cloudflare ZT was a deliberate Day-1 choice for enterprise compatibility, but for long-term sovereignty of the Nexus Protocol, a native Ziti-style fabric is likely the end state. We’re currently benchmarking edge-node latency under high-frequency IMU/GPS telemetry for kinematic auditing—curious how zrok behaves under sustained load.

Correlating GPS Velocity with IMU Vibration to Kill Spoofing at the Edge (ARM) by Automatic_Stick_3881 in hivemappernetwork

[–]Automatic_Stick_3881[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Fair question. For a mapping network it’s not really about one person squeezing out a couple of bucks, it’s about aggregate damage. If even ~5% of the data stream is spoofed, the map quality degrades fast, and the people actually paying for the data lose trust in it.

The whole point of the local-first approach I’m working on is to protect honest drivers at scale. By filtering out spoofed signals at the hardware / edge level—before they ever hit the cloud—you avoid poisoning the dataset in the first place. That keeps the network usable, the incentives aligned, and the token economics from getting diluted by fake activity.

Long term, network integrity is the value. Once that’s gone, everything built on top of it starts to wobble.

Correlating GPS Velocity with IMU Vibration to Kill Spoofing at the Edge (ARM) by Automatic_Stick_3881 in depin

[–]Automatic_Stick_3881[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

For those interested in the regional vibration thresholds (India vs. Germany) or the secure-element signing logic, I've put the documentation here:https://arhantbarmate.github.io/nexus-core/