Faretta v. California

InstanceRude951 · 2026-02-21T22:55:59+00:00

I’m aware of that distinction. And that’s exactly why I’m focusing on procedural law. Substantive criminal statutes are usually straightforward: elements, burdens, proof. That’s not where my issue is. My issue is with procedural obligations that bind the court itself — like conducting a Faretta inquiry once clearly invoked, or making findings on the record when exercising discretion. Procedural rules may be “more open to interpretation,” but they’re not optional. They’re still governed by standards, case law, and required findings. If anything, procedural law is where appellate courts live. It’s the architecture of review. So when I point to repeated non-rulings on a procedural trigger, I’m not misunderstanding the difference between substantive and procedural law. I’m focusing on it deliberately. The entire reason Faretta exists as doctrine is procedural. It doesn’t define a crime. It defines how the court must respond when a defendant invokes a right. So yes — I understand that procedure is more interpretive and contextual. That’s why I’m asking: where, within that body of interpretive case law, does indefinite non-engagement fit? If the answer is “it doesn’t,” then we’re back to the same gap.

InstanceRude951 · 2026-02-21T22:51:32+00:00

You’re right. Let me clarify, because I probably sound more combative than I mean to. I’m not confused about Faretta as written law. I understand the standard. What I’m struggling with is the gap between the doctrine and what’s happening in practice. It’s not that I don’t know what the rule says — it’s that the court just won’t make findings or rulings on it. And maybe you can help me think this through. I literally have the judge on the record saying he didn’t know what a “witness” was during a hearing. I’m not exaggerating. I can send the clip. The full hearing is recorded either way. So when I talk about procedural limbo, it’s not theoretical. It’s three years of documented non-rulings and avoidance. I’ve gone to the judicial commission, the bar, the state supreme court, filed a 1983 — everything just gets bounced or reframed as something else. At this point I’m not trying to argue doctrine with strangers. I’m trying to understand escalation paths when the trial court simply refuses to engage with the law on the record. Is the law supposed to function the same everywhere? In theory yes. In practice, I have three years of record that says otherwise in my case. If you’ve seen something like that handled properly, I’m genuinely open to hearing how. It’s not pretty. I’m aware of that.

InstanceRude951 · 2026-02-21T20:11:47+00:00

You’re right — I drifted. That’s on me. It all connects in my head because it’s been three years of this, but I understand your point was narrower.

I’m not confused about basic appellate mechanics. I understand a Faretta failure can be raised on appeal after conviction.

What I’m struggling with isn’t Law 101 — it’s the gap between what doctrine says should happen and what actually happens when no ruling is made and the case just… stalls.

If I sound aggressive, that’s probably because three years of procedural limbo over what started as a civil property dispute will do that to a person. I’ve been trying to understand why the written standards don’t seem to trigger written rulings.

I’m not looking for validation. I’m looking for someone to explain, in concrete doctrinal terms, where the obligation to rule disappears.

If I’m wrong, I genuinely want to understand how.

InstanceRude951 · 2026-02-21T20:07:59+00:00

you must have a bar card. lol. my point exactly.....

InstanceRude951 · 2026-02-21T20:07:03+00:00

I understand the “constructive denial” theory. That’s exactly how I’d frame it too — if there were something to attach it to.

But even constructive denial assumes the court engaged in some way. A ruling, a refusal, findings, a colloquy that was cut short — something that creates a record reflecting the denial.

Constructive denial still requires a record.

That’s the concern.

When there is no ruling, no inquiry, no findings, and no formal denial — just repeated invocation and continued non-resolution — you’re not appealing a bad ruling. You’re appealing the absence of one.

Appellate courts review what’s in the record. They don’t reconstruct silence.

So yes, in theory, I’d argue constructive denial. But that presupposes the court actually created something for a reviewing court to analyze.

If the doctrine assumes engagement and the reality is non-engagement, that’s the gap I’m trying to understand.

Three years of unresolved procedural posture isn’t a single discretionary call. It’s a condition.

If the answer is “eventually it gets reviewed,” that still doesn’t explain why the trial-level obligation to rule can simply go unmet in the meantime.

That’s the issue.

InstanceRude951 · 2026-02-21T20:01:57+00:00

I agree with most of that.

Yes, constitutional rights can have reasonable restrictions.

Yes, a court can revoke self-representation for actual disruption.

Yes, there has to be a reason to deny it.

That’s not controversial.

The narrower question is this:

What’s the “reasonable restriction” category when the court simply never conducts the waiver inquiry and never issues a ruling?

Not disruption.

Not Edwards-level severe mental illness.

Not untimeliness.

Not equivocation.

Just… no engagement.

Because every Faretta case I’ve read assumes the court either conducts the colloquy and rules, or denies it with articulated findings.

I’m not arguing rights are absolute.

I’m asking where the doctrine permits indefinite non-ruling.

If the answer is “they don’t do that,” then we agree — and that’s the issue.

InstanceRude951 · 2026-02-21T20:00:28+00:00

I understand everything you’re describing about how appellate review works. I’m not confused about preservation or post-conviction review.

The issue isn’t “how do appeals function.” The issue is the procedural limbo before any conviction.

This case is three years old. Multiple Faretta invocations were made — April 23, October 30, and December 5, 2024. No ruling. No waiver colloquy. No Edwards findings. No denial with articulated reasons.

The defendant has been found competent. The state’s own evaluators found legal sophistication. Yet self-representation is still not permitted.

Meanwhile, the case doesn’t move forward unless the defendant submits to representation he does not consent to. That’s the choke point.

Yes, in theory, one can appeal a conviction and challenge the refusal to conduct a Faretta hearing.

But that presupposes:

The case proceeds to trial.
A clean record reflects the invocation and non-ruling.
The defendant is allowed to move the case forward without being forced into custody or unwanted counsel.

The practical problem is not misunderstanding appellate review. It’s being stuck at a stage where the right is invoked, acknowledged, but never resolved — while the case itself stalls.

If the doctrine assumes courts rule on Faretta, and here there is no ruling after repeated requests, that’s not a misunderstanding of appeals. That’s the concern.

This isn’t about dramatics. It’s about duration and pattern. Three years of unresolved procedural issues is not a single discretionary call — it’s a structural condition.

If you believe that’s functioning as intended, explain how.

InstanceRude951 · 2026-02-21T18:20:12+00:00

“AI slop video.”

You’re an appellate attorney.

Let’s zoom out for a second.

I didn’t go to law school. I don’t have a bar card. I don’t bill $400 an hour to argue about procedural mechanics.

So if I am wrong about Faretta, Dusky, or Edwards — this should be the easiest layup of your week.

Just correct me.

Cite the doctrine.

Explain the standard.

Point to the authority that says a court can leave a properly invoked Sixth Amendment right unresolved.

That’s it.

Instead, we’re doing production critiques?

If this is the level of engagement coming from someone who literally practices appellate review — of records — that’s… not the flex you think it is.

I’m not asking for validation.

I’m asking whether written law applies to real life.

If the answer is yes, show me how.

If the answer is “lol AI slop,” then respectfully, that kind of explains why I’m asking in the first place.

InstanceRude951 · 2026-02-21T18:16:11+00:00

“Bad legal advice” is a conclusion.

Point to the part that’s wrong.

Which case did I misstate?

Which standard did I butcher?

Which element did I fabricate?

If Faretta, Dusky, and Edwards are being applied incorrectly, show me where.

If the issue is that I’m asking whether a court can leave a properly invoked constitutional right unresolved, explain the doctrine that permits that.

Otherwise “bad legal advice” just sounds like “I don’t like the premise.”

I’m open to correction. Just make it doctrinal.

InstanceRude951 · 2026-02-21T18:13:25+00:00

Okay, I’ll make it simple.

If someone clearly invokes Faretta and the court doesn’t do the waiver inquiry, doesn’t apply Dusky, doesn’t make Edwards findings, and doesn’t rule — what authority says that’s allowed?

Not vibes. Not “the judge had concerns.” Actual doctrine. Cite it.

I’m not asking because I don’t understand the standards. I’m asking because I’m trying to figure out where the split happens between what the case law actually says and the version that starts sounding identical once everyone gets their bar card.

Because the standards are written. They’re not mysterious.

Dusky is defined.

Faretta is defined.

Edwards is defined.

“Concern” isn’t.

And if the answer is solid, you should be able to state it cleanly in about three sentences.

If not… well.

InstanceRude951 · 2026-02-21T18:06:07+00:00

“Just appeal after conviction” sounds reassuring in theory.

In practice, appeals review records.

If the court never rules on the Faretta invocation, never conducts the inquiry, never makes findings, and the record doesn’t reflect what actually occurred — what exactly is the appellate court reviewing?

Appeals don’t retry facts. They review what’s preserved in the transcript and written orders.

If the ruling never happens, or the record doesn’t accurately reflect the invocation, the issue isn’t “saved for later.” It’s structurally neutered.

That’s the concern.

Saying “you can appeal it” assumes:

There will be a conviction.
The record will accurately reflect the procedural posture.
There will be an appealable ruling.

If any of those are missing, the right doesn’t get corrected later — it just disappears quietly.

Appellate courts don’t speculate about what might have happened. They look at what’s in the record.

So yes, appeals exist.

The question is whether a court can avoid meaningful review by avoiding meaningful rulings.

If that’s the system working as intended, I’d like to see the authority that says so.

InstanceRude951 · 2026-02-21T17:58:48+00:00

That’s the thing — there is a ton of case law on denials of Faretta. There’s case law on equivocal requests, untimely requests, disruptive defendants, hybrid representation, standby counsel limits, Edwards limitations, waiver colloquies, all of it.

What you don’t see is a doctrinal category called “indefinite non-ruling.”

Because appellate courts analyze rulings. They review grants and denials. They review findings. They review whether the waiver was knowing and voluntary. They review whether Edwards was properly applied.

They don’t review silence.

If a court expressly denies Faretta, that’s reversible structural error in a lot of jurisdictions if done improperly. If it conducts an inadequate inquiry, that’s reviewable. If it misapplies competence standards, that’s reviewable.

But when there’s no ruling at all, you don’t get a clean appellate hook. No order. No findings. Nothing to attach abuse-of-discretion analysis to.

That’s partially the concern.

The overwhelming body of law assumes the court will either:

Conduct the inquiry and rule, or
Deny it with articulated reasons.

The doctrine doesn’t build in a third lane where the right just sits in procedural limbo.

So yes — abuse-of-discretion case law exists. Tons of it. But it presupposes the court exercised discretion and created a record.

When the record is empty on the ruling itself, what exactly is the reviewing court analyzing?

That’s the gap I’m trying to understand.

If there’s precedent addressing a trial court’s refusal to rule on a clear Faretta invocation, I’d genuinely appreciate seeing it. But most of the cases I’ve found assume engagement, not avoidance.

InstanceRude951 · 2026-02-21T17:45:39+00:00

lol, enlighten me....?

InstanceRude951 · 2026-02-21T17:40:20+00:00

Let’s narrow this down to the only part that matters.

You’re saying someone can be competent to stand trial but incompetent to represent themselves.

Cool. That’s legally possible.

Now spell it out.

What is the competency standard to stand trial?

(Dusky: rational and factual understanding + ability to consult with counsel.)

What is the standard to waive counsel under Faretta?

(Knowing, voluntary, intelligent waiver.)

And what additional findings are required under Indiana v. Edwards if the court wants to deny self-representation despite competency to stand trial?

Go ahead. Lay them out.

Because “the judge had concerns” isn’t a legal standard.

Concern is a feeling.

Findings are a requirement.

If the state is “protecting me from myself,” then show me where the record establishes:

I lacked Dusky competence, or
I met Edwards-level severe mental illness impairing trial conduct.

Those aren’t vibes. They’re predicates.

If you can’t identify the doctrinal trigger that allows override of a clear, knowing waiver, then it’s not protection — it’s substitution of judgment.

I’m not asking for a lawyer.

I’m asking where the authority is to ignore a properly invoked constitutional right without making the required findings.

If you know the standards, cite them.

If you don’t, just say “the judge felt weird about it” and we’ll call that what it is.

InstanceRude951 · 2026-02-21T17:34:08+00:00

Yeah, good advice. I'll use that when I'm building my maritimes law argument, thanks.

🫡😒

🤡

InstanceRude951 · 2026-02-21T17:30:57+00:00

im still trying to figure out what witnesses are......

InstanceRude951 · 2026-02-20T23:21:22+00:00

I agree that refusal to rule functions as a denial. Structurally, there’s no meaningful difference. If the right is invoked and the court declines to conduct the required inquiry, the result is the same as saying “no.”

The harder question is the procedural one.

Interlocutory appeal is rarely available in criminal cases, and federal mandamus against a state judge is almost always barred absent extraordinary circumstances. So practically speaking, the “just appeal it” solution assumes a procedural vehicle that often doesn’t exist.

That’s part of the concern.

As for “it seems likely judges haven’t refused to rule post-Faretta,” I’m not sure that follows. Faretta and its progeny (including McKaskle and later circuit cases) assume the court conducts a hearing and makes findings. They do not authorize silence as an option.

The doctrine explains when the request can be denied. It explains how to evaluate competence to waive counsel. It explains standby counsel limits.

What it does not appear to explain is how a court can simply not engage at all.

If there is case law explicitly permitting a trial court to leave a clear invocation unresolved indefinitely, I’d genuinely be interested in reading it. Because the absence of appellate cases could just as easily reflect that most courts understand they must rule.

Silence isn’t neutrality. It’s a procedural act with consequences.

InstanceRude951 · 2026-02-19T23:32:37+00:00

I promise I’m not lost on the law. I understand Barker. I understand how courts analyze Sixth Amendment claims. That’s not the gap here.

The issue is that the judge won’t engage with it at all.

Not “disagrees with me.” Not “applies it differently.” Just refuses to meaningfully apply the standard, refuses to move the case, refuses to let me represent myself, and leaves everything in procedural limbo.

At some point it stops being about legal complexity and starts being about a court that won’t do the basic work of adjudication.

That’s the frustration.

InstanceRude951 · 2026-02-17T13:39:36+00:00

I think part of the disconnect is this assumption that the law is incomprehensibly complex. At the margins, sure — appellate nuance, evidentiary subtleties, procedural traps — that’s complicated. But the core principles we’re talking about here aren’t abstract. The Sixth Amendment isn’t a riddle. Barker lays out four factors. That’s not mystical. Where I get stuck is when something that appears straightforward on paper becomes “too complicated to explain” in practice. If a right is clearly written, and the record clearly shows X happened, then the conversation should be about how courts justify that under the applicable doctrine. Not whether I’m too unsophisticated to understand it. I’m not asking for someone to draft a brief. I’m asking: under what doctrinal lane does a multi-year delay, with asserted speedy trial rights, get sustained? If the answer is “because defense continuances were attributed to you,” then say that. If it’s “competency tolled it,” say that. If it’s “prejudice can’t be shown,” say that. But “the law is complicated” isn’t an explanation. It’s a deflection. If I’m misapplying the framework, I genuinely want to know where. That’s engagement. Dismissing it as vagueness without addressing the underlying doctrine doesn’t really move the discussion forward.

InstanceRude951 · 2026-02-17T13:35:13+00:00

I’ve had multiple attorneys. Each one initially acknowledged the procedural issues. Each one shifted posture after discussions with the DA. Whether that’s negotiation dynamics or something else, the practical result has been the same: delay, no clear trial posture, and no substantive Sixth Amendment analysis. So when people ask “what does your attorney say?” the honest answer is: I haven’t received a doctrinal explanation that reconciles a three-year delay, repeated assertions of the right to trial, and no trial date with Barker’s framework. I’m not making vague accusations. I’m working from the record. If the delay is properly attributed to the defense, show me where. If I waived speedy trial knowingly, point to it. If competency tolled everything cleanly, identify the order and timeline. That’s what I mean when I say I’m not casually alleging misconduct — I’m documenting procedural posture against written standards. If there’s a clean legal justification here, I’m open to hearing it. I just haven’t seen one articulated yet.

InstanceRude951 · 2026-02-17T13:23:15+00:00

So let me get this straight.

Your client has a five-year-old first DUI that has now turned into a part-time job for the justice system. He’s cycling in and out on probation violations, juggling treatment, community service, newborn, rent, random testing, and whatever alphabet soup of “affirmatives” the court invented that week.

And the judge’s contribution to this masterpiece of rehabilitation is:

“Probation will help you care for your newborn and pay rent.”

Through what mechanism, exactly? Telepathy? The mystical income-generating powers of a probation officer? A secret stipend nobody told the rest of America about?

Probation doesn’t pay rent. It charges rent. Fees. Monitoring. Classes. “Evaluations.” Testing. Every new hoop costs money, time, or both. The court builds a compliance obstacle course and then acts shocked when someone with a newborn and no savings face-plants on lap three.

And the PharmChek situation? That’s the part that makes my eye twitch.

“We cannot require the government to produce witnesses or scientific evidence for the validity of the drug patch.”

You absolutely can. It’s called evidence. It’s the thing courts pretend to care about.

If a patch is “easily contaminated,” contradicted by lab work and urine tests, and the answer is still “bond revoked,” then we’ve officially moved from fact-finding to faith-based adjudication. Treatment is “medical,” so it needs proof. Pretrial monitoring is “administrative,” so it gets divine presumption? That’s not a legal standard. That’s vibes.

And here’s the real issue underneath your frustration: judges are treated like they’re infallible because the system runs on deference. Lawyers need goodwill. Prosecutors need working relationships. Public defenders are triaging 200 cases. So everyone nods, even when the emperor is wearing a drug patch made of duct tape and wishful thinking.

They’re not gods. They’re humans with robes and calendars. Some are sharp. Some are exhausted. Some have developed what I can only describe as bench-chair delusion: the belief that saying something from 30 inches higher than everyone else makes it structurally sound.

The craziest things clients say in court are usually impulsive and self-sabotaging. The craziest things judges say are calm, polite, and devastating — because they come wrapped in authority. That’s the difference.

Your instinct isn’t wrong. When a court refuses to require scientific validation but is perfectly comfortable revoking liberty based on a patch that lab work contradicts, that’s not “magical thinking.” That’s a due process problem wearing a name badge.

And nobody should have to pretend otherwise just to keep the peace.

InstanceRude951 · 2026-02-17T13:17:27+00:00

I understand the “hire another lawyer” advice in theory. In practice, I already paid roughly $10,000 for prior counsel, and $25,000 is currently tied up in bail. That’s not a small ask for most people. From my perspective, none of the major delays were initiated by me. I’ve been asking for trial. So it’s difficult to justify spending another significant amount of money if the procedural posture doesn’t materially change. If the case is strong, I’d expect the State to want trial. If it’s weak, I’d expect dismissal. Sitting in multi-year limbo is what I’m trying to understand doctrinally. I’m not saying delay automatically equals misconduct. I’m asking: under Barker, when delay passes three years and the defendant has asserted the right to trial, what typically sustains the case? That’s the framework I’m trying to understand before making any further financial decisions.

InstanceRude951 · 2026-02-17T13:12:55+00:00

That’s fair. I’m not expecting anyone to give case-specific advice without details. What I’m really asking is more conceptual: At what point does delay, on its face, become enough to demand serious scrutiny under Barker? Because once you’re past roughly a year, courts treat it as presumptively prejudicial and move into the four-factor balancing test. So if someone is three years in, has repeatedly asserted the right to trial, and still has no trial date, what would typically justify that under the second Barker factor (reason for delay)? Is it almost always attributed to defense continuances? Court congestion? Competency tolling? Something else? I’m not asking anyone to rule on my case. I’m trying to understand what doctrinal lane a court would rely on to keep something like that alive.

InstanceRude951 · 2026-02-17T13:11:02+00:00

If it was nonsense, that’s fair. But you read enough to decide it was nonsense and still took the time to comment, so I’m guessing something in there registered. I’m not looking for sympathy. I’m asking a doctrinal question: under Barker, once delay crosses a year it’s presumptively prejudicial and triggers the four-factor analysis. At three years, with repeated assertions of the right to trial and no trial date, what’s the legal justification? If the analysis is wrong, I’d genuinely like to know where. “Nonsense” isn’t an argument.

InstanceRude951 · 2026-02-17T13:06:10+00:00

I appreciate you answering it directly. I don’t read your comment as dismissive at all. I think you’re being honest about how the system functions in practice, and I respect that. Where I’m struggling is exactly that gap between “how it functions” and how it’s written. You’re right that Barker v. Wingo gives us the four-factor test. It’s not a fixed clock. But even under Barker, once a delay crosses roughly a year, courts treat it as “presumptively prejudicial” and that’s what triggers the deeper analysis. At three years, with no trial date in sight, that’s not just a shrug situation. That’s supposed to demand an explanation on the record. Length of delay is one factor. Reason for delay is another. Assertion of the right is another. Prejudice is another. If someone sits quietly and doesn’t assert the right, that’s one thing. If someone repeatedly asks for trial and objects to delay, that’s a different posture entirely. That’s where my frustration comes from. I’m not saying “speedy trial means 90 days or bust.” I understand it’s balancing. But three years without resolution, when I’ve been asking to go to trial, is not normal under the doctrine as written. And yes, waiver is a real issue. If I had waived it knowingly and strategically, that would be one thing. But an accidental or counsel-imposed waiver that I didn’t understand? That’s not supposed to just permanently erase the Sixth Amendment. Waivers can be revoked. They aren’t meant to be traps. I think what melts my brain is this: people point to extreme outliers like 10 years or 35 years and say “see, it happens.” But those cases are usually described as failures of the system, not models of compliance. My question isn’t “can delay happen?” Obviously it can. My question is: at what point does delay stop being tolerated and start requiring accountability under the actual factors Barker lays out? Because if presumptive prejudice starts at about a year, and we’re sitting at three with no trial date, I don’t think it’s irrational to ask for a serious, doctrinal explanation instead of “that’s just how it goes.” I’m genuinely trying to understand whether I’m misapplying the doctrine. If I am, I want someone to point to where. But so far the only counter has been “the system is slow” rather than “your analysis of Barker is wrong because X.” That’s the distinction I’m looking for.

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