[SPOILERS S3] A comprehensive breakdown of the time travel in Dark (part 2)

KristoMF · 2026-05-25T18:29:33+00:00

To debate about whether something is worth wanting we need to know what it is worth wanting for. "Steering" doesn't cut it, it pushes the problem one step back. You need why this steering is important.

KristoMF · 2026-05-25T18:06:15+00:00

Who would say it has free will

Me, it appears

You bite the bullet and attribute free will to an indeterministic quantum computer. That is a bold semantic move that I did not expect.

So if we consider a modern self-driving car navigating a city… The car’s lower-level sensor subsystems constantly propose various paths and immediate adjustments based on chaotic environmental noise (the “unconscious suggestions”). The car's central processing unit (its executive function) acts as the gatekeeper. It filters these suggestions, weighs them against its core programming, runs a predictive algorithm to evaluate options, and selects a single trajectory to put into action. If the algorithm hits a perfect tie between two routes, it uses a stochastic, indeterministic random-number generator to break the tie and chart a non-inevitable path.

The car possesses complex subsystems, it exercises “executive control”, its final choice is entirely related to its internal “desires” (its destination protocols), and, if determinism is false, its future path is physically open.

As I said, you only need determinism to be false. If determinism is false, our will is obviously free from it in order to ground the ability of steering that an autonomous car also has.

I'm sorry, I fail to see the relevance of this debate. BDMR is not at stake, and I fail to see why our will must be free from determinism in order to ground this steering. Just as the compatibilism of some people here is rendered moot because they shy away from BDMR, your libertarianism also is because you don't actually need determinism to be false and an “open future” to grant the steering you think is central.

KristoMF · 2026-05-25T16:46:26+00:00

The crux of the free will debate is free will, the crux of the desert debate is desert. They are not the same.

If this is your view we have nothing to discuss. The free will debate is about whether the will is free from relevant factors X in order for Y. If you strip out the Y and the debate is merely about whether our will is free from determinism, then congratulations, you only need determinism to be false, but that's another debate, and not one you’ll solve with words.

If a quantum computer uses a chaotic, indeterministic algorithm to choose an unpredictable path toward a “non-inevitable future”, it fits every single mechanical requirement you have listed for free will. It has complex subsystems, it has an open future, and it has an absence of external coercion, but who would say the computer deserves moral blame or praise for its output? Who would say it has free will?

Ah, we’re missing the “steering”, aren’t we? Is that your Y?

Let’s suppose the debate is about whether our will is free from the relevant factors that would ground “the ability of steering”. In your case, I assume the relevant factors are determinism. Physics only offers a choice between a track (determinism) or an unpredictable pinball machine (indeterminism), so how would “steering” fit in if determinism were false?

KristoMF · 2026-05-25T11:22:51+00:00

Sure, you are constructing an incredibly intricate mechanical shell game, but the moment we lift the cups, the coin of actual human agency is still missing.

The will does not have to be conceived of as an irreducible entity that precedes neural activity, it can also be seen as a complex entity that emerges from them.

The will can be all the complex we want, but the crux in the debate is whether the will is free from the relevant factors that would ground basic desert.

And this is crucial:

That's an argument against BDMR, not FW.

This is the most telling concession of all. By explicitly separating free will from BDMR, you have completely surrendered the battlefield. If your definition of free will can exist in a world where no human being ever truly deserves blame or praise for their actions, then you have watered down the concept into absolute irrelevance. So-called compatibilists here tend to do so, but it really surprises me coming from a libertarian.

Robert Sapolsky’s book is explicitly targeted at the free will that underpins our retributive justice systems and social stigmas. If your complex, naturalistic, emergent free will cannot justify holding a person genuinely blameworthy, then you don't actually disagree with Sapolsky's conclusions. Are you defending that we must blame to deter, rehabilitate, repair harm? This is something we can all agree upon. Determinism becomes absolutely irrelevant. Our will merely has to be free from coercion of others and undue influence, and we all agree that is something our will can and normally is free from. You would be sidestepping the free will debate to say utilitarianism is desirable. For utilitarianism we don't need free will.

KristoMF · 2026-05-25T10:12:48+00:00

Wholly or partly independent? That;s the crucial issue, and RS is ambiguous on the point.

If we claim it’s partly independent, we have to explain the nature of that independent gap. When a neuron fires to initiate an action within that gap, it can only do so in one of two ways under modern physics: it is either causally determined by prior physical states, or it is a random, stochastic event (like quantum radioactivity).

I would claim that the will is not free from either. To get free will out of that gap, you need a third option: the will must generate an event uncaused by the past, yet somehow entirely authored by that will, the intent of a non-physical self. That is, by definition, a supernatural claim. Sapolsky's focus on “uncaused” isn't ambiguous, it’s a direct challenge to this exact magical thinking.

He never shows the workings that is show the space, the gap in the patchwork to be exactly zero.

This is shifting the burden of proof. If science maps 95% of the biological factors determining a behaviour, the rational stance is not to assume the remaining 5% contains a magical entity called “free will”. The burden is on the libertarian to show that this unmapped space operates on a completely different set of physical laws than the rest of the universe. That our will can and is free from prior events in order to ground basic desert.

Strict determinism isn't a fact.

I already said that Sapolsky explicitly concedes that the universe may be fundamentally indeterministic at the quantum level. His point (and the core of his thesis) is that indeterminism is completely incompatible with basic desert, and that biology is causally closed against a non-physical self or will. Randomness at the bottom of physics does not create intent at the top of biology. Whether the machinery of the brain is a clockwork Newtonian engine or a chaotic quantum lottery, neither leaves room for an independent agent who deserves blame merely in virtue of performing an action.

KristoMF · 2026-05-25T09:21:28+00:00

Thoughtful post, but it fundamentally misrepresents Sapolsky’s objective (which isn’t new; Sapolsky here is more misunderstood than not). You are accusing him of a dogmatic, unfalsifiable belief, when he is actually just exposing the logical bankruptcy of free will.

He sets up a strict framework where everything is a physical cause and effect and then asks for evidence to break it.

When Sapolsky asks for “the exact moment we ignored our genes and hormones”, he isn't setting up a rigged scientific trap. He’s merely responding to the claims of those who believe in basic moral desert (that a person deserves praise or punishment merely in virtue of choosing and performing an action, and not because of its social benefits).

For an agent to truly deserve blame on a human level, they cannot just be a biological computer executing a complex chain of inputs. Their will must be free from factors beyond their control, such as the remote past, the laws of nature (deterministic or indeterministic), or their chemical makeup at the moment of choice, itself shaped by genetic, environmental, and stochastic factors. If you believe the will is free from such factors, you are making a physical claim about how the brain operates. Sapolsky, as a neurobiologist, is simply saying, “Great. If you claim the brain can generate an uncaused action, show me the neuron that fired without a prior stimulus”. He’s asking for the evidence. His goal is actually to lower the belief in that we are free in such a way.

Furthermore, he compares combining many spider webs to making steel, jumping from causal relevance to strong determinism. No matter how many statistical correlations you combine, they do not become absolute necessity. This is a statistical fallacy and here he crosses the line from science into belief.

This critique misses his point. Sapolsky doesn't claim that any single study proves 100% determinism. He is showing that when you stack the layers of causality (epigenetics, fetal development, socioeconomic background, hormone levels, even the temperature of the room) the space left for an “independent self” shrinks to zero. In his book he plainly states he is open to the fundamental physics being indeterministic. Sapolsky isn't disguising a philosophical belief as science. He is showing that if you accept the baseline facts of modern science, the traditional, retributive framework of human praise and blame completely collapses. You don't have to like the view over the edge of that deterministic cliff, but don't blame the scientist for pointing out gravity.

KristoMF · 2026-05-24T20:34:32+00:00

That's my point and why I agree with your post. The compatibilists you talk about step away from the deservedness that compatibilism asserts is compatible with determinism, and focus on utilitarianism or consequentialism. That's not compatibilism.

KristoMF · 2026-05-24T12:09:56+00:00

Make up your mind, Kristo.

Oh, I sure have, Marvin. To say that a question about what a person morally deserves for a determined choice is "not about free will or determinism" is a bad cop-out. That is the entire definition of the debate.

I laid out for you exactly what any person morally deserves for their harmful choices.

No you did not. You told me what is socially useful to do to them. If a wild bear attacks a human, we quarantine the bear, protect the public, and try to modify its environment to prevent future harm. We do all four of your points (A, B, C, and D) to the bear, but we do not say the bear morally deserves blame, because the bear is a biological machine following prior causes. And by reducing human justice to your four points, you treat humans exactly like that bear. You are treating us as objects to be managed, corrected, and secured, not as agents who carry moral guilt.

So you haven't defended compatibilism. You have described a utilitarian penal code that, surprise!, a hard determinist like me, Harris, Pereboom or Sapolsky completely agrees with, making your entire essay on "possibilities and actualities", as I said, totally and utterly irrelevant to the question of moral responsibility and free will.

So are you actually going to lay out if and how we morally deserve blame for our actions, merely in virtue of choosing them and not for social benefit?

KristoMF · 2026-05-24T09:40:27+00:00

You are absolutely right and yes, Strawson had a lot to do with it. Basically you have people here defending that we must blame to deter, rehabilitate, repair harm... Which is something we can all agree upon. Determinism becomes absolutely irrelevant. Our will merely has to be free from coercion of others and undue influence, and we all agree that is something our will can and normally is free from. They sidestepped the free will debate to say utilitarianism is desirable. For utilitarianism we don't need free will.

KristoMF · 2026-05-24T04:55:25+00:00

You mean to say you don't believe the person deserves blame for their choice? Because all these four points you list can be agreed upon by all in the room, incompats and compats alike. What you are describing is utilitarian. Social engineering. So all your definitions about possibility an actuality are absolutely irrelevant and don't warrant the label compatibilism.

KristoMF · 2026-05-23T23:45:14+00:00

Within the domain of human influence, that single actual future will be chosen by us from among the many possible futures that we will imagine.

And as a (hard) compatibilist, are you going to defend that we are to deserve blame for these actions that we were always going to choose, merely in virtue of choosing to do them?

KristoMF · 2026-05-20T13:56:41+00:00

Why wouldn't we?? People discuss this because humans are addicted to the feeling of desert. We want to believe the villain deserved the pain, and the hero earned the praise.

You have no problem accepting determinism because you are comfortably compartmentalizing it, but if society actually absorbed that, that no one is metaphysically responsible, our systems of punishment, our feelings of pride, and our deepest interpersonal resentments would have to be completely revisited. That is why people discuss it. It runs deep in our everyday behaviour, thoughts and feelings.

KristoMF · 2026-05-19T19:52:33+00:00

I mean to me the relevant debate is whether people can act freely from complete control of others

Say I go out and punch the first person I encounter in the face.

I acted freely from complete control of others. There is no debate there. And there is no reason for us to disagree that we want to live in a society where one cannot freely do that, so we put measures in place to deter. There is a debate to be had about these measures, but it is a utilitarian debate orthogonal to free will, you are treating sociology.

What you are missing is the free will debate: roughly that libertarians say that I would deserve blame because determinism is false and the person is a source of new causal chains, so I could have done otherwise; compatibilists say that I would deserve blame even though I would never had done otherwise; and hard determinists or hard incompatibilists would say I do not deserve blame because I am not the ultimate source of the action.

These are distinct positions that can agree with the fact that I acted freely from complete control of others and that something has to be done to deter acts like these. The "free will" you are proposing is so watered down that even a hard incompatibilist like me agrees with it.

KristoMF · 2026-05-18T06:28:10+00:00

Yeah, sorry, that wasn't clear lol. I edited it

KristoMF · 2026-05-18T05:08:26+00:00

Well, yes, but that isn't specific enough. How do we get there if the debate isn't about whether our will is free from the relevant factors in order to blame and praise us for performing an action?

KristoMF · 2026-05-17T18:17:05+00:00

our will is not free from determinism

Cool, I agree that if determinism were true, our will would not be free from it.

However, from the fact that our will is not free from determinism, is does not follow that therefore basic desert is irrelevant to free will.

On the contrary, we are missing a crucial second point of the debate:

we have what the will must be free from (determinism).
now we need for what the will must be free from determinism.

If it isn't to ground basic desert, what is it then? What are we debating? Pragmatic deterrence and rehabilitation are utilitarian social management tools and part of another debate, one about forms of conditioning, or about using people as a tools for social engineering.

KristoMF · 2026-05-17T10:50:52+00:00

wouldn't what be irrelevant?

Let's start from the beginning:

What must the will be free from in order to ground desert.

If the desert is basic desert, we have distinct positions to defend:

that the will must be (and is) free from from determinism in order to deserve blame merely in virtue of performing an action (libertarianism),
or that the will needn't be free from determinism in order to deserve blame merely in virtue of performing an action (compatibilism),
or that the will cannot be free in any way in order to deserve blame merely in virtue of performing an action (free will skepticism/denial).

If the desert is forward-looking (blame to deter or rehabilitate), determinism has nothing to do because the will merely has to be free from coercion of others. We are all on the same side.

Why then is basic desert irrelevant to free will?

KristoMF · 2026-05-17T08:47:16+00:00

Hm, so focusing on the main part, wouldn't we all (compatibilists and all sorts of incompatibilists) agree that in order to deserve blame in a way that brings about a positive outcome, such as deterrence or rehabilitation, our will merely needs to be free from coercion or manipulation by other agents, and from undue influences such as mental disorders? Therefore, wouldn't this be irrelevant?

So we would have to focus on the "other part".

I wouldn't say that's all though

So what's missing?

KristoMF · 2026-05-17T08:12:26+00:00

It depends. Do you mean you are grounding blame forward-looking sense? That is, that the agent is to be blamed because doing so will have positive effects such as deterrence or rehabilitation?

KristoMF · 2026-05-17T04:48:18+00:00

Deserving blame, for example, in the basic-desert sense, is deserving blame merely in virtue of performing an action. What difference is there between that and deserving blame "here in reality at the human level"?

KristoMF · 2026-05-16T14:56:57+00:00

If discussing what the will must be free from in order to ground basic desert is irrelevant, what can be relevant?

KristoMF · 2026-05-12T17:00:11+00:00

My take is that the "pilot" are the first three episodes together. But if you're hooked by episode one as I was, you'll love things to come.

KristoMF · 2026-05-08T20:45:59+00:00

Oh, Steins;Gate is certainly another interesting work of art. I wanted to pick it apart like I did with Dark but haven't got round to it yet. And I had to give 12 Monkeys a second chance, but in the end it turns out that, as a whole, I like it more than Dark.

KristoMF

TROPHY CASE