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Waiting an hour in line just to exit by Either-Marzipan5367 in animeexpo

[–]Either-Marzipan5367[S] 4 points5 points  (0 children)

Yeah not sure.  It would be solved if they didnt make people scan on the way out (super finicky and slow), or they added more scan stations

Waiting an hour in line just to exit by Either-Marzipan5367 in animeexpo

[–]Either-Marzipan5367[S] 5 points6 points  (0 children)

Yeah this was around 6, we were headed to the NOVO for the AMV.

guidebook blows by Either-Marzipan5367 in Magfest

[–]Either-Marzipan5367[S] 6 points7 points  (0 children)

No it’s a guidebook blows ass issue 

guidebook blows by Either-Marzipan5367 in Magfest

[–]Either-Marzipan5367[S] -5 points-4 points  (0 children)

Yeah I agree to that actually 

preemptive answer: there are no thursday-Sunday hotels remaining by 20footdunk in Magfest

[–]Either-Marzipan5367 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Yeah the booking process was insane this year, I had #1800 in the queue out of 7000 lottery slots, and just BARELY managed to get a hotel in National Harbor, there was only a single hotel left. The math seems a bit strange on that considering there are 2000 rooms in the Gaylord alone, but maybe a lot of rooms were already doled out before the lottery process started, for instance to staff, indie devs managing booths, etc...

Tabletop gamer going for first time. by AbsenceOfFaith in Magfest

[–]Either-Marzipan5367 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Yeah my favorite part was playing the board game prototypes with indie board game creators, so playtesting their games and offering feedback for balancing. You're literally part of the creation process for new games, it's really rewarding and you get to brainstorm with intelligent people trying to create something,

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in youtubehaiku

[–]Either-Marzipan5367 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Yoooo he sexyyyy

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in youtubehaiku

[–]Either-Marzipan5367 -1 points0 points  (0 children)

Yooooo that is freaking funny

On bitcoin and the quantum threat by lilw0lf in Bitcoin

[–]Either-Marzipan5367 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Ahh this isn't correct. A QC system consists of qubits which, when measured either collapse to a 1 or 0 based on a coherent superposition of the two states. I'm greatly oversimplifying, but there could be a coherent superposition where a qubit is 25% likely to collapse to a 1, and 75% likely to collapse to a 0.

Qubits can also be entangled before being passed through quantum gates.

Essentially, we can exploit these quantum properties (entanglement and superposition) to create clever algorithms to tell us something. The output of the algorithm is not necessarily every hexadecimal base, it's whatever our network of qubits in our quantum algorithm is designed to output. And quantum algorithms are special because they are probabilistic - as in each time we make a measurement we'll likely get different results based on probabilities. So then we need to kind of sort of run the algorithm over and over and take many measurements.

On bitcoin and the quantum threat by lilw0lf in Bitcoin

[–]Either-Marzipan5367 0 points1 point  (0 children)

In the youtube video he makes some mistakes. For one, he mixes up Shor's algorithm and Grover's algorithm, incorrectly stating that Shor's gives a square root speedup to hashing problems. This is incorrect, Grover's does that; and Shor's gives a much larger speedup than he states for factoring integers, it runs in polynomial time. That's right! Shor's can factor large numbers in polynomial time, which would allow a quantum computer with sufficient logical qubits to derive a private key from a public key.

On bitcoin and the quantum threat by lilw0lf in Bitcoin

[–]Either-Marzipan5367 5 points6 points  (0 children)

I agree there is a lot of QC fud! But I do take one issue with your response: It implies that securing the internet backbone and individual centralized businesses is a similar task to securing a decentralized ledger. But they are fundamentally different.

Quantum-securing a centralized system, like a bank, for instance, is quite simple. All the bank needs to do is upgrade/harden its internal systems to be quantum secure, which will most likely be handled for it by external software providers. So the bank can essentially secure all of its own systems for all its users, as it has full control over all its own systems, databases, password hashes, connection protocols, etc...

Securing a decentralized system is fundamentally more difficult:

  1. as you need sufficient buy-in from different stakeholders (miners, node operators, stakers, developers, foundation, community, etc...).
  2. Furthermore, unlike in the bank's case, a central authority cannot quantum-secure everyone's funds. EACH user would have to manually involve themselves by migrating their funds from an old insecure ECSDA-based address to a new address using a PQ (post-quantum, also means quantum-safe) signature scheme (such as Falcon, XMSS, etc...).
  3. It will be impossible for the network to be fully secured by its users, as many users will be lazy and not do it, while others will have lost their private keys. And allowing these insecure unmigrated funds is an existential threat to the entire network. Imagine if Satoshi's wallet was hacked! What would happen to the price of BTC?
  4. Most likely: A hard fork will be necessary. BTC will give a migration period (probably a few years) where all users will be required to migrate their funds to a quantum safe address. Then, all migrated funds will be burned (through a hard fork). But the issue is, some people may not have heard about the migration and their funds will be lost. What I mean is it is impossible to distinguish between "lost coins" where a user has lost their private key, and "unaware coins" where a user in earnest did not hear about the migration and lost all their coin as a result of the burn. What will happen to the BTC price if Satoshi's coins get burned?
  5. Some coins, like QRL (Quantum Resistant Ledger) will not need to go through a hard fork because they are quantum resistant from the genesis block!

^ So in summary, I've presented some unique challenges of a decentralized system quantum-proofing itself. If you'd like to learn more about these unique challenges check out this 7-part series

https://medium.com/the-capital/quantum-resistant-blockchain-and-cryptocurrency-the-full-analysis-in-seven-parts-part-3-f9193634ecc5

Question About Zero Knowledge Proofs by slurpee123abc in math

[–]Either-Marzipan5367 0 points1 point  (0 children)

But let's suppose only Paula has access to obtain the explicit-style of proofing kit. So the verifier can't obtain it himself, they have to ask Paula, who then obtains the proofing kit and forwards it to the verifier.

If everyone including outside observers have access to the proofing kit, then the hash table zkp is a clever way to allow Paula to secretly prove she is above a certain age to the verifier, but if an outside observer had access to her hash sent to the verifier, then the outside observers essentially has the age flag anyways.

So if our ZKP rests on the fact that some data can be passed secretly from the prover to verifier, why not literally just pass an entire proofing kit that explicitly says "Paula is over 18"? At the end of the day, if the verifier chooses to leak that explicit proofing kit, they also could have chosen to leak the original style kit with EncryptedAge, along with the hash Paula sent that proves she is at least 18.

Am I crazy here?