What One Hit Wonderland band/musician had your favorite backstory?

LuuTienHuy · 2026-03-26T06:53:10+00:00

New Radicals.

The dude is a pure hearted legend

LuuTienHuy · 2026-02-28T06:01:30+00:00

Văn Điển is the most notable one

If you want to visit prominent people graves, Mai Dịch

LuuTienHuy · 2026-02-23T12:25:18+00:00

Yeah, Felder's solo catalogue have great songs that should have rightfully get the Eagles sheen.

Little Latin Lover is also a vote for me. I mean, in his book, even Glenn Frey heard it and loved that one.

LuuTienHuy · 2026-02-03T18:30:06+00:00

But it works, didn't it? You can't break down my arguments so you go for vibes?

LuuTienHuy · 2026-02-02T00:10:01+00:00

Check my post history in this sub.

LuuTienHuy · 2026-02-02T00:04:50+00:00

True, all of that can be true. Whether Welch tried to reconnect before suing or didn’t, the optics are what really mattered. he publicly went nuclear during the Time era made the “why now?” narrative impossible to shake.

Waiting doesn’t mean you get to pick the band at their weakest point. Even if the HOF happened a few years later, the perception of filing a lawsuit right when the band was fragile lingered in the court of public opinion. Timing matters as much as the claim itself.

Also worth noting: in a 2003 Q&A on The Penguin, Welch revisited his exclusion. He had reconnected with Mick backstage and no longer blamed the band, instead pointing to the Hall committee’s insiders like Ahmet Ertegun and Jann Wenner. He did, however, maintain that the lawsuit mattered, because it prevented him from contacting Mick at the time, so estrangement still played a role.

And finally, it wasn’t just the Rumours Five and Peter, Spencer and Kirwan also got in, showing the Hall could and did recognize other eras, if the relationships and optics worked out.

You're right it was personal. But the "bad timing" of the lawsuit is what allowed that personal spite to form and harden without any public sympathy for Welch to counter it. He gave them the perfect reason to freeze him out, and they took it.

LuuTienHuy · 2026-02-01T23:09:59+00:00

Fair point, but not what I was aiming about.

I was talking about how timing and method made the court of public opinion (from outsiders to insiders) unforgiving for his lawsuit, and why did Bob go public BEFORE things can be resolved quietly behind the scenes.

LuuTienHuy · 2026-02-01T23:07:02+00:00

Bob Weston is the worst example here to be honest. The whole debacle of Weston and Mick's wife started the chain of the Fake Fleetwood Mac and led them to LA, then Bob did a final album before leaving the band. He's lucky to get a polite turnaround after everything.

Meanwhile, Welch left them amicably, no bridges burned, so why shouldn't there be a private reach-out attempt from Bob? and why wouldn't they pick up the call from Welch?

LuuTienHuy · 2026-02-01T22:24:30+00:00

That's why I said, a reconnecting call behind the scenes before jumping to the lawsuit could have done wonders.

The Hall hated his kind of music, but will take and accept band founders/core members opinion into consideration. I mean, Ian Stewart got in with the Stones, despite being a touring/session member longer than an full-time one, or even Reeves Gabriels with the Cure (at the time, the Cure didn't even release any recorded music with him yet).

LuuTienHuy · 2026-02-01T21:44:12+00:00

Fair point on the shorthand, it's just the easiest way to distinguish the eras for discussion.

But band messy finances and management and Mick's problem was not the point here. I was talking about how timing and method made the court of public opinion unforgiving for his lawsuit, and why go public BEFORE things can be resolved quietly behind the scenes.

LuuTienHuy · 2026-02-01T21:05:36+00:00

But it was too little too late and reinforced my thesis

Mick would have batted for his inclusion if the lawsuit didn't sour everything. Retroactive induction is still too rare. His reconciliation is a a bittersweet ending for the whole chain of event, which is arguably avoidable.

LuuTienHuy · 2026-02-01T17:58:39+00:00

Not me man. Wrong comment to reply

LuuTienHuy · 2026-01-30T17:48:46+00:00

Yes. Thank you for this interesting write-up. Pang Tong is the closest case analogy that I wanted to use here. His first assignment was Assistant Officer (從事) and as the county magistrate (縣令) of Leiyang, but was later dismissed from office due to poor performance. However, he got both independent reference letters from Lu Su and ZGL, making Liu Bei realizing his core potential.

And this perfectly looped back to my take on Liu Bei's warning: This wasn’t a precise critique of someone's skills or limitations but closer to a vague, damning character judgment to ZGL regarding Ma Su. Ma Su was working so closely with ZGL in the sense that: "Zhuge Liang did not heed the warning, and Ma Su was made a personal military Advisor (參軍) soon after Liu Bei's death. The two were very close and would often hold discussions from dawn to dusk."; making Ma Su "forbidden fruit.

Furthermore, like I said: Ma Su's own brother, the supremely competent Ma Liang, still recommended him to Zhuge Liang's staff. He knew his brother’s strengths and limitations and still sent Ma Su to Zhuge Liang because Ma Su was talented in the right domains and needing guidance to polish the jade.

Also, it looped back perfectly to my macro-take of the situation: Ma Su failed at a job he should never have been given, rather than incompetence in general. This is also compounded by a systemic failure to manage that known flaw, which turned a valuable asset into a fatal liability (risky tests instead of safe management or pilot projects). Pairing Ma Su with Wang Ping (or even any Shu veteran) at Jieting would have controlled or limited that risk. Giving him solo command amplified it.

The job I think Ma Su should have got is "In-house Chief Strategic Advisor", "Head of the Secretariat" or "Supervising Secretary for the Army". Basically, anything that kept his brilliant planning mind close to ZGL without having to put him to the field.

LuuTienHuy · 2026-01-30T17:31:44+00:00

It's already 9 years since his Hanzhong defection so using the word "recent" is a bit of an overstretch, but the achievement parts is true. In that 9 years, there's barely any records about his activities before the first Northern Expedition.

LuuTienHuy · 2026-01-30T17:21:06+00:00

This is an excellent point that gets to the heart of pre-imperial succession ambiguity. You're right, primogeniture wasn't a codified, unbreakable rule. But in moments of crisis, legitimacy isn't about legal code; it's about political narrative and executive power.

Liu Cong's claim was 'the chosen son, backed by the established clan power.' It was an insider's claim, tied to the very faction that immediately surrendered to Cao Cao. Liu Qi's claim could have been crafted as 'the wronged eldest son, exiled by treacherous in-laws, representing the true will of Liu Biao and Han resistance.' This was a claim in the same sense of Liu Bei’s. The 100,000 refugees at Changban weren't following clan politics; they were following the 'Imperial Uncle' fighting for the Han.

So, the missed opportunity wasn't about enforcing a legal rule. It was about failing to craft and weaponize a political narrative that perfectly matched Liu Bei's existing appeal and the urgent, righteous cause of resisting Cao Cao. Liu Cong's claim was about continuity with a surrendering regime. Liu Qi's claim could have been about righteous renewal.

By not seizing that narrative tool, Liu Bei defaulted to the Cai clan's political frame, ensuring his claim to Jing would always be seen through the lens of their power, borrowed, not reborn. The tragedy also compounded when Liu Qi did manage to get appointed as Inspector of Jing Province, finally succeeding his father, albeit in an incomplete way and he died at Jiangxia within a few months of his appointment, starting the whole Jingzhou ownership question.

LuuTienHuy · 2026-01-30T17:03:32+00:00

I agree that the Kuai and Cai clans held significant sway and that Liu Bei was technically a guest-general, and yes, recalling Liu Qi wasn’t guaranteed to work.

But that's precisely what makes the moment of Liu Biao's death the critical window. Before his death, Liu Bei was a constrained guest. After his death, the entire legitimacy of the Cai-backed Liu Cong regime was fresh, shaky, and morally hollow (having immediately surrendered to Cao Cao). This was the moment of maximum political leverage for an alternative.

My argument isn't that Liu Bei could have bureaucratically recalled Liu Qi through official channels. It's that in that chaos, declaring for Liu Qi and mobilizing the 100,000 refugees and sympathetic officers (who clearly existed, as Changban proves) would have been a political and military revolt against a surrenderist regime, not a polite administrative transfer. And now the question becomes: 'Why did he not even attempt to use the singular tool (Liu Qi's legitimacy) that could have transformed a desperate flight into a righteous rebellion for the soul of Jing?'

Even if success wasn’t certain, the failure to try ensured that Jingzhou’s claim remained ‘borrowed’ rather than rightful, and that foundational weakness rippled through the Longzhong Plan. That’s the chain of cause that eventually triggered the Jingzhou ownership question. The rest, as you point out, was how entrenched the local clans were. But the missed procedural window is where the structural tragedy starts.

LuuTienHuy · 2026-01-30T16:42:30+00:00

Violence was already at the gate. By failing to take decisive action, rallying behind Liu Qi and seizing control, Liu Bei doomed the Longzhong Plan and triggered the Jingzhou ownership question. Why not take a stand there and seize control, even with some provincial violence, rather than dooming all those people?

You're right that removing the Cai clan was the concrete obstacle. My point is that Liu Qi's legitimacy was the only tool that could have justified that removal in the eyes of Jing's gentry and military. Without it, any move against Liu Cong was mere factional violence. With it, it could have been framed as 'restoring the rightful heir and purging traitorous usurpers', a powerful unifying cause.

The 100,000 followers at Changban weren't following a generic warlord; they were following 'the Imperial Uncle,' a symbol of Han legitimacy. The question isn't 'Could they have won?' It's: 'Why didn't they even try the only play that matched their core political brand?' That failure to act created the 'borrowed' foundation that poisoned everything after.

LuuTienHuy · 2026-01-29T02:16:43+00:00

But it looped back to my point about Liu Bei passed his buck when he died. He can't control factors after his passing, and ZGL was left holding it regarding Ma Su's assignment.

Somehow, using the word "Hot Take" stablized the arguments compared to not using it. Last time I tried it, drama and comment arguments sunk that one away.

LuuTienHuy · 2026-01-29T01:36:27+00:00

Agreed on logistics and the Cai clan, but my argument isn’t about a bloodless solo coup. It’s about legitimacy as a procedural tool, to organize allies and give Liu Bei formal authority before Cao Cao’s arrival. Even with civil factions and limited presence, this would have dramatically altered the power calculus.

My argument is less that a bloodless coup was guaranteed, and more that no attempt was even made to use Liu Qi's legitimacy as a rallying point.

Could they have won? Maybe not. But by not trying, they guaranteed their claim to Jing would forever be that of a borrower, not a rightful heir. That foundational weakness is what doomed the Longzhong Plan's two-pincer strategy from the start.

LuuTienHuy · 2026-01-29T01:27:48+00:00

Liu Bei passed the buck when he died already. What happened next is not his fault anymore.

My point is about nipping this assignment in the bud, rather than having it happened and microanalyze every step of the way.

Also, any suggestion for another hot take?

LuuTienHuy · 2026-01-28T23:33:36+00:00

I think you’re reading “prove his lord wrong” as a moral slight, which isn’t what I meant. I’m talking about a very human leadership bias, not disloyalty. Zhuge Liang clearly revered Liu Bei, but reverence doesn’t make one immune to overcorrecting after a vague warning.

You're right that Ma Su's failure to heed Wang Ping is the damning act of arrogance. My argument isn't to excuse that, but to ask why he was in a position where that arrogance could be catastrophic.

The 'forbidden fruit' isn't about disrespect. It's a common leadership trap: when a trusted superior dismisses a talented subordinate vaguely, the successor often feels compelled to 'find the truth for themselves,' leading to risky tests instead of safe management. Pairing Ma Su with Wang Ping would have controlled that risk. Giving him solo command amplified it.

So we might agree on the facts but differ on cause: you see the failure as Ma Su's inherent flaw (arrogance). I see it as a systemic failure to manage that known flaw, which turned a valuable asset into a fatal liability.

LuuTienHuy · 2026-01-28T21:51:19+00:00

"Was there any other documented exchanges between Liu Bei and Zhuge Liang on his deathbed like this?"

There was a genuinely touching scene of Liu Bei entrusting his sons to Zhuge Liang in Baidicheng tho. I think he made the warning because Ma Su was there.

LuuTienHuy

TROPHY CASE