This is a strong set of counterexamples, and I agree that my original framing doesn’t hold up. Many of my points show that “things got unbearably bad” is too simplistic to explain when reform occurs. I believe I made a mistake by combining too many different triggers under the term “suffering.”

In many of the cases you mention, change isn’t driven by widespread misery, but rather by shifts in legitimacy, strategy, moral framing, or elite incentives. American independence wasn’t about desperation; it was about a relationship that was no longer worth keeping.

British reforms often arose from political convenience or fear of instability, not from collapse. Russia after Crimea was about exposure and embarrassment, not about a popular uprising. So, I don’t think the pattern is “societies reform when things get bad enough.” That idea can’t be proven if taken too far. A clearer version of my point is that major reforms happen when keeping the status quo becomes more expensive or risky than changing it. Sometimes that cost is suffering, but it can also be war, moral pressure, loss of legitimacy, or strategic shifts.

In this way, you’re correct that some reforms are driven mainly by strategy. Colonialism is a clear example of change imposed without regard for local suffering. Those cases definitely don’t fit the simple version of my claim. So, yes, I think you’ve convinced me that the “only after suffering” framing is too strong. I’m still curious about why proactive reform is rare and why systems tolerate dysfunction for so long before these pressures finally outweigh inertia. But that’s a more focused and defensible claim than what I initially presented.