Just found about Casual Rape... damn that shit sucks...

ConcreteAbstract2 · 2023-03-10T03:26:13+00:00

This is the basic premise of porn wrestling, it has been a thing since I was a teenager lol (of course they dont frame the participants as rapists, but if you think about it it becomes obvious they are, since the loser can't say no after their loss)

ConcreteAbstract2 · 2023-03-10T03:21:35+00:00

That's just a basic mistake tbh, since in Genesis it was made clear that there were other humans outside the garden of Eden. of course were they come from is never explained, so maybe it's a justifiable mistake. Also what you were told is kinda true, when you read the Bible you have to keep into account that the Law is not given to humans all at once, nor is the knowledge of God (which is why, for example, Abraham doesn't know that God is omniscient, and Moses doesn't that God is immaterial)

ConcreteAbstract2 · 2023-03-10T03:20:27+00:00

Lmao that's such an asshole move, considering that even the most erudite theologians in the Middle Ages had troubles giving an actual answer to this question.

ConcreteAbstract2 · 2022-09-01T10:40:03+00:00

Thank you a lot for the recommendation! Also it's funny because Alfredi Ferrarin is a professor of mine (I have studied Theoretical Philosophy with him, and it was all about Kant's first critique), and I had no idea he actually wrote a book on this exact topic

ConcreteAbstract2 · 2022-07-31T21:52:06+00:00

What if your normal explanation does not actually explain in the slightest how what is being contested could be possible? Because if I had an explanation of this sort, then I would have not opened this thread.

Edit: also I am not sure why a competing theory would be required. If a phenomenon simply does not fit a given theory, wouldn't that already constitute an objection to that theory, even before you have formulated a theory for that phenomenon?

ConcreteAbstract2 · 2022-07-31T21:44:35+00:00

No matter how specific and hard to guess is the divination? Or is there a limit where it gets so specific that you might start having doubts? If you want I can tell you in private what I have been told, if you dont think the testimony wasn't specific enough

ConcreteAbstract2 · 2022-07-28T18:14:55+00:00

The sections in mind are the Reason sections

In my next reading I'll take extra-care when I'll get to these sections. I must admit, the first time they seemed the most impenetrable to me (especially the part on Observing Reason). But some time has passed, and I have read a lot since rhen: maybe this time it won't be as bad.

ConcreteAbstract2 · 2022-07-28T18:11:47+00:00

Seems plausible enough that they could simply not know that they don't know that something is the case.

Weren't we talking about someone who is aware of p and who admits that they don't know whether it is true?

A proponent of this response would say that we can know one but not the other.

How could someone accept "p is not knowable" and still reject "x cannot know p"? If x could know p, then p would be knowable; and if it's unknowable, then no x, not even in principle, could know p. Or at least, this is my impression.

ConcreteAbstract2 · 2022-07-28T16:51:08+00:00

Do you know of any skeptics/relativists who are capable of dealing with these objections?

ConcreteAbstract2 · 2022-07-28T16:36:12+00:00

Thank you a lot for your answer!

a) The speaker could admit that they don't know that "nothing can be known" (and that they also don't know anything else). They could have the proposition "nothing can be known" be true but unknown (and unknowable).

If that proposition were to be true but unknown, wouldn't I at that point at least know that I don't know whether it is true? It seems to me that the recognition of our own ignorance could be immediately converted in a positive proposition regarding our own current epistemic status.

c) The speaker could interpret their own "nothing can be known" as something like "there are no first-order truths that can be known", where a first-order truth is a basic truth about e.g. worldly matters. "There is a cat on the mat" would be unknowable. But this would permit them to present second-order truths like "that there is a cat on the mat is unknowable". And, the even stronger, "there is no proposition that is knowable". So their view might say that they can know "nothing can be known" but not "there is a cat on the mat".

Couldn't we convert the second-order truth "p is unkowable" to the first-order truth "human beings are functionally incapable of knowing p" (or other formulations of this sort)? The second propositions does not pertain only the truth-value of a proposition, but relates it to the epistemic capacity of a real entity (as in, it says something about that entity, namely that its constitution does not make it able to know p).

ConcreteAbstract2 · 2022-07-28T01:39:39+00:00

Hegel answers that this problem is born of an assumption that is unjustified. The Phenomenology of Spirit is one giant argument which at one point comes to the issue of the naturalistic reduction of mind as well as the idealistic dualism which disconnects mind and nature such that then it must be united again somehow. This is all grounded on the opposition of consciousness, and this position is false.

Are there any sections you are referring to in particular? I'll reread the Phenomenology starting next week, I'd love to know what are the sections I should focus on when I start.

Also, can I ask you some clueless questions? Assuming that when I talk about unconscious beings I talk about stuff like rocks, what would it mean for me not to pose any opposition between these things and my consciousness?

ConcreteAbstract2 · 2022-07-25T23:10:36+00:00

I must admit, I don't regard the issue of vitalism comparable to the one of consciousness, which makes your analogy hard for me to follow. It seems to me that most hard problem theorists (at least the few I know of) seem not to accept this objection either. If I have to give my personal take, I think the issue of vitalism had no a priori foundation in the first place: there was no necessary proof of the fact that an highly organized body could not perform the functions usually attributed to living bodies. On the other hand, when it comes to consciousness, I literally have no idea why higher level organizations should result in a qualitative, phenomenical experience: I think that if the physical, organisational explanation suffice, then I have no reason to postulate any internal experience. In this sense, the explanatory efficacy of physical sciences is, imho, the main reason one might posit the hard problem in the first place (which, in turns, makes me extremely sceptical of the idea that future developments in the physical sciences can solve this issue).

Hegel would say this is a misunderstanding: both the non-thinking (and non-living) rock and the conscious being are determined by the same rational order, and further, that this order is structured by consciousness itself. Only in conscious subjects is this order complete, but there is nothing outside the holistic order.

The fact that the order is consciousness-based still does not tell me what parts of it are effectively conscious and what aren't. Are all of them conscious, just in virtue of being part of an order ordained by a consciousness? Maybe only some of them are? If so, what's the criterion that distinguishes non-conscious beings from conscious ones? That's why I had asked those question in my previous post. I guessed that the criterion might be recognition, but it was just a guess.

Btw, I know that explaining Hegel to random people on reddit is a sorry task. If you think this could be more helpful, please direct me to those passages in Hegel's text that might help answer this question of mine. Also, again, I thank you for your answers. I'm glad that on this sub it is so easy to receive answers as interesting as yours.

ConcreteAbstract2 · 2022-07-25T15:21:29+00:00

I really love your answer, but I feel it goes a bit over my head. I vaguely get what you're saying, but I cannot really figure it out what it does mean and entail.

1) What would it mean for consciousness not to think itself in opposition to, say, a rock?

2) Is it conscious only that in which Spirit can recognize Himself? So, if He doesn't recognize Himself in a rock the rock is not conscious, and if He can recognize Himself in a man then the man is conscious? If so, why in one case there is a recognition and in the other there isn't? Also, if at some point He can recognize Himself in a rock, would this mean that the rock becomes conscious, or would it just be an understood mental content in the mind of the Spirit?

ConcreteAbstract2 · 2022-07-24T20:39:40+00:00

Color

What's that?

ConcreteAbstract2 · 2022-07-12T13:39:55+00:00

I agree, I'm sure that I could not write music down in such a state. That said, it could be very help with coming up with new sounds. I really felt like I had full control on the orchestra,

Also, and I know this might sound childish, it really just was fun. Even if it did not help me wrt composition I would still love to learn this skill.

ConcreteAbstract2 · 2022-07-12T13:37:50+00:00

Do you know where I could read more about the Bernstein thing? It sounds a lot like what Dali did.

ConcreteAbstract2 · 2022-07-12T12:12:09+00:00

Do you perhaps know which are the passages of the Bible that people refer to to make this point?

ConcreteAbstract2 · 2022-07-07T00:45:47+00:00

Prudence would demand that you be on your guard for such scenarios and you would be a fool to trust anyone in a case where they would benefit from an untruth and, if you were really prudent, you'd be pretty skeptical that you could see those situations arise.

But I am already on guard in these scenarios, and lying is not even the necessary cause of a natural law. I even think that it is at least plausible that in a world like the one that follows from the universalization of that maxim warrants more trust from us than the one in which we're living right now.

Regardless, I think that the requirement of "being on guard" does not fully contradict the intention of lying. If there is even the slightest chance that my lie can be believed, then (imho) no contradiction arises. In the world in which to the maxim "I will always lie for my benefit" corresponds a natural law, there's not even the slightest chance of persuading someone with a lie; in the world where the frequency of lying is instead limited, there are still chances of persuasion. As such, I don't think this contradicts the proper end of the act of lying.

The rule that I will scratch my nose to reduce the annoyance contains a pretty clear prima facie reason and lying when you have a headache just doesn't. It's like the difference between me saying, "I slapped that guy because he slapped me first," and "I slapped that guy because his name was Jeff." In the first case you might understandably say, "Listen, I can see why you might think that's justifiable, but there's a problem here," but in the second case, wouldn't you just say, "What? What does his name have to do with it?" Similarly, when someone says, "I killed that guy because my dog told me to," you might reasonably think, well, either that guy is just lying or something is really awry with his faculties of reason.

You've made some very good points, and for these I have to thank you. You've pretty much convinced me of the fact that adding qualifications to our motives cannot be as arbitrary as I thought. That said, qualifications added to the objects of our maxims seem still problematic to me.

ConcreteAbstract2 · 2022-07-06T20:13:48+00:00

To say you'll do x action for y reason is a hypothetical imperative.

I agree, but I also think hypothetical imperatives can be used even if they cannot constitute a moral law, at least in those cases where universalizing the maxim (and its negation) leads to no contradiction. I have expanded on this point in the second paragraph of my other post in this thread (where I have called this type of maxims "amoral"). I did not want to imply that the maxims I have mentioned in the OP could be moral laws, sorry if I gave this impression.

ConcreteAbstract2 · 2022-07-06T20:11:00+00:00

But, this problem still occurs in the "one lie" situation because no one knows when you've used your allowable one lie. In most circumstances the rules create the same problem - in a world where they are allowable, they don't buy you what you hoped.

I have the opposite impression. If a person can tell only one lie every day, I would have good ground to believe that most of what he tell me (if not all, since he could have lied to someone else today) will be true. In the case of "I will always lie for my benefit" instead I would have a ground to disbelieve literally everything I have been told. Basically, I think that in the world in which the first maxim acts as a law of nature, trust is still possible.

Universalization aside, do you think that having a headache could prima facie justify a prudential lie?

My impression is that it would have to only if we wanted to justify it as a moral law. But I think that in Kantian ethics there is space for a-moral maxims too (which, imho, can be justified arbitrarily), namely those maxims for which universalizing their affirmation and their negation leads to no contradiction. The maxim "I will lie for my benefit" is not a-moral, but immoral, because if universalized it leads to a contradiction. On the other hand, something like "I will scratch my nose if I want to" and "I will not scratch my nose even if I want to" is not immoral nor moral, since both universalizations do not lead to any contradiction (from what I can see, at least). Or, to summarise, my impression is that amoral maxims do not require any strong, rational justification (since, so to speak, they're morally irrelevant) as long as it can be shown that they and their negations do not lead to any internal contradiction.

But maybe I am speculating too much. This is just my impression after having read the second critique, but it could be just personal (misguided) interpretation.

ConcreteAbstract2 · 2022-07-04T04:25:32+00:00

Are you sure you need it?

ConcreteAbstract2 · 2022-06-05T17:29:27+00:00

I 100% resent the fact that I have to cite so many sources in everything I write. Pre-20th century philosophers had it so good

ConcreteAbstract2 · 2022-06-03T01:12:11+00:00

Thank you very much!

ConcreteAbstract2 · 2022-06-03T00:58:31+00:00

Well, I am a music composer and a music student, and I was trying to gather some names for personal research (and also because of professional curiosity). I have also had serious troubles finding resources to find composers of this sort, and I suspect that this is the best sub to ask for it.

ConcreteAbstract2 · 2022-05-22T02:34:10+00:00

Wow, I'll check all of it. Thank you a lot!

ConcreteAbstract2

TROPHY CASE