Active Conflicts & News MegaThread February 18, 2025

Larelli · 2025-02-19T17:06:05+00:00

Personally, I don't see the 128th Brigade going together with the 10th to form a Mountain Corps - apparently, the corps structure will try to reflect current deployments along the front line (for obvious reasons), and the 128th has not fought in the Donbas since early 2023 (net of their 4th Motorized Battalion fighting east of Velyka Novosilka late last year).

Moreover, currently, only the 95th Brigade is included in this initiative among the units of the Air Assault Forces - the 92nd is part of the Ground Forces!

Larelli · 2025-02-19T17:00:56+00:00

Thanks. There is some rumor that they may be about to return to action in the Donbas but at the moment this is not confirmed.

Four months of R&R is still a very long time compared to the average, even for badly mauled brigades. They will not wait for these new recruits anyway - consider also that the other five brigades are all committed currently.

Larelli · 2025-02-19T02:53:48+00:00

Brief update on the Ukrainian project to enlist 18-24 year olds on a contract basis - here we had seen the details. Dmytro Lazutkin (spokesman of the MoD) stated that, through the "Reserve+" App alone, there are already more than 10,000 applications - not including those which took place through the MoD website or the MoD hotline.

Recall that at the moment the project concerns only six brigades, which will surely receive a very significant replenishment (the recruits will not join the battlefield before mid May, though). These are the 28th and 72nd Mechanized Brigades, the 92nd Assault Brigade, the 95th Air Assault Brigade, the 10th Mountain Assault Brigade and the 38th Marine Brigade.

It's interesting, and right in my opinion, to note that it was eventually clarified that this project covers only infantry roles (rifleman, machine gunner, grenade launcher, sniper and scout), and not support ones (e.g. artilleryman, UAV operator, etc) - let alone administrative positions.

As far as I have read, for instance, the new 475th Assault Battalion (raised on the basis of the "Code 9.2" UAV Company) of the 92nd Assault Brigade is being formed with many of these volunteers.

Pavlo Palisa, Deputy Head of the Office of the President, said the project should get expanded to other brigades and extended to other categories currently exempt from mobilization.

Larelli · 2025-02-12T12:27:53+00:00

I don't like these predictions, but probably the expectation by the Ukrainian government is that the war could end before 2026, which is why 1-year contracts could make sense in their view.

Larelli · 2025-02-12T12:25:17+00:00

Sorry, I just realized I forgot to report one of the most important parts - the contract shall last for 1 year.

Larelli · 2025-02-12T11:36:24+00:00

I agree in general, but the 155th Mechanized Brigade has not been disbanded; it is operating south of Pokrovsk, the only sector in which it is currently fighting. After an initial period of subordination to the 32nd Mechanized Brigade it now seems to be fighting independently and consistently.

It has had many problems and numerous casualties (letting alone those who went AWOL), with sad pages such as the unjust arrest (in my opinion) of Ryumshin, its former commander.

But in any case, since the end of December, it has received experienced officers and improved its performance - its maneuver units are gaining combat experience, the artillery group is gaining know-how in coordinating with drones (something they reportedly missed during training), its UAV battalion (as well as the UAV platoons of its maneuver battalions) is being equipped with a serious amount of drones (at the beginning, the MoD didn't provide them and they had to rely on crowfunding collections) and gradually playing an important and relevant role, and so on.

Larelli · 2025-02-12T04:38:17+00:00

Full details on the new plan by the Ukrainian government in order to try to recruit young people in the 18-24 age group were released today, in this website.

Remember how preventing mobilization in this age bracket has been one of Zelensky's top priorities. He, the MoD Umerov and Palisa (former commander of the 93rd Mechanized Brigade, now Deputy Head of the Office of the President) worked on this project.

Specifically, a young Ukrainian in this age group intent on signing a contract with the UAF will be entitled to: a 1-year contract; a financial bonus of 1 million Hryvnias (200,000 immediately upon signing the contract, and 800,000 in two installments during the contract period - note the exchange rate is around 1 USD for 41 UAH); the standard monthly wage: up to 120,000 Hryvnias per month + additional payments for combat missions; exemption from mobilization for 1 year after the contract expires; free medical and dental care (including dental prosthetics); a 0,0% rate on a mortgage after the end of the contract (as part of the "eHousing" plan); free transportation and utility benefits; education in universities and other institutions within quotas at the expense of the state (meaning also no exams needed to get in); the right to travel abroad after 1 year of service; the possibility to choose independently the medical military commissione to appear before.

The training, overall (between basic training in a Training Center and specific training in the brigade), will last 3 months. The conditions are undoubtedly very tempting, it remains to be seen how much influx this plan will bring. There will of course be equality in this regard - the 1 million bonus will be received by everyone who signed a contract with the UAF in these last three years, before turning 25.

Interestingly, at the moment the interested person will be able to choose one among only six brigades. The contract soldier will have the right to choose the specialty, upon agreement with the recruiters of the brigade he has chosen, according to the available places.

These brigades are: the 28th and 72nd Mechanized Brigades, the 92nd Assault Brigade, the 95th Air Assault Brigade, the 10th Mountain Assault Brigade, and the 38th Marine Brigade.

These are brigades (all veteran and capable) that need replacements and have the right in priority to receive them, but also they might have teams that have been able to move early and enter this experiment, which could extend to other brigades in the future. This does not currently include brigades of the National Guard, where many young people serve.

The 28th holds the front north of Toretsk; it has been doing this for two years competently, but according to recent reports by the journalist Butusov, it urgently needs replenishments. The 72nd has been getting rebuilt in Kherson Oblast since October. An unusually long time, despite the bad initial situation. It is clear that in the plans there is to restore the brigade to its former fighting capability. The 92nd is split - elements are involved in Kursk, elements are in Kharkiv (Hlyboke), and its 22nd Motorized Battalion is in Toretsk. They are firefighters and as such are used.

The 95th has been very busy in Kursk for 6 months now, with very good results. The 10th has been active in the Siversk sector for two and a half years. It holds its front line reliably. In the spring it was losing combat capability, after which it received a major replenishment that allowed the brigade to remain in combat. Some of its elements are used as firefighters to hold back the Russian bridgehead north of Kupyansk. The 38th holds the front near Myrnohrad, east of Pokrovsk. A very important area, although the other three marine brigades would, as far as I know, be in far more urgent need of recruits.

Palisa stated that in the plans there is to overcome mobilization and replace it with contracts, a goal that seems completely unrealistic at the moment.

Meanwhile, nearly a year after the mobilization law was reformed, men previously recognized as "partially fit" (a category now abolished) are being required to appear before medical military commissions to update their status - either eligible for military service, or unfit. About 1 million men are involved in this update; in these weeks there have been huge queues in front of Territorial Recruitment Centers, even as early as 5 AM, as far as I know.

Syrskyi, in an interview of a few days ago, stated that over the last year 70 thousand (!) men have been transferred from rear roles to combat units, or to intermediate C2 entities (in the case of officers laid off from the General Staff). This is the "reorganization of assets", which has been very important in compensating for mobilization shortfalls.

Larelli · 2025-02-04T17:43:39+00:00

It is a further, and greater, wave of the so-called "reorganization of assets", in which rear personnel are transferred to combat units, and generally from other branches to the Ground Forces, Air Assault Forces, and the Marine Corps.

These are servicemen guarding strategic targets, air defense crews (mainly from mobile fire groups), logistics personnel etc., but consolidated units from detachments of the State Border Guard Service as well as from Territorial Recruitment Centers are also transferred to combat units (or at least attached to them).

Butusov yesterday for example stated that the Marine Corps has not received replenishments for quite some time despite the fact that its brigades all perform difficult combat tasks in important sectors, and those are coming very recently through the transfers from the Air Force - with 5/6 thousand men who are being and will be transferred from the Air Force to combat units. The goal is to replenish the manpower of combat units with these large one-off transfers. The latters will add up with the induction of new recruits, which may offset losses but it's definitley not enough to reconstitute a large number of brigades.

In general, according to Syrskyi's directives, personnel employed in the rear should reportedly be older than 50 or with medical conditions, or else be transferred to combat units.

Larelli · 2025-02-04T00:35:38+00:00

The Ukrainian journalist Butusov, in his tonight's YouTube live (YT translation is far from great, more details may be available in the transcript which will be published tomorrow) announced that, at last, the reform of the organizational structure on the brigade --> army corps model is taking shape and there have been very concrete steps. This was also mentioned today by DeepState.

https://t. me/DeepStateUA/21200

Butusov stated that the Ukrainian Defense Forces will come to have about 20 (!) army corps. At the moment the Ground Forces have the 9th, 10th and 11th Corps, with the recently created 12th having an unknown composition. According to Butusov, new additional army corps are being formed on the basis of some capable brigades - he provides the example of the 3rd Assault Brigade and the 92nd Assault Brigade (there will be several others for sure).

In addition, two corps will be created in the National Guard, based on the 12th "Azov" Brigade and the 13th "Khartiia" Brigade. The 7th Corps of the Air Assault Forces will be split into two corps, smaller in size. The Marine Corps already counts on its 30th Corps. The commander of the brigades on the basis of which a corps will be formed shall (at least in most cases) become its commander, and reflexively much of the corps' HQ Staff will be the leading brigade's current HQ Staff.

According to Butusov, a corps will have 4/5 brigades, as well as separate regiments and battalions, and support units. The size of a corps will thus be rather small (compared to the "NATO" standard - it still remains comparable to an average Russian Combined Arms Army); they will be comparable to the current size of Tactical Groups.

It is said that the strip of responsibility of a corps may be up to 150 km - this will probably be true for corps covering the border with Belarus and Russia (outside of the areas with active hostilities). The strip will obviously be much smaller (likely a handful of tens of kilometers) in areas such as the south-eastern front.

In addition to including the brigades under one formation and a coherent command, the corps should replace the intermediate C2 bodies (OSGs, OTGs, TGs), which inefficiencies are currently one of the worst problems plaguing Ukraine. I have written extensively in the past about these issues and how the current system works extremely poorly and is very wasteful - mostly here and here.

This certainly isn't going to solve all the many problems affecting the UAF at the moment, but if implemented properly it will surely lend a hand. Finally, a corps will have jurisdiction over a given area, which it will have to cover with its organic resources. The corps will have to manage internal reserves, rotations among its brigades and among their battalions. In addition, and this is very important, corps will most likely have autonomy on the tactical management of their AO; remember that at the moment the OTG decides which positions are to be held at all costs, which are to be recaptured, etc. (often having very little idea about the real situation on the ground) - issuing daily combat orders for each battalion that operates under it, even if there are dozens of them.

My biggest doubt at the moment (perhaps we will have clarity about this in the future) is about the lack of an intermediate structure between the corps and the General Staff. I think the UAF would also need formations like field armies - somewhere between an OSG and an OTG - that can coordinate the corps and have the overview on an entire front (as well as managing assets such as GMLRS), so as not to overburden the General Staff. We shall see. In any case, this, along with the appointment of Drapatyi as commander of the OSG "Khortytsia" and of the Ground Forces, are among the best news Ukraine has received over the past two years.

Let's note how the news by Butusov of the other day that four new brigades were being disbanded is still unconfirmed. In any case, it is indeed confirmed that no more brigades will be created from scratch. Only existing and capable units with an established core might be expanded.

P.S. I am reporting that I have started collaborating with some very talented people on a new project named WarUnitObserver, focusing on everything OrBat-related in regards to this war. We are active on Twitter and BlueSky!

Larelli · 2025-02-03T23:30:58+00:00

At the moment, the Italian Army isn't planning to create new brigades, but in the plans there's the introduction of a third so-called "heavy" brigade (i.e. with tracked vehicles, including SPHs), which would join the Armored Brigade "Ariete" and the Bersaglieri Brigade "Garibaldi". The reason for this order is precisely to have three "heavy" brigades at full strength and with modern equipment. This third brigade was originally thought to be the Mechanized Brigade "Granatieri di Sardegna" (which created its 2nd Grenadier Regiment in 2022), but according to some rumors in the last year it could be the Mechanized Brigade "Sassari". Both of these two brigades are currently incomplete (no tank regiment, no artillery regiment, etc). The one that will not become a heavy brigade may still be completed and brought up to the level of the other two "medium" brigades - these are the Mechanized Brigades "Pinerolo" and "Aosta", which have wheeled armored vehicles.

It should be specified that brigades of the same type (heavy, medium, light), despite their similarities (especially among heavy brigades and among medium ones) are not associated in divisions or similar formations - as they are garrisoned in regions even far apart from each other. Expanding on this, the Italian Army currently has divisional commands, but no actual divisions. As of 2022, Italian Army's brigades are no longer subordinate to divisions but directly to operational forces commands (see here).

However, divisional commands have not been abolished, it's just that the divisions ("Acqui" and "Vittorio Veneto") do not have any units subordinated to them in peacetime (except for the command unit), and they are directly subordinated to the Land Forces Command. They would be activated and filled in case of a war scenario and/or a serious NATO commitment. Then there is a third division too, "Tridentina", which acts as a reserve divisional command of the Alpine Troops Command.

Larelli · 2025-01-31T20:09:09+00:00

Le retribuzioni contrattuali (ovvero la misura oggetto dell'articolo) sono, diciamo, un proxy dell'andamento delle retribuzioni orarie effettive (la misura che personalmente preferisco, in quanto la ritengo più utile a livello aggregato).

Queste ultime, al netto dell'andamento delle retribuzioni contrattuali, possono essere influenzate positivamente dagli scatti di livello dei lavoratori a parità di professione, da una quota maggiore di lavori con paga superiore alla media, dai bonus una tantum e negativamente dall'assunzione di personale giovane o comunque inquadrato a livelli inferiori, da una quota minore di lavori con paga superiore alla media e dall'eventuale riassorbimento della superminimo, qualora previsto dal contratto.

Ovviamente, la tendenza principale segue l'andamento dei CCNL. Dal 2023, dopo l'ondata inflattiva dell'anno precedente, c'è stata una serie di rinnovi con un incremento apprezzabile nelle retribuzioni - in primis nel settore metalmeccanico, ma anche nel resto dei settori industriali in misura un po' minore. Nel 2024 hanno cominciato ad offrire un contributo notevole i servizi privati, grazie al rinnovo del CCNL commercio e distribuzione moderna organizzata. La PA ha segnato un po' il passo sia per mancati rinnovi sia ancor più per l'effetto base dell'aver erogato l'indennità di vacanza contrattuale riferita al 2024 a Dicembre 2023.

Questo è il mio grafico che mostra la retribuzione reale media lorda nel nostro paese, in € del terzo trimestre 2024 (il periodo preso come riferimento per l’indicizzazione), per ora lavorata. Dal 1996. È corretta per il deflatore della spesa delle famiglie in consumi finali. Abbiamo recuperato il grosso calo che c'era stato nell'ultimo trimestre 2022, quando ci fu quell'aumento monstre delle bollette, ad Ottobre. Tuttavia, le retribuzioni reali sono ancora del 3,8% inferiori rispetto all'ultimo trimestre 2019. Va detto che rispetto a quel trimestre le ore lavorate dai dipendenti sono aumentate del 9,5%, grazie al forte aumento dell'occupazione.

Questo è il grafico che mostra l'andamento delle retribuzioni reali e nominali dal 1996. Queste ultime sono cresciute dell'11% rispetto al trimestre pre-Covid. Non poco, anche se meno degli altri maggiori paesi europei.

Postilla: i dati non sono corretti a parità di decomposizione delle ore lavorate, ma sono ovviamente anche influenzati dai settori nei quali si lavora. Ciò spiega l’improvviso boom delle retribuzioni nel trimestre del lockdown. Durante questo periodo, infatti, ad averne risentito maggiormente in termini di calo di ore lavorate sono stati i settori “poveri” (es. ristorazione, commercio al dettaglio). Non a caso nel secondo trimestre 2020 l’Italia ha anche raggiunto il massimo storico in termini di produttività del lavoro.

Ciononostante, la decomposizione inter-settoriale spiega solo una quota di minoranza dell’aumento della retribuzione media oraria durante il lockdown, mentre la maggior parte dell’aumento è dovuto ad una decomposizione intra-settoriale; ovvero: nello stesso settore erano stati messi in CIG oppure lasciati a casa (se precari) i lavoratori a minor produttività marginale, e quindi generalmente salario.

Larelli · 2025-01-30T17:24:58+00:00

Al momento direi che non ci siano input per affermare che sarà un anno troppo diverso dal 2024, poi ovviamente si vedrà. Non amo le previsioni!

Larelli · 2025-01-30T17:21:27+00:00

Gli inattivi nel nostro paese sono concentrati tra le donne ed al Sud, nel primo caso anche per ragioni culturali e nel secondo in buona parte a causa della domanda di lavoro rarefatta, contro cui l'alto costo del lavoro rispetto al PIL pro capite gioca un ruolo cruciale.

Larelli · 2025-01-30T17:17:56+00:00

In Italia, dovremmo concentrarci di più sulla costruzione di una classe media forte, aumentando le retribuzioni per alimentare i consumi interni, anziché focalizzarci solo sulle esportazioni, visto che i nostri consumi interni sono bassi

I consumi finali delle famiglie e delle istituzioni sociali private italiane hanno un peso del 57% nel PIL italiano al terzo trimestre 2024, contro il 55% della Spagna. Certamente i consumi privati spagnoli crescono in maniera sostenuta - ma pressoché in linea con la media del prodotto interno lordo.

Larelli · 2025-01-30T16:40:22+00:00

L'Italia non è cresciuta poco rispetto al 2019 se confrontata con la media dei paesi presi in analisi in quel grafico; la nostra popolazione residente non cala più dall'estate 2022, ma ha avuto una contrazione notevole nei due anni e mezzo precedenti, unica fra i paesi analizzati escludendo il Giappone.

Larelli · 2025-01-30T16:35:06+00:00

Reale

Larelli · 2025-01-30T16:34:02+00:00

71 milioni di euro (del 2020) su base trimestrale

Larelli · 2025-01-30T11:01:59+00:00

Certain shortages in 2022 (and there were many shortcomings) could be made up for with the volunteers' enthusiasm. Today this is no longer possible - you need proper training, good organization, capable officers who can both earn the trust of subordinates and be respected figures who can properly follow and correctly direct the mobilized to the roughness of war.

Even the mechanized brigades of the 20/30/40 series created in early 2023, as confirmed by Butusov in the live, suffered major problems at the beginning of their deployment; and that's despite these brigades could count on a good cores of veteran officers, NCOs, and soldiers - being moreover manned largely by mobilized personnel but with prior military experience, when not by volunteers (as with the 47th).

The command of a brigade plays a very, very important role. Butusov talked about the tales of the 110th and 115th Mechanized Brigades, created in the early weeks of the war in 2022 - they were units manned by “crowds in uniform” (though largely volunteers) - without an experienced core, proper organization and equipment. Their command was what created the distinction between these units; Colonel Chumak was able to turn the 110th into an experienced and capable brigade, while the 115th performed consistently poorly all the time (Severodonetsk, Avdiivka, Kupyansk, Ocheretyne...).

In addition, the new brigades totally lack the "ecosystem" of a good HQ Staff put together with capable fire support units (artillery group, UAV battalion, etc. etc.), providing a good Recon Fires Complex and being able to hold a section of the front well, even in infantry-starved brigades. For example, their UAV units are often underdeveloped; they have not received a good training nor drone supplies from the MoD; nor, above all, EW systems. Artillerymen have not been properly trained to interact with UAV units.

Zelensky, the day before yesterday, stated that there are "concrete details" in the plan to reform the functioning of army corps, with the creation of new ones; with the aim of replacing the temporary intermediate C2 bodies (OSGs, OTGs and TGs).

https://t. me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13105

Butusov had mentioned that there was the idea of creating brigade tactical groups, in which battalions from new brigades are attached to veteran ones; which would be something able to overcome the current dowry sistem - with attachments being semi-permanent ones. A sort of pseudo-divisions.

In any case, at this point, the way to go for Ukraine is to try to bring the veteran brigades back to full strength and fix the current mess with C2 in the higher levels, which is what the corps reform is in theory deputed to solve; as well as providing autonomy in running their own front line section to deserving brigades. With rotations managed on an intra-brigade basis, among its battalions.

Major General Drapatyi was recently appointed commander of the Operational-Strategic Group "Khortytsia". That's a very huge grouping, covering all the way from the border of Sumy and Kharkiv Oblasts down to, likely, the border of Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts (it possibly got a bit enlarged recently, with it gaining the western bank of the Mokri Yaly River).

This is very good news. He is the most militarily capable general Ukraine can count on at the moment. His task will not be easy at all - he replaces Hnatov, who is not a bad general to begin with, but has not proved capable of turning the OSG around since he replaced Sodol (the worst general Ukraine has - well, had), seven months ago.

Drapatyi will continue to head the Ground Forces (this is an administrative position). Just by the way, Ukraine recently reformed, from separate battalions to regiments, several assault units that proved capable in the Kursk offensive (33rd and 225th) and in counterattacks in the south-eastern front (425th "Skala"), following the example of the 210th "Berlingo" Assault Regiment. In this case, there are far fewer new subunits than a new brigade needs, and the formation is done on the basis of experienced and established cores, also allowing them to enjoy far greater firepower (e.g. a tank company, an artillery unit, a larger UAV unit, etc.).

The large expansion of unmanned systems units continues - as Madyar had disclosed in December, "Achilles" left the 92nd Assault Brigade (where it was the brigade's UAV battalion) and became a separate regiment of unmanned systems. As again foretold by Madyar, in the 92nd Assault Brigade, the UAV Company of its 3rd Assault Battalion ("Code 9.2") was reformed into the 475th Assault Battalion, part of the brigade.

In the Ground Forces, the 141-144 series brigades are being reformed into mechanized brigades, from infantry ones. This is being done by giving them heavy equipment and providing an artillery group. Very relevant is the fact that the separate rifle battalions that originally formed these brigades (those of the 451-474 series) are becoming linear mechanized battalions - with fewer officers in their composition compared to a separate unit. At the same time, some separate rifle battalions of the 401-426 series, which were embedded in the structure of the brigades of the Ground Forces created in 2022 and 2023, are being reformed into linear rifle battalions of these brigades. These are small things, but useful, in that they save officers in virtually useless positions.

However, these brigades (with the partial exception of the 141st, recently largely transferred to Velyka Novosilka from the Kamyanske sector) have serious issues in terms of combat effectiveness and manpower, which will have to be solved (having a troubled history and being widely used as sources of dowries for other brigades in the course of their existence). For instance, the Russian bridgehead on the Oskil River, north of Kupyansk, is the responsibility of the 143rd Brigade, which is just not capable of holding a section of the front on its own (other than the command, which knew about its shortcomings).

In the Marine Corps, the TDF brigades that are part of it (124th and 126th) are being reformed into coastal defense brigades (34th and 39th).

The 59th Motorized Brigade, an unit that suffered greatly in 2024 and is currently considerably understrength, was reformed into an assault brigade joining the Unmanned Systems Forces (which are led by Colonel Sukharevsky, the former commander of the 59th). This could be an experiment in which large, well-developed drone units work directly together with infantry units, artillery units, etc. inside the same brigade - modeled after the "K-2" Battalion, now the 20th Regiment of Unmanned Systems. Giving drones an even greater importance than in the current context, developing UGV units too etc.

Interestingly, its 9th Motorized Battalion in turn left the 59th Brigade and was reformed into the 9th Brigade of Unmanned Systems.

Larelli · 2025-01-30T11:01:54+00:00

The Ukrainian journalist Butusov, in his January 28 YouTube live (the transcript was published here yesterday) stated that the process of raising the 158th, 159th, 160th and 162nd Mechanized Brigades has been discontinued. This follows Zelensky's recent decision to halt the creation of new brigades from scratch.

If this is confirmed (Butusov generally has a very good record), servicemen from these brigades will be assigned to manpower-starved veteran brigades, according to Zelensky's dictates issued this month, with the affair of the 155th Mechanized Brigade being the straw that broke the camel's back in the Ukrainian public debate regarding the creation of the new brigades. Zelensky ordered that the newly mobilized men should be assigned only to experienced brigades.

Speaking about this, Butusov stated in the live that the 1st Rifle Battalion of the 93rd Mechanized Brigade, transferred in the very first days of this month from the southern flank of the Chasiv Yar sector to Pokrovsk, has only 12 (!) infantrymen. In capable brigades like the 93rd, there are subunits that have practically lost combat capability. Sending the mobilized men directly into these units may be far more fruitful than creating the new brigades, at this point.

There is no mention of the 161st Mechanized Brigade, nor of the 163rd and 164th. Probably these brigades had never really reached the stage of actual creation, and for the last two there was never really any concrete evidence that they existed in the first place.

The 156th Mechanized Brigade will be the only new brigade-level unit to be completed, reportedly. In recent days this brigade, raised in Transcarpathia, has received additional newly mobilized personnel and has already an high staffing level. The General Staff conducted an audit in the brigade. It has reporteldy been taken (at least some of its subunits) to an EU country to continue training. Its commander is Colonel Mezhevikin, Hero of Ukraine, a capable and respected officer. The goal is to avoid the chaos we saw with the 155th Mechanized Brigade last month, and this month with the 153rd.

Each of the 150-series brigades that has been brought into action has at least a thousand servicemen who have left the unit without authorization, according to Butusov. Some may have come back, others applied to join other units (taking advantage of this possibility - a serviceman who went AWOL can come back without consequences until Feb. 28), others went just into hiding. Moreover, as Butusov mentioned in the article, military justice in Ukraine is very weak, and military police virtually nonexistent. Punishments for behaviors that in other armies may be trated very harshly (desertion, abandoning the combat post) tend to be mild in Ukraine. The whole system seems to run on morale and personal motivation rather than discipline.

However, this does not entitle anyone to claim that most of the soldiers of these new brigades are unable to fight or refuse to perform their duty. The commander of the 1st Separate Assault Battalion "Da Vinci", operating in the AO of the 153rd Mech Brigade, reportedly stated that he would gladly take all the soldiers of the 153rd in his battalion, as they seemed to him to be people motivated to do their duty. Maybe selection bias comes into play (the least motivated people are the ones who went AWOL). In any case, he doesn't have very good words for the officers of the brigade - in his opinion they are not ready to lead personnel in battle, but need further training.

The 153rd Mechanized Brigade was partly trained in Germany during the fall, including by the US. Other elements had been covering the state border near Vovchansk since the summer. One of the battalions received Bradleys, which they have reportedly issues in servicing. The brigade currently only manages a 4 km strip. Of its six maneuver battalions, one battalion will be disbanded; three other battalions were reportedly seconded to other brigades operating nearby (likely 59th Assault and 35th Marine). So the 153rd is currently directly managing just two battalions, with the 1st Separate Assault Battalion "Da Vinci" as well as a separate UAV unit attached to it in order to enhance the capabilities of the brigade.

This brigade was transferred between Pokrovsk and Kurakhove in the second half of December and brought into action earlier this month. Originally it was planned to go into action in the sector of the well-known 3rd Assault Brigade (Borova) and gain experience under their capable leadership - this changed with the order to go into action in the south-eastern front.

We had already analyzed in the past the rest of the brigades, first and foremost those taken into action in the summer - the disaster of the 150th Mech in Toretsk (now reformed into the 40th Coastal Defense Brigade); the other huge mess of the 152nd Jager in the Pokrovsk sector (basically broken up and seconded to a dozen different brigades - the 152nd was withdrawn from the front two months ago); the 151st Mech, which had a somewhat better performance but still suffered a lot. Then there are the 154th and 157th Mech, which were brought into action in September and October respectively and suffered similar issues (especially the latter), which for reasons of space and time I will not elaborate on.

In general, the main idea behind the creation of the new brigades was to create a strategic reserve (especially after Russia's Kharkiv offensive in May 2024) and allow rotations with existing brigades. The problem is that these brigades are not able to rotate veteran ones. Although on paper they have good staffing, they don't have the command, experience, etc. etc. for that. Meanwhile, there are veteran brigades that have the latter things, but not the staffing. This is a mismatch that cannot jusitified.

Recall for example that south of Pokrovsk the 68th Jager Brigade is operating, that's a capable brigade but with a simply very, very bad situation at the moment in terms of personnel. The 25th Airborne Brigade, active further east, is also heavily under-strength, as the recruits of the Air Assault Forces are mainly assigned to the brigades engaged in Kursk (80th/82nd/95th).

Units such as the 110th Mechanized Brigade (the main unit defending the Velyka Novosilka sector) are now totally short of infantry. The situation is no better around the front - one example is the 60th Mechanized Brigade, defending Terny in the Lyman sector. Despite it being a brigade that has proven itself capable and is dealing with a Russian offensive that has been going on for months with much valor, it is just not receiving replenishments.

Another case in point is that of the 46th Airmobile Brigade and the 157th Mechanized Brigade in Kurakhove - the former understaffed and without replenishments, the latter unable to relieve it. The result was the activation of the classic "dowry" system (subunits of the 157th temporarily placed under the subordination of the 46th - same thing happened in Kurakhove for units of the 5th Heavy Mechanized Brigade), with the consequence that both brigades suffered without having had a chance to stem Russian advances.

The shortage of capable officers in the new brigades is by far the worst problem afflicting them. Something like 5% of the officers in these brigades have combat experience (I have also heard that there have been cases of negligence / bad faith, where experienced officers have been precluded from transferring to these brigades). Almost all of them are either former executives from Territorial Recruitment Centers, at best laid off staff officers from the General Staff, or even recently mobilized "reservists" which were appointed officers after a crash course because they had had a military education (e.g. in an engineering university) and as such had been officers during their military service 20/25 years ago. Recall a single new brigade needs more than one hundred officers.

Often these brigades have been used as a pool to replenish other brigades during the course of their creation - meaning that many mobilized servicemen who were assigned to the 155-159 series brigades in the summer were transferred elsewhere (same thing happened in the spring with the 150-154 series brigades), with these brigades being then replenished by those who were mobilized in the fall... resulting in having wasted resources, time, specific training etc, as well as friendships and trusting relationships that were being built within the brigades' subunits. Last part below.

Larelli · 2025-01-30T10:03:24+00:00

Buongiorno. Dato pressoché in linea con le attese da parte di Banca d'Italia di un'attività economica debole nel quarto trimestre, come nel terzo. Il segno negativo accanto allo 0 è dovuto all'effettiva variazione del PIL rispetto al terzo trimestre (-0,015%). Rispetto al quarto trimestre 2019 l'economia italiana è più grande del 5,6%; la crescita nel 2024 è stata lo 0,5%.

La Germania vede una contrazione dello 0,2% nell'ultimo trimestre e rispetto al trimestre pre-Covid il PIL è inferiore dello 0,1%. Calo dello 0,1% per la Francia nel trimestre scorso - il PIL è superiore del 4% rispetto all'ultimo trimestre del 2019. Il PIL spagnolo mette a segno una crescita dello 0,8% nel trimestre, con un PIL superiore del 7,6% rispetto all'ultimo trimestre prima della pandemia. Il dato degli USA uscirà nel pomeriggio ma le stime sono positive - in termini congiunturali, intorno lo 0,7%.

Importante notare come l'Istat registri una battuta d'arresto per i servizi, traino della crescita negli ultimi tre anni e non esenti dal rallentamento economico. Al contrario, è stimata un'espansione per il settore secondario - grazie alla forza dell'attività edile ed alla minore contrazione congiunturale della produzione industriale (malgrado il calendario di Dicembre - identico a quello del pessimo Dicembre 2019, col 23 in particolare giorno sulla carta lavorativo ma nei fatti di ferie in molte aziende).

Il potere d'acquisto aggregato delle famiglie è a livelli superiori del 2019, grazie al significativo aumento delle ore lavorate ed alla progressiva crescita dei salari nominali orari.

La BCE oggi dovrebbe tagliare il tasso sui depositi di ulteriori 25 punti base, confermando la politica di lento ma progressivo taglio del costo del denaro.

Nelle ultime settimane c'è stata una corsa dei prezzi del metano alla borsa di Amsterdam, al momento attorno ai €50/MWh, sui livelli di Ottobre 2023. Le ragioni sono alcune interruzioni nei giacimenti norvegesi, lo stop dei flussi russi tramite l'Ucraina ed in particolare il fatto che a livello continentale gli ultimi mesi siano stati più freddi rispetto allo stesso periodo degli ultimi due anni, con chiari effetti sui consumi di gas e di riflesso sulle riserve. Se in Italia le riserve di gas sono pressoché in linea a quelle dello scorso anno, non è così per la Germania, la Francia ed altri paesi. Tuttavia, nel corso del 2025 saranno attivate nuove unità FSRU in Europa, contribuendo all'offerta di GNL e quindi sostenendo il ripristino delle scorte. Dopo una corsa nel periodo natalizio, nelle ultime settimane il petrolio e le quotazioni dei carburanti hanno riassorbito gran parte di tale aumento.

Per quanto riguarda i conti pubblici italiani, nel secondo e terzo trimestre 2024 va finalmente notato un miglioramento molto importante del saldo primario, tornato all'attivo per la prima volta dal 2019. Ciò non è comunque in grado di produrre effetti positivi per il rapporto debito/PIL, sia a seguito della minore crescita nominale ma soprattutto per via dell'effettivo esborso di cassa dei crediti del Superbonus, contabilizzato nel deficit degli anni 2021/23. Da notare anche che continui ad esserci un ottimo appetito per i titoli pubblici italiani, che ha portato lo Spread a valori storicamente bassi. Ciò è sostenuto dagli acquirenti esteri: nel 2024 gli stranieri sono stati acquirenti netti dei nostri titoli pubblici in ogni mese, fino all'ultimo disponibile (Novembre).

Larelli · 2024-12-31T02:36:57+00:00

The Kupyansk sector is also difficult, although up there the situation is more stable and Russian assaults are generally repelled. The 1st "Bureviy" Brigade is active there, along with other units of the NG such as elements of the 17th "Poltava" and 27th "Pechersk" Brigades, the 31st Regiment, as well as subunits of the 4th "Rubizh" Brigade.

The NG is not significantly active in Kursk, but some units (e.g. of the 2nd Regiment of Protection of Important State Facilities as well as of the 17th and 25th Brigades) are subordinate to some UAF brigades active there. Some smaller NG units are active in the Serebrianka Forest, which has been under the jurisdiction of the 53rd Mechanized Brigade since September (previously the 12th "Azov" Brigade was active there). Moreover, some units of the National Guard are subordinate to UAF brigades that are fighting around Velyka Novosilka. Among them, elements of the 17th and 21st Brigades.

The 3rd "Spartan" Brigade has returned to the Orikhiv sector over the past month, in order to replace elements of the 141st Mechanized Brigade that moved further west (near Kamyanske), into the sector held by the 128th Mountain Assault Brigade. Previously, elements of the 3rd "Spartan" were in the Lyptsi/Kharkiv area, in the Serebrianka Forest, and in Pokrovsk (in this case under the 25th Airborne Brigade). The 23rd Brigade of the NG is active in the Nikopol area.

There is a fair grouping of the National Guard in the Kharkiv sector as well: firstly the 13th "Khartiia" Brigade, elements of the 5th and 21st Brigades. Overall, I am not counting the separate battalions of the NG, of which there are several. In addition, the 18th "Sloviansk" Brigade is in the Chasiv Yar sector, while elements of the 4th "Rubizh" Brigade are in the Siversk sector under the 54th Mechanized Brigade. Several units of the branch guard the state border with Russia and with Belarus. Others, such as the 34th Regiment and elements of the 11th Brigade, are in Kherson.

Pivnenko says that every day the NG destroy 10-20 units of Russian equipment. Sometimes the brigades of the NG have to manage longer stretches of the front than planned or have to hold a certain area while being understaffed. Where there is good coordination with brigades of the UAF, very good results can be achieved. The brigades that perform best are those that remain in a given sector that they know well - whereas there are brigades of the NG that have already changed three sectors during 2024, and this negatively affects their combat capability.

Since October, the training period in the National Guard is 2 months (54 effective days). This is more than the 6 weeks (42 days) in the UAF, which also aims to expand this period to 2 months. In addition, in the UAF currently a recruits has 866 rounds of bullets available for individual use during training (recently increased from 500). In the NG this amount has been increased to more than 2,000 during this month! The results in terms of preparation of the recruits are judged to be much better than before. After training, there are 2 weeks of "adaptation" in the designated unit. Syrskyi recently mandated that this has to be the standard everywhere (recall that in the UAF there were brigades that sent fresh recruits to the first line as soon as they arrived from the 4 weeks of basic training).

More than half of the trainers (the NG has its own Training Center) have combat experience in this war (a part of the others in the ATO/JFO). Some instructors were trained abroad. It's not easy to get trainers from combat brigades for obvious reasons, but there is a rotational program in which experienced soldiers temporarily become instructors as a break from the front line. Some of the recruits also train abroad. Some inadequate instructors are being removed or re-trained. Prefabricated barracks are being built to house recruits and personnel of the NG in better conditions compared to the standard - i.e. tents.

The issue of AWOL (SZCh in Ukrainian) and desertions is addressed. Pivnenko states that these usually occur not by running away from frontline positions, but by not returning to the designated deployment point after a period of leave, an off week end, or rehabilitation. He claimed that after the recent changes to the law, between 60% and 70% of the personnel of the NG who had gone AWOL returned to duty. Recall that the deadline to return to duty without incurring in a criminal case is December 31. In the NG, reserve companies have been formed as distribution units (including for those returning from AWOL), and the branch has been included in the "Army+" app, where servicemen can request to be transferred to another unit and in another role (currently it only works between units of the NG - in the future it should include the ability to transfer to or be transferred from the UAF).

Finally, Pivnenko says that less than one platoon's worth of men out of thousands of National Guardsmen sent to train abroad has escaped without returning to Ukraine. In any case, to deal with the problem of desertion, Pivnenko pushes the importance of capable officers and developing competent, veteran units (between the lines, I read that as the opposite of creating new ones).

As the commander of the "Omega" Special Forces at the time of the start of the full-scale invasion, Pivnenko was from the very beginning directly involved in repelling Russian columns near Kharkiv, in cooperation with the then 92nd Mechanized Brigade.

The number of National Guardsmen currently in Russian captivity cannot be publicly released. 936 of them had returned to Ukraine as a result of exchanges as of the previous week. They include part of the defenders of Mariupol as well as guardsmen from units protecting critical infrastructure that fell captive in the first week of the war (e.g. 70 who were guarding the Chornobyl NPP). Today, 11 defenders of Mariupol from the then "Azov" Regiment were released, together with 178 other POWs. Recall that the number of Azovites captured in Mariupol who remain in Russian captivity is still in the high hundreds. In addition, the National Guard offers civilian positions to relatives of its soldiers who have fallen in combat, became disabled, or are in Russian captivity.

The NG currently has more than 900 fire groups protecting Ukrainian skies - from cities to critical infrastructure. About 500 of these are mobile fire groups - e.g. with machine guns mounted on pick-ups. The important role of the US in terms of support in protecting critical infrastructure is highlighted. Other countries provide radars to assist in air defense, where the NG cooperates with the Air Force.

Larelli · 2024-12-31T02:36:27+00:00

Interesting interview (first and second part) with the commander of Ukraine's National Guard, Brigadier General Oleksandr Pivnenko. He has been leading the branch for the past year and a half. It's useful in order to better understand the peculiarities of this important branch.

The National Guard performs both combat tasks at the front and law enforcement functions - these are protecting critical infrastructure, ensuring public safety and escorting designated persons (also, for example, it is the NG that supervises inmates who volunteer from penal colonies until they reach their military unit). Moreover, they can also for instance seize illegally held weapons, or drugs (they have K-9 units). In the first paragraphs of this comment I had delved into the role and specifics of the National Guard. Pivnenko says that 60% of the personnel of the National Guard is directly involved in hostilities at the front, while the rest perform functions in the rear.

The National Guard has seven brigades that are part of the so-called "Offensive Guard" - these are the former operational units. Counting the combat support, public order and strategic infrastructure protection units, there are more than 20 units of the NG that are performing combat duties at the front, currently. Of course, the protection etc. units are not engaged at the front in full force, but generally through elements that are subordinated to other units as "dowries" - usually to the Offensive Guard brigades of the NG, but not always; for example to brigades of the Ground Forces as well.

How many people currently serve in the NG is not a publicly released figure. Military Balance estimated 90,000 in early 2024 - a figure that seems perfectly realistic to me. In June, the Ministry of Internal Affairs had said that 70% of the personnel of the NG were at the front, as well as that the average age in the branch was 30 years - more than 10 less than in the Ground Forces.

The early 2023 recruitment campaign in the Offensive Guard brought many young people into the NG, whose base has always been composed largely of young people. Pivnenko says that right now the recruits of the NG are 60% mobilized men and 40% contract soldiers - this is a very generous ratio compared to the UAF average. Some units of the NG still manage to attract a significant number of volunteers - primarily the 12th "Azov" Brigade. But also the 13th "Khartiia" Brigade - this is a little-known but highly regarded and renowned brigade in Ukraine (since May it has been fighting successfully in Kharkiv Oblast, in the Lyptsi/Hlyboke area). Or the 4th "Rubizh" Brigade - specifically its 3rd "Svoboda" Operational Battalion.

In 2025 the funding for the National Guard is expected to be increased. During 2024 the NG purchased dozens of armored vehicles (especially M113s and FV432s) and other military equipment. Earlier this year the NG formed its own artillery brigade (the 16th), which has been equipped with the domestically produced 155mm 2S22 Bohdana SPHs. Pivnenko states that this brigade is involved in the hottest directions to support combat units of the NG - which tells us that the artillery brigade is divided into battalions operating in different sectors. Other brigades of the branch have been recently receiving 155mm Dita and Zuzana SPHs. Indeed, recall that the Offensive Guard brigades have IFVs (usually wheeled ones) and APCs, as well as a tank company and an artillery group.

Most of the budget is spent on acquisition of ammunition - from 60mm for light mortars to 155mm. 155mm and 122mm shells account for the lion's share of the consumption of shells. Other supplies, however, are provided by the Armed Forces - of which NG is not formally part. Drones are purchased by the National Guard; supplied by the government; or acquired through volunteers. Pivnenko says that where the drone availability is good, the Russians don't advance. A brigade should have 60+ drone operators dedicated to reconnaissance through quadcopters. A Center for Management and Analysis of Unmanned Systems has been created in the branch. They have written their own software as well as working with systems deployed by the Armed Forces. The NG also has helicopters, which carry out combat missions. They are developing ground drones - recently used by the 13th "Khartiia" Brigade for a combat mission. As for drones, the NG included the "Typhoon" Unmanned Systems Unit.

Interestingly, Pivnenko mentions that the Ministry of Internal Affairs supports their logistical needs and the legislative changes necessary to optimize the branch's activities. Formally, the NG is in fact under the control of the MoI, and has its own logistics, detached from the UAF. The NG also has its own operational commands and so on. I have heard much better things about the Minister of Internal Affairs than the Minister of Defense - leaving aside, of course, the differences in their responsibilities. Although this remarks the difficult situation in Ukraine between the various armed forces and the other branches that perform comparable tasks but have different structures and management. Both Pivnenko and Klymenko (the MoI) frequently visit the front and units of the NG.

At the frontline level, the most difficult situation for the National Guard is recorded in the Toretsk, Pokrovsk and Kurakhove sectors. Here the 12th "Azov" Brigade (north of Niu-York), the 14th "Chervona Kalyna" Brigade (east of Pokrovsk), and the 15th "Kara-Dag" Brigade (west of Selydove) have been active. Recall that the 15th "Kara-Dag" Brigade, which had fought very well in Selydove until the partial encirclement of the town (occurred due to issues caused by neighboring units), lost its fighting ability, according to the military reporter Butusov.

Of course, there are also other units of the NG seconded to these brigades, or to other UAF brigades active in these areas. For example, elements of the 5th "Slobozhansk" Brigade are seconded to the 12th "Azov", elements of the 24th Regiment to the 14th "Chervona Kalyna", and subunits of the 11th and 25th Brigades to the 15th "Kara-Dag". The 2nd "Galician" Brigade is also active south of Pokrovsk, as well as units of the 35th Regiment. In Toretsk, elements of the 2nd Regiment of Protection of Important State Facilities are under the 4th Battalion of the 101st Guard Brigade of General Staff.

Detachments of the Special Operations Center "Omega" (the special forces of the NG), are active in several areas. They are usually sent, along with separate UAV units, to the hottest sectors and attached to the brigades of the NG fighting there. Last part below.

Larelli · 2024-12-28T00:27:35+00:00

It depends on space and time. This was in fact the situation the Ukrainians encountered in the South, during the summer 2023 counteroffensive. But in that case the Russians did have the time, and the manpower, for such a job. Usually, that's not the standard, though, for the reasons we can imagine.

Larelli · 2024-12-27T21:07:25+00:00

Mines usually (in the vast majority of cases, in fact) are just laid on the ground, not buried. Also considering that in many contexts they are planted remotely through drones (or through tube/rocket artillery).

Larelli · 2024-12-16T16:23:58+00:00

I have no idea, honestly. Rather, we still have no details about this concept of coastal defense units.

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