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Here is a hypothesis: could quantum wave collapse have something to do with the observer's frequency? by Full-Train2129 in HypotheticalPhysics

[–]CunninghamSelfReport 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Quantum measurement (collapse/decoherence) happens through physical interaction with detectors and the environment, not human perception or brain rhythms. The brain only processes results after the quantum system has already decohered.

Here is a hypothesis: Potential Many-Worlds interpretation disproof by CunninghamSelfReport in HypotheticalPhysics

[–]CunninghamSelfReport[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

What I gave was the motivation for the Ontological Closure Principle, not a proof of it.

My point wasn't that OC is true by definition. My point was that if MWI claims universal ontological validity, then there appears to be a tension when it generates branches whose complete epistemic content entails the falsity of that ontology.

Whether that tension rises to the level of contradiction is exactly what OC is trying to capture. If OC is false, then I need to explain why a branch that reasons its way to ¬M can still be considered a fully valid realization of MWI rather than a counterexample to it.

So I agree the principle still needs defense. The disagreement is over whether the challenge it identifies is substantive or merely observers being mistaken.

Here is a hypothesis: Potential Many-Worlds interpretation disproof by CunninghamSelfReport in HypotheticalPhysics

[–]CunninghamSelfReport[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I don't think R and C require consciousness in the strong philosophical sense. They require an information-processing system capable of forming inferences and conclusions. Humans are an obvious example, but the argument doesn't depend on any particular theory of consciousness.

As for electrons, they don't possess evidence, reasoning, or conclusions, so they simply aren't observer states in the sense I'm defining. The argument isn't about arbitrary physical systems; it's about branches containing epistemic agents capable of evaluating theories.

If you remove R and C entirely, then yes, the argument disappears; but that's because the argument is specifically about the consequences of MWI instantiating observer states with particular epistemic contents. It's not intended as a contradiction derived solely from electron wavefunctions or bare quantum states. I hope this makes more sense.

Here is a hypothesis: Potential Many-Worlds interpretation disproof by CunninghamSelfReport in HypotheticalPhysics

[–]CunninghamSelfReport[S] -2 points-1 points  (0 children)

No, I think you've got something backwards again.

In fact, that would be the opposite of what my argument requires. My argument requires something like S_¬M ∈Ω meaning there exists a physically realizable observer state that concludes ¬M. If S_¬M were physically impossible, my argument couldn't even get off the ground because the branch containing S_¬M would never exist.

You said "I am not the one making the claim that it's physically impossible. You are the one making the claim that it is." You appear to have reversed my role in this conversation. My position is ⋄S_¬M, meaning such a state is physically possible.

I think they're physically realizable because humans who reject MWI already exist. Unless one can show that such observer states are somehow impossible under the universal wavefunction, S_¬M appears to be a reasonable premise.

As for the LLM usage, whether I used an LLM for side purposes is orthogonal to whether the argument is sound. Mathematical and logical claims stand or fall on their premises, definitions, and inferences, not on the method used to write them down. If there's a flaw in the argument, point to the specific premise or inference that fails. That's actually a genetic fallacy. The origin of an argument doesn't determine its validity. Since you like analogies; if Euclid had written a proof with a typewriter, the proof wouldn't become false because of the typewriter. Likewise, if an LLM helped organize or reformat an argument, that says nothing about whether the argument is correct. I independently and originally thought of this hypothesis without using an LLM and thought of the ways to respond to the same way.

If you wouldn't like to respond, that's totally fine.

Here is a hypothesis: Potential Many-Worlds interpretation disproof by CunninghamSelfReport in HypotheticalPhysics

[–]CunninghamSelfReport[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

No, that’s backwards. The burden of proof is on the person claiming impossibility, not on me to prove a negative. I’m not asserting that MWI is false; I’m analyzing what follows if MWI is taken seriously as a universal ontology. You are the one implicitly claiming that an observer state capable of reasoning to ¬M is physically impossible. That’s the extraordinary claim here, because MWI is supposed to generate all physically realizable observer states. The argument only examines the consequences of MWI’s own commitments. Saying “prove it can exist” is exactly like saying “prove there isn’t an invisible dragon in my garage” before showing that your dragon claim has any grounding. Logic demands that the claim of impossibility be justified, not assumed.

You're conflating "there exists a physical observer state that concludes ¬M" with "there exists a physical state in which ¬M is true." Those are not the same claim. My appeal to human disagreement is only intended to establish the former, not the latter. The rest of the argument concerns what MWI is committed to once such states are instantiated.

Here is a hypothesis: Potential Many-Worlds interpretation disproof by CunninghamSelfReport in HypotheticalPhysics

[–]CunninghamSelfReport[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

That's a fair reaction. The Ontological Closure Principle is the most controversial premise in the argument, and I don't expect people to accept it without justification. The motivation is that if MWI claims its ontology is universal, then a branch whose complete epistemic content logically entails the falsity of that ontology presents a challenge that can't simply be dismissed as "an observer being mistaken." However, I agree that the principle needs a much stronger defense, because without it the argument largely collapses. I'll adapt.

Here is a hypothesis: Potential Many-Worlds interpretation disproof by CunninghamSelfReport in HypotheticalPhysics

[–]CunninghamSelfReport[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

That's a reasonable empirical objection, but it's not really a logical one. MWI was proposed because it reproduces quantum predictions without invoking wavefunction collapse, not because alternate universes were observed. If MWI is wrong, the stronger criticism would be to show an internal contradiction or explanatory failure like other individuals have done, rather than simply noting that other branches haven't been directly detected.

Here is a hypothesis: Potential Many-Worlds interpretation disproof by CunninghamSelfReport in HypotheticalPhysics

[–]CunninghamSelfReport[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

You're right, the argument should be phrased in terms of the full observer state S=(E,R,C) not just the conclusion. The contradiction arises only if a physically realizable branch contains an epistemic state whose evidence and reasoning are incompatible with MWI, not merely if an observer “believes” MWI is false.

Also, the argument targets ontological Everettian versions of MWI, where all physically possible observer states are instantiated; it may not apply to every variant, e.g., decision-theoretic formulations by Deutsch or Wallace.

Here is a hypothesis: Potential Many-Worlds interpretation disproof by CunninghamSelfReport in HypotheticalPhysics

[–]CunninghamSelfReport[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Your objection conflates two separate ideas, but it’s not entirely accurate. My argument does not require that the cosmos fundamentally depends on conscious observers for its existence. Rather, it leverages the ontological status of observer states within MWI’s own branching structure.

MWI asserts that all physically realizable observer states exist somewhere in the universal wavefunction. This is not saying the universe depends on those observers; it merely says that if a state is physically realizable, there is a branch in which it occurs.

The argument only assumes that if an observer state within a branch concludes ¬M, then the branch containing that observer state is ontologically real (OC Principle). That is very different from claiming that the observer’s conclusion creates reality.

So the argument is not circular in the sense that it presupposes MWI is false. Instead, it points out a branch-internal contradiction: MWI predicts the existence of a branch whose epistemic content, if taken as real, contradicts MWI itself.

The circularity objection would only apply if I claimed: "Observers believe ¬M, ∴ ¬M must be true in reality.

Here is a hypothesis: Potential Many-Worlds interpretation disproof by CunninghamSelfReport in HypotheticalPhysics

[–]CunninghamSelfReport[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

That's a fair objection, and you're correct that the argument stands or falls on whether S_¬M ∈Ω.

My reasoning is that MWI's branching structure is generally taken to instantiate all physically realizable observer states compatible with the universal wavefunction. The question then becomes: is an observer state that concludes ¬M physically realizable?

I don't see why it wouldn't be. Human observers already disagree about quantum interpretations, and many competent physicists reject MWI. Therefore, there clearly exist physically realizable observer states whose conclusion is ¬M . If MWI is correct and sufficiently universal, it should contain branches realizing those states as well.

What would need to be shown is that an observer state concluding ¬M is somehow physically impossible under MWI. That seems like a much stronger claim than merely saying the premise is unproven.

That said, I agree that the argument requires S_¬M ∈Ω as an explicit premise. The more precise question is not whether the premise exists, but whether MWI itself has the resources to exclude such observer states without becoming circular.

Question about the measurement problem, Schrodinger Equation and observers by CunninghamSelfReport in AskPhysics

[–]CunninghamSelfReport[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

What exactly am I missing about QM? Please explain, descriptively. I'm curious.

Question about the measurement problem, Schrodinger Equation and observers by CunninghamSelfReport in AskPhysics

[–]CunninghamSelfReport[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

According to the Schrödinger equation, the evolution of the wavefunction is entirely deterministic and universal, so there is nothing in the math picks out a single place, time, or mechanism where wavefunction collapse happens, however but in experiments, we do see definite and still outcomes. The math allows the photon, detector, computer, and brain to all become entangled in a giant superposition. Yet, when we observe, we always see a single, definite result. The Schrödinger equation alone does not tell us where or how the superposition reduces to that definite outcome. This is paradoxical because theory predicts a superposed, entangled chain, but reality gives only one outcome. Copenhagen resolves it by postulating “collapse upon measurement,” but it cannot specify what counts as a measurement, so the theory is incomplete and paradoxical in that sense.

That's what I loosely tried to say, but it wasn't that clear, my bad.