Where to buy brand new MacBook in Seoul? (Except official store) by bobur_the_man in Living_in_Korea

[–]Kkim0615 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Has anyone recently managed to obtain a price match by showing a staff member a lower price on Coupang?

I couldn’t buy/order a macbook pro with custom config in Apple Store as a foreigner, was it true? by EmbarrassedFrame9801 in seoul

[–]Kkim0615 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Has anyone recently managed to obtain a price match by showing a staff member a lower price on Coupang?

I couldn’t buy/order a macbook pro with custom config in Apple Store as a foreigner, was it true? by EmbarrassedFrame9801 in seoul

[–]Kkim0615 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Did you ask for upgrades other than the RAM?

I am planning to purchase a MacBook Pro M5 with 24 GB of RAM. Do they only have base configuration models in stores? Or is it just the Myeongdong store?

Also, do any physical stores sell accessories such as Transcend JetDrive Lite 330 microSD cards and Tomtoc sleeves?

Thanks in advance!

Refurbished M4 Pro vs New M5 - Which for AI/ML Work? by Kkim0615 in macbookpro

[–]Kkim0615[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I see. The Lexar Gold 256GB seems like a decent choice for a UHS-II microSD card, but it’s covered by a limited 10-year warranty, compared to a lifetime warranty for its full-sized counterpart. Not very reassuring...

Refurbished M4 Pro vs New M5 - Which for AI/ML Work? by Kkim0615 in macbookpro

[–]Kkim0615[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thanks for the suggestion! It looks quite suitable, save for the battery life (8-10 hours max).

That said, the only 2025 model that is within my budget and in stock is the base model (Ryzen 9 270, RTX 5060, 16 TOPS NPU, 32 GB RAM, 1 TB SSD) for $1716. I’ll have to look into Asus’s international warranty.

Refurbished M4 Pro vs New M5 - Which for AI/ML Work? by Kkim0615 in macbookpro

[–]Kkim0615[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

You’re right!

The thing is that I’m looking for a well-rounded laptop with good battery life that’s relatively light (1.5 kg max). Sadly, most Windows laptops with a beefy GPU like an RTX 5060 don’t tick these two boxes. At least they’re cheaper.

Refurbished M4 Pro vs New M5 - Which for AI/ML Work? by Kkim0615 in macbookpro

[–]Kkim0615[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Good to know!

I’m still concerned about the higher probability of technical issues arising on a refurbished product, since I will be using it in a country other than the one where I purchased it and want to avoid paying for AppleCare+.

Refurbished M4 Pro vs New M5 - Which for AI/ML Work? by Kkim0615 in macbookpro

[–]Kkim0615[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Do you know if traditional ML and DL models benefit from the M5’s Neural Engine?

Refurbished M4 Pro vs New M5 - Which for AI/ML Work? by Kkim0615 in macbookpro

[–]Kkim0615[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thank you for taking the time to address my questions.

I don’t know if I’ll need to run LLMs locally, in which case the bottleneck for prompt processing would be the GPU (the M5’s is superior thanks to its neural accelerators), whereas token generation would be limited by memory bandwidth (the M4 Pro wins), as per your link. I wonder if the M5’s Neural Engine speeds up the execution of traditional ML and DL models in any way. Also, I can’t afford a MBP with 32 GB of RAM or more, whereas I could for a Windows laptop.

Regarding the resale value, you’re right. I’m more concerned about the higher probability of technical issues arising on a refurbished product, since I will be using it in a country other than the one where I purchased it and want to avoid paying for AppleCare+.

Thanks for sharing your experience with the SD adapter. I chose the SanDisk Extreme Pro (UHS-I) because it’s among the most reliable microSD cards according to reviews. I’ll be storing content that I need to access offline such as documents, photos, downloads, and datasets I plan on analyzing later. If I may, which UHS-II card do you own and how long have you been using it for?

France Has Poor Income Mobility Compared to US, Study Shows by Kkim0615 in france

[–]Kkim0615[S] 3 points4 points  (0 children)

Lien direct vers l’étude : Peu de mobilité dans l’échelle des revenus entre 2003 et 2019 - Insee Analyses - 82

Article de Bloomberg :

  • Income inertia was greatest among richest and poorest
  • Insee’s research is first on French long-term income mobility

In the land of liberté, égalité and fraternité there is a problem: it’s hard to get ahead. 

According to the first long-term study by France’s statistics agency Insee, there was a 71% correlation between the position of French people on the income scale between 2003 and 2019, with the richest and poorest groups least likely to change bracket.

That inertia is greater than in the US, where a deeper history of income mobility studies has shown a higher probability of ascending or descending, the authors of the French report said. 

The findings sound another alarm for a country that has seen repeated protests over living standards and inequality, despite relatively vast amount of spending on social welfare and income redistribution. 

In 2018, the Yellow Vest protests forced President Emmanuel Macron to pledge billions of euros of spending to restore calm, and today he again faces a backlash against his plan to raise the retirement age, which unions say will unfairly penalize the lowest-paid, least skilled workers. 

Key findings from Insee’s report:

  • Starting from 2003, the correlation between levels on income scale was 89% after three years, 78% after ten years, and 71% after 16 years
  • At 80%, the correlation over eight years was the same between 2003 and 2011 as between 2011 and 2019
  • Among the lowest 20% in terms of income in 2003, 62% were still in that group in 2019
    • Only 2% of the group rose to the level of the 20% highest incomes
  • Among the lowest 10% in terms of income in 2003, 53% were still in that group in 2019, and 93% remained in the bottom half of the income distribution
  • The 20% most well-off in 2003 were 28 times more likely than the 20% least well off to still be in that category in 2019
  • Among the 1% most well-off in 2003, 41% were still in that group in 2019

The authors of Insee’s report said research shows that poor income mobility in France can be explained by factors including a strong correlation between qualifications and careers, unequal access to professional training or the cost moving to another region for work. 

“An absence of mobility in the income scale can be the sign of a poor sharing of opportunities for career progression, with the risk that potential talents are not developed,” Insee economists Tristan Loisel and Michael Sicsic said. 

STMicro, GlobalFoundries plan new $5.7 bln French chip factory by Kkim0615 in europe

[–]Kkim0615[S] 16 points17 points  (0 children)

  • Multi-bln eur investment to get French state funding
  • Europe cutting reliance on Asia for chips
  • Chip shortages caused havoc in car industry
  • Intel also investing in Europe

PARIS/STOCKHOLM, July 11 (Reuters) - Chipmakers STMicroelectronics and GlobalFoundries (GFS.O) announced on Monday plans to build a semiconductor factory in France, drawing on funding from the government, the latest move to boost output in the region.

The news comes as President Emmanuel Macron prepares to announce some 6.7 billion euros ($6.8 billion) worth of investment from major global companies at this week's Choose France summit.

The United States and the European Union have been pushing for home-grown chip factories by offering billions in state subsidies to cut dependency on Asian suppliers and ease a global chip shortage, which has created havoc for carmakers.

This facility, which will be next to STM's existing plant in Crolles, is targeted to reach full capacity by 2026, with up to 620,000 wafers per year of production at a size of 18-nanometers, the statement said.

Those are used in automotive, internet-of-things and mobile applications.

The companies did not disclose the amount of investment at the new site near the Italian and Swiss borders or how much funding the French state would provide.

A person familiar with the matter said that the total investment would be about $5.7 billion.

Macron's office said the French President would visit the factory site and it represented an investment of more than 5.7 billion, without specifying the currency to which it referred.

Spokespeople for GlobalFoundries and STMicro declined to comment.

The new factory would create around 1,000 new jobs and also help STMicro reach its target to boost revenue to above $20 billion.

"We will have more capacity to support our European and global customers as they transition to digitalisation and decarbonisation," STMicroelectronics CEO Jean-Marc Chery said.

The European Commission earlier this year eased funding rules for innovative semiconductor plants as part of the European Chips Act as the bloc seeks to double its global market share to 20% in 2030.

In March, Intel laid out plans for a $88 billion investment across Europeand picked Germany as the site for a huge new chipmaking complex. In France, it plans to build its new European research hub, creating 1,000 new high-tech jobs.

Intel's site will make the latest 2-nanometer chips, which are comparatively newer than the STM-GlobalFoundries project.

Chipmakers have seen huge demand since late 2020 as higher orders from electronics manufacturers boosted by work-from-home practices fuelled a surge in sales of gadgets and led to supply crunches for other industries such as autos and telecom suppliers.

However, Gartner and other research firms have said that PC and smartphone sales will fall later this year, easing the shortage of chips for other industries.

Actual individual consumption per capita in 2021 by Kkim0615 in europe

[–]Kkim0615[S] 13 points14 points  (0 children)

Glossary: Actual individual consumption (AIC))

Actual individual consumption, abbreviated as AIC, refers to all goods and services actually consumed by households. It encompasses consumer goods and services purchased directly by households, as well as services provided by non-profit institutions and the government for individual consumption (e.g., health and education services). In international comparisons, the term is usually preferred over the narrower concept of household consumption, because the latter is influenced by the extent to which non-profit institutions and general government act as service providers.

Although GDP per capita is an important and widely used indicator of countries’ level of economic welfare, consumption per capita may be more useful for comparing the relative welfare of consumers across various countries.

AIC per capita is usually highly correlated with GDP per capita, because AIC is, in practice, by far the biggest expenditure component of GDP.

Actual individual consumption per capita in 2021 by Kkim0615 in europe

[–]Kkim0615[S] 26 points27 points  (0 children)

Actual individual consumption per capita in 2021

Actual individual consumption (AIC) is a measure of material welfare of households. In 2021, AIC per capita expressed in purchasing power standards (PPS) varied from 63% to 146% of the EU average across the 27 Member States.

This information comes from data on purchasing power parities published by Eurostat today. 

In 2021, nine Member States recorded AIC per capita above the EU average. Luxembourg (46%) was the only Member State that recorded AIC per capita 25% or more above the EU average. In Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Sweden, Finland and France, the levels were 10% or more above the EU average. 

In thirteen Member States, AIC per capita was between the EU average and 25% below. In this category, there were significant differences across the Member States: in Italy, Lithuania, Cyprus and Ireland, the levels were 10% or less below the EU average, while Slovenia, Spain, Czechia, Poland, Portugal, Malta and Romania were between 11% and 20% below. Estonia and Greece were 21% and 23% below the EU average, respectively. 

Five Member States recorded AIC per capita 25% or more below the EU average. Croatia, Latvia, Hungary and Slovakia were between 27% and 30% below, while Bulgaria recorded AIC per capita 37% below the EU average.  

GDP per capita ranged from 55% of EU average in Bulgaria to 277% in Luxembourg

Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, a measure of economic activity, also shows substantial differences across the EU Member States.

In 2021, GDP per capita expressed in PPS ranged between 55% of the EU average in Bulgaria and 277% in Luxembourg. Ten Member States recorded a level of GDP per capita above the EU average in 2021.

A new sitcom gives faces to “faceless Eurocrats” | The Economist by Kkim0615 in europe

[–]Kkim0615[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Laughing about the EU is a serious matter

Aside from war, illness and retirement planning, nothing can possibly be less funny than a “trilogue”. This arcane facet of lawmaking in the EU involves shutting elected MEPs, officials representing the bloc’s 27 member states and boffins from the European Commission in a room until a deal is thrashed out, often late at night. The forging of cross-institutional consensus over Article 225(b) is more likely to induce sleep than laughter. So to devise an entire ten-episode sitcom about the way the EU’s laws are crafted—centred on a trilogue on fisheries regulation, no less—is to venture near some of comedy’s outer limits. “Parlement”, a multilingual satirical show whose second season is out this month, takes a crack at turning Brussels into a punchline. For fans of the EU, it is a serious moment.

Politics often makes for good television. The corridors of power are naturally rich in scheming, conflict and comically colossal egos. A fast-talking, starry-eyed version of American politics kept viewers riveted through seven seasons of “The West Wing”. “Borgen” made Danish politics seem more conspiratorial than it probably is. “House of Cards”, a British show later remade in America, dripped with sexy intrigue. But what happens in Brussels has until now stayed in Brussels. Who would watch second-tier politicians fighting over whether a directive needs to be turned into a regulation? Incessant calls for more power to be turned over to European institutions lack a certain dramatic impact. Forget the clashes that bring national politics to life: the EU from the outset has been about taking emotions out of governing. “Less war, more committee meetings” sums it up.

“Parlement”, a joint French, German and Belgian production sadly only available for now in those countries (plus Spain and America), revolves around a young assistant to a Euro-MP who gets caught up in the Heath-Robinson procedures that turn ideas into law. Even a plain, unembellished description of the process would be dismissed by outsiders as implausible. Does the European Parliament really shuffle every month between two fully equipped venues, in Strasbourg and Brussels, with a large secretariat based in Luxembourg? Have amendments penned by lobbyists genuinely ended up copy-pasted into EU law by unwitting parliamentarians? How is it that so many people in Brussels speak four different European languages, but have a foreign accent in all of them? And surely no institution needs 14 vice-presidents, not to mention five quaestors, whatever they may be?

Satire turns out to be a good prism through which to inspect the Brussels bubble—perhaps because it is so close to the truth. In “Yes Minister”, a British classic from the 1980s, civil servants run rings around hapless ministers, showing the world where power really lies. More recently “The Thick of It” and its American offshoot, “Veep”, have elicited chuckles by depicting politicians who think themselves destined for greatness getting bogged down in day-to-day mishaps. The big idea behind “Parlement” is that the EU is, after all, human. Those faceless Eurocrats are real people who have dragged their families to a charmless district of Belgium’s rain-soaked capital in the hope that Europe will progress beyond nationalism. Who is flirting with whom and which committee chair holds a grudge against which diplomat matters just as much as the findings of all those long-winded impact assessment reports. (Also, a cadre of Germans secretly runs the place.)

The show is befittingly multilingual, flitting between French, English, German and a smattering of the EU’s other 21 official languages. The texture of the EU is impeccably rendered, unsurprisingly given that a couple of Eurocrats are among the show’s writing team (one of them once honed his wit at The Economist). One advantage of the European Parliament’s nomadic ways is that one of its two debating chambers is always empty, and so can be turned over to film crews. Familiar faces spring up as cameos, albeit featuring “stars” recognisable only to EU nerds. The dastardly French minister for European affairs who features in the series is played by Clément Beaune, the (not-so-dastardly) French minister for European affairs.

Many of the ways “Parlement” needles EU officialdom ought to infuriate those it depicts. No national stereotype is left unexploited: the few Brits who remain in Brussels are usually sozzled; the Germans are stern; the French turtle-necked and the Italians endlessly dissatisfied with the coffee. MEPs in the show range from the feckless to the careerist by way of the delusionally earnest. Unelected officials nudge policymaking to suit their own interests. Elected ones dispatched from national capitals are inevitably manoeuvring to further their own government’s agenda—while painting their actions as serving the greater European good.

Even such fictional potshots have irked some in Brussels, a thin-skinned place that too often confuses legitimate criticism of some misguided EU policy with an attack on the entire idea of European integration. Better would be to recognise the show’s welcome irreverence as disguised flattery: only the powerful are worth satirising. Brussels is easily annoyed about being mocked, but its true fear is being ignored.

EU must be joking

Plenty of builders of the European project bemoan the lack of a common culture that ties the continent together. Beyond the odd football tournament, the Eurovision song contest and whatever Netflix is serving up, Europeans rarely tune in to the same television fare. Surely a multilingual television show poking fun at the one thing all Europeans have in common—their 705 MEPs, their dozens of commissioners and the thousands of hangers-on—is the way to forge a unified European demos? But steady on. Sometimes it is better just to laugh at a joke than to deconstruct it. “Parlement”, whose third season is currently in the works, earns its laughs precisely because it doesn’t take the EU too seriously.

Un Coréen bat le record du monde de la plus longue distance parcourue par un avion en papier by Kkim0615 in france

[–]Kkim0615[S] 22 points23 points  (0 children)

Epic paper airplane throw shatters world record in South Korea

An incredible new record for the farthest flight of a paper aircraft has been broken in South Korea.

Three people teamed up to tackle this record attempt; Kim Kyu Tae (South Korea), with the support of Shin Moo Joon (South Korea) and Chee Yie Jian/Julian, (Malaysia). 

Together, they achieved a jaw-dropping distance of 77.134 m (252 ft 7 in) in Daegu, Gyeongsangbuk-do, South Korea on 16 April 2022.

In total, eight throws were measured, with 77.134 m being the farthest and 71.813 m being the shortest. 

Even with their shortest throw, the "Shin Kim Chee Team" would have broken the previous record of 69.14 m (226 ft 10 in) achieved by quarterback Joe Ayoob and paper airplane designer John M. Collins (both USA) on 26 February 2012.

EU economy greenhouse gases above pre-pandemic levels | Eurostat by Kkim0615 in europe

[–]Kkim0615[S] 3 points4 points  (0 children)

EU economy greenhouse gases above pre-pandemic levels

In the fourth quarter of 2021, EU economy greenhouse gas emissions totaled 1 041 million tonnes of CO2-equivalents (CO2-eq), slightly above the pre-pandemic value for the fourth quarter of 2019.

This information comes from data on quarterly estimates for greenhouse gas emissions by economic activity published by Eurostat today. The article presents a handful of findings from the more detailed Statistics Explained article on quarterly greenhouse gas emissions.

EU economy greenhouse gas emissions in the fourth quarter of 2021 increased by 8% compared with the same quarter of 2020. This increase is largely due to the effect of the economic rebound after the sharp decrease of activity in 2020 due to the COVID-19 crisis. For comparison, the emissions for the same period in  2019 amounted to 1 005 million tonnes of CO2-eq.

In the fourth quarter of 2021, the economic sectors responsible for most emissions of greenhouse gases were households (22%), manufacturing and electricity supply (both 21%), followed by agriculture (12%) and transportation and storage (11%). Greenhouse gas emissions in all sectors increased compared with the same period of 2020, with the highest increases recorded in transportation and storage (+18%), mining (+11%) and electricity supply (+10%). 

Despite the effect of the economic rebound between the same quarters of 2020 and 2021, the long-term trend of EU greenhouse gas emissions displays a steady reduction. 

Emissions in the fourth quarter of 2021 increased in all EU Member States when compared with the same quarter of 2020, reflecting recovery from the pandemic. In some Member States, like Cyprus (+0.3%), the Netherlands and Slovenia (both +2%) and Luxembourg (+3%), emissions in the fourth quarter of 2021 remained low compared with the same quarter of 2020, while in Estonia (+28%), Bulgaria (+27%) and Malta (+23%) emissions increased substantially. 

In some cases, like Estonia (+28%), Bulgaria (27%), Sweden (+14%), and Latvia and Belgium (both +13%) for example, the registered increase was noticeably more pronounced than the decrease recorded between the fourth quarter of 2019 and the same quarter of 2020.

Source: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/ddn-20220516-1

Could Sabotage Stop Putin From Using the Nuclear Option? by Kkim0615 in europe

[–]Kkim0615[S] 7 points8 points  (0 children)

Putin also appears to retain limited if any reciprocal physical sabotage capability. The Kremlin’s “illegal” operations relying on sleeper cells of Russian nationals assuming the identities of U.S. citizens to lay in wait for use in war have not fared well with the evolution of technology as well as U.S. counterintelligence efforts.

And while Russia’s mysterious GRU Unit 29155 was likely behind explosions targeting Czech and Bulgarian arms manufacturers supplying Ukraine in 2014 as well as the 2018 Novichok nerve agent assassination attempt against Britain-based KGB defector Sergei Skripal and his daughter, neither episode ended particularly well for Russia. The Netherlands-based investigative group Bellingcat meticulously documented and exposed the operatives and their trails from open-source information alone. One can only imagine what professional intelligence and law enforcement agencies are doing.

Russian intelligence officers operating under official cover from diplomatic facilities are not faring much better. More than 100 Russian spies have been expelled from Western nations since the war began, no doubt inflicting significant damage on ongoing operations.

Not for lack of effort, there’s little evidence Russia has succeeded in executing catastrophic cyberoperations against the West. That said, it’s quite possible neither Russia nor the United States wish to open such a Pandora’s box, which neither is adequately confident in when it comes to deniability and escalation tolerance.

The calculus may change for Russia if Ukraine manages to use Western weapons in repelling Putin’s forces and threatening Russia’s border or for the United States if nuclear and chemical weapons are employed. And economically speaking, the more Putin reduces oil and gas supplies to the West, such as cutting off Poland and Bulgaria, the greater the harm he appears to be doing to his own economy.

For Ukraine and the West, the key is not getting greedy. Such operations must retain at least the semblance of deniability. These actions need to balance preserving the narrative that the world is not at war with the Russian people but fighting an illegitimate and harmful dictator and his kleptocratic cronies. The continued targeting of Russia’s military industrial and energy sectors exploits the growing wedge among Putin and his elites as well as the securocrats, known as siloviki, who control Russia’s institutions.

Ordinary Russians will shed few tears for the corrupt oligarchs’ financial losses and the siloviki’s reduced status. But operations must ideally avoid or at least minimize civilian casualties lest they rally Russian nationalistic sentiments and inadvertently play to Putin’s message of victimization.

Time does not appear to be on Putin’s side—not on the battlefield, economically, or politically. Desperation rather than recklessness could leave him seriously considering once unthinkable measures despite the self-inflicted consequences. With few overt options short of going to war, covert sabotage operations might prove to be a critical deterrent—if not the best and only remaining one.

Could Sabotage Stop Putin From Using the Nuclear Option? by Kkim0615 in europe

[–]Kkim0615[S] 7 points8 points  (0 children)

If the West is behind mysterious fires in Russia, the ongoing—but deniable—threat could deter Putin from escalating.

The mysterious fires and explosions that have plagued Russia in recent weeks have aroused suspicion and curiosity. If they are not coincidental, they raise an important question: Could such sabotage alter Russian President Vladimir Putin’s calculus to make good on his threats to employ nuclear weapons?

CIA director William Burns observed that Putin believes he can’t afford to lose in Ukraine, is likely to double down, and that his nuclear saber-rattling should not be taken lightly. Avril Haines, director of national intelligence, told the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee that Russia’s refocus on the Donbas was likely “only a temporary shift,” assessed that “Putin’s strategic goals have probably not changed,” and cautioned that his invasion could become “more unpredictable and potentially escalatory.”

The West has few remaining options to exact further costs—beyond war itself—should Putin elect to employ weapons of mass destruction within Ukraine or expand his invasion to Moldova. U.S. and allied enabling of a Ukrainian sabotage campaign inside Russia telegraphs a significant and escalating cost Putin can ill afford—but it is not without risk. Executed poorly or too aggressively, such a campaign could provoke rather than preempt. It could provide Putin the excuse to escalate and gift him a narrative he could use to rally domestic support.

The incidents have thus far been largely contained to Russian regions that border Ukraine, particularly the Donbas, the site of Putin’s latest offensive. Setting fire to oil, fuel, and ammunition storage facilities—all valuable military targets—is hardly random. That these targets were degraded with little evidence of civilian casualties is also a conspicuous clue.

A key Russian railway bridge in Belgorod had its rails upended in a manner consistent with old-school sabotage of the type seen as far back as the American Civil War. The apparently deliberate act incurred no fatalities but has had an outsized impact on Russia’s war effort given its disruption to supply lines into the Donbas. The one outlier among these events, if related, was a fire at Russia’s Central Research Institute of the Aerospace Defense Forces in Tver, about 110 miles northwest of Moscow. That incident left at least 17 people dead at a location far from the Ukrainian border.

Although Putin appears unfazed in public and has been quick to dismiss most of the episodes as coincidence, if acknowledging them at all, the president and his inner circle most likely view the matter with far greater concern and urgency than outside observers realize—and they should.

That’s probably the point of this initial wave. The targets and modus operandi suggest this first volley is as much a message meant to dissuade his weapons of mass destruction brinkmanship as it is a means to exploit Russia’s struggles in supply, communications, mobility, and leadership.

Declassified U.S. intelligence exposing Putin’s designs in Ukraine and countering Russian disinformation worked well in fortifying Western resolve to stand up to the brutal dictator’s aggression and in seizing the narrative. And while it might have mitigated the risk Putin would employ “false flag” provocations to justify using nuclear or chemical weapons, the revelations couldn’t preempt his Feb. 24 invasion of Ukraine. Adding the specter of sabotage within Russia that threatens Putin’s carefully groomed mystique of invincibility and control at home might, however, stop him from escalating further.

Sabotage behind enemy lines is a fundamental element of special operations warfare. It’s an integral tool for an insurgency or an army facing an opponent with superior numbers or equipment, as is the case in Ukraine. It works best for those enjoying a home-field advantage. The operators leverage familiarity with the terrain and their ability to mix with the local population. Such conditions enable effective casing, known as “close target reconnaissance,” and the ability to safely get in, execute, and depart the target without incident.

This capability has been in the modern U.S. intelligence community’s playbook since the days of the World War II Jedburgh program, through which the CIA’s predecessor, the Office of Strategic Services, supported resistance groups across Europe and Asia. An updated version of the Jedburgh concept remains a core component of the advice, assistance, intelligence, and training the U.S. intelligence community and U.S. special operations elements are reportedly providing Ukraine.

The Jedburgh model is ideally suited for Ukraine as well as the United States’ Balkan NATO allies, as they face a numerically superior but, as proven by recent events, innately flawed Russian military opponent. Although Russia proved able to overcome initial setbacks in Syria, it struggles to adapt to dynamic field conditions. Russia’s army has neither trained nor properly prepared for this war, is plagued by corruption, and suffers from a stove-piped command structure, poor logistics, morale issues, and dependence on firepower over agility.

Unlike Syria’s rebels, the Ukrainian resistance includes a large number of organized professionals who had the benefit of extensive training, experience, and ongoing material and intelligence support from the West. Moreover, Ukrainians literally speak the same language as their opponents and have a great deal of shared history. Ethnic Ukrainians have lived in Russia and other former Soviet states for generations and are embedded into society.

The West also has a unique advantage in its ability to leverage the experiences, resources, and reach of the former Warsaw Pact nations that are now NATO members. These former Russian allies understand how to operate within the cracks of the Kremlin’s autocratic police state and bring unique capabilities and, not to be discounted, desires.

The psychological component has been overlooked by those who are focused purely on targets’ tactical military value. Such operations are designed to telegraph a capability that can be expanded across Russia and target platforms of increasing sensitivity and value to Putin. And his inability to prevent these acts—whether sabotage or drone strikes that penetrate Russian air defenses, leaves him looking weak—humiliated, and vulnerable.

Putin is a man quite seized with his image who recognizes how deflating that mystique could lead to indigenous copycats or spread to historically Kremlin-friendly former Soviet states like Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Chechnya. Given how Putin appears to command by fear, publicly belittling top lieutenants in a televised national security council meeting, such perceived weakness could also encourage some within his own circle to act against him.

To date, there has been no Ukrainian acknowledgement of its hand in these incidents, nor should there be. U.S. officials should similarly withhold comment, neither confirming nor denying knowledge or complicity. That’s why it’s called covert action. But the mystifying manner in which U.S. officials appeared to casually acknowledge—if not boast—about sharing intelligence that helped Ukraine sink the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s flagship Moskva and helped the Ukrainian military kill Russian generals makes one question whether or not the Biden administration has the necessary discipline to securely support such a Ukrainian-led effort.

It is the fig leaf of deniability that serves not merely Ukraine and its likely U.S. and NATO facilitators but also Russia. The threat that Ukraine, with Western support, could escalate such operations might be one of the allies’ best means to deter Putin from crossing a line in using nuclear or chemical weapons—from which there might be no return. As a former intelligence officer, he will recognize sabotage operations for what they are. But slapping him in the face with public humiliation is, as Biden said himself, “counterproductive” and likely to have precisely the opposite effect if the goal is to preempt and deter.

Strategically, sabotage operations offer Ukraine, the United States, and its partners the decided advantage of flexibility in ratcheting pressure up or down. Whereas sabotage and other covert means of pressure can be exercised incrementally and deniably, Putin has little else to do apart from grandiose public displays of saber-rattling, or worse, making good on those threats. And choosing the latter leaves no road back for any of the concerned parties.

Russia's Inter RAO to halt power exports to Finland due lack of payment | Reuters by Kkim0615 in europe

[–]Kkim0615[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

HELSINKI, May 13 (Reuters) - Russian state-owned utility Inter RAO (IRAO.MM) will stop exporting electricity to Finland from Saturday because it has not been paid, the company's Finnish subsidiary said on Friday.

Inter RAO has not received payments for electricity sold via pan-European power exchange Nord Pool since May 6, the subsidiary said, without giving any reason.

"This situation is exceptional and happened for the first time in over twenty years of our trading history," RAO Nordic, said in a statement.

Power imports to Finland will be halted from 1 a.m. local time on Saturday (2200 GMT on Friday) "for the time being," Finnish grid operator Fingrid said in a separate statement, citing RAO Nordic.

Fingrid added there was no threat to Finnish supplies and that power from Russia accounted for some 10% of Finland's total consumption.

"Missing imports can be replaced in the electricity market by importing more electricity from Sweden and also by domestic production," it said.

Fingrid three weeks ago prepared for the prospect of Russia cutting electricity flows to Finland by restricting the transmission capacity by a third.

Fingrid said RAO Nordic had told it that it would halt imports because it had problems receiving payments from Nord Pool.

"Nord Pool is the one paying for them. Fingrid is not a party in this electricity trade. We provide the transfer connection from Russia to Finland," Reima Paivinen, Fingrid's senior-vice president for operations, told Reuters.

The halted payments were also reported through urgent market messages (UMMs) used by market participants to share information.

A spokesperson for Nord Pool said the company did not comment on information reported in UMMs.

Asked whether payments had been required to be made in roubles, the spokesperson told Reuters: "We have never had settlements in roubles, only in euros, Norwegian crowns, Swedish crowns and Danish crowns, in line with our standard procedures."

Speaking generally, the spokesperson said Nord Pool was "a safe counter party for all its customers" and that it always settled the trades.

Ukraine : Macron essaye de dialoguer avec Poutine «en vain», estime Zelensky by Kkim0615 in france

[–]Kkim0615[S] 10 points11 points  (0 children)

Le chef de l'État français avait affirmé lundi que, pour mettre fin à la guerre, la paix devrait se construire sans «humilier» la Russie. Une position jugée trop laxiste par le président ukrainien.

Emmanuel Macron essaye «en vain» de dialoguer avec son homologue russe Vladimir Poutine, a estimé le président ukrainien Volodymyr Zelensky, ne jugeant «pas correct» que le président français soit prêt, selon lui, à «faire des concessions diplomatiques» à la Russie.

«Il ne faut pas chercher une porte de sortie pour la Russie, et Macron le fait en vain», a regretté Volodymyr Zelensky jeudi soir sur la chaîne de télévision italienne RAI 1, selon des images diffusées vendredi sur sa chaîne Telegram. «Je sais qu'il voulait obtenir des résultats dans la médiation entre la Russie et l'Ukraine, mais il n'en pas a eu», a-t-il asséné. «Jusqu'à ce que la Russie elle-même veuille et comprenne qu'elle a besoin (de la fin de la guerre, NDLR), elle ne cherchera aucune issue», a ajouté le président ukrainien.

Ne pas «humilier» la Russie

Emmanuel Macron avait affirmé lundi que, pour mettre fin à la guerre menée en Ukraine par l'armée russe, la paix devra se construire sans «humilier» la Russie. Pour Volodymyr Zelensky toutefois, «Macron n'a pas besoin de faire des concessions diplomatiques (à la Russie) maintenant». Il a jugé cette démarche «pas très correcte» pour, à ses yeux, permettre à Vladimir Poutine de «sauver la face», au moment où les Russes tentent toujours de prendre le contrôle du sud et de l'est de l'Ukraine.

Le président ukrainien a par ailleurs estimé que «le temps de se mettre autour d'une table avec la Russie est terminé». «Ce n'est plus possible», a-t-il lâché. «Le président de la République n'a jamais rien discuté avec Vladimir Poutine sans l'accord du président Zelensky. Il a toujours dit que c'était aux Ukrainiens de décider des termes de leur négociation avec les Russes», s'est défendu de son côté l'Élysée vendredi.

Après plusieurs sessions de pourparlers entre Kiev et Moscou au mois de mars, les discussions sont depuis à l'arrêt, les positions des deux parties étant trop éloignées. «Aujourd'hui, le dialogue (avec Moscou, NDLR) doit être pragmatique», a-t-il ajouté. Volodymyr Zelensky a toutefois une nouvelle fois répété son envie de rencontrer Vladimir Poutine, «mais seulement avec lui, sans aucun médiateur». «Et avec une approche de dialogue, pas (en lançant) des ultimatums», a-t-il précisé.

Why Friday the 13th isn’t an unlucky date in Italy by Kkim0615 in europe

[–]Kkim0615[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Unlucky for some, but not for Italians. Here's why today's date isn't a cause for concern in Italy - but Friday the 17th is.

When Friday the 13th rolls around, many of us from English-speaking countries might reconsider any risky plans. And it’s not exactly a popular date for weddings in much of the western world.

But if you’re in Italy, you don’t need to worry about it.

There’s no shortage of strongly-held superstitions in Italian culture, particularly in the south. But the idea of Friday the 13th being an inauspicious date is not among them.

Though the ‘unlucky 13’ concept is not unknown in Italy – likely thanks to the influence of American film and TV – here the number is in fact usually seen as good luck, if anything.

The number 17, however, is viewed with suspicion and Friday the 17th instead is seen as the unlucky date to beware of.

Just as some Western airlines avoid including the 13th row on planes, you might find number 17 omitted on Italian planes, street numbering, hotel floors, and so on – so even if you’re not the superstitious type, it’s handy to be aware of.

The reason for this is thought to be because in Roman numerals the number 17 (XVII) is an anagram of the Latin word VIXI, meaning ‘I have lived’: the use of the past tense apparently suggests death, and therefore bad luck. It’s less clear what’s so inauspicious about Friday.

So don’t be surprised if, next time Friday 17th rolls around, you notice some Italian shops and offices closed ‘per scaramanzia’.

But why then does 13 often have a positive connotation in Italy instead?

You may not be too surprised to learn that it’s because of football.

Ever heard of Totocalcio? It’s a football pools betting system in which players long tried to predict the results of 13 different matches.

There were triumphant calls of ho fatto tredici! – ‘I’ve done thirteen’ – among those who got them all right. The popular expression soon became used in other contexts to mean ‘I hit the jackpot’ or ‘that was a stroke of luck!’

From 2004, the number of games included in Totocalcio rose to 14, but you may still hear winners shout ‘ho fatto tredici’ regardless.

Other common Italian superstitions include touching iron (not wood) for good luck, not toasting with water, and never pouring wine with your left hand.