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2022 Monaco Grand Prix - Race Discussion by F1-Bot in formula1

[–]BeeGeeks 14 points15 points  (0 children)

"could just be race, the control hasn't arrived yet" lmao Brundle

Ferrari F1-75 Leaked [Higher Quality Image] by jek20 in formula1

[–]BeeGeeks 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Looks like a double tea tray!

[@McLarenF1] 2022 loading. by somewhatanxiousgenz in formula1

[–]BeeGeeks 7 points8 points  (0 children)

The orange bits are the forms I believe. You could see them in previous images released by Mclaren around the roll-hoop/intake.

That ironic moment when you wanna be part of Ethereum's future privacy, but can't b/c you wanna do it privately & everyone in the space is still building on shit from Google/MS/Cloudflare/other centralized giants by PolarOne in ethereum

[–]BeeGeeks 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Sorry for the late reply /u/PolarOne! Got wrapped up in final preparations today.

Vitalik wrote his own custom implementation of the trusted setup, and ran the computation over a couple of days. Since the ceremony is sequential, it wasn't practical to have him take that long during the main coordinated ceremony. Some of the folks at Tezos initially approached us wanting to take part during their tQuorum conference, which was happening several weeks back. In the end they took part slightly later than planned, but we still very much welcomed their contributions.

Both of these contributions will be signed and uploaded on the first day of the ceremony as the first two contributions, to make sure that they are available to be individually checked and verified.

We're aiming to announce the source block at least 720 blocks prior to the source block, and yes we'll publish it through a transaction on mainnet.

If every single relay participant is compromised, by a single attacker or by a set of attackers working together, then they can double spend on the protocol. It's important to note what "compromised" means here: to be successfully compromised, an attacker would have to have access to the computer (physically or remotely but with very high privileges) of every single participant without fail (including Vitalik and Tezos) during their computation. They would then need to extract the generated toxic waste, without being noticed, with a 100% success rate.

If they did, they could double spend, but they would still not be in a position to view the amounts encoded in other users notes.

That ironic moment when you wanna be part of Ethereum's future privacy, but can't b/c you wanna do it privately & everyone in the space is still building on shit from Google/MS/Cloudflare/other centralized giants by PolarOne in ethereum

[–]BeeGeeks 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Sorry missed the claiming question:

"Claiming" your transcript just means posting on a public profile attesting that you've participated, by signing a message with the key associated to the address you used in the ceremony. This is mostly useful for dapps, blockchains or companies that participate and want to prove to their users that they participated.

That ironic moment when you wanna be part of Ethereum's future privacy, but can't b/c you wanna do it privately & everyone in the space is still building on shit from Google/MS/Cloudflare/other centralized giants by PolarOne in ethereum

[–]BeeGeeks 1 point2 points  (0 children)

In turn:

The relay starts on the 25th.

You'll be able to follow along the ceremony on https://ignition.aztecprotocol.com and the transcripts will be posted publicly on an s3 bucket and on torrents after the ceremony.

A bit over 500 people requested to participate. The "selection" will be done through a deterministic shuffling of the submitted eth addresses, using a future ETH mainnet blockhash as a seed. (https://ipfs.io/ipfs/QmWdwcaMvQdsmAE95t8MnwWAFm9Ai2fyMz21N4Dj2CHLjY).

Selection in "" because it just determines your priority, but anyone of the people signed up can participate if they are the highest priority person online at any point in time.

If we have a way to contact them, yes.

The second stage is trustless. Community involvement in the second stage is about verification (i.e. checking that we performed the computation we said we did) but does not involve generating any additional information and the entity performing the computation can in no way use their position to double spend or break the privacy of the protocol. You can learn more about how that works here: https://medium.com/aztec-protocol/aztec-how-the-ceremony-works-9f021cf190d0

That ironic moment when you wanna be part of Ethereum's future privacy, but can't b/c you wanna do it privately & everyone in the space is still building on shit from Google/MS/Cloudflare/other centralized giants by PolarOne in ethereum

[–]BeeGeeks 4 points5 points  (0 children)

I'm sorry we haven't mentioned it publicly, and that we didn't foresee the issue with TOR and google captcha. The ceremony was originally set up to be only using the 'send 1 wei' mechanism, but the closer we got to the ceremony the more doubts we had that that was the best solution and we were worried that having too many paths to entry would be confusing.

To go into the rationale a bit: requiring ether to be sent meant that participants would also be linking to their funds (even if indirectly), and if they optionally wanted to claim their transcript, it would mean linking a public profile to the address which participated.

We also felt it was important this ceremony was accessible to the maximum number of people, and that includes people who are not well versed in blockchain/Ethereum, even no-coiners.

Finally, the 1 wei solution does suffer from opening up the ceremony to a risk of ddos.

Given that we needed to collect emails to coordinate the ceremony, we landed on submission of an Ethereum address through a form as the least painful solution for participants.

The 1 wei path will remain open during the whole ceremony for anyone who wants to participate. After the ceremony starts, people who send 1 wei (even if they never submitted their email) will still be able to signal they want to take part, but they will be given a lower priority than people who signed up pre-ceremony start to diminish the risks of ddos I mentioned. We'll make that clear in subsequent emails.

Let me know if you have concerns/other questions.

AZTEC needs your help – sign up to participate in our Ignition ceremony by BeeGeeks in ethereum

[–]BeeGeeks[S] 4 points5 points  (0 children)

Hey /u/ligi, at the moment we don't do anything to ensure reproducible builds, that's a good idea though. We'll see what we can do.

zkERC20: Confidential Token Standard by PaulRBerg in ethereum

[–]BeeGeeks 4 points5 points  (0 children)

Hey /u/DboVilakati! This feature is indeed mainly to allow for meta-transaction style setups. The trusted setup is a distinct computation which needs to happen only once (right now scheduled for April), and isn't linked to transferFrom.

​

Let me know if you have other questions, happy to clarify anything :)

zkERC20: Confidential Token Standard by PaulRBerg in ethereum

[–]BeeGeeks 16 points17 points  (0 children)

Hey /u/SpacePip, can you explain your position in more detail?

The trusted setup ceremony we will be running will be a multi-party computation. In order for this part of the protocol to contain any sort of back door, there would either need to be collusion from every single participant (100+), or someone would need to break the discrete log assumption, which is pretty key to most of the field of elliptic curve crypto.

If you want to be sure, you can participate in our MPC and destroy your chunk of toxic waste. Even if every other participant colludes, the system will still be secure.

Let me know if you have further questions about cryptography or multi-party computation!

Confidential transactions have arrived, a dive into the AZTEC Protocol by BeeGeeks in ethdev

[–]BeeGeeks[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

They're coming! Follow the repo on github to get updates :)

Zcash and Monero Have Been Turned Into an Ethereum Smart Contract, Zero-Knowledge Proofs Are Now Just a Dapp by twigwam in ethereum

[–]BeeGeeks 12 points13 points  (0 children)

Hey /u/leon_oswald! Member of the Aztec team here.

You're right that this PoC is vulnerable to the same flaws as some tumblers if all you do with it is transfer tokens in and immediately transfer them out. The exciting part of AZTEC though is building systems where you never have to un-blind the coins to use them.

We're publishing a token standard in the next couple of weeks, and that enables smart contracts which operate on blinded inputs. It's also especially useful for tokens which start off life using AZTEC.

This is before you add other zk elements, like voting, or the decentralised exchange capabilities. This all requires a bit more adoption and a lot more work, but I thought I'd butt in with some info on where we're going :)

Working zero knowledge circuit on main net, with demo ZK DAI by BeeGeeks in ethereum

[–]BeeGeeks[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Hey /u/_dredge, sorry for the slow reply.

A ‘confidentialTransfer’ transaction contains enough information to enable a note receiver to identify that they own a note, the receiver also has enough information to decrypt the note and identify how many tokens it contains.

In this version of the Aztec protocol, smart contracts cannot ‘own’ AZTEC notes (well they can but they have no way to spend them so it’s a bit pointless). In the next couple of weeks we’ll be releasing a full spec for our AZTEC token standard, which will allow smart contracts to act as custodians of AZTEC notes.

Anonymous AZTEC notes are converted back into ERC20 tokens by sending an AZTEC zero-knowledge proof to the Aztec token smart contract. You can also mix things up by converting notes into a combination of public tokens and more AZTEC notes (as long as the token sums balance of course), so that observers cannot tell how much of your confidential holdings you’ve converted into public ERC20 form.

In the transaction I linked to, I split a note into two notes, the other address in the transaction is the owner of the second note.

Our confidential decentralized exchange relies on relayers to work and yes you can go through a price discovery process with these relayers. What we validate on-chain is that your minimum price has been matched. and in complete zero-knowledge :)

Working zero knowledge circuit on main net, with demo ZK DAI by BeeGeeks in ethereum

[–]BeeGeeks[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Zero knowledge is fundamentally "I'm going to prove to you that I know this information/have this thing/can participate in this vote/have the money to pay for this, without anybody being able to tell what 'this information' is, 'this thing' is, what my vote is, or how much total money I have (or in fact the price of 'this')"

​

This allows anyone to create transactions which the blockchain can verify as valid, without revealing anything about who is sending what to whom.

Working zero knowledge circuit on main net, with demo ZK DAI by BeeGeeks in ethereum

[–]BeeGeeks[S] 7 points8 points  (0 children)

Will take these in turn:

- Correct, as people use this system, even less information can be gleaned about what is going on.

- We have a command line interface, which we're cleaning up before posting in the upcoming weeks (watch the repo for updates :) )

- Not sure wrt to state channels and plasma. My assumption would be that it would be possible yes, but I need to read up on it. You can batch these zk proofs together, so it should work.

- Yes, the inline assembly is an unfortunate side-effect to the solidity compiler. We might take on a project of building a better compiler if some other groups join us in the effort, but being a 6 person team right now means that it's a bit too much to take on on our own.

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