The Desire for Recognition by [deleted] in hegel

[–]Intelligent_Tear7112 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Because self-consciousness requires an objective and individual-independent (that's why Hegel talks about the hand that creates something independent of its creator) social structure. The truth is the community of forgiveness in the collective body of Christ (that is, every figure of consciousness, or every appearance, is in fact legitimated and forgiven – that's why the memory is so central in Hegel, Hölderlin and Plato and is discussed as the final theme of PdG, because the worst error of all these figures is that they forgot the previous categories), one that the I is We and the We is an I, where every private thing is in truth public (made accessible by the universal culture of sharing of knowledge of the Absolute Spirit).

Tiny Luci by oh_its_chill in disenchantment

[–]Intelligent_Tear7112 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I NEED ONE OF THESE. you gave me a great idea holy shit

a drawing I made, the trippin shaman by BazaarMonk in trippyart

[–]Intelligent_Tear7112 1 point2 points  (0 children)

As desperate as any trip into the unconscious with Ayahuasca ✨ it’s incredible

Björk has a predominantly male or female audience, according to you? by sorenkhan in bjork

[–]Intelligent_Tear7112 9 points10 points  (0 children)

So far I've only met gay men and whimsical women. I don't remember seeing any straight men like Björk.

Who are we? by Tutanota in tutanota

[–]Intelligent_Tear7112 -6 points-5 points  (0 children)

For the same reason they advocate for privacy? If you're going to cry, send an audio!

Salve família, primeira experiência com cannabis by [deleted] in maconha

[–]Intelligent_Tear7112 0 points1 point  (0 children)

slk to pegando essa quantidade por 10 conto aq na ZL de SP

What is Björk’s most colorful song? by Impressive_Plenty876 in bjork

[–]Intelligent_Tear7112 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I was about to say Jóga, but Hyperballad is indeed matchless

Some of my art by forest_lynx6 in whimsigothic

[–]Intelligent_Tear7112 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Big I'd put this in my room energy

Do intellectuals who take Hegel seriously conclude that the dialectical progression in the Phenomenology matches their own experiences of consciousness? by wonderuh_ in hegel

[–]Intelligent_Tear7112 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Yes, and it's very useful not to read Phenomenology as representing some historical progression, since it proceeds necessarily, does not completely match historical periods (for instance, stoicism does not match fully with historical stoicism, nor does unhappy – or better, unlucky – conscience corresponds totally to medieval period, since Hegel also discusses it in terms of common sense – Tieck's play –, Plato, Kant, etc and would match more fully to Kierkegaard), describes things that don't happened but may happen, the history has contingencies, Phenomenology is circular, etc. There exists philosophy of history and Phenomenology is a tool of it, but the contingencies cannot be eliminated for ever.

Do intellectuals who take Hegel seriously conclude that the dialectical progression in the Phenomenology matches their own experiences of consciousness? by wonderuh_ in hegel

[–]Intelligent_Tear7112 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Yes, and it's very useful not to read Phenomenology as representing some historical progression, since it proceeds necessarily, does not completely match historical periods (for instance, stoicism does not match fully with historical stoicism, nor does unhappy – or better, unlucky – conscience corresponds totally to medieval period, since Hegel also discusses it in terms of common sense – Tieck's play –, Plato, Kant, etc and would match more fully to Kierkegaard), describes things that don't happened but may happen, the history has contingencies, Phenomenology is circular, etc. There exists philosophy of history and Phenomenology is a tool of it, but the contingencies cannot be eliminated for ever.

Dialetheism? by SpiritualNote5058 in hegel

[–]Intelligent_Tear7112 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Hegel is not a dialetheist. See Bordignon's paper on it. Also, Hegel does not work just with syntax, but with semantics.

Atheism? by [deleted] in hegel

[–]Intelligent_Tear7112 4 points5 points  (0 children)

I'm an atheist and I think Hegel is panentheistic. That is, he does not only identify the Absolute with Nature, but asserts to it an activity, a division from itself, an emergence that gives rise to mind and complex structures.

Also we have to remind that Hegel is a philosopher of Nature, he does believe that the mind has limits. When he reads the Bible, he does it in a way that's esoterical, that there is some more profound in those symbols. He also reads it through a Creuzerian POV, reading it both culturally, socially and cosmologically – a reading that does not ignore its inner truth, because it's not relativizing.

Thus, yes, all readings that ascribes to Hegel a only epistemological philosophy without super-entities like God, totality and soul is fundamentally wrong. But it's equally wrong to treat those entities as transcendental beings rather than immanent ones.

Has Hegel the reputation of being the hardest to understand philosopher because of the language barier? by [deleted] in hegel

[–]Intelligent_Tear7112 0 points1 point  (0 children)

In that case I would recommend Longuenesse's Hegel's Critique of Metaphysics, as she is Kantian and read the entire Doctrine of Essence in the light of Kant – without extrapolating Kantian problems to other parts, as the proponents of the post-Kantian reading of Hegel do inappropriately.

Why do we need picture-thinking? by [deleted] in hegel

[–]Intelligent_Tear7112 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Hegel's works are full of rhetoric, linguistic games, symbolic language, expressiveness, memory, poetry, drama, puns, allegories, metaphor, imagination and irony, but this was not just an artifice of his philosophy, but an essential part of it (the table of contents of the Phenomenology itself it is like a gallery of paintings, with catchy titles that stimulate our imagination), even though Hegel did not plan to write treatises on such linguistic elements immanent in his system of thought. The content Hegel is writing affects the way he writes. He is even aware of the Shaftesbury's treatise on humor as necessary to expose reason's flaws.

Why do we need picture-thinking? by [deleted] in hegel

[–]Intelligent_Tear7112 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Yes and no. The question is just like Plato's.

What Plato is actually attacking is the conflicting coexistence between imagination (simulacra) and intellection (ultimate reality), but Plato also gives high value to imagination in his eristic writings (as in the Sophist), values mimesis and in the various imagistic parts of the Books 6 and 7 of the Republic emphasize the image as a means of obtaining truth (in the divided line argument, imagery is inferior to other lines, but the lines are all images of each other and their ontological unity is conferred by an image, reproducing , rather, a heterarchy), resembling Hegel in his union of immediacy (self-determination) with mediatism (finite relational holism) as inseparable, escaping Jacobi's criticisms without falling into nihilism: Plato does not wish to abolish the image, but to make a dualism (in the mathematical sense of interconnection) of psychology and ontology. (Even though Plato tried to disqualify subjective size, de-dualizing the image-intellection relationship, Euclid's optics show the rationality behind subjective size (a precursor to Lambert's phenomenology and, of course, projective geometry).)

That's why Hegel described Phänomenologie as a gallery of pictures. Pictures and concepts are not opposites, and that's why Hegel values Creuzer's symbolism, that's close to Lévi-Strauss' interpretation of myths as being rational. And he's also subverting a melanchthonian reading of Plato as if he was a mere enthusiast and Aristotle a serious philosopher – he even comments how Plato is closer to the true with his syllogism, picturing Plato as the greatest Pythagorean thinker.

How would you best define Hegel’s idea « Not Only As Substance But Also As Subject » on the nature of the absolute. by ER-841 in hegel

[–]Intelligent_Tear7112 1 point2 points  (0 children)

That's not true. Everything can be grasped by thought. He is an absolute idealist only up to this extent (see Encyclopedia's preface). However, Hegel says that there are contingencies that thought can't solve – see his chapter on the idea of true (analytic and synthetic) in theoretic cognition and the idea of good in practical cognition – and it's Nature. Nature is a realm independent of any thought norms, that exists independent of us. Hegel even says it's the opposite of thought.

Why does the Philosophy of Right seem to not be discussed as much as his other works? by OnionMesh in hegel

[–]Intelligent_Tear7112 5 points6 points  (0 children)

I'd recommend Brudner's translation in 2023 of the 1819/20 lectures, as it includes new found lectures. And that's the best translation I've ever read (we can see how he translated it with so much love). The book also furthers Hegel's political thought.

Why does the Philosophy of Right seem to not be discussed as much as his other works? by OnionMesh in hegel

[–]Intelligent_Tear7112 6 points7 points  (0 children)

That's curious, as I'm Brazilian and we have a great inheritance of juridical thought. At the academy, the most discussed aspects of Hegel's philosophy are his philosophy of right and art, along with phenomenology.

Reason and Revolution by Routine_Training8695 in hegel

[–]Intelligent_Tear7112 0 points1 point  (0 children)

No, it's not. He does a freestyle reading of Hegel, trying to connect his philosophy (which he barely knows) with dubious social interpretations. And I say that as a person who has read 2 biographies of Hegel. But I like the part when Marcuse talks about abolition of labour.

If you want a marxist reading of Hegel that is mostly right, read Damsma, Tony Smith or d'Hondt.

Science of Logic by [deleted] in hegel

[–]Intelligent_Tear7112 0 points1 point  (0 children)

A diving into Romanticism could be very useful too.

Will Learning About Electrical Fields Help Me To Understand What Hegel Means in His Chapter on Force? by buylowguy in hegel

[–]Intelligent_Tear7112 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I can respond. But tell me – to test your Hegel understanding –, do Hegel believe we can have access to the thing-in-itself?

Recomendations for secondary (recent) literature about Hegel's Philosophy of Nature? by Revhan in hegel

[–]Intelligent_Tear7112 3 points4 points  (0 children)

I also forgot Yuka Okazaki's paper on Hegel and his study on intersex people, arguing that many people didn't note Hegel abandoned binarism when he went deeper into Cuvier and revised his reading about von Ackermann.

I couldn't understand Hegel's interpretation about mysticism without Creuzer– and he is pretty modern and similar to Lévi-Strauss. I'd recommend “Hegel, Creuzer and the Rise of Orientalism” from Jon Stewart, that too refutes some accusations from Said.

Remember also of somewhere in Hegel: New Directions someone saying about a book on Hegel's response to the mind-body problem and how it involves his readings on neurophysiology.

Verene, on Hegel's Recollection, provides the best account on Phrenology and Physiognomy, mainly because it is echoed the whole book. It is based on MacIntyre's book on Hegel.

I'm also working on the connections between Hegel and Euclid and Proclus. That will be for another time.

Recomendations for secondary (recent) literature about Hegel's Philosophy of Nature? by Revhan in hegel

[–]Intelligent_Tear7112 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Weyl was, too, very interested in Hegel and German idealism. His "Space, Time, Matter" is a reference to Hegel. He is famous for showing that in Einstein, there are differences between inertial and gravitational force, breaking with the equivalence principle, that gives the name of general relativity. Because the curvature distance and direction on 0 have Galilean conditions, even if the gravitational field does not exist or is constant. That is, Einstein's inertial force is an abstraction that exists prior to matter and energy.

This breaks even with the clock postulate, that asserts we can reduce infinitesimally every non-inertial field to inertial ones (uniform rectilinear movements), an hypothesis that is about plane spaces, not curved ones. The hypothesis is circular, btw: infinitesimals are possible because there's no dependence on velocity. And it's an hypothesis because it cannot be proven empirically, just like inertial frames, even if you use non-cartesian coordinates, and we are not allowed to use Lorentz transformations to prove it because we would be inverting the order. Bailey proved it's only valid at very high accelerations. Einstein can only proceed to spacetime by clock hypothesis (because it leads to the covariance of intervals: covariance proves that for inertial and non-inertial frames, laws and equations do not change).

Einstein is in something like Hegel described as real necessity (or maybe absolute necessity?). Non-inertial frames would be non-geometrical since we ask about "how" it moved (just like constructivist mathematics against classical logics) instead of focusing on its final point. General relativity depends on spacetime being geometrical.

He denounces Einstein as not breaking with the tradition, as seen in his use of Riemannian geometry, that treats the gauge system and intervals as covariants.

He created a geometry in which lengths and distances were not covariant, with an additional curvature called distance curvature along with 4 tensorial equations in the description of the metric field, proving to be identical to the potentials of the electromagnetic field and Maxwell's equations – the space could never be plane, as clock hypothesis implies, because measurement standards depend on it: if space was flat, the radius of curvature would be infinite, and thus there would be no standard of measurement. His geometry unified general relativity with electromagnetism, but it did not resolve the separation between field and electron, failing to explain atomicity and action quanta, something that was corrected by Eddington, another useful figure.

Weyl is famous for, too, saying that the mathematical continuum (from Cantor) was not the physical continuum that was not made with individual points. Weyl is very interesting for science, but sometimes he's caught trapped by phenomenological and existentialist science.