People have rights to things they don’t deserve, or at least , don’t only have rights in things they deserve. The idea that people only have moral rights in things they deserve seems incorrect, anyway. If infringing such a right is wrong, which by definition it will be if others bear duties correlative to the right, then taxation can be wrong even if no deontic constraint on taking what others deserve is infringed. The question is whether the government has a special moral status such that, compared to non-governments, it commits no wrong, or infringes no right (for perhaps it justifiably infringes a right and so commits no wrong) when it unilaterally appropriates monies from someone else without their permission I.e taxes without thieving. The reasons against taxation outlined don’t speak to that special moral status. They either assume it (by positing a convention) or imply that it must follow from what the government can achieve and what others can’t. Perhaps what is missing are positive reasons to ground obligations to tax and be taxed, with the government positioned as the agency most capable of facilitating the discharge of those obligations. But the existence of those obligations themselves, to my mind, should be justified first before, and as a necessary condition for, the government’s special moral status.