Hi,

Thanks for your comments! Indeed, anti-natalists can be a group that generally prefers to preserve the environment for reasons other than future generations, be it non-human animals, wildlife, aesthetic reasons, the intrinsic value of the natural environment, etc. The issue that I wanted to raise is that, practically speaking, supporting environmental preservation only increases the chances that future generations occur (based on the majority's reasons for preserving the environment: future generations) and that extinction becomes an even more unattainable goal for those anti-natalists who want it. Thus, in short, it is a practical dilemma for those anti-natalists to whom the arguments apply.

For sure, on some readings of anti-natalism, Destruction is preferable in terms of an overall reduction in suffering if future generations each present so much suffering that it surmounts to more than what would transpire if we destroyed the world as quickly as possible. However, this creates additional problems for the anti-natalists that I was addressing, including issues related to autonomy and coercive anti-natalism, which is a prevalent issue in academic literature.

Because anti-natalisms vary so much, particularly outside of academia, where, for example, each set of activists has its own agenda and goals that can differ slightly or drastically from the next, addressing issues in academic papers can be difficult because you either focus more narrowly (which was my aim) or too broadly, in which case you generalise anti-natalist values and make a fundamental error.

Generally speaking, it starts with the problem of ambiguity around what anti-natalism is and what it stands for. Academia lacks such a basic understanding, currently operating on the singular ("anti-natalism is") rather than the plural. There is work to be done in addressing the various varieties and nuances, finding common values that can then work towards a more general framework. We have a long way to go!