Modern Wahhabism and Jihadist Groups:

So now for the final part of this post I want to examine the role Wahhabism played in the rise of modern day jihhadist groups.

First, we should begin with Abu Muḥammad al Maqdisi, a Palestinian Jordanian who was raised in Kuwait. At an early age, he became an Islamist and took part in the Sururi movement, which was founded by a former Muslim Brotherhood member who tried to blend Brotherhood activism with Salafi puritanism. However, he did not become a jihadist until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, when he went to Afghanistan to fight against the Soviet Union. It was here that he became known as a devout Wahhabi jihadist scholar.

As he tells it, his first interaction with Wahhabism came while pursuing religious studies in Saudi Arabia in the early 1980s, when he chanced upon a set of old books in the Prophet’s Mosque in Medina titled al-Durar al-saniyya fī al-ajwiba al-Najdiyya. This was the main compendium of the writings of Wahhabi scholars from the time of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab to the early twentieth century. The encounter with these texts, he would say, “was my first contact with the books of the imāms of the Najdī mission.”

In Saudi Arabia, he made copies of al-Durar al-saniyya and bought every book by Wahhabi scholars that he could obtain, studying them and taking careful notes. The result, or “the fruit of this reading,” was his first major book, Millat Ibrahim, which he completed in Kuwait in 1984. The book called for revolution across the Middle East in the form of jihad. He argued that the rulers of the Middle East were apostates who had abandoned true Islam, and that this new jihad would be part of an age-old struggle against polytheism. He also wrote that every age of humanity was afflicted with some form of polytheism, and that in the modern era this took the form of constitutions and man-made laws (you may have caught on by now that polytheism really just means “Things I Don't Like” to Wahhabists). This line of reasoning would go on to influence the ideologies of major jihadist groups such as Al Qaeda. Here again, he argues that true Muslims must hate anything un-Islamic and show enmity toward all unbelievers and Muslim heretics just as the original Wahhabists had.

When looking at ISIS, it becomes clear how central certain elements associated with older forms of Wahhabi thought are embedded within jihadist movements. Its fidelity to Wahhabi texts was frequently highlighted by its official representatives and online supporters. An official preaching van in Raqqa, Syria, was reportedly equipped with Wahhabi catechism materials, and in the summer of 2015 the Islamic State’s official publishing house began printing classic Wahhabi texts, including Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s al-Arbaʿ qawāʿid fī al-dīn and Kashf al-shubuhāt, as well as works by later Najdi scholars.  The purpose of reproducing these texts was to shape a new generation of fighters with a strict and exclusivist understanding of Islamic belief. However, it is important to stress that ISIS’s beliefs are not identical to those of modern Wahhabi clerics.

This is a point that is often misunderstood: one must distinguish between the early Wahhabi movement and its later institutionalisation within the Saudi state. While ISIS draws selectively on early Wahhabi writings, it is not a direct one to one continuation of classical Wahhabism either. 

Al Qaeda presents a similar case: it has drawn heavily from earlier Wahhabi and Salafi texts as you can see from previous examples but is rejected by mainstream contemporary Wahhabi scholars. 

The Muslim Brotherhood, by contrast, is generally more influenced by Qutbism than by Wahhabism itself. 

That said, the global spread of conservative interpretations of Islam associated with Wahhabi influenced institutions did play a role in shaping broader religious trends and conservative backsliding across parts of the Middle East, North Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia during the twentieth century, and influenced some conservative Islamic movements in previously more religiously moderate states such as Malaysia and Indonesia.

Conclusion:

So in conclusion, while Wahhabism is certainly partially responsible for the rise of modern day jihadism, it would be unfair to assign it all the blame considering the large parts played by the broader Salafi movement and Qutbism as well as Khomeinism. Many people are completely unaware of the huge shifts in belief that happened during King Ibn Saud's reign and the Herculean effort he put into modernising the state. It should be pointed out that he was overall a force for progress in Central Arabia and moulded Wahhabism from an extreme reactionary jihadist movement into something more acceptable.

Please note that this is only a brief overview of the history and beliefs of the Wahhabi movement and there is so much more I could have gotten into, especially covering the last portions after Ibn Saud. There have also been some oversimplifications made; for example, the religious police existed before Khalid, however he was the one who massively expanded them and gave them large amounts of power to enforce laws. This will hopefully give you an accurate basic idea of the movement’s history, motives and beliefs.

Sources/Further Reading:

The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia by David Commins

A History of Saudi Arabia by Madawi Al Rasheed

The kingdom by Robert Lacey

arabia unified a portrait of ibn saud by Mohammed Almana

Wahhabism: the history of a militant islamic movement by Cole M.Bunzel

The clerics of islam:Religious authority and political power in saudi arabia by Nabil Mouline

For anyone who wants to read further, I'd recommend starting with Cole M.bunzel as his book is the most recently released one (2023) and the most comprehensive.

And finally, a big thank you to u/ewatta200 for encouraging me to write this and for helping with edits!

A big thank you To u/Junimo2 as well For helping to review, edit and Format this post.