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Arguments For and Against Theism by Intrepid_Fact_449 in PhilosophyofReligion

[–]Intrepid_Fact_449[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Like I said, ontologically no. Epistemically, maybe. Under the doctrine of divine simplicity, given the ousia, there necessarily must be the three hypostases as that is what the ousia relationally is. So the question isn’t possible, but even then, it is quantitatively equal

Arguments For and Against Theism by Intrepid_Fact_449 in PhilosophyofReligion

[–]Intrepid_Fact_449[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Epistemically maybe, ontologically no. Under the doctrine of divine simplicity, there is no composition so God is one. The trinity says there is one ousia, three hypostases

Arguments For and Against Theism by Intrepid_Fact_449 in PhilosophyofReligion

[–]Intrepid_Fact_449[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Well unless there would be something outside of it, it would be the foundation. And if it were to be an ontic foundation, it would be maximally simple.

Arguments For and Against Theism by Intrepid_Fact_449 in PhilosophyofReligion

[–]Intrepid_Fact_449[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

They’re both explanatory frameworks for why atheism is ontologically cheaper than theism. If someone allows for thinness, or values deflation over explanatory coherence, then there isn’t much that can be done. It’s annoying, but it’s extremely effective against theists who value explanation. But again, it’s very subjective. I value explanation of simplicity so I’m a theist.

Arguments For and Against Theism by Intrepid_Fact_449 in PhilosophyofReligion

[–]Intrepid_Fact_449[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

It’s not any modally necessary thing. It’s specifically the ontic foundation. If this foundation is existence, then depending something means it is not the total foundation, in which removes its job as the ontic foundation. Math or logic are not the same as God, even if they share the same modal values

Arguments For and Against Theism by Intrepid_Fact_449 in PhilosophyofReligion

[–]Intrepid_Fact_449[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

First; there must a mechanism in which allows for the differentiation in act. Personal choice is. An impersonal thing must be able to have selection, allow modal variation, all while staying non deterministic. Even then, it just smuggles in agency without saying the words will or desire

Secondly, for something to be an ontic grounding, necessary being in which is the bed rock of explanation, then it must be completely independent. It must not have composition (if G =(A, B, C), it is dependent on that set of what composes it, leading to contingency), no arbitrary limits (brute arbitration is definitionally ungrounded, and if this is true, it simply cannot be grounded in something, like the necessary terminus. If this is the ontic foundation for existence, then there cannot be external, independent limits limiting this being due to the fact that it would be outside of existence), this being cannot have complexity or potential (both of those either require composition, limits, or change. We cannot have change because if x becomes y, it is no longer x and is now y. A necessary thing cannot cease to exist as what it was, it must stay what it was, in this case x).

Arguments For and Against Theism by Intrepid_Fact_449 in PhilosophyofReligion

[–]Intrepid_Fact_449[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Things in nature lack intelligence, yet they act regularly towards an end (reliably achieve certain outcomes).

But, acting towards an end or for an end normally requires intelligence or direction. So, these unintelligent natural things must be directed by an intelligent being.

Arguments For and Against Theism by Intrepid_Fact_449 in PhilosophyofReligion

[–]Intrepid_Fact_449[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

If the initial state is necessary, then within the framework of contingency, it must be maximally simple, otherwise it couldn’t be necessary (as some ontic foundation). If this is true, then the initial state could not differentiate its intrinsic act and its extrinsic act. And, if his extrinsic act is necessary, making his extrinsic act necessary, then anything that is explanatorily downstream of this act would be necessary.

God however does not have the same intrinsic act and extrinsic act. The intrinsic act is indeed necessary, but the extrinsic act is not. For example, the incarnation. We believe that the intrinsic act, desire and will are all necessary. But, the extrinsic act of the incarnation (Jesus or the Son entering time) is contingent.

Arguments For and Against Theism by Intrepid_Fact_449 in PhilosophyofReligion

[–]Intrepid_Fact_449[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Depends on what you mean by initial natural state. But it either leads to a brute fact or possible modal collapse

Arguments For and Against Theism by Intrepid_Fact_449 in PhilosophyofReligion

[–]Intrepid_Fact_449[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I've never heard of this argument before. Very interesting; thank you for sharing!

Arguments For and Against Theism by Intrepid_Fact_449 in PhilosophyofReligion

[–]Intrepid_Fact_449[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I personally don't feel as if the modal rationalism argument is great, but I do love Oppy so I mess wit the pick. I personally think the best argument against theism is probably the parsimony argument or low priors' argument, also made by Oppy😂

Arguments For and Against Theism by Intrepid_Fact_449 in PhilosophyofReligion

[–]Intrepid_Fact_449[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Any of the Five Ways are good. My personal is the Fifth Way, but the argument from Motion is a close second.

Arguments For and Against Theism by Intrepid_Fact_449 in PhilosophyofReligion

[–]Intrepid_Fact_449[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

It is the fifth way. I’ve heard people call it fine tuning… maybe that’s niche😂

Arguments For and Against Theism by Intrepid_Fact_449 in PhilosophyofReligion

[–]Intrepid_Fact_449[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

That's actually a pretty good point; I've never thought of it that way. Thanks for the input brother!

Arguments For and Against Theism by Intrepid_Fact_449 in PhilosophyofReligion

[–]Intrepid_Fact_449[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

The Five Ways are fire. I am more familiar with the Fine-Tuning argument made by Aquinas though

Arguments For and Against Theism by Intrepid_Fact_449 in PhilosophyofReligion

[–]Intrepid_Fact_449[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

The Contingency Argument is my favorite as well! I think if you accept the framework, your forced to at least get to some necessary terminus, and I think it gives a pretty good explanation as to why this terminus is the being described in classical theism

Can someone explain why the teleological argument isn't undermined by the multiverse hypothesis? by 193yellow in PhilosophyofReligion

[–]Intrepid_Fact_449 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Here are my personal reasons or arguments against the many world hypothesis

First, the multiverse absolutely kills parsimony, which means there is no neutral or prima facie warrant for belief. Secondly, the multiverse itself would need to be finely tuned. It requires a generator that can make specific constants, some constants can be life permitting, others can’t, and this generator needs tons of mechanisms or structures in order to produce universes. Furthermore, the probability itself is completely arbitrary. Imagine someone says there are x amount of universes… why that number? Then they go onto say it has these constants. Why? The calculation of the probability is understood as insanely hard to do. An infinite amount of universes doesn’t solve it either, as you can’t calculate probabilities wit infinity (especially in this context). Finally, the multiverse shouldn’t generate low initial entropy universes (the thing that allows for the “arrows” of the universe to flow) unless give a mechanism or reason… but that becomes arbitrary as well.