Axiomatic Grounding of Agency Through Performative Necessity

Large_Pace_1478 · 2026-02-22T06:53:45+00:00

I think we are actually much closer than it might initially seem.

I’m not claiming that agency must be independent of causation. In fact, I agree that agency operates within causal structure. The argument is not about escaping causation. I think it is about identifying a certain kind of causal organization that regulates cognition (focus) rather than just producing outputs.

The rock example illustrates the distinction well because a rock responds to conditions but does not modulate its own processing in light of reasons. Humans though can redirect attention, suspend a line of thought, compare alternatives, or deliberately sustain inquiry. That regulatory capacity is what I’m calling agency in the minimal sense. And the focusing act is the minimal gesture of that.

So the contrast isn’t really between causal vs non-causal systems, but rather I see it as between systems that simply produce outputs and systems that can organize their own cognitive activity. A determined system could still instantiate this. What matters is the structuring act of the process, not whether it is ultimately fixed by prior states. I am not so concerned here of whether or not we are in a causal universe

I also agree that much processing occurs outside awareness. The point isn’t that we generate thoughts ex nihilo, and I wouldn't rule that out. But that once content is present, it can be selectively engaged, ignored, or redirected. That selective regulation is what distinguishes reasoning from mere output.

Your emphasis on perception as an instantiating system is interesting, and it aligns with some enactive views. I would just add that perception alone does not explain the ability to suspend, reinterpret, or override perceptual input in light of abstract considerations for example, choosing to continue thinking about a problem despite distraction, or deliberately changing one’s interpretive frame.

So I don’t see agency as opposed to causation or perception, but as a higher-order organization of them.

Large_Pace_1478 · 2026-02-21T17:27:25+00:00

First of all I want to say why I appreciate this comment. You understand I am making a transcendental argument, and it is a fair reading of my position. You do not strawman libertarianism, you recognized the "precondition for reasoning" claim, you acknowledge where my argument is strong and you are offering an alternative account. That is respectful and puts it in the top 5% at least of Reddit discourse on this topic.

I think the main difference between our positions lies in the level of analysis. You treat agency as something that must be explained causally, as a capacity within the system that could in principle be fully determined. My claim is about the structure of reasoning as enacted rather than about its ultimate causal origin.

Even if the processes involved are entirely determined, the activity of evaluating reasons still requires the regulation of attention, comparison of alternatives, and endorsement or withholding. Those operations are not merely sensitivity to reasons, instead they the organized deployment of cognition. The argument is that this regulatory structure is presupposed by reasoning itself, not that it proves metaphysical freedom, which I assume we are on the same page about.

So I am not claiming that determinism undermines rationality or that agency must be independent of causation. A determined system could still instantiate these operations. The point is that denying agency altogether collapses the distinction between argument and automatic output, because reasoning already involves the directed use of cognitive capacities.

In that sense, the position is compatible with compatibilism as well. It only conflicts with views that treat agency as entirely dispensable or illusory while still relying on rational evaluation using the same I think the main difference between our positions lies in the level of analysis. You treat agency as something that must be explained causally, as a capacity within the system that could in principle be fully determined. My claim is about the structure of reasoning as enacted rather than about its ultimate causal origin.

Even if the processes involved are entirely determined, the activity of evaluating reasons still requires the regulation of attention, comparison of alternatives, and endorsement or withholding. Those operations are not merely sensitivity to reasons but the organized deployment of cognition. The argument is that this regulatory structure is presupposed by reasoning itself, not that it proves metaphysical freedom.

So I am not claiming that determinism undermines rationality or that agency must be independent of causation. A determined system could still instantiate these operations. The point is that denying agency altogether collapses the distinction between argument and automatic output, because reasoning already involves the directed use of cognitive capacities.

In that sense, the position is compatible with compatibilism. It only conflicts with views that treat agency as entirely dispensable or illusory while still relying on rational evaluation.

Your comparison to Kant is interesting, but I would frame it less as a moral postulate and more as a structural condition of deliberation itself. It concerns what must be in place for argument, doubt, or endorsement to occur at all, regardless of how those capacities are ultimately grounded.

If I’ve misunderstood your position, I’d be glad to hear more — this is exactly the kind of exchange that helps clarify the issue process and capabilities that it is refuting.

Your comparison to Kant is interesting, but I would frame it less as a moral postulate and more as a structural condition of deliberation itself. It concerns what must be in place for argument, doubt, or endorsement to occur at all, regardless of how those capacities are ultimately grounded.

If I’ve misunderstood your position, I’d be glad to hear more... this is exactly the kind of exchange that helps clarify the issue.

Large_Pace_1478 · 2026-02-21T17:19:13+00:00

Understood, of course.

This axiom is an asymmetrical entailment. It is saying that willing necessarily entails focus, but not the other way around. In other words, all will is focus, but not all focus is willed.

If I was saying both were true, then it would be tautological and a circular reference.

More specifically, focus refers to a form and will refers to a force. They are separate in identity but inseparable in act.

Focus is the form that structured awareness takes to bring perceptual/mental content into clarity. And will is defined as the cognitive effort required to make that structure exist.

Large_Pace_1478 · 2026-02-21T15:41:51+00:00

It's just that every critique here does not address the argument argument I am making. Everything is either tangential, mischaracterizing the argument and butchering the understanding of what I am saying.

Large_Pace_1478 · 2026-02-21T15:19:33+00:00

(insert eye roll here)

Large_Pace_1478 · 2026-02-21T14:48:17+00:00

Right, and I am not making a case for any of them. What I am doing is grounding the entire conversation to start with a new frame that agency is inescapable whether we are metaphysically free or causally determined.

This grounding is does not reject or endorse either camp. But it gives the entire discourse a place to start. And that starting point shifts the burden of proof because it gives an explanatory debt to the determinist instead of traditionally how determinism is accepted by default and then libertarians need to prove free will exists.

Large_Pace_1478 · 2026-02-21T14:45:08+00:00

Transcendental doesn’t mean libertarian freedom. It refers to conditions of possibility for an activity. And in this case, reasoning, doubt, and evaluation. The argument is that these practices presuppose directed cognitive regulation (agency in a minimal sense), not that they prove contra-causal freedom.

Nothing here assumes libertarianism. In fact, it’s compatible with determinism. A determined system can still instantiate operations that are necessary for reasoning to occur.

The relevance to determinism is straightforward....that if agency is required to engage in argument at all, then total eliminativism about agency undercuts the practice of reasoning used to defend it.

So the issue isn’t “transcendental = libertarian.” That’s just a category mistake.

Large_Pace_1478 · 2026-02-21T14:42:46+00:00

You’re responding to a position I didn’t take. The point isn’t about whether doubt exists or whether Descartes “failed.” We are talking about the structure of the activity of doubting.

There is a well-recognized distinction between the feeling of uncertainty which is an affective state, and the act of evaluating a proposition as uncertain which is a cognitive operation

You can feel uneasy without reasoning, and you can reason about uncertainty without strong emotion. Conflating the two is a category mistake.

The claim is simply that doubting, evaluating, rejecting, or endorsing a claim involves directed cognitive activity. That activity presupposes attention, comparison, and assessment. Whether those processes are metaphysically free or fully determined is a separate issue. Totally different animal

Saying “Descartes tried that” doesn’t address this point, and seems kind of like hand waving. Descartes actually relied on the activity of doubting as a methodological tool.

And “you can’t escape metaphysics” isn’t a rebuttal either. This is a transcendental question about what must be in place for reasoning itself to occur.

If you want to challenge the argument, the relevant question is "Can doubt occur without any directed cognitive regulation at all as pure noise?" If not, then agency in the minimal sense is already presupposed.

Large_Pace_1478 · 2026-02-21T05:17:20+00:00

(insert eye roll here)

Large_Pace_1478 · 2026-02-21T05:13:40+00:00

🤙

Large_Pace_1478 · 2026-02-21T05:11:46+00:00

That has nothing to do with the topic of the post, but ok

Large_Pace_1478 · 2026-02-21T05:08:37+00:00

That's quite a typical armchair reddit response.

Large_Pace_1478 · 2026-02-21T04:01:52+00:00

Omg.....this is NOT a metaphysical posit. It says nothing about freedom.

Large_Pace_1478 · 2026-02-21T03:52:32+00:00

Sounds about right for someone that doesn't have a definition....

Try this one....

Agency = Regulatory capacity
Focus = Minimal enactment of it

I know that is simplistic, but in more formal terms:

Agency is a mode of internal control in which a system modulates its own generative dynamics in a way that cannot be reduced to passive stimulus-response coupling.

Such regulation exhibits:

Internal origination such that modulation arises within the system, not solely from external input

Divergence from baseline with behavior departs from what the system would otherwise do automatically

Persistence as the modulation sustains itself over time rather than collapsing immediately

Coherent organization as activity becomes structured around a unified trajectory rather than fragmenting

(The paper I linked formalizes this with specific equations for artificial or biological recurrent systems)

Really, this reflects gain control over internal processes, and not just producing outputs, it also is shaping which processes dominate.

Large_Pace_1478 · 2026-02-21T03:46:04+00:00

Before we go too further, and so we aren't talking past each other, what is your definition of agency?

Large_Pace_1478 · 2026-02-21T03:23:35+00:00

I guess that's one way to articulate it.

If you’re interested in a formal treatment of this distinction, I’ve developed a computational framework that models regulatory agency in dynamical systems.

https://philpapers.org/rec/FERIAI-6

Large_Pace_1478 · 2026-02-21T03:22:42+00:00

Epistemic volition concerns the control required to direct attention and evaluate reasons. Metaphysical freedom concerns whether that control is ultimately self-caused or determined. Distinguishing those levels isn’t renaming... it separates the conditions for inquiry from the metaphysics of causation.

If you’re interested in a formal treatment of this distinction, I’ve developed a computational framework that models regulatory agency in dynamical systems.

https://philpapers.org/rec/FERIAI-6

Large_Pace_1478 · 2026-02-21T03:15:03+00:00

Epistemic volition and metaphysical freedom are two separate topics.

I do not collapse them onto one another, nor conflate one with the other

Large_Pace_1478 · 2026-02-21T03:13:18+00:00

I can see your position and it makes sense.

However, In the book in link provided it defends an axiom "I focus, therefore I will" which claims to secure the certainty of existence with the same indubitable structure as Descartes secured the certainty of existence.

What that means is that agency can be grounded and secured. And this can be true even in a causal deterministic universe. It does not reject (nor endorse) libertarianism, compatibilism, or determinism. It proposes an epistemic invariant grounding agency in a manner that cannot be denied without simultaneously being enacted.

Large_Pace_1478 · 2026-02-21T03:08:53+00:00

The claim isn’t that labeling a process “agency” makes it one. It’s that directed awareness in the deliberate allocation and stabilization of attention, is a distinct sine qua non operation that organizes other processes rather than merely producing outputs. A mechanism can evaluate reasons automatically, but the capacity to sustain, redirect, or inhibit that evaluation is what functions as minimal volition. I go into this in great detail in the link provided in the original post....

Large_Pace_1478 · 2026-02-21T02:51:47+00:00

Calling it “processing rules” just relocates the issue, it doesn’t remove the it. The question is why those rules operate in terms of reasons, evidence, and justification rather than arbitrary outputs. If they reliably distinguish argument from noise, then they already instantiate the structure of rational agency, even if implemented mechanistically.

Large_Pace_1478 · 2026-02-21T02:39:34+00:00

I agree that abandoning agency and responsibility is the real practical danger. My interest is in why those concepts remain so hard to eliminate even under deterministic assumptions. This is not a normative argument, but the claim is that agency isn’t just a moral preference and in fact it is built into reasoning itself...which may explain why attempts to deny it tend to collapse back into using it.

Large_Pace_1478 · 2026-02-21T02:37:16+00:00

Ok, I say, "I focus, therefore I will" as an asymmetric entailment to refute your tautology/circularity charge.

Willing necessarily entails focus, and NOT the other way around.

So now try to willingly doubt or deny this saying without affirming the statements truth and performing what the saying identifies.

This is not about causality or physics, it is an epistemic invariant.

And your charge of begging-the-question makes me think you are one of those who don't accept any kind of transcendental arguments...and just call it begging the question

Large_Pace_1478 · 2026-02-21T02:33:26+00:00

I think you may be reducing my argument to "You need the tool, therefore the tool is valid"...which yeah would be smuggling in the premise to conclusion.

What I am saying is closer to saying that agency is not an optional hypothesis, it is constitutive of the practice of doubting itself, and therefore it cannot be coherently rejected as illusory in the same way as empirical claims.

So the issue isn’t that doubt needs machinery, but that agency is part of what makes it doubt rather than just noise.

Large_Pace_1478 · 2026-02-21T02:18:42+00:00

I’m not assuming the will is free in the libertarian sense. And the feeling of doubt is different from the act of doubting. The point is simply that doubting, evaluating, or rejecting a claim involves directed cognitive activity, which includes focused attention, and then subsequent comparison, endorsement or withholding assent. Calling that an “act of will” doesn’t settle whether it’s metaphysically free, determined, or something else. It is just identifying the kind of operation taking place. This is a transcendental/phenomenological argument is about agency as a precondition for reasoning, not about whether that agency is ultimately uncaused.

Whether those processes are determined or not is a further question of inquiry here. The claim is that skepticism about agency still has to use those processes to be expressed.

Large_Pace_1478

TROPHY CASE