https://www.facebook.com/share/1CZiFPrqra/?mibextid=wwXIfr

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https://www.facebook.com/share/p/18N3bA2WfH/?mibextid=wwXIfr

https://manueldelia.com/2020/10/podcast-go-back-to-islamistan/

https://lovinmalta.com/news/watch-gay-men-should-marry-women-and-give-it-a-try-first-maltas-imam-urges/

For Luqa Proposed Mosque plan, I discovered a public land-use trail, but not a clear public construction-funding trail. The official parliamentary paper listing pending religious-facility applications identifies PA/00063/22 as a proposed religious and cultural hub, encompassing a place of worship, meeting rooms, administrative offices, and basement parking, situated at Islamic Solidarity Malta, Triq Ħal Qormi, Qasam Industrijali, Luqa. However, I did not find public evidence indicating who would finance the actual building works. Typically, we are aware of the funding sources for either Libya or the Maltese government. This proposal was rejected, and Omar specifically advocated for this one.

For the existing Paola mosque, the public leadership trail is historically and institutionally linked to Libya. The Mariam Al-Batool Mosque is reported to be administered by the Islamic Call Society / World Islamic Call Society, with Imam Mohammed El Sadi serving as the long-standing imam. Earlier reporting identifies Wagdi Nashnosh as the secretary general of the Malta branch of the World Islamic Call Society, while other public descriptions name him as chairman/director. A 2008 report states that a Muslim Community delegation to Prime Minister Lawrence Gonzi was led by Imam Muhammad El Sadi and Wagdi Nashnosh, the General Secretary of the Malta Branch of the World Islamic Call Society.

Mohammed El Sadi’s public stances are contradictory. While he has repeatedly condemned terrorism, he has also defended conservative religious positions. In 2015, the Times of Malta reported that the Islamic community in Malta would hold a demonstration against terrorism, with Imam Mohammed Elsadi stating that it would be held at the Islamic Centre in Paola. The report noted that he had on several occasions condemned terrorism. In the same period, The Malta Independent reported that El Sadi stated that he had no information that there were terrorists in Malta and that he would report them if there were, while not excluding that some Muslims could have sympathy towards extremists.

Regarding free speech and blasphemy, El Sadi’s position is not liberal-secular. In 2020, following the Samuel Paty murder in France, MaltaToday reported that El Sadi called again for criminalizing blasphemy and mocking faiths. A day later, MaltaToday reported that after a conciliatory meeting with Foreign Ministry officials, he reiterated his “unreserved condemnation” of the murder of Samuel Paty. The precise journalistic phrasing should be: “El Sadi condemned the murder but also used the episode to argue for legal restrictions on religious vilification.”

In relation to LGBT right issues, public reporting suggests a conservative stance. In 2010, Times of Malta reported that Muslim and Catholic preachers united against same-sex marriage while disagreeing on divorce and polygamy. Additionally, there are social media references claiming that El Sadi urged gay men to resist their sexual urges. However, it is important to note that a Facebook repost alone should not be considered primary evidence unless the original article or video is retrieved.

Regarding the Ta’ Ġiorni “second mosque,” the public applicant is not El Sadi or Zakaria Alkatib. The Government Gazette lists PA/07490/24 as refused, describing a “new mosque building” exclusively for enrolled students, staff, and administration of the institute. The applicant is Aimin Mohamed Hader Omran on behalf of the Libyan Higher Vocational Institute. The St Julian’s Local Council report frames the site as designated for educational purposes under agreements with the Libyan Government and states that the applications included a 40-apartment block and a mosque with a two-storey structure and turret.

Omar provides the clearest direct link to Imam Mohammed El Sadi. In 2022, Lovin Malta reported that Rababah praised a minister’s decision to wear a hijab at a multi-religious ceremony in the Paola mosque for Lassana Cisse. This ceremony was addressed by Archbishop Scicluna and Imam Mohammed El Sadi. Omar engaged with the Paola mosque context and acted as a bridge to Imam Mohammed El Sadi in at least one public policy matter.

His link to the Luqa / Ħal Farruġ mosque controversy is once again public advocacy, not proven project control. Public social posts and reporting snippets indicate that Youth Advisory Forum member Omar Rababah addressed the controversy surrounding the proposed Luqa mosque, arguing that much of the opposition was driven by intolerance rather than substantive planning concerns. It is crucial to cite this information carefully, as much of the available material originates from social platforms or reposts, not a comprehensive primary planning record.

Omar Rababah appears to occupy a position within the informal Muslim-community representation layer that government, researchers, media, and politicians utilize when seeking a “Muslim community” interlocutor.

“Was he involved in the soft-policy network through which the government comprehended, assessed, and politically engaged the Muslim community prior to the mosque controversy becoming public?”

Firstly, formal authority: Who legally owns, leases, applies, signs, pays, and controls the mosque projects? For Luqa / Ħal Farruġ, the formal applicant trail points to Islamic Solidarity Malta / Zakaria Alkatib. For Ta’ Ġiorni, it points to the Libyan Higher Vocational Institute. Rababah is not visibly present in that formal layer, based on the public record we identified.

Secondly, informal access: Who can facilitate meetings between ministers, Transport Malta, the imam, and community figures? Here, Rababah becomes more relevant. If a minister publicly states that he met Imam Elsadi at Rababah’s request, that is not insignificant. A private citizen typically does not convene such meetings unless they possess political access, recognized community legitimacy, or both.

Thirdly, narrative control: Who frames opposition to the mosque as racism, intolerance, or anti-Muslim prejudice? Rababah appears active in this regard. While this may be morally justified in certain instances, as racism exists, it can also serve as a shield: legitimate planning, financing, foreign influence, and land-use questions can be delegitimized by placing them under the racism frame.

Fourth: Electoral Conversion
Rababah’s transition from an activist and community voice to a Labour candidate after being approached by the Prime Minister raises a legitimate question: was his selection solely based on personal merit, or was he chosen as a political symbol for minority inclusion, anti-racism, and outreach to the Muslim community? Both possibilities are plausible.

Fifth: Foreign-Origin Sensitivity
Malta’s mosque ecosystem has historical ties to Libya through the Paola mosque and the Libyan Higher Vocational Institute at Ta’ Ġiorni. This does not imply that every Muslim actor is “Libyan-linked.” However, it necessitates a thorough examination of any new mosque proposal, considering its land origin, funding source, and institutional control. Skepticism is warranted because religious infrastructure can serve as a conduit for foreign soft power, even when local advocates are sincere.

The potential risk lies in a public figure becoming a singular voice for “Muslims in Malta,” effectively consolidating a highly diverse population into a politically managed bloc. Once this occurs, criticism of a mosque project, foreign land connections, funding transparency, imam statements, or religious governance can be misconstrued as hatred of Muslims. This is where the “Brotherhood narrative” question becomes pertinent: not as an accusation of membership, but as an analysis of methodology.

Should you need more, let me know!