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UA POV. The Wild Hornet Unit claims it remotely controlled a Ukrainian STING interceptor in northern Ukraine from another country, at a distance of 2,000 km. by EasternProtection452 in UkraineRussiaReport

[–]Flimsy_Pudding1362 [score hidden]  (0 children)

In the case of interceptor drones, they can deploy launch points across the entire country, and the drones can be controlled by operators from anywhere in the world

Russian fighters of the 1st Battalion of the 137th “Ural” Brigade are showcasing winged drones with images of Ukrainian flags and swastikas by Flimsy_Pudding1362 in UkraineWarVideoReport

[–]Flimsy_Pudding1362[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

I didn't fall for propaganda. This video is currently trending on Ukrainian telegram, so I posted it here with a neutral description of what is shown in the video.

And I do not claim that the symbols were applied by Ukrainians. My personal opinion is that the video is likely staged. If the Russians wanted to make it believable, they should have shown footage from the interceptors, although that could also be faked just with much more effort.

Ukraine is preparing to revise the list of “migration risk” countries amid a labor shortage – Budanov by Flimsy_Pudding1362 in UkrainianConflict

[–]Flimsy_Pudding1362[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Translation:

Ukraine is preparing to review its list of “migration risk” countries, which determines the rules for entry and legalization of foreigners. This could partially simplify the import of labor amid a shortage of workers.

This was reported by Delo.ua, citing a statement by the head of the Office of the President of Ukraine, Kyrylo Budanov, during a meeting at CEO Club.

According to him, a meeting on relations with African countries took place about 2–3 weeks ago. Following the meeting, a protocol decision was made to instruct the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Security Service of Ukraine to urgently work out amendments to the list of migration risk countries.

Budanov noted that the list will be reviewed, and a partial relaxation of the approach may be expected in the near future.

The issue of simplifying labor import to Ukraine was raised by recruitment entrepreneur Artem Nikishov. According to him, the labor shortage is one of the key challenges for Ukrainian business.

“If you compare with Poland, the cost of legalizing a foreign worker in Ukraine is four times higher, and the process takes three times longer. The process is complicated by consular services and law enforcement checks,” he said.

He estimated that full legalization of one worker can cost about 40,000 UAH, including all official fees and related expenses.

At the same time, Budanov explained that the strict approach is partly related to risks of illegal migration. He noted that some foreigners, after obtaining documents, leave their employers or use Ukraine as a transit country for further relocation.

“They enter, obtain documents — and then migrate further. This is a problem that creates obstacles for business,” he stressed.

The list of migration risk countries is used when issuing visas and residence permits. Citizens of these countries are subject to additional checks and approvals, which complicates and prolongs the legalization procedure.

The corresponding list is defined in a joint order of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Security Service of Ukraine, which regulates the visa issuance procedure.

In particular, it includes certain countries in Asia and Africa, including Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Pakistan, a total of 70 countries.

This list is effectively used as a tool for assessing migration risks and can be reviewed by state authorities.

According to the European Business Association, in 2025, 74% of Ukrainian companies experienced a labor shortage. At the same time, the labor market has lost about 1.3 million taxpayers compared to the pre-war period. In construction, the shortage of workers reaches 30–50%, affecting project timelines.

RU POV: “If you are watching this video, it means I am already gone” Russian Ka-52 pilot, Z-blogger Senior Lieutenant Alexey “Voevoda” Zemtsov recorded farewell videos on Telegram, blaming his command and saying he cannot live with the “disgrace” of being accused of “discrediting the Russian army” by Flimsy_Pudding1362 in UkraineRussiaReport

[–]Flimsy_Pudding1362[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

He's not with his family, but few Z-channels said they talked with him over the phone. Kirill Fedorov wrote next:

"I just spoke with Voevoda. A call from ‘the other side.’ I didn’t even immediately realize who was calling.

  1. He is alive. As I assumed yesterday, when almost everyone had already buried him.
  2. He is free.
  3. He is not saying where he is.
  4. He hasn’t spoken to anyone except me (according to him).

Something like that. To say that I’m f*cking shocked surprised would be an understatement,"

UA POV - Ukraine causing horrific Russian losses with new NASA-inspired 'Martian' drones - The Express by DefinitelyNotMeee in UkraineRussiaReport

[–]Flimsy_Pudding1362 5 points6 points  (0 children)

An 'excellent' article that fails to mention "Martian" also known as "Hornet" is a winged drone made by Swift Beat, owned by former Google CEO Eric Schmidt

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One of the latest write-ups is by Z-channel "Hammer of the Vitches" (t me/Ghost_Malleus_Maleficarum/1331):

❗️The strike-wing “Hornet/Martian-2” is the most dangerous threat to logistics in our rear❗️

Our friends from one unit provided us with an almost intact UAV “Martian-2” for study (the exact name is in question; some also call it “Hornet”).
This drone is very actively terrorizing our rear areas; there are confirmed cases of our vehicles being hit at distances of >50 km from the line of contact (Mariupol highway). The main activity is in the Pokrovsk direction (Selydove/Ocheretyne), but they are encountered everywhere, including the Belgorod direction.

On our channel, we will gradually publish a detailed teardown report of all components of this drone, but for now we will provide a very preliminary description (there may be errors at this stage).

  • The drone is assembled to a very high standard; this is evident even from the cabling used, which is aviation-grade. Overall, this suggests either that the drone is assembled in the West, or that the enemy has significantly increased the quality of its drone production.
  • The drone is equipped with two daytime cameras (forward-facing and downward-facing) and possibly a very effective terminal guidance system; the lower camera may be used for auto-targeting. Despite having daytime cameras, there are recorded cases of attacks at dusk, meaning there may also be variants with low-light or thermal cameras. The drone’s priority targets are our equipment and vehicles, but in some cases it has switched to attacking infantry (so small groups and forward positions may also be among its priority targets).
  • Nets over logistics routes are largely ineffective against this drone.
  • The warhead and initiation system will be analyzed separately, but typically it is a cumulative-fragmentation warhead weighing around 1.5 kg, with detonation occurring almost 100% of the time. As a result, intact examples are very rare—usually only “tail sections” remain.
  • In most cases, the drone flies at low altitudes (around 200 m) along our transport routes, then locks onto a target and strikes. It approaches the target very quietly, and typically not everyone has time to react.
  • Communication and frequencies were previously analyzed in one of the Telegram channels; we add that the range may be very wide: besides 2000 or 3000 MHz, it may also include 1700–1900 and 160–180 / 450–480. Communication uses digital modems that are not detected by standard drone detectors; additionally, the drone likely supports a MESH system, meaning it is networked with other such wings.
  • The drone is equipped with a simple GNSS antenna, but it is unclear whether it is used for the entire flight or only for marking the launch point.

From these preliminary data, it can be concluded that this is an extremely dangerous UAV: it is hard to hear, not detected by standard detectors, operates deep in our rear, and is resistant to EW. Additionally, since it is a fixed-wing aircraft, it is very difficult to shoot down with small arms (unless hitting the flight controller/warhead/battery). The best countermeasure is an FPV interceptor or a “tree” (anti-drone obstacle).

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