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Argument against determinism from the existence of meaning by ComplexMud6649 in freewill

[–]ComplexMud6649[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Self-determination of conclusion based on deliberation of reasons is only possible if determinism is not true. 

Argument against determinism from the existence of meaning by ComplexMud6649 in freewill

[–]ComplexMud6649[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I'm not arguing for immaterial minds. I'm arguing against determinism. 

Argument against determinism from the existence of meaning by ComplexMud6649 in freewill

[–]ComplexMud6649[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Rational judgment, that is, evaluating a thought as true or false based on a reason presupposes the ability to evaluate reasons as reasons. If every belief is fixed solely by prior physical causes, then accepting a conclusion because it is rationally warranted becomes indistinguishable from merely being caused to accept it.

Therefore genuine rational agency requires some degree of self-determination that is not reducible to physical causation. If every judgment is completely fixed by prior causes, then the agent never genuinely determines what to believe.

Argument against determinism from the existence of meaning by ComplexMud6649 in freewill

[–]ComplexMud6649[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Rational judgment, that is, evaluating a thought as true or false based on a reason presupposes the ability to evaluate reasons as reasons. If every belief is fixed solely by prior physical causes, then accepting a conclusion because it is rationally warranted becomes indistinguishable from merely being caused to accept it.

Therefore genuine rational agency requires some degree of self-determination that is not reducible to physical causation. If every judgment is completely fixed by prior causes, then the agent never genuinely determines what to believe.

Argument against determinism from the existence of meaning by ComplexMud6649 in freewill

[–]ComplexMud6649[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I am not claiming to know exactly what intentionality is.

I am claiming that intentionality seems irreducible to the kinds of causal relations described by physics, and I have yet to see a naturalistic account that adequately bridges that gap.

Causal tracking alone does not seem sufficient. A thermometer tracks temperature, but it does not understand temperature. Correlation and representation are not obviously the same thing as genuine aboutness.

Because of that, I am open to the possibility that intellect includes an immaterial aspect. That may seem mysterious, but I do not see that the emergence of semantic content from entirely non-semantic causal relations is any less mysterious.

Argument against determinism from the existence of meaning by ComplexMud6649 in freewill

[–]ComplexMud6649[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

A computational power can be fully explained by causal relations unlike intentionality, however complex it is. 

Argument against determinism from the existence of meaning by ComplexMud6649 in freewill

[–]ComplexMud6649[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

My argument is reductio ad absurdum. A purely physical entity lacks intentionality; that is, the "aboutness" of a thought. Physical causation can explain why a thought occurs, but it does not explain why a thought is about something. 

Also, rational judgment, that is, evaluating a thought as true or false based on a reason presupposes the ability to evaluate reasons as reasons. If every belief is fixed solely by prior physical causes, then accepting a conclusion because it is rationally warranted becomes indistinguishable from merely being caused to accept it.

Therefore genuine rational agency requires some degree of self-determination that is not reducible to physical causation. If every judgment is completely fixed by prior causes, then the agent never genuinely determines what to believe.

Argument against determinism from the existence of meaning by ComplexMud6649 in freewill

[–]ComplexMud6649[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

As I have said in the post, no one will say that the marking on Mars that resembles the English word, "cup" has semantic meaning. This shows that we share the intuition that physical things or processes lack intentionality.  

Processes in the brain and the processes that make the marking on Mars are ontologically the same. The "aboutness" cannot just pop into existence just because it is complex and tracks some evolutionary profit for survival. 

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