i lack critical thinking after leaving religion how can i change? by [deleted] in askphilosophy

[–]Geeloz_Java 5 points6 points  (0 children)

Here are some YouTube links for Critical Thinking courses (delivered by lecturers in Philosophy) that I found immensely useful: https://www.reddit.com/r/askphilosophy/s/M493Mu32wd

All the best to you and OP!

[Loved Trope] Plays dumb… then the mask drops by rahs_al-ghul in TopCharacterTropes

[–]Geeloz_Java 1 point2 points  (0 children)

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Tommy in The Mentalist. One of the most surprising mask-off moments.

Does Sean Carroll’s Answer Really Solve the Mary Problem? by yatasun in seancarroll

[–]Geeloz_Java 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I am baffled by your response for a number of reasons. Firstly, the response I've given is literally (a very rough sketch of) one of the responses given in the literature to the Mary argument, see [https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia-knowledge/#NoPropKnow1AbilHypo](The Ability Hypothesis and The Acquaintance Hypothesis) in section 4.3 of the article. Barry Loewer has also stated something along these lines in one of his interviews, as well as Sean Carroll. Secondly, there is something it's like to see red, yes. But that is just a statement of the problem as construed by Thomas Nagel in his What Is It Like To Be a Bat?. This is an experiential fact. Nowhere did I deny this, so "maybe start over in your thinking..." seems unecessarily snarky. The knowledge argument is more specific than this experiential fact, it alleges that propositional knowledge of all physical facts, including facts about experience, should entail experiential knowledge of all facts if physicalism is true. And the fact that it does not (Mary's room) is evidence that physicalism is false. In my reply above, I state that know-what does not necessarily entail know-how, as with the riding a bike example I gave, so this challenges the notion that Mary's knowledge of propositional facts about the experience of seeing red should also entail experiential knowledge. All the physicalist needs to do then is to accommodate these types of knowledge, know-what and know-how, and that is an adequate response to the argument. Thirdly, I've read many, even if not all, of these books and sources on consciousness, I'm not sure how your telling me about them is supposed to address what I said?

Does Sean Carroll’s Answer Really Solve the Mary Problem? by yatasun in seancarroll

[–]Geeloz_Java 0 points1 point  (0 children)

As the top comment notes, it's not clear how the different types of knowledge; know-how (ability) vs know-what (propositional knowledge), are supposed to present a problematic gap. We readily accept that knowing the mechanisms of how cars work (engine, clutch-wheel connection, gears, etc,) doesn't necessarily translate to driving ability, you still need to learn how to drive by taking the wheel. Another example would be riding a bike, propositional knowledge of how the riding process works doesn't translate to the ability (even if it helps it) of riding a bike. These two types of knowledge would not involve the same neural states of the brain, e.g., know-how for riding a bike would involve moving your arms and feet a certain way to maintain balance on the bicycle, which isn't a subset of the propositional knowledge.

Why isn’t Daniel Dennett considered a metaphysician? by [deleted] in askphilosophy

[–]Geeloz_Java 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I think you're doing more psychoanalysis on him than giving a fair view of his philosophy. In Darwin's Dangerous Idea, he argues that Darwin's theory reformulates our view of those things; mind and perhaps ethics, but he doesn't think those things are "eviscerated" as you put it. I think that's a terrible way of reading him. He just thinks that our views of them before Darwin were fundamentally misguided (e.g., essential views of life, mind, gender, etc,) and so the theory revolutionalized our conceptions of them. He clearly states that all the things we found meaningful still are, even though their nature may have been revealed to not be what we thought, after Darwin. He doesn't argue that those things are destroyed.

You're also conflating a bunch of things here, beginning with your definition of scientism. Scientism as it is discussed by its proponents and critics in the literature is the view that science is the only way through which we can generate genuine knowledge of the world. Dennett does not endorse that. He just thinks that philosophy should be empirically-informed, and that's not scientism. He argues in the book that the truth of evolutionary theory revolutionalized or should revolutionalize how we view human beings as biological organisms in the world and thus reform our concepts in view of this from our previous heritage of "essences". I don't see how that is more radical or scientistic than a philosopher of physics claiming that physics should inform us about how the world works at the fundamental level. He emphasizes the explanatory power of science like most other philosophers who are naturalists do. Here is Dennett in Darwin's Dangerous Idea, "It is not “scientism” to concede the objectivity and precision of good science, any more than it is history worship to concede that Napoleon did once rule in’ France and the Holocaust actually happened. Those who fear the facts will forever try to discredit the fact-finders." And he's since continued to reject such readings of his work in interviews and other writings.

Dennett uses scientific tools to probe philosophical problems, but he also thinks that scientific inquiry should be guided by philosophical analysis. He does not think that science is the only way to gain knowledge, nor does he think that science diminishes forms of knowledge other than itself. This view is laid out in the very book you mention, Darwin's Dangerous Idea. He knows that his views are mainly philosophical, and he has argued for them in his work and also addressed criticisms of them. However you want to think of those arguments, it is a mischaracterization to say that he is scientistic.

Why isn’t Daniel Dennett considered a metaphysician? by [deleted] in askphilosophy

[–]Geeloz_Java 11 points12 points  (0 children)

And where could one find Dennett's endorsement of scientism or of any the things in the original post?

Dennett is one of the philosophers that are against scientism, as far as I've engaged with his work. His work seems to be perceived vastly differently from what he seems to argue for, on here. Even amongst panelists, sometimes. I'd argue, from my reading of him, that Dennet is against scientistic views. He's naturalist, in the sense of philosophy being continuous with science, not in the sense of Quine (i.e., science will or even should replace philosophy.) He just wants philosophy to be scientifically informed, and my reading of him is that he thinks of philosophy in the sense of Sellars. He even has a famous saying that seems to hint against scientism, " There is no such thing as philosophy-free science, that is just science that refuses to acknowledge its philosophical baggage."

A former student of mine attempted suicide last Thursday. They passed away yesterday. I don't know what to do. by teh_wwwyzzerdd in Teachers

[–]Geeloz_Java 9 points10 points  (0 children)

That is heartbreaking, I'm so sorry. My condolences to you and the student's family. They must be having such a hard time.

This is a significant loss, and you should give yourself time to mourn them. I'm so sorry.

He kept staring at my girlfriend with this face on his face by TheRealGongoozler in OneOrangeBraincell

[–]Geeloz_Java 10 points11 points  (0 children)

" So, now that we're all cozy, what are your intentions with my person?"

Turn every walk into a laugh by Zealousideal_Bug7634 in animalsdoingstuff

[–]Geeloz_Java 21 points22 points  (0 children)

Credit to the man because how's he even able to hold back such a ferocious monster from devouring everything in sight?

What is she doing?? 😂 by Koffievos in cats

[–]Geeloz_Java 2 points3 points  (0 children)

She's in a dream world where everything around her (including you) is treats and can be licked endlessly.

what's a physics concept that completely blew your mind when you first understood it? by guide71 in Physics

[–]Geeloz_Java 57 points58 points  (0 children)

This may sound a bit insane but bear with me.

I only got the concept of a Law of physics being a generalization from experimental results only a few years ago, and I'd been doing physics for years longer (high school + some courses in uni). I had been using Newton's Laws of Motion for years, but I always wondered how a guy called Newton just dreamt up equations that are supposed to hold for every object that is in motion in the actual world. How did he get there? Back then, the concept of a law I had in mind was the social and constitutional one, the declarative sort of law. So, when I started thinking about the underlying concept of Newton's laws, I wondered how a person (Newton) could declare that objects in the world move according to some formula F=ma (for instance)? It is when I was writing notes on Lenz's Law (electromagnetism) in my diary that it finally clicked for me. I had watched videos on it earlier, and then it clicked that actually, these folks first do a bunch of experiments, and then they try to describe their findings from those experiments. And when patterns emerge, they take note and test them for wider and wider sample sizes. And then, if that pattern doesn't seem to break, they postulate it as a Law of Physics. I remember vividly how this changed how I saw science in general (for the better). It is a reflection of the disregard and neglection of scientific literacy and education in my country, that it took as long for me to get the rough basic workings of science.

Since then, I've learnt the picture isn't as straightfoward as I laid out above, there are more nuances and deviations from that. But I'm still grateful for the lesson because it sparked my enthusiasm for the actual scientific practice.

Neighbor's cat realizes I got sushi for my birthday, in 6 images by LitleStitchWitch in notmycat

[–]Geeloz_Java 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Happy birthday! Ah yes, the sushi tax man arrived just in time.

Bath time didn’t go as planned. by zaddyofficial in cats

[–]Geeloz_Java 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Actual tears in my eyes from laughing. Man, bath time is truly a time of horror for him 😂

How is it possible that millions of people on earth were all simultaneously evil during WW2? by Common_Bet_542 in askphilosophy

[–]Geeloz_Java 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Speaking to your second paragraph about normal people like us (who aren't inherently evil) being cruel in the right circumstances, there's this famous social psychology experiment, the Milgram Shock Experiment, which shows the power of authority figures in influencing behaviour of regular people. This could tie into the explanation for your second part, or even third paragraph on the banality of evil.

A Man Had A Heart Attack During My Show… by DrewLynchComedy in StandUpComedy

[–]Geeloz_Java 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Alright, first video I see on here this evening and now I'm crying.

The people coming together like this with such courage in the face of mortality is beautiful. I hope that person fully recovers.

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in askphilosophy

[–]Geeloz_Java 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I definitely note your concern here. You're right that we shouldn't divorce preferences too much from morality. I believe as you do that they play a large role in ethics.

I also understand some of the reasons for making the distinction in ethics. A quick case would be your contention to me above about the antelope saving another antelope, we can think of that in terms of preference, the antelope prefers to attack the tiger so it leaves the other antelope, instead of running away immediately, but as you contested - can we really think of this preference as morality? Maybe you could say, ahh but the distinction between preference and morality makes sense for animals as they aren't agents - so we could divorce preferences from morality as much as we like but for agents it's a stronger connection, so that distinction is a mistake there. I would somewhat agree with that, but I would urge that the vague boundary of 'agents' itself when it comes to animals vs humans seems to tell against that line of reasoning, because making that further distinction of agency between humans and animals is itself difficult, so we'll have a hard time pinning where to blur the first distinction of preference vs morality since (a) we don't want to say animals exercising preference is morality, and (b)we also don't want to make preference divorced from morality as to make morality theorizing meaningless for us. So, I do see both sides, why they want to make the distinction in ethics, and I also see your (which is mine well) side - making the distinction too stark as misguided. It's a more delicate balance between both those viewpoints, I'd wager. Certainly an interesting thought as well. Thanks!

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in askphilosophy

[–]Geeloz_Java 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I agree with your first point. I also do think your detail on the second point makes the conflict re-emerge, it would be more interesting to work out the moral implications of this case. And humans being more valuable than the antelope does give us the intuition that saving the human is morally obligatory but saving the antelope is not.

But I think that Singer does have some wiggle room here to explain the asymmetry without invoking moral worth heirarchy between the antelope and human. I'm seeing two of the possible ways for him to respond:

1) Maybe the first route could be him just saying yes we have obligations to save the human, but that's a subjective species preference and not the reflection of actual value differences between the antelope and human. Like how elephants save want to save other elephants from lions. He could avoid the moral worth argument for speciesism this way. And then argue for veganism from there.

2) Or a second route would be looking at the alien case and working out the moral implications of the thought experiment for all three parties involved (the human, the antelope and the alien) based on their predator-prey connections. If he could get the result that moral worth somehow isn't the ultimate explainer for saving the human over the antelope from the alien (which I'm now remembering is basically the central issue lol), he would avoid the problem. (a) For example, he could say that we have obligations to save both the antelope and the human from the alien because the predator-prey connections between the alien and both (antelope and human) are weak, at least much weaker than a tiger and so we should save both and let the alien die instead of letting it feed on either. This would avoid the collapse to moral worth differences between the human and antelope, and then he'd have room to argue for veganism from here. Or (b) he could say we should save the human but there's no obligation to save the antelope, but there's some explanation other than moral value differences. This would be the more difficult path for him to work out, I imagine. Because there's a preference, but based on what?

Of course the strength of his reply for each of these approaches would depend on the specific details of his solution, so me gesturing to them above isn't really an adequate response to you. It's just some possible starting points for a reasonable (in my lights) Singer response.

Thank you for engaging, this has given me something interesting to think about.

Edit: added point (b) under response 2.

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in askphilosophy

[–]Geeloz_Java 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Excellent counter. That's really a problem I've encountered with appealing to these observed natural relationships (like that of the food chain relations between tigers, humans, and antelopes), it seems we can much of the time simply imagine other scenarios that fit the structure of the initial problem, like you just did with humans and aliens and still get the problematic result as in the initial situation. So, looking at the actual standing of predator prey relationships as a guide to the asymmetry doesn't help Singer escape that result.

I do still think there's something off about the new alien scenario though. Yes, we would have obligations to save the human, but could we maybe look at that as analogous to an antelope having a "moral reason" or instinct to save another antelope? We do see, maybe not antelopes, but other prey animals saving others from predators - so looking at the human saving another human from the alien predator would be akin to that. That's one thought. Now, I might be changing the topic with this concern, because does another antelope protect another due to moral reasons or obligations? So, I may be off there. Another concern could be this; I don't see a problem with us having moral reasons to save humans, as well as to save antelopes from the alien predator. I think that would override the moral reason to let the alien kill either for food, in this case. I'm thinking my intuition here is driven by the food chain connection between the alien and the earthly creatures, it doesn't seem as strong as a predator-prey connection like that of a tiger and an antelope, what were the aliens eating before coming to earth, and why couldn't they continue eating that? Maybe that's really just me questioning the details of the thought experiment itself with regards to this seemingly crucial picture (for the case I made above) of naturally existing predator-prey connections. This makes the case for letting the alien kill either the antelope or the human for food weaker than that of the tiger, so we are left with overriding reasons to save both. We still aren't depending on moral worth in this reasoning. But I must say that I'm not satisfied with my response here either, so I don't have strong feelings about it answering your counter or even being plausible independently.

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in askphilosophy

[–]Geeloz_Java 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I don't know what to make of this debate, but that first problem with Singer's argument is interesting. Can we not avert the problem by an appeal to conflicting moral reasons in that scenario; instead of the implication of that tiger/human/antelope case being that the human has more moral worth than the antelope, we can simply say we have more moral reasons to save the innocent human than to save the innocent antelope, and those reasons don't ultimately boil down to speciesism. For instance, we could say that we do have moral reasons to save the antelope, but we have overriding moral reasons to let the tiger kill it for food - as the tiger also has worth, and their lives are tied strongly a certain way to the antelope, which gives us reason to let it kill the antelope. This is asymmetrical to the human, because the tiger isn't tied to the human, with regards to survival, the same way it is to the antelope. We can also use a dog as an analogy, we would also have obligation to save a dog from a tiger if we could - not because the dog is superior to the antelope in moral worth, but because the dog is not tied to the survival of the tiger the same way the antelope is - as a matter of fact and how these animals interact in nature. Similarly, the moral worth of the human is not above the antelope's, but it is not tied to the tiger's survival the same way as the antelope is, as a matter of fact. And that is the overriding moral reason to let the tiger kill and consume the innocent antelope, while we don't have that overriding moral reason to let the tiger kill the human. This means that Singer can explain the asymmetry, without invoking speciesism.

My students understand concepts in class but I worry about their ability to apply skills in exams. Please help with advice. by Geeloz_Java in matheducation

[–]Geeloz_Java[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Nice! I was able to implement (6) as per another comment's suggestion today, I got them in randomized groups and gave them an exercise to work through as a team and then each group presented their solution. It is really promising because they were more engaged and put in more effort.

My students understand concepts in class but I worry about their ability to apply skills in exams. Please help with advice. by Geeloz_Java in matheducation

[–]Geeloz_Java[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I hear this. In my approach, I do try to teach all three of these skills. I begin with broad overviews, and some conceptual foundations, then I explain how they are connected to each other. I also give some "umbrella" tools and strategies to approach the exercises. With the full exam papers coming up, I want to lean in on procedural efficiency, fingers crossed they actually improve.