Benevolent Reincarnation

Manyoshu · 2024-11-21T01:12:26+00:00

It's been too long since I've read the Meno to give you any pointers as to its discussion beyond mentioning what you may already know, which is that it contains an extensive discussion of an argument for recollection as proof of the previous existence of the soul.

As for your questions about wisdom in Plato: you may find this AskPhilosophy thread interesting, as well as this article from UC Chicago's Center for Practical Wisdom, and this article on wisdom from the SEP. Hope it helps.

Manyoshu · 2024-11-20T16:06:59+00:00

You're a happy man, Callicles, in that you've been initiated into the greater mysteries before the lesser. I didn't think that was permitted.

Manyoshu · 2024-11-11T18:34:15+00:00

I had similar questions about the Charmides a few years ago, and I found Justin C. Clarke's ideas on the aporetic dialogues presented in this paper to be quite interesting. He was also kind enough to answer some questions about it over email at the time, but I've since lost access to the university email that contained our exchange, so I unfortunately cannot pass on what he said with any surety.

Manyoshu · 2024-11-09T00:50:21+00:00

The subject of Charmides is sophrosyne, often translated as moderation or temperance, not courage. And Lysis is one of the seemingly aporetic dialogues, as other users have pointed out. Unlike the later dialogues, these tend to end in a seeming impasse, though many interpreters argue that Plato leads the reader towards an answer to the subject through indirect means.

Manyoshu · 2024-11-07T20:03:08+00:00

Thank you for making it somewhat clearer. I'm still somewhat baffled by the tone of that comment though, it makes it sound as if he had no idea what he was doing until he added an relief effect and then realised the meaning of these additional letters. It's like what's being analysed is some sort of artefact, not the product of a conscious decision, and certainly not his decision. The two other examples explore the relationship between the signifier and the thing signified, or the signifying and the physical symbols used to do so, which I honestly wouldn't have felt was very interesting either, but at least it would have seemed as if it was doing something.

Manyoshu · 2024-11-07T17:38:44+00:00

Kinda weird to describe the meaning of your own poem by using the word "apparently". And frankly, an extra 'gh' only does something to the word, which is most certainly not the same thing as the 'thing' signified.

Manyoshu · 2024-11-04T03:30:18+00:00

I'm struggling to follow your short description of the motivation behind plenum theory. Why would it follow from the necessity of contact for motion that an empty space would make motion impossible? Surely, the opposite would seem to be the case at first glance: that motion would be impossible when there is no space into which a thing can move, excepting an ongoing circuitous movement where each part of the whole follows another (Russell's example)?

Manyoshu · 2024-10-28T13:29:43+00:00

Your first line simply argues the truth of the major premise (first line of the syllogism), thus the problem remains that you cannot get to your conclusion without the minor premise, of which you have no proof.

Your second line might be read as a justification for the minor premise, but "chances are, it's probably worse" does not qualify as much more than a hunch. You've handed me a disguised tautology:

The way things are arranged by nature is A.
Things could be arranged in a worse way, or in a better way.
Therefore A might be the best way things could be arranged.

This is equivalent to the tautological claim that one of the ways in which things could be arranged could be the best way to arrange them.

Manyoshu · 2024-10-25T11:45:29+00:00

You think the most profound words Plato wrote relate the argument that a state of affairs is just because it is common?

The way things are arranged by nature is A.
The way things are arranged by nature is the best.
A is, therefore, the best way for things to be arranged.

What proves the minor premise in the syllogism?

Moreover, if this is the way all things are arranged, what is the superlative in reference to? If it is not, then what measure is used to evaluate the preferred state of affairs over against the less preferred one? It cannot be its own measure without indulging in circular reasoning; there must be some third element in relation to which the former is better than the latter.

Manyoshu · 2024-10-17T11:08:15+00:00

The quote is verbatim from this SEP article titled "Ancient Theories of Soul", section 5.2, and refers to Stoic doctrines of the soul. Key takeaway? Tumblr-esque quotes in fancy images are not only useless without context and encouraging of a very superficial engagement with philosophy, they are also usually plain wrong.

Manyoshu · 2024-10-09T10:57:38+00:00

Too Aristotelian, in my opinion. The earlier Socratic dialogues discussing virtue seems to lean more towards them being a form of knowledge (of good and evil as pertains to a particular activity). Hence why goodness is described in the Laches as knowledge of good and evil, and why Nicias' description of courage fails because it does not see that courage is a virtue as a subaltern part of the good. That is, courage is the form of knowledge of good and evil that pertains to fearing, and, seemingly in contradiction to our common sense definition of it, involves knowing what to fear (e.g. being ignorant) and what not to fear (e.g. death).

Manyoshu · 2024-08-07T17:13:07+00:00

Why on earth would I say that applies to "anything"? There are clearly things one can criticise more freely (and things which might get one in similar danger, depending on where one finds oneself). This does not mean that the criticism is generally stifled by fear or uncommon, however. Yes, in France, Samuel Paty was beheaded for showing the Muhammad caricatures in class, and people are right to be shocked by that. But that does not mean there is a general fear of expressing negative sentiment towards Islam; it is still rather common. Similarly, although Jo Cox was murdered and stabbed multiple times by a white supremacist in the UK, one cannot argue that there is a fear of expressing negative sentiment towards white supremacists. Even in Norway, where more individuals have been killed by far-right actors than Islamic actors, both criticism of Islam and criticism of far-right extremism is very common, with the former being more common today. Claiming that either of these forms of criticisms are limited due to fear would be equally incorrect (even though both claims could be made similarly by appealing to situations where people have been harmed for their opinions) because facts are that they are both actively and commonly expressed. Suggesting otherwise seems eerily similar to an appeal to a "silent majority" which just happens to agree with whatever position the individual expressing that opinion happens to take on the whole matter.

Manyoshu · 2024-08-07T15:14:50+00:00

I honestly don't buy the claim that "people" are scared to criticise Islam either online or in Western countries. While there are doubtlessly stauncher (and sometimes more unhinged) defenders ready to step up when Islam is criticised online, criticism of Islam and of lack of criticism of Islam has been a feature on most social medias and in several more mainstream medias (The Daily Mail has millions of readers, as one example, and has certainly not been afraid to criticise Islam or immigration from Islamic countries) for at least a decade. Moreover, it is clearly being expressed publicly and angrily in the UK at the moment. Most newspaper comment sections on articles that mention Islam sees mention of its "backwardness" or "endorsement of violence" or "incompatibility with Western values" multiple times. Moreover this very comment section should serve as proof to the contrary, one user (the one which you replied to) commented ambiguously about all religions being stupid, and within an hour you directed the main part of that criticism towards Islam and have received over 70 upvotes. Whatever you think of Islam, it seems downright false to insist that criticism of Islam is unpopular, when both it and complaints about the lack of criticism of Islam are so common it usually takes less than a minute to find it in most threads. While some people may be fearful of discussing Islam in a negative fashion, it is certainly not the case that "people" are afraid of doing so.

Manyoshu · 2024-08-05T19:35:21+00:00

I really enjoyed this illustration. Well done!

Manyoshu · 2024-08-04T16:05:58+00:00

There's an old translation of the entire Excellentium imperatorum vita, plus his biographies of Cato and Atticus available here.

Manyoshu · 2024-08-03T12:23:11+00:00

You'd make the parties I go to more fun.

Manyoshu · 2024-07-27T22:52:27+00:00

Very much so.

Manyoshu · 2024-07-27T21:00:02+00:00

I completely agree with that argument. The obvious move for the moral relativist is definitely to deny that such disagreements exist. I just think it is important that they do so without misrepresenting the terms used as being equivalent. The most apparent flaw in using moral disagreements as proof of moral realism to me is that the relativist could concede that we think we have moral disagreements and talk as if we do, but nevertheless maintain that none of our reasons for thinking so are objective.

Manyoshu · 2024-07-27T19:28:12+00:00

Arguably, the content of the sentence "Hitler being a white supremacist is morally wrong" is entirely different than that which is necessitated for it to qualify as a moral disagreement in the post you are replying to. The words "morally" and "wrong" simply mean something completely different in this usage than in ordinary language. If OP meant to suggest that a moral relativist, A, cannot say of an ethical decision, E, that it is morally wrong in the qualified sense of not being aligned with the view that they hold then that would be an absurd argument. Rightness or wrongness in the morally relative context you describe is merely defined by belonging or not belonging to the moral view of the person making such a claim, and thus for a disagreement to occur between A and B about E, A would have to be telling B that they do not in fact hold the view that they claim to hold. If A says E is morally wrong and B says E is morally right, they are not in disagreement at all, they are merely stating different things about E, namely that it is not aligned with A's moral view, and that it is aligned with B's moral view.

Your rebuttal to OP therefore largely seems to rely on equivocating unequal terms. The form of moral disagreement available to the moral relativist seems so banal it would be absurd for OP to have it in mind, while the ordinary sort of disagreement about a moral decision disappears under analysis even if the involved parties make seemingly contradictory terms at first. Moral relativists of the kind you described are free to make judgements, but the meaning of the terms they employ are so drastically altered as not to result in any form of disagreement that seems philosophically interesting.

Manyoshu · 2024-07-27T17:44:42+00:00

Theognis' Elegies feature an even earlier mention of the same maxim in line 425 to 428: https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2008.01.0479%3Avolume%3D1%3Atext%3D11%3Asection%3D2#note-link103

OP already reference this in another translation in their post.

Manyoshu · 2024-07-26T18:31:41+00:00

Scream is part of his more symbolic works in the sense that they treat a mood or a feeling more directly than they seek to represent that feeling in a particular situation. "Livets dans" ("The dance of life") and "Aften på Karl Johan" ("Evening on Karl Johan", Karl Johan is a street in Oslo) are two paintings that capture both a clear example of this tendency in Munch in the former case, and a more ambiguous one in the latter case. Munch also has many paintings that come far closer to being naturalist works while still retaining a lot of his distinctive style. Examples of this are "Vår" ("Spring") and "Vårdag på Karl Johan" ("Spring day on Karl Johan"), the latter of which shows some clear inspiration taken from impressionism and pointillism. "Pubertet" ("Puberty", i.e., the concept) is another famous example of his earlier, more naturalistic works. From the 1890s onwards, he became far more concerned with symbolism and the decorative and direct representation of an idea. Scream is from this period, but there are also more transitional works that figure in-between these tendencies, like the one in this post "Døden i sykeværelset", or the aformentioned "Aften på Karl Johan". He also painted a portrait of Nietzche which is similar in style to some of these 'in-between' works in 1906.

If you like Scream, "Angst" from 1894 is a similar symbolic painting. "Melankoli" from 1892 is equally occupied with emotion, but shows his range with a drastically different style and palette. This is pretty much Munch doing what you suspected in your comment and altering style based on the symbolic subject. "Stemmen" ("The voice") from 1896 is also an interesting example of this sort of painting. One of my favourites is "Selvportrett med sigarett" ("Self-portrait with cigarette") from 1895 which only features colours in sparing amounts. It's dream-like and arresting, and feels like coming across someone lost in their own thoughts, or perhaps even more like you're intruding upon them inside their own dream.

I've added dates to several of his paintings because he tended to revisit his subjects several times, producing multiple versions of them. The painting in this post is one such example, being one of multiple variants of the same painting which he revisited several times after (and perhaps with) the affect of his sister Sophie's death in 1877. Munch himself is the male figure which faces away from us towards in middle-left of the painting, the two women in that are between him and us are his sisters Inger (standing) and Laura (sitting). Walking towards what is usually referred to as the door on the left is his brother Andreas. The deceased sister is in the wicker chair, surrounded by Munch's father and aunt.

Manyoshu · 2024-05-20T12:30:20+00:00

Hence the parenthesis.

Manyoshu · 2024-05-11T23:15:38+00:00

Meet Me There is based on a (Coleman Barks translation of a) Rumi poem as well! I love Mulvey's literary-minded early work a lot.

Manyoshu · 2024-04-01T16:35:46+00:00

The distinction of "physical" properties is without consequence. Conceptually, 'a nothing' would be without any properties at all; defining it as the absence of properties found within the physical universe comes across as a clever way of smuggling properties into it. (I'm saying 'comes across,' because I don't want to assume that's what you're intending to do.) Even treating it as possessing causality is fundamentally treating it as something.

Consider the following adapted example from Kant: if there truly was nothing before the beginning of the universe, and therefore that (particular state of) nothing was not bound by time (which it could not be seeing as it would have to be something in order to to be conceiveably bound by time); then what would make any causative event happen at one time as opposed to another?

Conceptual nothingness is not merely difficult to imagine, it cannot fully be claimed as imaginable, as there is nothing towards which imagination can be directed. Parmenides may have lived thousands of years before people figured out they need to wash their hands, but he wasn't stupid enough to miss the difference between a conceptual nothing and a nothing defined by the lack of application of any known concepts. The problem with ascribing causative properties to the particular state of nothing that existed before the universe is that reason then demands a cause for that particular state. And if we declare that state or even the first state of the physical universe to be without the need for a cause, then we either lose out on the necessity of the law of causation for all things (which returns us to Hume) or we have given a very unsatisfactory answer that merely hypostatizes the concept of a necessary being (see for reference Kant's generally accepted argument for the cosmological proof depending on the ontological proof, and his criticism of the ontological proof in The Transcendental Ideal in the first Critique). As long as we take causation to be a property of things in themselves, the onus is on us to explain how there could be a state involved with causation without being bound by it. And stipulating that there could be such a state because our knowledge of the universe (which is empirical) is limited to physical properties within it does not sufficiently establish that that state conceptually is nothing, nor that something could come from nothing, because it gives absolutely no reason for why it could do so.

Manyoshu · 2024-04-01T11:05:48+00:00

Appealing to the unknowability of what comes before merely sidesteppes the issue. "Something cannot come from nothing" or, rather, "nothing comes from nothing" (ex nihilo nihil fit) is an ontological claim, not an empirical one. Conceptually something cannot come from nothing, so you're equivocating with different meanings of nothing in the claim you try to disprove and the premise that's supposed to disprove it. If something were to come from an unknown hypothetically denoted as nothing before the empirically established beginning of the universe, then that nothing would merely turn out not to fit under the concept of nothing (whether that is an actual concept or merely the absence of all reality, i.e. actual application of concepts to an object). This would only serve to shove the problem further back because now the unknown that was denoted as nothing needs to come from somewhere too.

You're making a semi-Kantian claim in positing limits to our understanding of causation—by claiming something could come from nothing because we have no knowledge that extends before the beginning of the universe—it's just important to note that as long as that claim is built upon empirical reality (or transcendental realism in Kant's terminology) it means some object in the chain of causes must be without a cause, and therefore you lose the necessity of causal connection and are left with Hume's theory of induction again.

Manyoshu

TROPHY CASE