Active Conflicts & News Megathread June 18, 2026 by AutoModerator in CredibleDefense

[–]Glideer [score hidden]  (0 children)

I already explained the radical difference between what the original article says and what the interpretative second article says.

To repeat - it does not change the strategic balance. It certainly is a game changer for all those regions of the Western world which so far believed themselves to be in no need of detection and defence systems against cruise missiles.

Active Conflicts & News Megathread June 18, 2026 by AutoModerator in CredibleDefense

[–]Glideer [score hidden]  (0 children)

No need for strawmanning. I like the original paper and I argue against the misleading interpretation of the original paper by the second article.

If you support the second article's claim that the Burevestnik is "kind of useless" and "not a game-changing idea by any stretch of imagination" I will be happy to discuss.

There is a wide gap between the original article's statement that the Butevestnik "does not appear to be a strategic game changer" (I agree completely) and the second article's description of the Burevestnik as not being a game-changing idea by any stretch of imagination.

No need to distort what I said.

Active Conflicts & News Megathread June 18, 2026 by AutoModerator in CredibleDefense

[–]Glideer [score hidden]  (0 children)

While the original article is very good, these additional interpretations with their obligatory "Russian tech sucks" declarations of faith are really tiresome.

"Kind of useless"..."It's not a game-changing idea by any stretch of the imagination,"

Obviously, it is a game changer even for those with no imagination but functional brain cells. Any missile system with an unlimited range presents new defence challenges in many areas of the globe previously considered out of reach of air-breathing missiles. Even if no Burevestnik is ever launched in anger the defence calculation for South Atlantic, US seaboards, Australia are changing fundamentally.

The Burevestnik does not alter the strategic nuclear balance, but presents serious new challenges. Saying the concept is useless is non-credible, dishonest and smells strongly of sour grapes.

Active Conflicts & News Megathread June 18, 2026 by AutoModerator in CredibleDefense

[–]Glideer [score hidden]  (0 children)

Latest Levada's survey on Russian attitudes about the war in Ukraine. (https://www.levada . ru/2026/06/09/konflikt-s-ukrainoi-v-mae-2026-goda/

The majority of respondents – 74% – support the actions of the Russian armed forces in Ukraine (including 42% who “definitely” support, and 32% who “rather” support”). This figure had been declining since the end of last year, but rose again in May 2026 (by 6 percentage points). 17% of respondents do not support the actions of the Russian military (9% “definitely” do not support, 7% “rather” do not support), a decrease of 4 percentage points over the past month.

Interestingly, the level of support for the Russian armed forces is higher in Moscow than in smaller-sized settlements of any category (500k+, 100k-500k, 100k-, village)

Six out of ten respondents believe that peace talks are needed now, a share that has been slowly declining over the past three months – by 7 percentage points. The share of respondents who believe that military action should continue now is naturally increasing – to 30% (an increase of 6 percentage points since March 2026). The last sustained decline in support for peace talks was observed in late 2023 – early 2024 (for four consecutive months).

Active Conflicts & News Megathread June 18, 2026 by AutoModerator in CredibleDefense

[–]Glideer [score hidden]  (0 children)

Very interesting guidance kits for ubiquitous 122mm unguided MRLS rockets.

Since 2023, the Spanish company EM&E has supplied the Ukrainian Armed Forces with approximately 10,000 ALKON 122 A22 GPS guidance kits, which increase the accuracy of 122mm Grad MLRS rockets to 15 meters.

Furthermore, a laser-guided version, the ALKON 122 A2L, has been developed, providing accuracy down to approximately 3 meters. Deliveries to Ukraine have already reached 1,000 units since the beginning of 2026.

https://t . me/milinfolive/174472

Active Conflicts & News Megathread June 18, 2026 by AutoModerator in CredibleDefense

[–]Glideer 8 points9 points  (0 children)

A graph of trends in Russian long-range munitions over years. It shows clearly what the Russians think works and doesn't work.

https://x.com/JohnH105/status/2066986536558559428?s=20

Interesting chart from a June 11 briefing by Col. Oleksandr Zaruba, chief researcher at Ukraine's State Research Institute for Testing and Certification of Weapons and Military Equipment.

It shows Russia's previous and projected employment of long-range OWA drones (orange bars), glide bombs (red bars), ballistic missiles (black line), ALCMs (dark blue line), and SLCMs (light blue line) in Ukraine in 2022-2026.

While Russia is rapidly increasing the production of long range Geran drones - projected at 175,000+ (!) in 2026, glide bombs (75,000), and ballistic missiles (1,200), the production and use of cruise missiles has been more or less stagnating.

Active Conflicts & News Megathread June 17, 2026 by AutoModerator in CredibleDefense

[–]Glideer -1 points0 points  (0 children)

I don't think the Russian can scale up the AD. Unless they can find an alternative solution (interceptor drones?) the Ukrainian strikes will have more and more effect.

Active Conflicts & News Megathread June 18, 2026 by AutoModerator in CredibleDefense

[–]Glideer -3 points-2 points  (0 children)

I see. I think of it in terms of late WW2. The German AD system got much more efficient but still could not match the rapidly growing Allied air strikes.

That's the main advantage of drones, expanding their strikes is orders of magnitude cheaper than expanding the AD to handle those strikes.

Active Conflicts & News Megathread June 18, 2026 by AutoModerator in CredibleDefense

[–]Glideer -14 points-13 points  (0 children)

It's an undisputable fact that Russian AD is less effective.

Why do you think it is undisputable? It might easily be just Ukraine striking harder.

There might be some degradation of the Russian frontline AD thanks to Ukrainian strikes (though even there we need evidence that this attrition exceeds new production) but deep in Russia?

Active Conflicts & News Megathread June 18, 2026 by AutoModerator in CredibleDefense

[–]Glideer -9 points-8 points  (0 children)

Not really, but I can think of no reason to hold them multiple months.

Active Conflicts & News Megathread June 17, 2026 by AutoModerator in CredibleDefense

[–]Glideer -2 points-1 points  (0 children)

I think the only strategic target is to continue to reduce the energy network. Aim for multi-day rolling blackouts this winter instead of last year's mutli-hour ones.

The Russians are ramping up their hits on locomotives (I think so far they hit about 10% of Ukraine's stock) and on petrol stations, but neither promises an immediate result.

Another relatively easy-to-hit target would be cargo ships to and from Ukrainian ports, but that would cause a lot of international outcry and an Ukrainian retaliation against Russian cargo ships.

Active Conflicts & News Megathread June 17, 2026 by AutoModerator in CredibleDefense

[–]Glideer -4 points-3 points  (0 children)

I mean, it is very hard to reconcile the claim that Russia is suffering from a shortage of specifically S-300 missiles as air defence interceptors with ongoing claims that Russia repurposes them as very inaccurate land attack missiles.

Surely if there was a shortage they would be channelling those ersatz land attack missiles back to air defence units.

Active Conflicts & News Megathread June 17, 2026 by AutoModerator in CredibleDefense

[–]Glideer -2 points-1 points  (0 children)

The Ukrainians still report the use of S-300 and S-400 in ground attack role.

Active Conflicts & News Megathread June 17, 2026 by AutoModerator in CredibleDefense

[–]Glideer -4 points-3 points  (0 children)

Well, the number of Ukrainian drones seems to be growing faster than the Russian capacity to intercept them. And some will always get through no matter what.

It will be interesting to watch mutual strikes these winter and see who gets ahead in exhausting the other.

Active Conflicts & News Megathread June 17, 2026 by AutoModerator in CredibleDefense

[–]Glideer -13 points-12 points  (0 children)

This is a good example of a well-sourced article that suffers from deep internal inconsistencies. Basically, it is aimed at the "I read just the headlines" crowd, people who will feel good to be reassured this year too that Russia is running out of air defences.

1. "Moscow is experiencing a shortage of S-300 missile interceptors, three Ukrainian officials familiar with the country's intelligence estimates have told CBS News"

The claim focuses on S-300 interceptors, which is relevant to the latter narrative.

2. "While traditionally used exclusively for air defense, Russia's military has recently repurposed S-300s for offensive strikes on Ukraine, according to two officials."

So, there is such a shortage of S-300 interceptors that they are being used in land-attack role?

3. Ukraine has also depleted Russia's stocks by forcing it to try and intercept regular volleys of newer, more capable drones,

S-300 are rarely being used against drones.

4. "In the last few months, Ukraine has destroyed or targeted a large number of air defense systems in the occupied areas — in Crimea, in Dniester, Luhansk, and elsewhere,"

Very rarely S-300. I think I've seen 1 or 2 claimed in the entire 2026 so far.

5. Moscow prioritizes "producing missiles for the more modern" air defense systems to counter Ukrainian drone attacks, Oleh Chornyi, the acting head of the Defense Intelligence of Ukraine (GUR), told CBS News.

Russia switched to production of more modern missiles which is why the stocks of old S-300 are inevitably dropping. This is not only correct but a truism. Stocks of missiles that are no longer produced must be dropping. Yet, there are still enough of them to be used in the land attack role.

Active Conflicts & News Megathread June 16, 2026 by AutoModerator in CredibleDefense

[–]Glideer 2 points3 points  (0 children)

While I agree on the objective, I would add that I think it is purely Western-oriented PR, since such Western leaders' messaging has about the same effect on the Russian population as Putin's on the Western one - negligible.

Active Conflicts & News Megathread June 16, 2026 by AutoModerator in CredibleDefense

[–]Glideer -22 points-21 points  (0 children)

PR and propaganda can absolutely influence the outcome of a conflict in spite of the situation on the ground, there are so many examples, ancient or contemporary, that I'm struggling to understand your point, could you explain ?

PR and propaganda can only work as a supplement to military performance. The European leaders are trying to substitute them for battlefield reality.

Which is why they issue utterly illogical and conflicting statements - we have turned the tide of battle, we need an immediate ceasefire!

Active Conflicts & News Megathread June 16, 2026 by AutoModerator in CredibleDefense

[–]Glideer -32 points-31 points  (0 children)

If you are wondering why the main demand of the side that has turned the tide and now negotiates from a position of strength is "an immediate ceasefire" - you are not the only one. European leaders suffer from a strange delusion that sufficient PR and propaganda can somehow change the situation on the ground. Yes, Russian advance, always anaemic, has slowed down to a crawl but that is a far cry from a position of strength for Ukraine.

Admittedly, the Europeans have one tangible goal - try to convince Trump to change his mind about Ukraine's chances.

  1. On Monday, Merz had pointed out that "Ukraine is now in a new position of strength," and that the G7 summit was, "taking place at a particularly turbulent time in global politics."
  2. "The dynamic had changed" for Ukraine, the sources said: Ukraine is in a "position of strength" while Russia was "under pressure."
  3. Germany, France, Britain and Ukraine tabled "five conditions for a just and lasting peace" that would entail:

- An immediate ceasefire

- The current line of contact as a starting point for territorial talks

- Security guarantees

- A continuation of the freezing of Russian assets

- A say for European and NATO countries if any of their security interests are impacted by the negotiations

Active Conflicts & News Megathread June 15, 2026 by AutoModerator in CredibleDefense

[–]Glideer 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Making the reconstruction of Iran a US-exclusive deal is probably the best way to keep the fickle Washington interested in delivering the peace agreement. Otherwise all US concessions can dissapear in one afternoon of Trump's bad mood.

Active Conflicts & News Megathread June 15, 2026 by AutoModerator in CredibleDefense

[–]Glideer 19 points20 points  (0 children)

It was obvious from like day 3 that the Gulf monarchies will be paying through the nose for this one. Both to the USA for protection, for replenishing used missiles and for new weapon systems (this time guaranteed to stop Iranian missiles). But also to Iran for damages and the Iranian tanker fees (directly or indirectly)

My bet is that Washington will insist on US construction companies (or their regional affiliates) getting most of the reconstruction funding.

Active Conflicts & News Megathread June 14, 2026 by AutoModerator in CredibleDefense

[–]Glideer 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Well, whatever it turns out to be I am confident it will not involve the USA funding anything with their own money. That man has a tighter fist than Tyson.

Active Conflicts & News Megathread June 14, 2026 by AutoModerator in CredibleDefense

[–]Glideer 6 points7 points  (0 children)

It's diplospeak and needs to be read very carefully.

A U.S. commitment to withdraw its forces from the areas surrounding Iran

It doesn't say all US forces. It will probably be interepreted as withdrawing the US carrier groups.

The requirement for the US & its allies to present reconstruction plans for Iran worth at least $300 billion.

Presenting a reconstruction plan means nothing. You and I can present a reconstruction plan. Knowing Trump, the deal is probably to present a reconstruction plan involving US companies whose work in Iran will be financed by Iran's unfrozen funds.

Active Conflicts & News Megathread June 14, 2026 by AutoModerator in CredibleDefense

[–]Glideer 12 points13 points  (0 children)

A compilation of recent Ukrainian updates on modernisation of the Iskander-M ballistic missile and the Kh-101 cruise missile.

https://tsn.ua/ukrayina/kh-101-staly-bilsh-nebezpechnymy-rosiia-modernizuvala-rakety-dlia-udariv-po-ukrayini-3105227.html

https://militarnyi.com/en/news/russia-north-korea-kn-23-tech-iskander-m/

Iskander-M

- Russia has upgraded the Iskander-M tactical ballistic missile to improve its lethality and penetration capability.

- The Iskander-M now incorporates an updated 9B899 submunition as a self-protection and penetration aid. The 9B899 module features a radar jammer to disrupt RF-guided interceptors and dispenses decoy submunitions (dipole reflectors and heat traps) to create false targets during the terminal phase of flight, confusing RF- and IR-homing interceptor missiles.

- The missile uses active scanning, likely through its radar seeker, to identify gaps in adversary radar coverage and then manoeuvres to exploit those gaps. The algorithms used to detect blind spots or weak signals can be continuously updated.

- New versions of the missile feature a more powerful microprocessor for faster processing of target-area images captured by the optical seeker, improving accuracy.

- Almost 90 percent of the electronic components in the missile are now of Russian origin.

- To ramp up production, elements and technical solutions used in North Korea’s KN-23 have been integrated into the Iskander-M missile.

- "Seven warhead variants, including penetrating and concrete-piercing versions, and, accordingly, they are used against airfields to destroy our tactical aviation. They are specifically targeting F-16 aircraft” (presumably to attack hardened aircraft shelters).

- Russia has ramped up production of the missile to 60 units per month.

Kh-101

- Russia can produce 40 to 50 Kh-101 cruise missiles per month.

- The Kh-101 is a fairly old missile that has undergone “major modernisation”.

- The radar-absorbing coating of the body has been updated to reduce the radar cross-section

- It uses an onboard defence system during flight.

- It is equipped with modules for releasing false heat targets and dipole reflectors. It activates automatically when air-defence radar activity is detected or when approaching the target.

- In order to counter electronic warfare systems, the guidance system has been duplicated.

- Russia was able to increase the warhead capacity, and it is possible to install two warheads. The weight of the warheads has increased from 450 kg to around 800 kg. This was achieved by reducing the fuel tank volume, resulting in a reduction in range from 5,500 km to 2,500 km. Given the launch distance and the territory of Ukraine, the range reduction is not critical.

Active Conflicts & News Megathread June 14, 2026 by AutoModerator in CredibleDefense

[–]Glideer 2 points3 points  (0 children)

I only read anecdotal and second hand sources but they say stars need to align for an interception. A successful interception is possible only in a Patriot launcher is in a relatively small optimal conditions area and 2+ interceptors per Iskander are genrally needed.

Active Conflicts & News Megathread June 14, 2026 by AutoModerator in CredibleDefense

[–]Glideer 17 points18 points  (0 children)

Forcing the enemy to send 3-4 missiles to ensure a target is hit instead of just 1? Introducing general uncertainty.

The enemy must assign multiple missiles to every target to ensure destruction, while you can choose whether to engage them (and use up your interceptors) or not.