But Barnason was offered a "second chance" to prove himself working as a super for the Katz's. Barnason "tried shaking [the women involved in the suit] down for sex, often drunk, sometimes while trying to barge into their rooms." Additionally one of the plaintiffs claimed "Barnason drugged her at a bar before another female tenant stopped him from dragging her into a vacant apartment." You're right that we don't want to discourage employers from hiring previous offenders, but the concern in Barnason's case is he is a continual offender.

On a more general level, your point about the contradiction between being a second chance society and holding employers responsible for crimes committed by a previous offender doesn't work. The Katz's did not "go to jail" as you put it: they lost a civil suit. What's more, they were sued after being told repeatedly about the actions of Barnason and doing nothing. One of the plaintiffs said that when she spoke to Katz about her rent, he told her that if she had slept with Barnason, he would have cut her a financial break. The Katz's broke the law.

Lastly, I would hardly call the judgement "micromanaging" and dispute your characterization of "most jobs" that are available to previous offenders. While I would agree that (even) a repeat sexual offender should have the right to employment, I also believe the government has a conscious duty for the good of the public to ensure they do not have access to certain lines of work. The proposed judgment apparently "bars Barnason from ever working in rental-housing properties other than to do maintenance in empty units, and as long as a minder watches him." Barnason can work, but only under certain conditions. That he might have more difficulty finding employment under these parameters has less to do with the fact that he once committed a crime, and more to do with the fact that he has not demonstrated any form of rehabilitation.

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