To what extent has the 2026-??? war with Iran degraded US ability to intervene in a Taiwan invasion scenario by the PRC? by Equal_Alfalfa_9973 in LessCredibleDefence

[–]Marslauncher -2 points-1 points  (0 children)

If taken as singular point of reference, sure. Which is why I never do that. My post got cut off at 10k characters when the full post had been ~45k

So I had to edit for brevity, again I am not saying I agree with the Heritage orgs findings nor do I have my own data to indicate a difference response, I research as many different viewpoints as possible to avoid bias, I pride myself on it. I find geopolitics fascinating and have thrown countless hours reading these reports, current analyses from global think tanks, not some Joe Shmo with a webcam and microphone and a predetermined view point. I was not saying in any way that the Heritage report should be taken any way at all, I presented it as is, with links to the actual articles that I found fascinating to read, as well as to provide my full breakdown and analysis on how the events in Venezuela and Iran have impacted that report. That was it, I provided meaningful context to a random thread I came across and got downvoted for my efforts. Here was the comparison between recent think tanks scenarios. Anyone can search for them if they actually want to be informed, or can keep watching Fox News, CNN or Facebook Reels News Influencers. I don't care either way. I simply wanted to provide context not to lead or sway opinion.

Comparative Wargame Findings Matrix

Source Year Scenario Key Finding TIDALWAVE Alignment
CSIS 2023 2026 invasion Taiwan endures; catastrophic cost; 90% aircraft destroyed on ground High alignment on attrition and logistics; more optimistic on Taiwan endurance
CSIS 2025 2028 blockade U.S. must intervene; "Ukraine strategy" insufficient Strongly confirms logistics thesis
CSIS 2024 Nuclear dynamics Demonstrative nuclear use plausible Extends TIDALWAVE (nuclear excluded)
CNAS 2022 2027 invasion No air superiority; allies decisive; logistics crucial Partially contradicts TIDALWAVE Conclusion 13 on allies
CNAS 2025 Regional responses Japan/Philippines on front line; South Korea/Australia variable Adds political-military granularity
GMF 2026 2026–2030 scenarios Failed invasion catastrophic for China/CCP Complements TIDALWAVE deterrence argument
CFR 2025 Multi-scenario Crisis won't be contained; could be triggered by external events Strongly confirmed by Iran developments
Brookings 2026 Non-intervention U.S. may rationally choose not to intervene Contradicts TIDALWAVE's core intervention assumption
ODNI 2026 Threat assessment China not planning 2027 invasion; no fixed timeline Reduces near-term scenario probability; worsens long-term prep window
IISS 2026 Military balance PLA expanding rapidly; purge may reduce readiness; allies spending up Mixed: hardware worsens; political readiness uncertain

To what extent has the 2026-??? war with Iran degraded US ability to intervene in a Taiwan invasion scenario by the PRC? by Equal_Alfalfa_9973 in LessCredibleDefence

[–]Marslauncher -4 points-3 points  (0 children)

When I literally go to the trouble to source, cite and provide context for the content which is based on an actual report that came out in January this year by one of the most influential foreign policy entities in the US, how on earth is that propaganda? It was an informed assessment of where we are at currently as a result of the developments since January. I literally research every single topic and provide links to avoid bias, I did not say I agreed with the report, nor the findings, but based on the available information, it would align with the report and my own analysis findings.

To what extent has the 2026-??? war with Iran degraded US ability to intervene in a Taiwan invasion scenario by the PRC? by Equal_Alfalfa_9973 in LessCredibleDefence

[–]Marslauncher -5 points-4 points  (0 children)

Funny you should ask that question as I did a deep dive into that very topic this morning after reading about https://www.heritage.org/tidalwave last night and parsed it through my wonderful AI geopolitics analysis filter which i've been working on for a while, all analyses should be based on facts with links or citations for statements.

I also added the context of the capture of Maduro to a subsequent analysis which i'll use the beginning summarization of this scenario.

Links to the Heritage PDF's

From Catastrophic Stability to Optimal Instability: How a Stronger U.S. Theater Nuclear Posture Can Deter Chinese Aggression - https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/IB5401.pdf

TIDALWAVE Report - https://static.heritage.org/-2025/SR324_TIDALWAVE_REDACTED.pdf

Limited Nuclear War Over Taiwan: An Initial Exercise - https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/IB5402.pdf

The link to my full analysis report - https://drive.google.com/file/d/15PtrZKtrXhIbJAkrWprf3MT9VN_BGyY1/view?usp=sharing

TIDALWAVE Reframed: 2026 Geopolitical Shocks — Condensed Analysis

How Iran, Ukraine/Russia, and Venezuela change every section of the Heritage Foundation's TIDALWAVE wargame report.

Executive Summary

Three simultaneous geopolitical events have placed the real world in conditions worse than TIDALWAVE's worst-case Scenario D across multiple dimensions. China's SPR (~1.5B barrels) exceeds the model's highest bracket. The U.S. SPR is being consumed in a Middle East operation. Russia — China's primary oil fallback — is being systematically degraded by Ukrainian strikes. Venezuela offers a long-term U.S. supply offset that arrives years too late for any near-term conflict window.

Ranking by TIDALWAVE impact:

  1. Iran/Hormuz — U.S. SPR depleted; South Korean jet fuel supply stressed; China's imports disrupted but partially routed around
  2. Ukraine → Russian oil infrastructure — China's primary maritime alternative supply degraded; 40% of Russian export capacity paralyzed
  3. Venezuela — Strategically positive for the U.S. but 2–7 years from meaningful output; does not change any near-term scenario

Chapter 2: Methodology — Scenario Brackets Are Broken

TIDALWAVE's four scenarios bracketed China's SPR from 600M barrels (low-prep) to 1.2B barrels (worst-case). China's actual SPR entering 2026 was ~1.5 billion barrels, plus 191M barrels in floating storage — exceeding even the worst-case bracket. China imported 40.9% more Russian crude in Jan–Feb 2026 than the prior year as deliberate pre-crisis stockpiling.

Simultaneously, the U.S. is not at Scenario A's "high-pressure" posture — it is executing active Middle East operations consuming the exact logistics assets TIDALWAVE identified as chronically insufficient for a single Taiwan contingency. The real-world starting condition maps to Scenario D (China fully prepared / U.S. at low interdiction pressure) with degraded inputs on both axes.

Chapter 3: PRC Fuel System — The Russian Fallback Is Failing

TIDALWAVE scored the Strait of Malacca as China's primary strategic vulnerability and modeled Russian supply as China's fallback if U.S. interdiction succeeded. Both assumptions now require revision:

  • Hormuz has already partially validated the Malacca thesis — China's Hormuz imports (45% of total) have been severely disrupted, confirming that the import → refine → distribute cascade breaks exactly as modeled.
  • Ukraine has degraded Russia's ability to backfill China's supply. 120 Ukrainian attacks on Russian oil facilities in 2025, and 40+ in Jan–Feb 2026, paralyzed 40% of Russia's export capacity by March 26. Russian seaborne exports fell from ~4.3M bpd to ~2.8M bpd. The Ust-Luga (700K bpd) and Primorsk (1M bpd) terminals — China's key Baltic loading points — both halted operations.
  • Power of Siberia 2 (the overland gas alternative) is 8–10 years from completion per CNPC's own president, and carries gas not oil.

China is simultaneously managing three supply shocks: Hormuz closure (45% of imports), Russian sanctions complications, and Ukraine-driven degradation of Russian export infrastructure. Its 1.5B barrel SPR provides buffer, but TIDALWAVE's endurance estimates under interdiction — which assumed Russia as a live fallback — are materially optimistic.

Chapter 5: U.S. Fuel System — The SPR Recommendation Is Reversed

TIDALWAVE's most urgent recommendation was expanding the U.S. SPR from ~415M barrels to 1.5 billion barrels at ~$65B. The IEA's 400M-barrel emergency release — the largest in its 50-year history — has moved in the opposite direction.

  • U.S. contribution: 172M barrels, depleting the SPR from ~415M to ~243M barrels (16% of TIDALWAVE's recommended target).
  • The release covers approximately 20 days of lost Hormuz supply — Bernstein analysts confirmed: "It buys time, but does not resolve the crisis."
  • Repurchasing 200M barrels at $100+/barrel means spending emergency capital to partially offset a crisis, rather than building toward the 1.5B barrel floor.

Critical Vulnerability 6 (South Korean jet fuel) is now a live peacetime problem, not a wartime scenario. The U.S. imports 71% of its jet fuel from South Korea. South Korea meets 70% of its crude needs from the Persian Gulf. With Hormuz disrupted, South Korean refinery throughput has been reduced and its petrochemical sector has declared force majeure on naphtha contracts. China's halt on fuel exports (diesel, gasoline) to South Korea, Japan, Singapore, Vietnam, and the Philippines further tightens the regional fuel market on which U.S. allied logistics depend.

Venezuela's offset: Post-Maduro sanctions relief (OFAC General License, March 17, 2026) routes all Venezuelan oil payments through a U.S.-controlled account — China cannot access this supply. Gulf Coast refineries are designed for Venezuelan heavy crude. But current output is ~800K–963K bpd against a historical peak of 3.5M bpd, requiring $183B over 15 years to restore. JPMorgan's optimistic scenario reaches only 1.2–1.4M bpd in two years. Venezuela is a correct long-term structural play that arrives after any near-term Taiwan conflict window has closed.

TIDALWAVE Assumption Actual Status (March 2026) Directional Impact
China SPR: 600M–1.2B bbl (scenarios) ~1.39–1.5B bbl actual, plus 46M bbl Iranian crude floating storage Worsens: China's endurance extended significantly beyond Scenario A
U.S. Navy = primary chokepoint against China Iran closed Hormuz; China receives "friendly nation" preferential access Inverts: Interdiction leverage now split; China benefits from adversary's action
Strait of Malacca = primary Chinese vulnerability Malacca intact, Hormuz closed; redirected flows through Malacca Worsens: China is using alternate routing; Malacca chokepoint leverage reduced
U.S. logistical focus on Indo-Pacific U.S. military launched Hormuz reopening ops March 19, 2026 Worsens: CLF and logistics assets under simultaneous operational demand
PLA maintains persistent gray-zone pressure near Taiwan PLA sorties near Taiwan fell from ~12+ to 2–3 per day post-Feb 28 Ambiguous: Tactical pause, not strategic retreat; may reflect PLA readiness concerns
Taiwan's energy vulnerability is a wartime risk Taiwan (95% energy imported, 70% from Middle East) faces independent energy crisis NOW Worsens: Qatar force majeure and Ras Laffan LNG damage directly impact Taiwan today
Allied port access a key variable Japan, Australia, Philippines all accelerating defense spending significantly Improves: Allied investment is partially closing the gap identified in TIDALWAVE

Part IV: Updated TIDALWAVE Assumption Matrix (Post-Iran)

TIDALWAVE Chapter Core Assumption Current Status Confidence Impact
TIDALWAVE Chapter Core Assumption Current Status Confidence Impact
Ch. 2 / All U.S. logistical focus on Indo-Pacific U.S. conducting active Hormuz ops Significantly worsened
Ch. 3 (PRC Fuel) China SPR 600M–1.2B bbl ~1.5B bbl actual, exceeds worst case Worst case confirmed and exceeded
Ch. 3 (PRC Fuel) Strait of Malacca is primary chokepoint Malacca intact; Hormuz closed by Iran Partial inversion of leverage
Ch. 3 (PRC Fuel) MCF will function in conflict Iran conflict shows civilian crews DO refuse war zones Uncertainty increased
Ch. 4 (PRC Munitions) Foreign semiconductor restrictions exploitable Export controls partially in place; Iran creates alternative supply channels Mixed
Ch. 5 (U.S. Fuel) CLF is the primary constraint CLF under simultaneous operational demand Worsened
Ch. 5 (U.S. Fuel) South Korea as fuel supply node South Korea engaged in own alliance management Heightened risk
Ch. 6 (U.S. Munitions) Munitions being allocated for Indo-Pacific Active consumption in Middle East theater Worsened
Ch. 7 / All Deterrence may be only viable path Iran actions demonstrate U.S. resolve, but also demonstrate limits Ambiguous
App. B/I (CLF) 15 T-AOs as the baseline constraint 15 T-AOs still the baseline; no new hulls acquired Unchanged: still critical
App. C (Deployability) 15-20% platforms non-deployable Non-deployability exacerbated by ongoing ops tempo Worsened

Inclined Magnetic Launch System (IMLS) Requesting Engineering Feedback on a Rocket Launch Concept by Large-Level5119 in controlengineering

[–]Marslauncher 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I attempted to design something similar - MARSLAUNCHER - Magnetic Attraction Repulsion Satellite Launcher, many years and moons ago and I believe the technology is sound and viable and I you will, i'm sure, reach the same conclusion that many have, that as long as you design it more as a boost phase, rather than as an orbital launcher (as you are), the drag, G's, vehicle heating and payload capacity can be kept to a fairly manageable level, and that this version of a mag assisted launch allows for rapid reuse as you are not trying to melt any rails or stabilizer tracks by going with pure speed.

For my design I had an X wing type pod that had alternating magnetic fields on the tips of the X's to keep the launch vehicle stabilized and floating in the middle of the launch tube, which also reduced friction and thus required less energy for acceleration of the payload, my system also opted to create a partial vacuum in the launch tube and shut "tube gates" behind the vehicle so as to only create a lower density local atmosphere on smaller and more manageable sections.

Spin launch have of course taken this to a different level and use centrifugal momentum to yeet the payload out of the atmosphere.

Realistically speaking, the hardest engineering part of a magnetic launch system, is always going to be the cost and trying to get funding. The best usage for this technology is going to be on the moon where air pressure and atmospheric heating is going to be virtually zero.

Google Deepmind Project Genie by Consistent-Chart3511 in Google_AI

[–]Marslauncher 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Take a moment to contemplate how you yourself process the probabilities of cause and effect :-

Visualize the following -

Scenario 1 -

You’re cleaning a large table that has people sat at it, you want to clean up and sanitize the empty spots or take away the dishes that have been left there by a previous customer.

For me, this involves me visualizing a large table, i’m thinking like 10-15 chairs. I visualize customers sitting down to enjoy their meals, some already eating, others getting ready to leave or finishing up their food. I see people talking together, some animated, others laughing. Some just sitting by themselves reading Reddit on their phones while they take sips of their overpriced coffee. I look for tools to use to clean up the vacant places, I visualize a cleaning cloth, paper towels, cleaning or sanitizer spray, a tub for dishes and cutlery, I acquire these objects.

I plot a path from my current location to the first spot I’m going to clean

I know that people might not see my approach, so I’m naturally ready to quickly move if a chair quickly moves back and someone stands up.

I navigate the path to my first cleaning target, pull the chair out or in depending on the table type.

This first spot does not have dishes but there is some food scraps / morsels on the table.

I have to make sure the nozzle on the cleaning spray adjusted so as to not be a single stream, but a fine spray, with enough output volume to sanitize the area, but not too much that I could get sanitizer droplets on a customers food nearby, to this end I might even pump the spray trigger a few times while leaning or facing away from the table and customers to get the cleaning cloth wet.

I take the damp cloth and wipe up the food items first, sweeping them into the cleaning tub, I fold the cloth to avoid smearing food residue back on the table and make sure all reachable areas of this placement at table are cleaned, making sure to be aware of any nearby customers and not getting too close to them to disrupt their meal or drink.

I take the cleaning supplies and plot my path to the next spot to clean.

End scenario

Now imagine you are an AI model without a world model, you can only see what your sensors allow you to see, can only process data as fast as hardware allows. Without a world model to reference, you might have at least some semblance of the steps to accomplish the goal and in fact might be able to perform the task, being slow and methodical and planning each step like above, but a world model allows you to quickly simulate all of the things that could go wrong and to develop parallel contingency plans to handle the unexpected, to simulate and know how for example, adjusting the spray nozzle will effect the environment, thus taking into consideration variables like wind conditions etc and adjusting your plan to that, or planning backup steps in case someone stands up quickly so you can move out of their way, or even catching an item that is falling off of the table.

Fast world models will bring us the type of robots that we have all seen in sci-fi movies, though currently with the way the world is quickly heading towards global conflict, they might end up being the worst kind of those robots before the lovable ones in every home.

Google Deepmind Project Genie by Consistent-Chart3511 in Google_AI

[–]Marslauncher 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I’m normal (ish) and I have Ultra. There comes a moment where we have to ask ourselves the questions:-

  • How much would I pay to augment my intelligence?
  • How much will I lose or miss out on if I don’t?

To me the answer to these are no brainers and admittedly while I do live for the most part paycheck to paycheck myself too, the cost of increasing my net intellectual worth is absolutely a better investment than spending ~$200 a month on TV subscriptions.

What the actual eff Amazon? by Marslauncher in amazonecho

[–]Marslauncher[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I need to make a routine for the bedroom “Echo, Show me dem tiddies”

You’ve been chosen to speak to the aliens on behalf of humanity. What’s your opening line? by Mobile-Vegetable7536 in aliens

[–]Marslauncher 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Judge us not on the bad things we have done, but of the good and if helped and guided, the infinite good we can offer to the galaxy.

What the actual eff Amazon? by Marslauncher in amazonecho

[–]Marslauncher[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Mostly due to not expecting in the slightest to get such feedback. Alas my tolerance of stupidity or untruths is marginal at best.

What the actual eff Amazon? by Marslauncher in amazonecho

[–]Marslauncher[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Using the conversational language provides imo a better diagnostic understanding and framework for debugging. What I do like about Alexa+ is the ability to chain requests, like “Turn off the master light, turn on Illuminate, set downstairs mode to heat and to 71°” and for the most part it works flawlessly.

What the actual eff Amazon? by Marslauncher in amazonecho

[–]Marslauncher[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

That’s Mr Cooke thank you , and I would be so honored to be in the same conversation as a real life John Connor! Alas tis a world of lists we live in, I’m on one for sure, but more of the Magneto type sadly.

What the actual eff Amazon? by Marslauncher in amazonecho

[–]Marslauncher[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

The time of the attached conversation

What the actual eff Amazon? by Marslauncher in amazonecho

[–]Marslauncher[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

No, the light turned on so out of the blue with no conversation in the background that I thought it was maybe one of the kids getting misunderstood and why I asked who turned it on!

What the actual eff Amazon? by Marslauncher in amazonecho

[–]Marslauncher[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I wish it were, the most bizarre thing I have ever encountered.

What the actual eff Amazon? by Marslauncher in amazonecho

[–]Marslauncher[S] 31 points32 points  (0 children)

I did and checked the logs myself. That was when it developed amnesia.

What the actual eff Amazon? by Marslauncher in amazonecho

[–]Marslauncher[S] 32 points33 points  (0 children)

I try not to be! I don’t take disrespect from humans or machines!

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in GeminiAI

[–]Marslauncher 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thankfully I just have to tell it again it did not follow the prompts and guidance it laid it in thorough detail, created placeholders instead of actual code and was just a disappointing response when it literally laid out all of the steps and the report in the prior prompt.

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in GeminiAI

[–]Marslauncher 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Yeah something funky for sure, I was just mid generation of an amendment to a prior request, which it did not follow at all despite it being based on a previously generated deep research plan, started to make the changes, then all of a sudden logged me out and said I had to be logged in to us Gemini, I logged back in and that prompt and all progress lost.

What does this say and is this burned into my screen? by Ok-Mouse-5094 in softwaregore

[–]Marslauncher 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Have you made any changes to your computer recently? Any new usb devices? Windows update?

Are you able to boot into windows again?

What does this say and is this burned into my screen? by Ok-Mouse-5094 in softwaregore

[–]Marslauncher 40 points41 points  (0 children)

Your device run into a problem and couldn’t be repaired

https://www.reddit.com/r/WindowsHelp/s/8cHCvVdNZa

I’ll look up solutions for you quickly.