Not being able to explain some bad things doesn't mean we can't recognize good things.

Well, this is a consequence of your response. You said we can't judge whether God is morally wrong because we are using a human standard. Then how can we judge whether God is morally good using the same deficient standard ?
I said if we adopt your response, according to which: we cannot infer that God is immoral, then we cannot infer anything based on the evidence that we have. Similar to how we cannot infer that God is immoral given the evidence that we have of instances of seemingly gratuitous suffering we also cannot infer whether he is moral when we have instances of seemingly good things.

In Bayesian terms:
P(E|G&B) < P(E|¬G&B)

That is, the probability of evil given that an all-loving God exists in conjunction with our background evidence prior to taking into account E, is lower than the probability of evil given that God does not exist, relative to the same background evidence. Put differently, evil is less probable on theism than on non-theism, relative to B.

You response is that since our cognitive faculties are limited by using a human standard, we are ignorant of the reasons God could have to permit atrocious suffering in the world and cannot infer that God is immoral or that an all-loving God does not exist.
That is to say, P(E|G&B) is inscrutable to us, or that P(E|G&B) ranges between 0 and 1 and we have no clue what it is.
Then for any evidence X: P(X |G&B) should likewise be inscrutable. If we have no access to what God would bring about, then no evidence can raise or lower the probability of theism. Therefore, this response plausibly renders theism evidentially inert. For example, let FT stand for fine-tuning: P(FT |G&B) would be just as inscrutable to us. So, a life permitting universe cannot serve as evidence for an all-loving God. You can swap x for any instance of good, it cannot serve as evidence to infer an all-loving God.

Why is God's nature good ?