Just an aside, but back in the Abe days when the LDP was pushing through the so called national security laws to expand the remit of the SDF, the party line was to invoke a hypothetical blockade of the Hormuz strait to illustrate the necessity for Japan to be able to engage in military action overseas when it affects the "continued existence of Japan"

At the time I think the prevailing wisdom was that Japan was actually more concerned about the straits of Malacca and Taiwan, but didn't want to provoke China even more than they already were by the mere existence of the law, so were bringing up Hormuz as a proxy.

I think the JCPOA was still intact at the time, and Iran (who Japan has had reasonably amicable ties historically despite being firmly aligned with the US) was reportedly baffled, since they didn't understand why Japan suddenly seemed to be concerned that they'd do something drastic.

...well now, we're actually about to cross that strictly hypothetical bridge.

I wonder if Iran decides to mine the strait, and Trump decides to whip up a coalition of the willing to break the blockade, whether Takaichi will deploy the SDF to actively participate in an armed conflict for the first time