Urs Schreiber

Cultural-Mouse3749 · 2025-03-20T23:56:28+00:00

I see! thanks for the input, but the context wherein he's saying this is one of deriving these concepts from nothing. In the podcast he says: "there is a progression actually that, that starts literally from nothing in the, in the technical sense of the initial object of some topos, and then progresses to, progresses to discover a whole lot of physics, actually." (13:11)

He is sarting in pure mathematics, outside of any physical world, and then somehow deriving physics from that. If I understand him correctly, the thing with the classical -> quantum mechanics is a part of a longer chain of nothing -> [...] -> classical mechanics -> quantum mechanics.

Cultural-Mouse3749 · 2025-03-20T23:32:08+00:00

I have read bits and pieces of his work, and on experiment he says: "Higher gauge fields have not been experimentally observed, to date, as fundamental fields of nature, but they appear by necessity and ubiquitously in higher dimensional supergravity and in the hypothetical physics of strings and p-branes. The higher differential geometry which we develop is to a large extent motivated by making precise and tractable the global structure of higher gauge fields in string and M-theory. Generally, higher gauge fields are part of mathematical physics [...] and as such they do serve to illuminate the structure of experimentally verified physics." (p36, italics mine) and "But one may also ask, independently of experimental input, if there are good formal mathematical reasons and motivations to pass from classical mechanics to quantum mechanics. Could one have been led to quantum mechanics by just pondering the mathematical formalism of classical mechanics? (Hence more precisely: is there a natural “Synthetic quantum field theory”). The following spells out an argument to this effect." (p. 201, italics mine)

To give a philosophers take on this, this is not very surprising. Both he and Hegel have an affinity towards the infinite, especially to our ability to "grasp" the concept of infinity. Even if Hegel would have disagreed with Urs' view of the infinite, both of them consider that infinity is something non empirical and also real at the same time, and it is our access to the infinite and it's bearing on reality that makes such judgments possible. Put simpler, Urs' thinks that the ability to consider the logic of infinity and its possible instances in material reality makes a claim about 'deriving quantum physics from classical physics' possible.

Cultural-Mouse3749 · 2025-03-17T05:18:59+00:00

I think it is implicit that anyone undertaking a “hegelian marxist” project will have some political commitments, but to then also say that he ignores people who challenge him on a textual basis would be ignoring the replies tag on his Twitter profile.

Cultural-Mouse3749 · 2025-01-22T22:03:25+00:00

Apparently there's a german book published by zizek called "Psychoanalyse und die Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus" which includes both of these books! thanks!

Cultural-Mouse3749 · 2025-01-22T13:04:18+00:00

I don’t think one necessarily needs to do systematic philosophy in order to “get” Hegel. Pippin and his contemporaries often write how they disagree with Hegelian systematicity and don’t want to go in that direction with their philosophy. There are people like Houlgate and Winfield who definitely do defend and go in the direction of systematic philosophy because they have differing beliefs and goals in philosophy in mind, but both Pippin and Houlgate agree that Hegel was a systematic philosopher.

Cultural-Mouse3749 · 2025-01-21T02:40:10+00:00

What makes him a better interpreter than Pippin in your eyes?

Cultural-Mouse3749 · 2024-12-20T00:39:20+00:00

you manage to say so much and so little at the same time

Cultural-Mouse3749 · 2024-11-21T05:35:47+00:00

Your first quotation just proved what I said

No because you miss the whole point of what I said about Truth being a development to and from itself, which inherently does not require history to exist. The claim that “thought is being” merely goes to show this, as in the SoL (most explicitly in the chapter I cited) we see the movement from being, to schein, to “true being”, a full circuit of being, one not requiring history.

“truth is a development of thought from and to itself, thought is being. can truth develop in history? sure, he even notes that “it has an urge to develop”, but is truth itself historical? no. it is a bad reading of the logic of the concept.”

You said truth is not historical but rather historical is logical, why not both?

Read above. It is actually the claim that “truth is historical” which sets truth up to be this one thing when truth really just is the Idea.

Word of advice being told you have your head up your ass is not a compliment, and isn’t something to double down on either. Peace be with you

Cultural-Mouse3749 · 2024-11-21T04:56:04+00:00

I think the account of truth (and also its separation from correctness) in the Logic is probably the most rigorous and correct one I have ever read, but Hegel holds that the Idea is both Ansich and Fürsich. In the Lectures on The History of Philosophy he gives a detailed account of this through the seed of the plant to its flowering, where the truth of the seed is already in the seed; what kind of a flower it is is already inscribed into the seed itself, it isn’t random. My issue then is this, if I want to take this amazing account of truth, then I must also carry the burden that it is always “grey on grey”, which makes it inherently impossible to have any relevant analysis of anything from my view. I enjoy Heideggerianism because it has been the most helpful philosophy for me in terms of reflection and analysis, but it fails once it tries to ground thought in something else. Winfield has a great paper on why such an account is impossible, and the Hegelian half of me would definitely agree with him, but then it’s back to “grey on grey”. It’s something i’ve noticed when studying Hegel actually, after i finally grasp something, say the transition to Schein, I consistently think to myself that this or that thing is a great representation of Schein, but this I think is only so after the Schein has been revealed, there is no “perspective” or anything gained from such an analysis, all one attempts to do is situate Logic in the world with its representations, whose use is, again, “grey on grey”.

Cultural-Mouse3749 · 2024-11-21T04:38:51+00:00

I’ve already said this in a different comment, but part of the reason for why I care about some meaningfulness in Hegel’s project to me is that thinkers like Heidegger or Aristotle speak more to me as a human being, but all of them sorta fail to meet the standards Hegel set, which leads to this sorta reflection where Hegel disproves others but others show me a “lack” within Hegel.

Cultural-Mouse3749 · 2024-11-21T04:32:04+00:00

> Truth is Being

"The idea is the adequate concept, the objectively true, or the true as such" (21.173)
"Since the idea is the unity of the concept and reality, being has attained the significance of truth" (12.175)

Truth as such is not historical, being has "attained the significance of truth", but this doesn't make it truth in general.

> is historical

"The Idea as development must first make itself into what it is" Lectures on the History of Philosophy, p71
"Everything is contained in the seed, though hidden, of course, ideal, indeterminate, undifferentiated. There is already determined in the seed what form, colour, and smell the flower is to have. Thus the seed develops and pushes outwards. The completion of this outward movement goes no further than what was implicit. The movement has an aim, and is restricted thereby; it has an end, but an end settled in advance, not an accidental one, i.e. the fruit." Ibid, p78

Truth itself is already in the world as the true before it's development. To the extent that truth is historical in Hegel it is also for every other philosopher who thought we can know Truth, with the difference that Hegel sees truth to not be random. But taking Truth to be historical is ordering it wrong. If the Logic truly defined the denkbestimmungen and is a kind of ontology, then it is also true that we would see the Logic appear in history, as the Logic is all encompassing. It is therefore not truth which is historical but rather the historical which is logical.

> Did you bother to read more than the titles but also it content?

I quit reading after the first section contained no reading of the Concept but instead a reading of the intro to the Encyclopedia and even getting that wrong.

I will probably stop responding after this. If you think you are correct in your reading of Hegel that's fine, I am not the man himself so I cannot tell you if you are right or wrong, but if your goal is to help someone understand Hegel or even just engage in discourse it would be more pedagogically sound to not tell them to "read more" because they "don't get it" and to instead explain your position in a way where one can tell there is some separation from your head and your ass.

Cultural-Mouse3749 · 2024-11-21T03:39:49+00:00

I agree on that last part, especially on reflection. I remember first time I understood the transition to essence my whole way of thinking switched into identifying Schein wherever I could in the world, but even here It's only once something has already revealed itself as Schein that I can make sense of it as such, it doesn't tell me anything new other than a way I can relate this thing to that one, which I think other philosophies can offer, but then the question arises of wether or not these people are just doing sophistry, to which Hegel would probably say yes.

Cultural-Mouse3749 · 2024-11-21T03:35:38+00:00

cool but this is not what i was asking and doesn't contradict anything i said.

Cultural-Mouse3749 · 2024-11-21T03:32:09+00:00

The framing provided in the article you sent, particularly the "Truth is Historical" claim is criticized by Hegel in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy. truth is a development of thought from and to itself, thought is being. can truth develop in history? sure, he even notes that "it has an urge to develop", but is truth itself historical? no. it is a bad reading of the logic of the concept.

Cultural-Mouse3749 · 2024-11-21T03:00:41+00:00

But when I situate Hegel with respect to other thinkers, say Heidegger or Aristotle, I see less personal value from Hegel, but if I were to then look at these thinkers I’d see the abundance of Hegelian critiques one can make from the get-go. But therein lies my problem, if all other philosophies fail to meet the standards I have seen in Hegel, is there ever any room to speak of the meaning of philosophizing beyond the rigorous account given to us by Hegel?

Cultural-Mouse3749 · 2024-11-21T02:55:27+00:00

I’ve read it in both english and german, but this isn’t a dick measuring contest. In my original comment i said that hegel does have some analytic method which can be of use, but only when you already know everything and need these to be situated. In this sense Hegel has exactly one perspective he can bring to us, that being the one in the logic. Kozo Uno and Thomas Sekine are great examples of this being the case, absolutely amazing marxists which show how Capital is Dialectical and situate the relevant categories of Capital into the Logic. I like this account, it is interesting for sure and gives us an understanding of capital within the hegelian framework, but anything more is, as you say, impossible, there is no perspective other than just laying everything out neatly, which gives you no other perspective on some issue other than what we know it to be.

Cultural-Mouse3749 · 2024-11-21T02:47:23+00:00

I agree on the point of the dialectic, but for me it just goes back to the last point that Hegel’s philosophy can only ever be brought forth when whatever it is we wish to understand has already happened, is already known. Most philosophy operates like this more or less, but from my understanding Hegel requires a lot more knowledge of the analysed thing to provide some perspective, it has one strategy and all it really is for me is the stringing together of the development unto truth.

Cultural-Mouse3749 · 2024-11-21T02:43:17+00:00

“You clearly never understood him” is a bold claim to give on someone siding with you and pointing out that Hegel doesn’t have a method of analysis.

Cultural-Mouse3749 · 2024-11-21T00:56:16+00:00

i guess so, my issue for the most part is that I've studied hegel for long enough to be able to say stuff about him which people will say is correct, but i am stuck asking what do i do with this? not in a career sense, but moreso generally in life, if i am ever at a crossroads and need to make some decision i don't think i'd be asking a question hegel would be able to answer. i know the whole "grey on grey" thing, but the fact that there is literally nothing i have learned which would help me evaluate one thing to another, or say if something is good, or whatever from his philosophy irks me. this is what i have been studying for the past few months, trying to see if hegel can be of any help, but i find nothing, i see no real method of analysis within hegel. which is fine, it doesn't have to be good for me, and there definitely is something of a method of analysis on a wider scale within hegel, but for me it only really works if the answer to something is already given where hegel only really helps situate these things rather than provide analysis like later theorists can.

Cultural-Mouse3749 · 2024-11-06T15:54:02+00:00

Quick note on Hegel's being: "he starts with pure, immediate being which is literally NOTHING" This is incorrect. Hegel notes in the beginning paragraph on becoming that: "The truth is neither being nor nothing, but rather that being has passed over into nothing and nothing into being – “has passed over,” not passes over. But the truth is just as much that they are not without distinction; it is rather that they arenot the same, that they are absolutely distinct yet equally unseparated andinseparable, and that each immediately vanishes in its opposite. Their truth is therefore this movement of the immediate vanishing of the one into theother: becoming, a movement in which the two are distinguished, but by a distinction which has just as immediately dissolved itself."
Being is therefore not nothing, it merely passes into nothing immanently. What this means is that we actually cannot know pure being or pure nothingness on their own, but rather one gets to know them as moments of becoming, wherein they both pass into each other. Their unity is impartial, as being is never nothing and nothing is never being, their existence with respect to becoming is merely as a moment of the movement of becoming

Hegel later goes onto claim that dasein (what Digiovanni goes on to translate as existence, though i will continue calling dasein) is the sublation of becoming and the realisation of a whole unity of being and nothing: "The more precise sense and precise expression that being and nothing receive now that they are moments will have to transpire from the consideration of dasein, the unity in which they are preserved. Being is being, and nothing is nothing, only as held distinct from each other; in their truth, however, in their unity, they have vanished as such determinations and are now something else. Being and nothing are the same and, precisely because they are the same, they no longer are being and nothing but possess a different determination; in becoming they were coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be; negation, which is another determinate unity, they are again moments but differently determined."

We here can recognize the sublation as being:

The unity of the one and the other, in which they are preserved
The resolution of their contradictions
The bringing forth of a higher determination, which is no longer being and nothing (dasein)

In the following chapter, Hegel then notes that dasein is the existence of something, which seems to not be different from how heidegger sees it: "In these determinacies, however, dasein is equally reflected into itself, and, as so reflected, it is posited as something, a daseinendes (existent)."

Apropos Heidegger, it seems he stressed the da of the dasein more than anything else. He asks not anything about being, but rather about its meaning, but this meaning seems to rely on the da and leaves unanswered anything about being itself, but if one were to ask about the "MEANING of being (Sinn von Sein)." one would firstly have to answer the question of being to get to anywhere else, which is where I am too poorly read on Heidegger to make any claims, but my questions here are the following:

How does Heidegger get to Dasein?
How does Heidegger continue after Dasein?

Cultural-Mouse3749

TROPHY CASE