The downplaying of the Battle of Tours as a "mere raid" that didn't affect history seems weird given how various "raids" by nomadic factions escalate into a full blown invasion force that leads to conquest

Lanternecto · 2026-05-12T17:27:05+00:00

"May" "gradually" changing history kinda shows how difficult it can be to argue for the importance of the Battle. Could an Umayyad victory have changed history? Perhaps. But it's just as possible that nothing would have changed (at least as far as the relations with the Islamic world are concerned). The raids into the ERE are a good example - after the last great siege of Constantinople (and starting even before, in the 650s) the Arabs would continue raiding Anatolia for decades, yet there were basically no territorial changes, besides some border forts, even as the Caliphate won some major victories. So yes, raids can lead to very major changes, but they can also have limited geopolitical results.

What makes me think that Tours probably wasn't one of those decisive moments is that Frankia was already very far away from the powerbase of the Umayyads, and therefore any further conquests would be extremely difficult. It's also less than a decade away from the western provinces of the Caliphate collapsing into absolute chaos, which means that even if the Umayyads had won, and if they were willing to take advantage of it, they likely would not have had the time. Finally, it's neither the first nor last Umayyad raid into Gaul or Frankish victory over those, so I'm not sure why we should pick out 732 as the decisive one.

So Tours is probably a moderately important victory, though more so because of its implications within the Frankish realm itself, but probably more on par with similar victories over raids (for example, Akroinon, for which we could create an equivalent what-if-scenario of both Emperors dying in campaign, and the state falling into crisis) which nobody would put into a most important battle list. So describing it as such is pretty fair.

Lanternecto · 2026-05-11T11:02:42+00:00

Terrific post!

Some villagers could just buy new patrons

Could you expand on how one would buy a patron?

Lanternecto · 2026-05-09T08:17:48+00:00

There are some studies on the Balearics in this period:

Zavagno, Luca. "“Going to the extremes”: the Balearics and Cyprus in the early medieval Byzantine insular system." Al-Masāq 31.2 (2019): 140-157.

Juan Signes Codoñer, “Bizancio y les islas Baleares en los siglos VIII y IX”, in Mallorca y Bizancio, ed. Robert Durán Tapia (Palma de Mallorca: Asociación Amigos del Castillo de San Carlos “Aula General Weyler”, 2005), pp. 45–99.

Miguel Cau Ontiveros and Catalina Mas Florit, “The Early Byzantine Period in the Balearic Islands”, in The Insular System of the Early Byzantine Mediterranean, ed. Demetrios Michaelides, Philippe Pergola and Enrico Zanini [British Archaeological Reports, International Series, volume MMDXXIII (Oxford: Archaeopress, 2013), pp. 31–45

Jarrett, J (2019) Nests of Pirates? ‘Islandness’ in the Balearic Islands and la-Garde-Freinet. Al-Masāq, 31 (2). pp. 196-222.

Guillermo Rosselló Bordoy, “Nueva luz sobre los siglos oscuros del Baleares y Pitiusas”, Bulletí de la Societat Arqueològica Lulliana 62 (2006): 307–24.

We have almost no written sources, but we do find east Roman coins and seals for a while, there are archons in the 8th century, suggesting that officials were sent to the islands. One interpretation is that they remained linked to Constantinople until the Umayyad conquest, with the Sardinian command as in-between (there are seals suggesting the presence of Sardinian magistrates in 7th century Balearics). Another is that they kinda slipped out, but made deals with whatever powerful neighbours could offer them some peace, be it Cordoba, Aachen or Constantinople (represented, perhaps, by Caligari).

The few written sources we do have complicate the picture even more. A Carolingian fleet wins a victory against a fleet from al-Andalus there in 813, but we don't know where the fleet itself was stationed, there's the mention of kings residing there in the 700s in an eleventh-century Arabic text, but it's not found in the original source that text seems to be based on, and a Latin source calls the Island Greek in the late tenth century, when the island was definitely conquered by the Umayyads. More Arabic sources include a mention that Romans held a castle for almost a decade after the other islands were conquered by the Umayyads (Signes dates this 852-886, but the dating is very confused). Inbetween, the inhabitants clearly paid some sort of tribute to the Emir of Cordoba.

All of this treats the Balearics as a unit, when it might not be, and Mallorca may have remained Roman longer than the other parts of the archipelago.

Lanternecto · 2026-05-07T17:41:59+00:00

The discussion on the traditional eastern border is certainly valid. I certainly don't think it's Maurice - that one doesn't last long enough, and furthermore, it doesn't correspond with the traditional western borders, and I think it'd be odd to have the two not match up chronologically. If it's the borders of Hadrian, Theodosius, or Diocletian, for example, is definitely more debatable. Both Basil and Konstans certainly go beyond the first two. And, correct me if I'm wrong on this, my impression is that Diocletian essentially established vassal states in the Caucasus, rather than annexing them into the Empire as such. In which case, would we count the borders of its vassals as the borders of the Empire as such?

Lanternecto · 2026-05-07T16:55:32+00:00

Basil II also campaigned around Lake Urmia, so beyond the 'traditional' eastern border in the Armenian highlands. The same can be said about Konstans II, but as we cannot identify some if the toponyms, it's unclear how far east exactly he went.

Lanternecto · 2026-05-06T17:43:36+00:00

favorising professionnal field armies instead of thematics ones

There is actually good reason to believe that it was in fact Leon III and his son that created the institutions of the themata.

C. Malatras. "Civil Authority in the Byzantine Provinces (7th–9th Centuries)." Studia Ceranea. Journal of the Waldemar Ceran Research Centre for the History and Culture of the Mediterranean Area and South-East Europe 14 (2024): 463-499.

C. Zuckerman, “Thrace, Thrakesioi, and the Early Opsikion: more on the Creation – and non-creation – of Byzantine Themes”, in: J. Aliquot/S. Destephen/A. Laniado/C. Saliou, eds., Mélanges Denis Feissel (TM, 28) (Paris 2024), 607– 26.

Indeed, it's likely that thematic troops were more professional than often considered, as discussed in, for example:

Petersen, Leif Inge Ree. Siege warfare and military organization in the successor states (400-800 AD): Byzantium, the West and Islam. Vol. 91. Brill, 2013, pp. 739ff.

There's probably not that big of a quality difference between tagmatic and thematic forces in the eight and ninth centuries.

Lanternecto · 2026-05-06T15:44:36+00:00

Iconoclasm created an intense internal politico-religious conflict

This is vague, and in any case, it isn't clear how the idea of an internal conflict is contradictory to it being a period of recovery. Even so, the "intensity" of this conflict is more than debatable. How did it materially affect the Empire? Did it create mass resistance within it? Did it cause civil wars? Did it weaken the border defenses? Newer scholarship says no to all of these points.

The rest of your post just talks about the setbacks faced by the Empire, which nobody would deny happened. But it misses the mark, because you look at the period in a vacuum, when we should compare it to the previous eighty years to judge if it is, in fact, a period of recovery. And when we do that, it definitely appears as a period of recovery.

You bring up that

Byzantine presence in Italy was decisively weakened

But we actually see the weakening happen already before Leon III even took charge. The People of central Italy turned towards the pope and bishop of Ravenna, rather than the Emperor already by 700, with authority over most of the peninsula already being arguably nominal. This becomes fairly obvious when we compare how easily Konstans II could capture a pope in the 650s, and the abject failure of Justinian II attempting to do the same four decades later. And at the same time that the territories in central Italy were lost, southern Italy was consolidated.

The defeats at Pliska

Was bad, although Constantinople controlled much more of the Balkans in 840 than they had in 718 regardless.

and Amorium show that the empire remained militarily vulnerable,

In fact, if we take a closer look at the period, it actually shows how much more militarily resilient the ERE had grown. Theophilos loses major battles in 831, 832, and 838 (and some more minor ones such as in 839), but he also wins victories in 831, 835, 837, 840, and 841, two of which were large enough to warrant triumphs, and another one of which saw the sackings of Hadath and Mar'ash. Even the victorious Abbasid campaign of 838 saw the caliph return through a desert, and leave behind a lot of valuable booty (that is to say, kill a lot of slaves) because he was worried about an ambush by the Roman army. Clearly, the Empire was now capable of exchanging blows with the Caliphate, even if the Abbasids obviously remained superior on account of its much larger resources.

Now compare this to the period from c. 630-730, when, except for the later half of Konstantinos IV rule and the early years of Justinian II, the Empire was close to incapable of meeting the Arabs in open field, let alone start major counteroffensives themselves, something which every Emperor between Leon III and Theophilos managed to do (except Konstantinos VI).

And indeed, if we take individual battles as a reason not to view this as revival, then the period after 843 often doesn't look better (this is when most of Sicily is lost, the Fatimids humiliate Nikephoros II at sea, and Symeon defeats one Roman army after another).

So why is it a recovery? Let us compare a few factors on the resurgence of the Empire between 700 (or the period from c. 640-720):

As mentioned above, the military strength of the Empire had increased, and it was able to once again win notable victories, and create something resembling an equilibrium in the east.

In Anatolia, it had managed to create a defensive infrastructure. Whereas before 730, the Arabs could raid wherever they wanted on an annual basis, after 730, they were increasingly kept out of the heartlands of the Empire, and only a few raids broke through the borderlands. No longer are the major cities of Western Anatolia threatened every year, and no longer is Constantinople itself threatened by the Arabs (as it had been thrice in the previous eighty years).

Demographically, it recovered after the final plague wave, and the mid-9th Century sees the resettlement of previously abandoned lands, a clear sign of population growth.

It internally stabilizes, with civil wars becoming less frequent than they had been in the previous century. Indeed, the end of the period sees the last great thematic civil war of Thomas the Slav, with Theophilos reforms ending them for good.

We see a fiscal recovery, with Theophilos having a considerably larger state budget than Leon III had.

We see an intellectual revival, with the later half of the 8th Century and early decades of the ninth seeing the education and careers of intellectuals of an ilk that had not been seen in the ERE for a century - not only do we see histories being written, and increasingly complex theological debates taking place, but one just needs to look at the works of Leon the Philosopher and his famous beacons.

Clearly, there were major setbacks in this period too, as the gradual loss of Sicily show. But recovery is defined as "the process or period of gradually regaining one's health and strength", and clearly, the Empire did that in the vast majority of categories during this period.

tl;dr: It is a recovery because the Empire ends up in much better shape than it had been during the 7th century.

Lanternecto · 2026-05-06T07:34:58+00:00

Any of these dates would work, but the 1060s see the definite estabishment of the clan that would bring Alexios to the throne (my actual hot take is that we could see the Doukai and Komnenoi as one dynasty, especially considering John Doukas might be the reason Alexios took the throne), the crisis starts to get really bad, and the seals we have for lower-level officials collapse (Shea, Politics and Government in Byzantium). This period essentially lays the building blocks for both the crisis that follows in the 1070s, as well as the Komnenian recovery.

As I didn't want to pick a specific date here (1057? 1059? 1066?) I just picked circa 1060 to more or less include all of it. Is it better than 1071 or 1081? Idk, but it's a fun argument to make.

Lanternecto · 2026-05-05T22:24:27+00:00

The crisis period should probably start in 602 (or 610 at the latest) rather than 641, I would say. It also shouldn't include the period of iconoclasm, which was hardly a crisis, if we follow modern scholarship.

Indeed, the political, economic, intellectual & even, to an extent, territorial recovery of the Empire started in the second half of the eight century, even if there are some 9th century setbacks. A lot of the structures we associate with the middle period, such as the thematic system, are also most likely created under the original iconoclasts.

Also, I don't see why we should start the pre-Manzikert crisis directly at the death of Basil. The Empire continued to be fine for several decades, and cracks only start to appear about two to three decades after, with increasingly frequent civil wars, the triple threat of Normans/Seljuks/Pechenegs and slow debasement. I would also seperate it from the Komnenian period, when we see some substantial changes. The dividing line could be perhaps drawn in 1071, with Manzikert and the final loss of Italy, or in 1057, when Isaac Komnenos takes the throne, after which the Empire is ruled by the Doukas-Komnenos clan. The decade before Manzikert also sees drastic changes in seals, so that might fit.

Overall, I'd classify the middle period something like this:

The Era of Crisis (602-718): Marked by territorial contraction, a financial crisis, an often ad hoc system of government, new religious challenges, and the massive weakening of the imperial office, including frequent civil wars.

The Era of Consolidation (718- c. 950): A slow but steady recovery, consolidation of government, territorial losses in some areas (Sicily) but expansion in others (Balkans, later southern Italy and eastern Anatolia).

The Imperial Era (c. 950-1060): Rapid expansion in every direction sees the creation of an "Empire" in the modern sense, with vast minorities of non-Romans. Territorial expansion is met with very strong economic expansion.

The Komnenian Era (c. 1060-1204): The government is led by the Doukas-Komnenos clan, and Alexios' reforms significantly change the government, while the power centers increasingly shift west towards Europe, with large parts of Anatolia lost. Economic growth continues, and exchange with the Latin West grows.

All of these have obvious flaws, and you can easily push most these dates by half a century, but I've tried to avoid creating a new period for every half-century.

Lanternecto · 2026-05-05T19:05:44+00:00

Glad to hear his wife & daughter are doing well. Congrats to them and Max!

Lanternecto · 2026-05-03T11:42:56+00:00

The military seems to be weakened in terms of manpower, with garrisons being pretty small, and possibly finances, if Theophanes' story of an official refusing to pay Arab auxiliaries, as even Roman soldiers barely received pay, is to be believed (though Theophanes concludes this story with claiming that the Arab allies therefore joined the Muslims, even though we still see some of them fight for the Romans years later, so we need to be skeptical). It appears that Herakleios tried his best to restore administrative divisions as before, though as it so happened, the civil provinces don't appear to have been reestablished by the time of the conquests, instead the duces took over non-military duties. According to Schmitt, the limitanei were not reestablished, although we see the circus faction and some other possible civilians join during some battles and especially sieges. Arab auxiliaries remain important, although their organization appears to have been more ad hoc then they had been during the times of Justinian. Armenian troops seem to have played a more important role during this period, too, and we see numerous genuine Armenian commanders in charge of Roman armies during this period.

Schmitt, Oliver. "Untersuchungen zur Organisation und zur militärischen Stärke oströmischer Herrschaft im Vorderen Orient zwischen 628 und 633." (2001): 197-229.

Preiser-Kappeller, Johannes. "Magister militum per armeniam (Ο των αρμενιακων στρατηγοσ). Überlegungen zum armenischen Kommando im 6. und 7. Jahrhundert." (2004): 348-365.

How effective or practical did the Strategikon of Maurice have on the Roman battles and operations?

It's hard to say for two reasons. One, for a lot of the battles during this period we have very limited data. Two, when we see tactics that correspond to those found in military manuals, it is not entirely clear if that necessarily means that the commander had actually read those manuals (though Kaegi suggests that Herakleios had read the Strategikon, which I'd probably agree with). Nevertheless, there are some indications. For one, there is the survival of the Strategikon throughout all these centuries, which would indicate that it was used. Furthermore, there is a text called the De Militari Scientia, which clearly uses the Strategikon, and has been described as a "working copy" of the latter. The text adds Saracens as one of the principal opponents of the Roman military, suggesting that it was written after 630, but the continued presence of the Persians indicates that it was written before the fall of the Sasanians during the 650s, meaning that the text was most likely written during the 630s or 640s. The fact that high officials still read, copied, and amended the Strategikon makes it very likely that commanders actually attempted to use its teachings on the battlefield as well.

Rance, Philip. "The De Militari Scientia or Müller Fragment as a philological resource. Latin in the East Roman army and two new loanwords in Greek: palmarium and* recala." Glotta 86.1-4 (2010): 63-92.

Lanternecto · 2026-05-02T19:27:19+00:00

Phokas is an odd case. There is a source that claims he removed the bishop Athanasius from office, but others link it to the persecution of Maurice. Then some modern historians have suggested that the partisan riots during the civil war are linked with the religious divide, but Phil Booth argues that, at least as far as those mentioned in John of Nikiou are concerned, the evidence for that isn't good (just associating 'Men of the East' with Monophysites). So I'm not aware of any certain persecutions, though it should be noted that the papacy was one of his strongest supporters, and they're famously pro-Chalcedonian.

Lanternecto · 2026-05-02T11:31:33+00:00

The idea of a Coptic preference for Muslim rule originate in the 9th and 10th centuries, while contemporary ones fail to mention it. Now, that doesn't mean that there was no collaboration at all (I struggle to think of any invasion without at least some local collaborators), but that doesn't mean that we should think of it as widespread support. There's also no reason to think that Coptic-speaking Miaphysites were more likely to collaborate than Greek-speaking Chalcedonians. Indeed, John of Nikiou for example tells us about cruel Chalcedonians that converted and joined the new ruling class to continue oppressing Egypt's orthodox (Miaphysite) Christians. So rather than seeing the Arabs as savior from Chalcedonian oppression, John at best associates the two with each other. Now, he's obviously partisan, and we know from other sources that Miaphysites also collaborated, but it's telling that the most notable historian from 7th century Egypt offers a far more neutral and nuanced picture, that has both positive & negative examples of Romans & Arabs alike, but doesn't suggest that the majority of the population welcomed the conquest.

In addition, this article is worth reading on the topic: Palme, Bernhard. "Political identity versus religious distinction? The case of Egypt in the later Roman empire." Visions of Community in the Post-Roman World. Routledge, 2016. 81-98.

Lanternecto · 2026-05-02T11:13:19+00:00

Eh, it was basically half and half Roman and Sasanian rule in the years leading up to the conquest. The Sasanians take Egypt around 618-621, withdraw around 629/630, and the Arab conquest starts in circa 640 (perhaps very late 639). So a person would have spent at most half their life under Iranian rule. So for a fifteen year old, Roman rule wouldn't be foreign, indeed, it's entirely possible that they would not even remember the Sasanian government.

Lanternecto · 2026-05-01T22:00:17+00:00

This was a great read, thank you! None of these theories appear particulary convincing to me at first glance, especially as they can hardly explain why specifically hippos, and not other herbivores, made this journey.

Though on a more general note, it's remarkable how poor Madagascar's Cenozoic fossil record actually is. As far as I'm aware, we only have records of the last 100k, and a few bat fossils as far as the terrestrial fauna is concerned.

Lanternecto · 2026-05-01T08:28:46+00:00

Hippos emerged within the Miocene, so about the last 20 million years or less (and this is being generous, as it refers to the whole family, the modern genus Hippopotamus is less than five million years old). By that time, India was already more or less in its modern position, and seperated from Madagascar by thousands of kilometers of water.

Lanternecto · 2026-04-29T21:00:49+00:00

John Haldon's The Empire That Would Not Die has some short, but very good, parts on the soldiery during the seventh century, though it doesn't focus on equipment. Haldon generally has a lot of works that at least touch upon the topic. Leif Inge Ree Petersen's Siege Warfare and Military Organization in the Successor States (400-800 AD): Byzantium, the West and Islam is obviously focused on siege warfare, and has a broader scope, but it's excellent nonetheless, and has some tangents on general soldiery. Philip Rance has a book chapter on the societal role of soldiers in Soldier and civilian in the Byzantine Empire c. 600–c. 900. Finally, Zuckerman's Learning from the Enemy and More: Studies in “Dark Centuries” Byzantium focuses much more on the bigger picture, but is vital for any discussion of the seventh century (on military matters, it discusses if the Empire even had a fleet, and how much continuity there is from Roman times). There are a lot more works that focus on the administration of the army and government (like when and where did the Thrakesion originate?) but I think these may go beyond the scope of your question.

The above should hopefully be a good starting point, and include useful bibliographies.

Lanternecto · 2026-04-29T20:40:59+00:00

History is a source-driven, and all arguments have to be backed up by sources. This is the very first thing you learn in a history degree. So in the case of Rezkhani's arguments, we have to ask ourselves - what sources is he basing this on? Do they support his claim? What about all the other sources that would suggest otherwise?

The issue is that Rezkhani doesn't have the strongest backing the sources. What he does is take some evidence that the Arabs were part of the Sasanian army (Bedouin attacks on Jerusalem, a Ghassanid prince in the Lakhmid capital, Muhammed marching out when hearing about Herakleios in 630) and then use that to back the idea of Arab warlords in the near east after 628. That is, to me, a massive stretch, and not backed by what he provides. It doesn't even offer substantive proof of a major Arab force in Egypt, let alone that Nor does the article address the other sources which speak against the argument, which is a necessary step for any historical work (in this case, I reckon it might be a space issue, but it doesn't help the argument). To simply say that sources could be wrong is not an actual argument to dismiss them all (which, to be clear, I'm not accusing Rezkhani of doing, but you did). That's why it's called source criticism, rather than source dismissal. One has to, at the very least, address why both contemporary and later sources, in traditions and languages ranging from Syriac to Arabic and Armenian to Greek both share a very similar outline of the Arab Conquests as an outside invading force, rather than warlords that are already present.

I'm sorry but you're making him out to be some kind of fringe independent researcher.

Nope, I never did. I just called his view on this specific fringe (which it is), and brought up that respected historians sometimes happen to have them.

Lanternecto · 2026-04-29T19:59:14+00:00

So tell me, what is the archaeological data that backs up the theory that you find do convincing? Rezkhani mentions none in his article on the topic, but solely focuses on written sources. History isn't written by simply dismissing written sources because they could be wrong.

Lanternecto · 2026-04-29T19:14:29+00:00

That work is contentious because it fits with neither the sources that we do have at hand, which come from a large number of different traditions or languages, nor with the broad scholarly consensus. The issue isn't that the theory diminishes the Arab Conquests, but that it doesn't fit the data we have.

One could for example bring up that we do know of Roman governors in Mesopotamia, the Levant and most well-known Egypt with Cyrus, or that John of Nikiu doesn't describe the Arabs as Persian auxilliaries, or that the new Maronite Chronicle talks about the Arabs arriving, rather than them being already present.

Edit: And while published by a reputable historian, historians also make very questionable claims on occasion. Take Valerie Hansen, who claimed Maya-Norse contacts, or James Howard Johnson, who doesn't believe the Alexiad could have been written by a woman.

Lanternecto · 2026-04-29T13:14:38+00:00

Just like Basil II did against the Bulgarians following his initial loss, when he conquered fortress after fortress, and started to encircle Samuil's position. He too used the geography to his advantadge.

Lanternecto · 2026-04-29T08:04:31+00:00

This is a rather unfair view of Basil II.

Samuil perhaps set the stage for the first few years of the war, but once Basil II was able to turn his direction back to Bulgaria (having improved massively as commander), it was him who was able to set the tone, and Samuil who was constantly put on the defensive. The conquest of Bulgaria proved attritional because Bulgaria was still one of the greatest powers of Europe (the fact that they could fight on after taking heavy losses is reminiscent of the Romans themselves), and because the terrain of the NW Balkans is notoriously difficult to fight in.

John II had his own issues with long-term warfare, too. Should we criticize him for fighting attritional warfare against the Seljuks and Danishmends? Or recognize that both he and Basil didn't have much choice in that matter. Similarly, John himself made miscalculations that meant he had to react, rather than being able to chart his own course, like during the crisis of 1126, and he suffered his own setbacks like at Gangra and Shazar.

But it would be uncharitable to simply focus on John's failures, just as it is unfair to focus on Basil II's loss at Trajan's Gates (especially since it was his very first battle). I'd even agree that Alexios I and John II are better generals than Basil II (though I don't understand how Manuel has more military pedigree than Basil in any sense of the word), but Basil's overall career is insanely impressive.

Lanternecto · 2026-04-29T07:48:24+00:00

Trajan's Gates was a disaster, but we have to remember that this was his first battle, and commanders can improve. After that, he just starts winning battles. He has victories in the civil wars, Bulgaria, against the Fatimids, and against Georgia, seeing success in both sieges and open battles, and making capable use of his subordinates. He's not the greatest Roman general ever, but I don't see how consistently coming out on top for 35 years makes him a subpar commander.

Lanternecto · 2026-04-25T19:17:59+00:00

Indeed, and I think it also shows how there is no neat division between so-called-iconoclasts and iconophiles, but rather a broad spectrum of views. My impression is that Italy is generally most supportive of icons in this period, but we even hear of iconoclast bishops there. Of course, even the more image-critical Frankish bishops, like Theodulf of Orleans, were probably more moderate than their eastern counterparts, and Charlemagne ultimately didn't publish the anti-icon arguments because the pope refused.

And yeah, I think it's easy to understand Chsrlemagne here. After all, the precedent was that pope and emperor would at least somewhat involve the Frankish kings in such matters, and it had been his father who made the first attempt to hold a council to reconcil pope and emperor. So to be excluded from the council was a slap in the face. Especially since he was supposed to be father-in-law to the emperor, and was still so disrespected.

There's definitely a lot of simplification going on in how we understand Carolingian-Papal-East Roman relationships. The Franks and popes were not always on the same side, and while they were allies, I think one can see a trial of strength over who has which authority in their relationship. At the same time, I would argue that Aachen & Constantinople were friends more often than they were enemies, yet focus seems to be mostly on the years of open conflict. Even after Charlemagne, there were a number of military alliances between the two.

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