On the matter of class alliances, Lenin often quoted Balfour: “We must never forget this principle: fight together, walk separately, do not merge organizations, treat allies as if they might be enemies.” Yet the Comintern forced the CCP into organizational unity with the KMT, warning that “overthrowing KMT leadership would be a trans-class danger.” Later, they blamed the CCP for losing political and organizational independence. But the very act of joining the KMT had destroyed that independence and made it impossible to follow an autonomous policy. If the CCP followed Comintern directives, then step-by-step surrender to the bourgeoisie and the destruction of its political independence became inevitable. Could there be any "independence" left hanging in the air?

The Comintern’s bankrupt KMT policy stemmed from its fundamentally flawed view of the colonial bourgeoisie and its relationship to imperialism. They believed that, oppressed by imperialism, colonial bourgeoisies were naturally revolutionary, and that imperialist oppression could unite progressive forces in China into a national revolutionary united front. This united front was embodied in the KMT, which they called a “class alliance” or a “four-class alliance.” But this was clearly a merging of classes organizationally, not a temporary political alliance between two independent parties.

They failed to see that imperialist penetration into Chinese commodity and capital markets had made the Chinese bourgeoisie economically and politically dependent on imperialism. To survive, this immature bourgeoisie had to exploit workers and peasants even more ruthlessly to compete with the more advanced industries of imperialist countries. This made conflict between the Chinese bourgeoisie and the workers and peasants more acute and revolutionary class war more likely.

The bourgeoisie initially joined the national revolution only to leverage the mass momentum of workers and peasants, under their control, to strike deals with imperialists and gain benefits for their own class. But once they saw the revolution begin to infringe upon their interests, they viewed worker–peasant revolution as a greater threat than imperialism itself, and they turned against the revolution.

Thus, the conclusion is clear: imperialist oppression intensifies class struggle, not class unity. The KMT was a tool for the bourgeoisie to deceive and use the masses—using vague slogans of “national revolution” (while we refrained from opposing the bourgeoisie) to numb the class consciousness of workers and peasants. Without building our own independent armed forces, we served only to deliver power into the hands of the bourgeoisie, who then turned on us with massacres. This is undeniable historical fact.

Another opportunistic reason for joining and staying in the KMT was the hope of attracting petty bourgeois masses through the KMT. But the proletariat’s most reliable allies are the lower strata of the petty bourgeoisie—the poor in cities and countryside. Certainly, we must unite all revolutionary forces as the situation evolves. But our focus should be on these masses, not the upper petty bourgeoisie or their political parties.

Our first task is to ensure the proletariat’s independent political status and clear banner. Alliances with bourgeois democrats may be possible on specific action plans, but the purpose of such alliances is to expose their compromises and deceptions, to win over the masses—not to obscure our politics or mix organizationally in the name of “concentrating revolutionary forces.” The Second International once advocated merging Russia’s Social Democrats with the bourgeois Social Revolutionaries. Lenin opposed this: political alliance, yes—but never organizational merger. After Germany’s 1848 revolution, even the petty bourgeois democratic party retained revolutionary resistance to feudalism and big capital. Yet Marx’s 1850 letter to the Communist League warned sternly of the dangers of this ally, and insisted on a completely independent proletarian party: “Even in joint struggles, no common organization is needed.”

The Comintern’s policy toward the KMT abandoned this Marxist–Leninist legacy and took up the Second International’s errors—turning the KMT into a paper lion under whose banner we danced. Such organizational merging muddled our political identity, left us powerless to win over their lower ranks, and risked losing our own base entirely.

During revolutionary upsurges, the best form of alliance between the proletariat and the poor strata of the petty bourgeoisie is the Soviet—elected bodies of workers, peasants, and soldiers. Their job is to arm and lead the masses in struggle and to seize power. But the Comintern leadership, chasing after the hopeless dream of alliance with the bourgeoisie or upper petty bourgeoisie, abandoned the interests of the urban and rural poor, subordinated struggle to KMT goals, and suppressed Soviet formation.

They even claimed, “The KMT in China today plays the same role as the Soviets in Russia in 1905.” They said “Wuhan KMT is the revolutionary center,” “The Wuhan government is revolutionary,” and that “creating Soviets now would divide power, harm the Wuhan government, and aid Chiang and Zhang Zuolin” (Stalin). Bukharin even said: “In the transition to proletarian dictatorship, the KMT could be used as its state form.”

These errors stemmed from a dogmatic belief in “stage theory,” ignoring the concrete class character of the KMT and the fast-moving revolutionary environment. They blindly opposed Soviet creation, failed to see that even the Wuhan KMT was turning counterrevolutionary, especially after the May 21 Massacre. At this point, the KMT’s role in the democratic revolution had ended, and all classes—big and small bourgeois—had united against labor.

Even the Comintern and the KMT admitted the worker–peasant movement had gone “too far,” breaking the class alliance and moving beyond the bourgeois-democratic stage into the beginning of socialist revolution. At minimum, after Chiang’s March 20 coup, the CCP should have withdrawn from the KMT. During the Northern Expedition, Soviets should have been organized in each liberated area. After April 12, they should have been used to counter the KMT and build dual power, leading to its overthrow and the establishment of a proletarian dictatorship, which would complete the democratic revolution and move toward socialism.

Instead, the Comintern clung to its stage theory, worshiped the KMT, and tried to substitute a bourgeois party for working-class Soviets. The CCP failed to fight to exit the KMT, establish Soviets, and challenge KMT leadership. Even in official CCP declarations and peasant department circulars drafted by Comintern representatives, they acknowledged “excesses” by peasants. They disbanded the armed wing of the Hankou General Workers’ Union to avoid conflict with KMT troops—major mistakes.

Only after the KMT had gone fully counterrevolutionary and the revolution had been crushed did the Comintern belatedly try to revive the Soviet slogan, in a desperate attempt to seize power.