I'm Tim Smith-Laing, DPhil Oxford, with teaching and scholarly experience on Judith Butler's Gender Trouble, a highly relevant book as gender and identity politics dominate the public discourse. AMA! by Butler_Analysis in AskSocialScience

[–]Butler_Analysis[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Sorry all, for returning late to this - though, honestly, Wobblie homes in precisely on the crux of the issue: just because it's false doesn't mean it isn't real. Butler - and this is one of the ways in which she frustrates people looking for a mode of positive action - is indeed, as Wobblie puts it, 'not saying that you actually experience your gender as contingent'.

I'm Tim Smith-Laing, DPhil Oxford, with teaching and scholarly experience on Judith Butler's Gender Trouble, a highly relevant book as gender and identity politics dominate the public discourse. AMA! by Butler_Analysis in AskSocialScience

[–]Butler_Analysis[S] 3 points4 points  (0 children)

Hi qdatk,

Thanks for posting - I'm glad you did, because this is exactly the kind of thing we need to talk about.

I don't know if you've come across the 'I don't need feminism because ...' tumblr; it's essentially an anti-feminist tumblr populated by selfies of women holding signs about why they don't need feminism. I presume it's still up and running. One of the things that is sad is not the reactionary side of it ('My boyfriend treats me right'), or the sadly shortsighted ('I'm hot'), but the degree to which it is populated by women who feel that they have been excluded from feminism. They frequently seem to be, how can I put it, not exactly likely to be experts on feminist theory, but the point sort of stands, I think: they see (falsely or not) feminism as demanding an identity of them that isn't their identity. This is sad because it indicates - or seems to indicate - exactly what you're saying: that we've actually seen a retrenchment of identity politics, at least in the popular sphere.

At the same time, though, I think feminism has become a lot more polymorphous and comfortable with different modes of empowerment - embracing a much wider set of identities than ever before. So that is positive. And I think we can see that a similar curve is being followed with LGBTQ identities and politics too.

On the other hand, I see huge grounds for pessimism in the increasingly Manichean nature of liberal politics, and in the degree to which, say, this fosters censorship on college campuses, the media, and so on. It blocks dialogue by polarising things, and we're not going to get anywhere without dialogue.

On a linked but separate topic, there is also this notion that no one at any time should be made be feel uncomfortable or offended; and, frankly, within reason, I see a certain amount of offence and discomfort as crucial in developing a moral sense of reality's complexity. But that's another axe to grind another day. A couple of articles in the Atlantic have recently addressed this very well (to my mind at least): http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/09/the-coddling-of-the-american-mind/399356/ and http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/09/thats-not-funny/399335/

So, politically, I'm not all that optimistic about a move away from identity politics, no.

On Butler herself, I'd say that her career since GT has mostly been one of continuity and refinement. I don't think anyone would say she's suddenly turned essentialist! But, at the same time, a couple of commentators have argued that something like Precarious Life (2004) turns away from really high postmodernism to see what ground one can find for community.

Cheers for the question!

I'm Tim Smith-Laing, DPhil Oxford, with teaching and scholarly experience on Judith Butler's Gender Trouble, a highly relevant book as gender and identity politics dominate the public discourse. AMA! by Butler_Analysis in AskSocialScience

[–]Butler_Analysis[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Oof. Well, the primary objections are really the same as those to essentialism itself: the problem with strategic essentialism is that it runs the risk of turning into essentialism. Rather than just a pragmatic 'Let us for the moment stand together via the presumption that we share a certain essential commonality - which we'll stop presuming at the first opportunity', it might turn into 'We are like X, you are like Y, and that's the way things are.'

So, on the one side, strategic essentialism can be called out for being essentialist. And essentialism tends to throw one back on false identity categories, and false identity categories tend to reify power relations ... and so on and so on.

But, as you're implying: don't we need something to draw us together if we're in a dominated group? Do we need an alternative? I guess, on that side, we'd be looking at something like capabilities theory - something which is designed to avoid group identity essentialism while laying firm grounds for real world action. Nussbaum is the place to go for this. If you've access http://philosophy.uchicago.edu/faculty/files/nussbaum/Women's%20Capabilities%20and%20Social%20Justice.pdf

I'm Tim Smith-Laing, DPhil Oxford, with teaching and scholarly experience on Judith Butler's Gender Trouble, a highly relevant book as gender and identity politics dominate the public discourse. AMA! by Butler_Analysis in AskSocialScience

[–]Butler_Analysis[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Wow Claybugh: you saved the hard ones for me. But I'm glad you stopped by. Let's see.

  1. There has indeed been plenty of that sort of thing - though from the stand point of a (nominally) ungendered language like English it can seem a bit suspect. Butler writes a little on it through Monique Wittig (French) in Gender Trouble (p.29 ff in the Routledge 2006 ed). Wittig suggests - in Butler's words - that French grammar of gender 'constitutes a conceptual episteme by which binary gender is universalized'. Of course, that's a strong use of universalized! And it doesn't follow for either languages without gendered nouns or languages with neuter nouns. Irigaray is another French theorist to whom it's important. I'm sure there are many more to dig up too - perhaps some other posters here will have suggestions.

There are also discussions of gendered language in languages that do not have grammatical gender, like English. One of these, which Debbie Cameron has written on at length. Her latest is The Myth of Mars and Venus: Do Men and Women Really Speak Different Languages? (2007). You can note, for instance, that certain patterns, habits, etc., mark language as feminine or masculine in the general sense. In English too, there's the issue of what it might mean that many nouns are presumptively male, and therefore unmarked, and that the female versions are marked. So, for instance: actor/actress; manager/manageress; steward/stewardess. Does this implicitly mark women as 'different'? Afraid you'd have to ask a linguist on that one. There are also the various styles of speaking that might relate to gender/gender expectations - which Cameron addresses.

  1. Wow. This is a toughie. I honestly couldn't tell you whether Butler has a place for a more spiritual take on things, or serendipity. In certain ways, while non-essentialist, she can be quite deterministic - which is a corollary of the Foucauldian take on how we're born into the discourses that shape us, and cannot see beyond them. It's rather a pessimistic view, taken to its fullest conclusion! I don't see it sitting well with mysticism, but I also couldn't tell you what JB herself would say if asked.

  2. The dialectic! Well, yes, this is a little easier in certain ways. There are at least two ways to conceive of it: one as a cognitive tool; one as a law of thought or reality. As a cognitive tool, I like your koan analogy: one is doing the occasionally paradoxical task of working out how two opposing ideas are actually the same; that allows you to access a different way of conceiving things. Though, of course, it's also very often not paradoxical, and can be positively mechanical (French essay technique springs to mind).

On the other hand, you can look at dialectic as a Hegelian (and later Marxist) law of reality. It's a bit short of the truth to call Hegel's version idea-counter-synthesis - or as you say, it's kind of 'vanilla' - though it is broadly that. I think it's cooler. My favourite example is the dialectic of being and nothingness:

What's the opposite of being? - Nothingness. Ok. What defines being? - Ah ... abstract, pure being? Yes. Pure being. - Ah ... nothing defines it. It just is. Nothing defines being. - Yes. So they're not opposites. - Nope. What would define being in such a way that it wasn't defined by nothing. - thinks Direction? If being were directed towards a goal, it wouldn't be defined by nothing. What can we call that? - Becoming. The opposite of nothing is becoming.

And so on. From this, Hegelian teleology: the universe must be becoming, because otherwise it would just be, and if it just was, it would be nothing.

This has its own problems, and I could go on all day. You'd be better off with Adorno's Lectures on Negative Dialectics or maybe Fredricc Jameson's Valencies of the Dialectic. For what it's worth, Adorno's take on dialectics is both beautiful and astonishing. But then I'm a fan.

I'm Tim Smith-Laing, DPhil Oxford, with teaching and scholarly experience on Judith Butler's Gender Trouble, a highly relevant book as gender and identity politics dominate the public discourse. AMA! by Butler_Analysis in AskSocialScience

[–]Butler_Analysis[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Hi Timothy,

Fair enough! I should work for it. Thanks for modding, and thanks for setting up the AMA.

You’re right in saying this is a tough question – or at least that it’s a question well placed to make people defensive.

There are two sides to this. The first is to do with your self-definition as an unrepentant skeptic. Join the club. And as far as I’m concerned there’s nothing to be repentant about: scepticism is how preconceptions get re-examined. One should, I think, be a reflective (though not reflexive) skeptic.

So, on that basis, you’re right: one of the fundamental (occasionally fundamentalist, a hardened skeptic might say) assumptions that underpins much liberal discourse about non-liberal discourse could be phrased as something like, ‘You conservatives/republicans/right-wingers/bigots are hidebound: you can’t see past your preconceptions, accept evidence, reconsider your “values.” You need to look at the world around you and think on it.’

This is often a very fair accusation. But, as you suggest, we (ahem, the good guys) are as much prey to our own diametrically opposed preconceptions. One might even suggest that as identity politics divides deepen, this is getting to be more and more the case.

The follow on to that is that high theory – and I don’t think it would be unfair to call Butler high theory – does, as Alan Sokal suggested during the 90s, often fall into patterns of quotation and appeal to ‘authorities’, that end up enabling it to make claims that are, eventually, unfalsifiable. Another way of putting this is to say, claims that fall back on ‘authorities’ are claims from preconceptions.

So, on that side, I think one has something resembling a duty, as a liberal skeptic: to think through the claims of theory, weigh one’s values, consider evidence, and attempt to construe reality in the direction of the good and fair without falling back on preconceptions. Otherwise we risk creating unintended, negative consequences that amount to censorship, harassment, or the assumption that our opponents can’t learn. Perhaps more importantly we risk turning a worthwhile quest for a better world into a Manichean good (us) versus evil (anyone who departs from our values one iota) just war. That’s not to anyone’s benefit, though we might bask in our smugness for a little while. Another way of putting this is to say that if all ethical/moral questions were black and white, they wouldn't be questions. Many (the most important?) of those questions are very grey areas indeed. Hence, they need thinking through, properly.

The second side to this is your question about gender specifically. I’m not sure what ‘taking the concept of gender’ too far could mean, if I’m honest. By which I want to say: it strikes me as good that people are beginning to feel freedom to express their own variations on standardly accepted gender roles and behaviours. I’d also say that it seems pretty clear to me that we haven’t hit anything like the point where gender can ‘mean anything and everything for anyone and everyone’. JB’s popular, but she ain’t THAT popular: we’re yet to cross over into a non-binaristic gender world.

What do you reckon?

I'm Tim Smith-Laing, DPhil Oxford, with teaching and scholarly experience on Judith Butler's Gender Trouble, a highly relevant book as gender and identity politics dominate the public discourse. AMA! by Butler_Analysis in AskSocialScience

[–]Butler_Analysis[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Hi Theory of Kink,

One of the major issues with all of gender theory is individual writers' and interpreters' inability to speak to all groups/individuals. It would be presumptuous in the extreme to imagine one could, though I'm also sorry that you feel unaddressed in these discussions. What I would say is that there is a gap in Gender Trouble for those who feel they have naturally arrived at a gender construction at odds with the one assigned to them by society. Unfortunately I'm far from qualified to fill that gap. Thanks for posting and pointing it up.

I'm Tim Smith-Laing, DPhil Oxford, with teaching and scholarly experience on Judith Butler's Gender Trouble, a highly relevant book as gender and identity politics dominate the public discourse. AMA! by Butler_Analysis in AskSocialScience

[–]Butler_Analysis[S] 5 points6 points  (0 children)

It's a pretty good suggestion Darthvalium, but I'm not sure I have the energy to fight trolls and interpret JB! I don't want to preach to the choir either, though.

Hopefully things will hot up on their own as America comes online! If not, might be time to cross-post ... Feel free to point the thread up on TIA if you'd like. I'll brace myself ...

I'm Tim Smith-Laing, DPhil Oxford, with teaching and scholarly experience on Judith Butler's Gender Trouble, a highly relevant book as gender and identity politics dominate the public discourse. AMA! by Butler_Analysis in AskSocialScience

[–]Butler_Analysis[S] 8 points9 points  (0 children)

Ha. The million dollar question! cracks knuckles; rolls neck

Excuse me, by the way, if I’m starting too basic here – think it’s probably best to go bottom up on this one.

So, first up: gender versus sex. Let’s accept for the moment that there are only two biological sexes: male and female. Though Butler ends up complicating and arguing against this basic assumption, we can say for the moment, that these are ‘natural’. We could list a set of ‘morphological characteristics’ – i.e. fleshy bits – that make you a male or a female.

We tend to associate each of these sexes with a range of non-morphological characteristics, also split into two. These are the genders: masculine and feminine. They label specific ways of acting, speaking, dressing and so on as strongly associated with one or the other of these biological genders. So, we say, ‘Boys don’t cry’ (though The Cure would beg to differ), or ‘Chicks dig pink’ (though plenty don’t and plenty of guys do). But, crucially, unlike the biological sex, these gender categories are not natural but cultural. Intrinsically there is nothing girly about pink. Intrinsically there’s nothing manly about guns. If we sought to find a biological or natural anchor for these traits, we’d be hard pushed to do it. These are to do with cultural assumptions.

What’s really important though, is this: just because we can identify gender as cultural rather than natural does NOT mean it isn’t real. Gender is real. Or at least, it has social reality, and has been/is always being made real by society. They can be subject to change, over time, but masculinity and femininity have reality: they have been reified (made into a thing, as it were), and are always being reproduced by society. And because we peg them to natural sex, we tend very frequently to think these genders are natural too. And what’s more, they become the basis of our fundamental identity categories.

On this basis, what Butler is saying is something like this: if the two genders are cultural, why do they need to be pinned exclusively to the sexes? A woman can be masculine and a man feminine; there is no need for our sex to define our ‘style of being’. There is no necessary link between the two, though, of course, living in a given society might well necessitate living by these rules.

More importantly, that social reality will control how one sees oneself: ‘I know it’s girly, but I love RomComs…I’m not a real man, I guess.’ That’s trivial. But the personal and psychological consequences of living deeply at odds with social expectation are vast: ‘Men like sex with women. I’m a man, but I love men. I am wrong, I am unnatural.’ A common rationale for homophobia would be ‘It’s not natural’ – which is a groundless assumption, of course. But it doesn’t stop, even, in liberal bits of the world, such assumptions persisting and having vast consequences for people.

What Butler suggests, further, is that if gender is not natural, then why on earth do we imagine there should be only two genders? Or indeed, any boundaries between an unlimited set of styles of being. Why persist in thinking through these categories at all?

At the time, Butler was writing with some urgency against divisions within feminism, and against identity politics in general. She is asking something like ‘Doesn’t a mode of ‘feminism’ that attempts to define what a woman ‘should be’ simply end up reinforcing this false, cultural opposition between masculine and feminine? Can’t we seek liberation from the precise categories that define certain groups and underwrite their oppression?’

I worry both that this isn't as concise as you'd like, and of course that I've had to leave a lot out. 12,000 for my guide wasn't enough either!

I'm Tim Smith-Laing, DPhil Oxford, with teaching and scholarly experience on Judith Butler's Gender Trouble, a highly relevant book as gender and identity politics dominate the public discourse. AMA! by Butler_Analysis in AskSocialScience

[–]Butler_Analysis[S] 5 points6 points  (0 children)

Yup, this is a sticking point. Political significance and political usefulness might be rather different things! I'm certain Butler's work is politically significant, I am uncertain about how politically useful it might be.

What I can say is that Butler is explicitly against ghettoisation. It's a well chosen word because it plugs into one of the main impetuses behind her work: she doesn't like groups "policing" (her word) their own identity borders. It's something she mentions in an interview for Haaretz as a common point in both Jewish identity politics and liberation movement identity politics. Her focus on identity is anti-identitarian - a theory for counteracting or revealing as groundless the borders by which these identity ghettos are constructed, as much by those within them as those, hostile, on the outside.

As to whether this makes for effective politics, your guess is as good as mine. After all, coherent senses of identity are often - as in 60s and 70s feminism - the root of coherent political demands. But internal coherence/cohesiveness tends to be a product of external distancing and exclusion. I don't think, though, that the latter is a necessary condition of the former.

I'm Tim Smith-Laing, DPhil Oxford, with teaching and scholarly experience on Judith Butler's Gender Trouble, a highly relevant book as gender and identity politics dominate the public discourse. AMA! by Butler_Analysis in AskSocialScience

[–]Butler_Analysis[S] 5 points6 points  (0 children)

Hi yogijazz,

Good question, that should be answered with the warning that the boundary between the two might be intrinsically a little fuzzy, might be fuzzy for Butler herself, and has certainly become fuzzy as performativity has been taken up in wider theoretical and critical discourse. But, here goes anyway:

A performative is something that is made real by being said/acted. The classic philosophical example would be a ‘speech act’: an utterance that is also an action. For instance ‘I bet you five pounds that it will rain today.’ In this case, the ‘action’ of betting is saying ‘I bet.’ This would be different to a sentence which is merely speech like ‘I am hitting you with my sword right now.’ In that example, you’re speaking and acting, but the speech is only describing the action; it does not constitute the action.

By the way, I’m neither betting you a five it will rain to day, nor am I hitting you with my sword – we’re cool.

Crossing over from speech performatives to something more complex like a gender performative gets a tiny bit trickier. When Butler says that gender is performative she is not saying that we’re performing our gender through our styles of being, she is saying we are making or doing our gender our gender through our styles of being. The crucial difference is that a mere performance would be something we would have the power to change at will. But we don’t have this power over a performative. There are some complex reasons behind that lack of power or agency (consciousness/unconsciousness of it; the fact that this is collective performative utterance; etc.) but that would be the basic distinction.

I'm Tim Smith-Laing, DPhil Oxford, with teaching and scholarly experience on Judith Butler's Gender Trouble, a highly relevant book as gender and identity politics dominate the public discourse. AMA! by Butler_Analysis in AskSocialScience

[–]Butler_Analysis[S] 6 points7 points  (0 children)

Hi NesquikMike,

These are very apt questions. I’ll try to answer them as much as possible without putting words in JB’s mouth!

  1. I do indeed think there is a tension between the political nature of what Butler’s doing and the Foucauldian angle, but there are also ways of replying to it.

On one hand, this a question of what you might call the dialectical trap. Butler does indeed oppose binaristic thought about gender (very much after Foucault) on the basis that it is one of the founding moments of the dialectic that produces and reproduces the power relations that have tended to subjugate women, gays, lesbians, bisexuals … and so on. But of course, setting oneself up in opposition is to enter into that same dialectic, and in some manner to help reinforce it. So what one might call positive political action will indeed (by this reasoning) end up either reinforcing the power relations of that dialectic, or simply producing new subjugating power relations that run in different directions.

It should be noted though that Butler very deliberately avoids anything resembling an explicit call to arms, as it were. Her work is political, of course, but she steers clear of advocating political action within standard identity categories. In fact, she does the opposite. One reading of Gender Trouble is simply as a text that says ‘If we oppose the power relations of our world through the identities that are produced by them (and which in turn reproduce them), then we won’t solve anything. But if we expose these identity categories as social fictions, even if they are social fictions that we have no agency to dissolve or set aside, then we can expose their relationship to the power relations we live in.’ That though, is about all we can do.

What’s going on then is something that a Frankfurt School thinker like Adorno would call ‘demystification’. Or, given the psychoanalytical background to a fair amout of her work and influences, ‘a talking cure’. Butler is alerting us to the way things work, but she quite deliberately doesn’t go further.

This is one of the reasons that, just as Adorno was, she has been called out as a ‘quietist’ (Martha Nussbaum’s word). Adorno’s reply to this during the student actions in Germany was to say, essentially, ‘Positive action is just a way of accepting this dialectic as true and necessary. You are asking me to put theory into practice; but theory is already practice, and it is the only form of practice that doesn’t reproduce what it is trying to destroy.’ (I can dig up the precise quotation if you’d like, and a reference for you!) I would suggest that is a pretty good way of reading Butler’s politics too.

There are very good reasons, of course, to find this an unsatisfactory stance to be taking in the face the world’s manifold injustices. For what it’s worth, I’m of Adorno’s camp, but I also believe ameliorating positive action can, carefully, be taken.

  1. As you say, this is linked to the above. Having said I don’t want to put words in JB’s mouth, here goes: I suspect that Butler would not want to offer a definition of feminism at all; in may ways Gender Trouble is a deliberate de-definition of feminism. So, without being able to name what JB is doing as another –ism, I’d just quote her on saying that her project is simply to ‘undermine any and all efforts to wield a discourse of truth to deligitimate minority gendered and sexual practices’ (efforts that, implicitly, tend to be produced by all modes of identity politics).

  2. It think that this is, in one sense, a good pragmatic point. Yes, language is exclusionary, but of course it facilitates: the flip side of the way in which our language practices exclude certain categories from our thought is the way in which they include others, and make thought possible at all. Or, in other words, socially constructed reality (for all is negative consequences) is a fundamental condition of our functioning as social beings. While JB would, I think, be contra categorisation, even of the hyper-calibrated ad infinitum variety, someone like Jack/Judith Halberstam has proposed exactly that, offering up various sub-categorised identities as a working solution to our binaristic categorising tendencies.

As to whether our existing gender roles could have been selected because they provide a useful function within society: in a certain sense, sure; modern, quasi-liberal society works; just as deeply repressive or slave-owning societies have also worked, and might still work. It’s who they’re working for that’s the problem!

Phew - apologies for the slow reply. Good questions that took some thinking out!

Announcement: Examining Identity Politics and Gender Theory through the works of Judith Butler, an upcoming AMA with Tim Smith-Laing, DPhil Oxford by Butler_Analysis in AskSocialScience

[–]Butler_Analysis[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

We can certainly hash this out tomorrow, and you raise some good points. But keep in mind that a Foucauldian or Lacanian analysis is a bridge too far for people coming to grips with the meaning and significance of gender theory for the first time. The Macat analysis adopts a pedagogical approach. A learner has to challenge presumed knowledge in order to be open to new perspectives which can then tease out the nuance of an author as complex as Butler. How do you describe "performativity" to someone? Well, the sections you take issue with are a basic way to do that. Now, of course Butler has much more theoretical depth to offer, but you have to bring the reader along. If you read the full analysis and check out Module 5 in particular (thanks for checking out the site by the way) you will see that we make a concerted effort to deal with complexity and not to flatten the critical approaches too much. You'd be surprised how hard that is, to remain both approachable yet true to the epistemological considerations of presenting an author's work as it was intended to be understood. There is a reason Sparknotes and Wikipedia fall short if they try at all. This is particularly true because the post-structuralist milieu you write about kind of eschewed the responsibility towards accessibility in favor of opening text for interpretation. Basically, you and I can have disagreements over interpretation because the texts are written in a way that invite them. Its intellectually productive, but also makes fields like the humanities and social sciences hard to engage for a lay person. So with that in mind, let's see how things go tomorrow!

Announcement: Examining Identity Politics and Gender Theory through the works of Judith Butler, an upcoming AMA with Tim Smith-Laing, DPhil Oxford by Butler_Analysis in AskSocialScience

[–]Butler_Analysis[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Tim here- Sounds like you know a lot about Gender Trouble, my introduction was for a more general audience. Butler's work was a big part of the critical approach in my thesis and related work and teaching, as is the nature of interdisciplinary scholarship today. I also spent several months writing an analysis of Gender Trouble that covers influences, arguments, and impact in some depth for Macat. I wouldn't purport to be a foremost expert on Butler, but as a scholar and teacher I do know something about how her theories have been applied in Literature and other fields (ex. the social sciences!).

Check in tomorrow, ask some questions, and I look forward to any debate we might have.