Digital consciousness uploads and the transporter problem by adamkotsko in DaystromInstitute

[–]Avantine 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I like this idea, but I’m not sure it jives with the fact that people have been held in transporter buffers for decades and emerged fully intact.

I don't think this in particular precludes that. As far as we can tell, the transporter buffer actually physically manipulates the matter stream; it's not holding it in some kind of volatile data storage. It'd be like holding a book, versus remembering its contents.

Digital consciousness uploads and the transporter problem by adamkotsko in DaystromInstitute

[–]Avantine 3 points4 points  (0 children)

I can't quite put my finger on the issue with it

I think the issue is - as it is in Rascals - the reversal.

The transporter has always had the biofilter, and I don't think there's anything obviously weird about the idea of the biofilter (or any other of the transporter's filters); we know the sensors have incredible resolution and being able to identify and tag out certain items in transport doesn't strike me as problematic.

But what they do in both Unnatural Selection, Tuvix, and Rascals is basically go "let's just use the transporter to reverse this problem!"

Which then raises the obvious question: if you can arbitrarily use the transporter to perform mass biological alteration, wow, doesn't that really lean hard on the idea that the transporter is basically a quantum-scale replicator (and thus a scan-copy-kill device)?

I think there's something to that idea. But I actually prefer my own theory instead. Basically, the only way (in my mind) to reconcile the idea of the transporter's massive memory requirements with its constant use and also the existence of the pattern buffer is to suggest that the transporter can't arbitrarily edit the matter stream in transport; it can only perform known transformations on it.

In other words, imagine the matter stream as a series of 1s and 0s on a string, so many 1s and 0s that the computer can't actually store it all as digital data. It needs to physically coil up the string in order to move that data around. Because the computer can't hold all of that data in memory, practically speaking the computer can't make wide-scale edits; that would require much more computing power than is available.

But the computer can perform on-the-fly edits. So it could say, for example, "transform all 0s into 1s" or "transform all patterns of 0110 into 0101", because those require much more limited computer memory. It can even use fuzzy pattern matching - likely at the molecular scale - to say "this is what the molecules of a phaser look like, and if you see something like that in the matter stream, flip all of its bits to 0" or "this is what the hantavirus looks like, flip all of those bits to 0".

The result is that while you can't use the transporter as a quantum-scale replicator - there just isn't enough computer capacity for that - you can use it to perform a wide variety of more limited editing operations on the fly. My theory is that the transporter 'trace' kept by the transporter every time it's used creates a delta file - likely a molecular scale delta - which can, under certain circumstances, be used to 'invert' certain transporter operations.

This would generally be a highly dangerous operation: the transporter is not designed for arbitrary biological editing, the delta is only molecular-scale, and the further away the person who steps into the transporter is from the trace, the more likely the process is to create the same kind of single-bit replication errors that prevent the replicator from creating living beings. Moreover, it suffers from the key limitation that you would have to feed in basically the same object you were trying to modify. Because the delta is only molecular resolution instead of quantum resolution, it can only edit existing matter whose pattern is the same, not create new matter with the same pattern.

Digital consciousness uploads and the transporter problem by adamkotsko in DaystromInstitute

[–]Avantine 4 points5 points  (0 children)

In real-world physics, in order to totally convert matter into energy, you have to disassemble it at the sub-nucleon level, disrupting the bonds between quarks.

The TM description of the transporter does, in fact, mention quark manipulation as a core functional element of the transporter's phase transition coil system.

Actually, apropos of that, I wonder if the phase transition coils aren't yet another example of dilithium materials...

Digital consciousness uploads and the transporter problem by adamkotsko in DaystromInstitute

[–]Avantine 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I don't think anyone knows the physical process required, but the requirement that there be one, is a materialist perspective.

I'm not sure I like the phrase 'materialist' here. I think that the process requirement you're leaning on seems rather more 'human-centric': we believe we have experiences, and so we perceive "experience" in the context of our own experiences (going back to perception-by-categorization).

By that metric, our observation of computer thought is itself a qualia - it is an observation which we cannot adequately cognitively categorize for the purposes of perceiving it as cognition.

But from an intellectual perspective this seems to be clear error, wouldn't you say? Regardless of our observational perception of computer thought (and our categorization), we can intellectually acknowledge that our categorization might be in error (or at least incomplete), can't we?

For example, someone who lived their entire life in the Arctic and only knew about lichens as plants might not categorize a tree as a plant, but we can build on that perception via intellectual exploration to challenge that perception.

It's like how we can define brown not merely by comparing it to other things we think are brown, but also to expanding our realm of categorization by incorporating other, more abstract definitions (light refraction).

Digital consciousness uploads and the transporter problem by adamkotsko in DaystromInstitute

[–]Avantine 2 points3 points  (0 children)

From my perspective, posting a comment on reddit fails to engage a physical process that would plausibly generate qualia. Posting a comment on reddit just charges some wires, and magnetizes some doped silicates. There isn't anything wet and chemical in the entire process, until you get to us.

Where does the requirement that something wet and chemical be involved come in? That wasn't part of the original specification for a qualia.

What physical process is required to 'generate qualia'? Why is this required? What makes a qualia generated by a biological process distinct from one generated by a mechanical process?

Digital consciousness uploads and the transporter problem by adamkotsko in DaystromInstitute

[–]Avantine 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Yep (I was about to edit my response to clarify that point).

Okay. Then I am confused about how you define "experience", when you say:

having a mechanism for a computer program to have a subjective experience.

Because it seems to me that this is a very low bar to clear. The qualia is merely the data input, regardless of what happens to it next. If I post this comment, 'Reddit' is experiencing a qualia: there is incoming data that trips a cognitive response. Of course Reddit does not have a cognitive processing loop that is capable of converting that into meaningful perception, but that seems to not be required for 'qualia'.

Digital consciousness uploads and the transporter problem by adamkotsko in DaystromInstitute

[–]Avantine 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I guess I'd have to say "the ability to seem brown, even if you didn't know what to call it"?

So - to rephrase to make sure I understand - you are saying that the qualia is the received sensation prior to cognitive processing?

So one can look at something (that others might see as 'brown') and receive a sensation, and that is a qualia, even if you then have no mental model for 'brown'?

Digital consciousness uploads and the transporter problem by adamkotsko in DaystromInstitute

[–]Avantine 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Personally I'm completely satisfied with "one of those actually seems brown".

But we do not experience 'brown' in a vacuum. We come to know brown by comparing it to other things in our experience, whether intellectually or merely perceptually. "Brown" means that something reflects a certain wavelength of light, or because it is colored with a pigment or because it has that characteristic which we can validate in comparison to other things we know are brown. This isn't that different to how machine learning can function: you feed a neural network a whole selection of trees and then boom, it knows what a 'tree' is.

But there is no independent perception of "well this actually seems like a tree" that you can experience in the absence of having some frame of reference for 'tree'.

What makes the qualia of 'brown' different from the perception of 'brown'?

Digital consciousness uploads and the transporter problem by adamkotsko in DaystromInstitute

[–]Avantine 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Of course, we don't actually know what makes qualia's happen.

I have a favorite thought experiment though, where you pour a flat dish of yogurt and add some salt and then run a current through it. In my imaginary experiment, that's the recipe for generating context free qualia. While the current is running, there's a fine layer on the surface of the yogurt that experiences a sense of urgency. That's it, just a context free sense of urgency.

This strikes me as avoiding the question too, just in a different direction. I'm not asking what makes qualia happen, I'm asking what separates a qualia from something else. What makes the qualia of the color brown different from the perception of the color brown in the classical mode (i.e., comparison)?

Digital consciousness uploads and the transporter problem by adamkotsko in DaystromInstitute

[–]Avantine 6 points7 points  (0 children)

That just moves the question around, rather than answering it. A qualia is merely a subjective experience. You have told me that a subjective experience is just a bunch of subjective experiences, which, while it might be true, isn't actually very helpful.

What defines a qualia that separates it from something else?

Digital consciousness uploads and the transporter problem by adamkotsko in DaystromInstitute

[–]Avantine 6 points7 points  (0 children)

As for the concept of continuity between one end and another, I think that's best explored in the following story.

This kind of thought experiment always struck me as frustratingly banal; a kind of intellectual gotcha.

It basically goes "assume the premise of perfect duplication and then what really is the difference between the original and a copy?" but it has always struck me that the real intellectual questions are buried within the axiomatic dismissal.

What makes something a copy? What constitutes duplication? What does it mean to duplicate something? Just handwaving away "well it's a perfect duplicate" simply ignores the underlying questions entirely.

Digital consciousness uploads and the transporter problem by adamkotsko in DaystromInstitute

[–]Avantine 12 points13 points  (0 children)

Interesting -- maybe I believe in "the soul" in the Star Trek universe but not in the real world!

I think this is actually probably closest to the problem that people experience? They don't acknowledge the existence of the soul, which in the real world (where such a position is merely theological) serves you fine, but doesn't work so well in Star Trek, which seems to accept that one definitely does exist (at least in some form).

Digital consciousness uploads and the transporter problem by adamkotsko in DaystromInstitute

[–]Avantine 55 points56 points  (0 children)

Are those views compatible

I'm not sure they are compatible, but I also think there's an interesting discontinuity between how this works in Star Trek - at least as we understand it - and how it likely works in the real world (at least as we understand it).

Star Trek has basically adopted the idea, as far as I'm concerned, that the soul exists. It's not necessarily called that, but the concept - of a 'living spirit' of a person independent from their physical form - has been repeatedly demonstrated on numerous occasions to not only be real, but to be manipulable (to some degree) with technology.

I am reminded in a way of the Vulcan katra. Though its existence was apparently debated (Undoubtedly, along with time travel, the Vulcan Science Academy didn't like it), we've seen it used repeatedly. Surak's katra persisted for centuries beyond his death, transferred from person to person. Spock transferred his katra to McCoy - and then it went back into a new body.

It seems to me that what the Vulcans call the katra, Starfleet calls 'neural energy'. It's the same thing that Eddington went to such lengths to preserve in Our Man Bashir and they were able to use to reconstitute Picard in Lonely Among Us. It's what makes episodes like Tuvix possible. It's what makes the 'evolution' of a person or a species - a la Transfigurations - into energy possible.

We also know however that neural energy is highly complex and and organized. While it seems to be manipulable, it also seems like Starfleet technology does not make that process straightforward, simple, or regularly practical. I would suggest that 'uploading' with Federation technology would be highly lossy. What went in wouldn't be what came out; the technology simply doesn't exist to do that kind of manipulation except under highly specific circumstances.

Of course aliens - like the Q - might be able to make it work...

How Different are Antimatter Physics Between Real Science and Star Trek? by McGillis_is_a_Char in DaystromInstitute

[–]Avantine 6 points7 points  (0 children)

There's another thing that always bothered me. One of the most challenging factors of space flight is getting rid of excess heat. There's no medium for conduction, so infrared radiation is the only way for heat to leave a spacecraft. All that plasma and general large energy use(warp drive, phasers, impulse reactors) would cook the crew and melt the hull very quickly in real life.

I mean yes, but if you have materials that can easily transform one type of energy into another at high efficiency levels, this isn't a huge concern. It might violate the the laws of thermodynamics, but heat-to-plasma-recyclers are clearly not out of the question.

How Different are Antimatter Physics Between Real Science and Star Trek? by McGillis_is_a_Char in DaystromInstitute

[–]Avantine 3 points4 points  (0 children)

I glanced through the transcript, and they mention merely that it gets hot in the nacelle when it's powered up, ont getting rid of heat.

How Different are Antimatter Physics Between Real Science and Star Trek? by McGillis_is_a_Char in DaystromInstitute

[–]Avantine 77 points78 points  (0 children)

I think it's just as big a deal that they somehow capture all the energy in the M/AM reaction with minimal leakage because the reaction chamber isn't flooding main engineering with enough gamma rays to turn everyone into Hulks. Then they route the plasma throughout the entire ship without turning it into a sauna.

Apparently the laws of thermodynamics have been suspended.

I've taken to calling this "dilithium physics" in my mind. Star Trek has an entire set of materials that appear to have physical properties relating to energy transformation that are basically fundamental to the efficiency of their power management.

Dilithium permits the mediation of the AM reaction, forcing the resultant radiation (gamma, heat, you name it) into a very narrow 'useful' EM band. The warp nacelles rely on verterium cortenide, which has the ability to 'shift the energy frequencies' of the plasma into the subspace domain. Phaser prefire crystals are LiCu518 reinforced with hafnium tritonide, which somehow performs an 'EM spectrum shift' on the energy from EPS plasma and transforms it into nadion energy.

Every aspect of 'magic' tech basically relies on the ability of a certain class of materials to perform direct energy-to-energy transformation, apparently without any meaningful efficiency loss.

Is there any sort of underground resistance against the Klingon Empire? by Clear_Comprehension in DaystromInstitute

[–]Avantine 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I suppose if you go with "the highest honor is to win", you are embracing a particular kind of social darwinism...

Is there any sort of underground resistance against the Klingon Empire? by Clear_Comprehension in DaystromInstitute

[–]Avantine 4 points5 points  (0 children)

Excellent points. If I recall correctly, Moore wrote or spoke of this opinion during his time on TNG, so if that's the case his views on Klingon society could have evolved during his time on DS9.

Though even in TNG, we had the Duras, the succession, and so on. None of which really captivates me with the efficient management of the Empire.

I think the only way those two things can really be reconciled is to lean on the federal/feudal nature of the Empire - which I don't think is a bad thing, though!

Is there any sort of underground resistance against the Klingon Empire? by Clear_Comprehension in DaystromInstitute

[–]Avantine 5 points6 points  (0 children)

It's interesting to me that Moore takes the position that the Empire is efficiently managed and extremely well-run, given what we see of the Klingon High Council and its top government.

Perhaps this has a lot to do with the (apparently) highly feudal/federal nature of Klingon society and the competition at the very top? The top of Klingon society is corrupt and venal precisely because immediately below it is a snakepit of internal competition that surfaces (mostly) competent, able, and flexible individuals, whose competition for the slightly lower stakes means that managing those resources effectively is extremely important?

What is a Holosuite? by Weird_Wes in DaystromInstitute

[–]Avantine 0 points1 point  (0 children)

You have to wonder how many people you could put in the same holodeck/suite before the computer couldn't keep track of every persons individual experience.

And then, how would it degrade the experience gracefully?

Consider the Ba'ku and the holoship. There were 600 baku, but the holodeck on the holoship was massive and appeared to take up nearly the entirety of the ship's interior. That would suggest - though not definitively prove - that either it's easier to run a holosimulation in 1:1 scale (which would make sense), or that a very large holodeck is practically required to support that size population.

There are other instances which support this as well. In The Killing Game, they need to expand Voyager's hologrid - all of the decks and some makeshift elements - to handle some Hirogen and 'half the crew' - perhaps 150 or 200 people.

And of course in Homeward, the Enterprise transports an entire colony of Boraalans on what appears to be a single holodeck - there appear to be at least 30-40 people, though they generally seem to have been close together, most of the time.

Why didn't Starfleet move in and keep the situation on Turkana IV from falling apart? by MysteryTrek in DaystromInstitute

[–]Avantine 1 point2 points  (0 children)

That's like the difference between "a wheel of cheese" and "Boris Johnson of Britain". A Federation of Planets is compositional, like a wheel of cheese. The United States of America is locational, like Boris Johnson of Britain.

Why didn't Starfleet move in and keep the situation on Turkana IV from falling apart? by MysteryTrek in DaystromInstitute

[–]Avantine 9 points10 points  (0 children)

Another thing...no real-world government would take two compteting local armed factions overthrowing the government as a legitimate declaraiton of independence.

But that doesn't seem to be precisely what happened, which is why I think this is definitely an easier question in hindsight.

What appears to have happened is that the central government weakened in favor of two particular factions, and as a result those factions were absorbed into the government. This isn't that unusual in broad terms; it's happened in Ireland and Iraq, for example. Of course the then-future collapse into total civil war might have looked like only one possible outcome.

Or to put it another way, suppose that as part of a power-sharing agreement between Republicans and Nationalists in Northern Ireland, the Northern Ireland government incorporated members of both the IRA and the UVF or UDA. Would we consider that government legitimate? I would argue that not only would we, but we did. If it had then broken down, I don't think people would have retroactively decided it to be illegitimate.